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Introduction 
 
 
I 
 
The degradation of the environment is probably one of the most pressing questions that humanity 
currently faces. As a global phenomenon, it also represents a big challenge for the discipline of 
international law, which in the last decades has also tried to come to terms with the threatening fact that 
nature is being destroyed at an unprecedented speed. Almost every day there is new data on the human 
impact on nature.1 More than any other ecological challenge, global warming has been the top 
contributing factor in squarely placing the state of the environment right at the top of the international 
community’s agenda.2 Climate change, however, is just one of several harmful ecological processes 
affecting the Earth’s ecosystems. Desertification, loss of biodiversity, destruction of maritime life, 
acidity, deforestation, etc. have all negatively affected the state of the global environment. Two scientific 
reports have recently raised alarm that the worldwide impact of human activities has reached the threshold 
at which it threatens to destroy the most fundamental of Earth’s support systems.3 In other words, current 
levels of human-induced environmental degradation endanger the viability of human life on Earth, now 
and in the future. 
The United Nations already as far back as almost half a century ago recognized the existence of a 
global ecological crisis.4 However, in spite of increasing environmental awareness and decades of 
                                                 
1 On the 15th of February 2016, we learnt that by 2050 there will be more plastic than fish in the sea (amounts measured by 
weight). See http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-35562253 (in the article, the BBC news referred to information that 
appeared in a report of the World Economic Forum). See The New Plastic Economy: Rethinking the Future of Plastic, World 
Social Forum (January, 2016) 7. Only five days later, on the 20th of January 2016, it was reported that 2015 had been the 
warmest year ever recorded since 1850 (0.75 ˚C warmer than the average temperature in the period 1961-1990). For more 
details on the study, see http://www.metoffice.gov.uk/news/releases/archive/2016/2015-global-temperature.   
2 The magnitude of the problem is acknowledged in the last report issued by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. 
See Core Writing Team, R.K. Pachauri and L.A. Meyer (eds.), Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report. Contribution of 
Working Groups I, II and III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 
Geneva, 2014) [http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/syr/SYR_AR5_FINAL_full.pdf access 11 November 2015]  
3 See Will Steffen et al., ‘Planetary Boundaries: Guiding Human Development in a Changing Planet’ 347 Science (2015) 736-
746 and Mark Williams et al., ‘The Anthropocene Biosphere’ 2 The Anthropocene Review (2015) 196-219. Allegedly, the 
unprecedented nature of human-induced changes on the Planet has given rise to a new era in the history of the Earth, termed 
the Anthropocene. The term was first used in print in P. J. Crutzen, and E. F. Stoermer, ‘The “Anthropocene”’ 41 Global 
Change Newsletter (2000) 17–18. 
4 See the U.N. Economic & Social Council, Report of the Secretary General on the Problems of the Human Environment, 
U.N. Doc. E/4667 (May 26, 1969).  
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international environmental negotiations and regulations, the destruction of the environment continues 
unabated. The global capitalist economic system that accounts for the unsustainable exploitation of the 
Earth’s resources has proven resilient to change.5 This situation has led some to argue that the experiment 
of global environmental governance, which states have embarked on since the Stockholm Conference, 
has largely failed.6 In fact, the proliferation of international environmental treaties and regulations has 
not had a tangible effect in the state of the global environment. 
The reasons for these failures are both complex and multifaceted—perhaps as complex as the creatures 
that are responsible for them. The role of international law in these failures is beyond the grasp of any 
single study. However, the present work is informed by the conviction that an understanding of 
international law’s historical engagement with nature, and concretely with non-European ecosystems, 
can illuminate—if indirectly—the present, thus, offering hints about how to begin to tackle the question 
of why international law is unable to put an end to the human destruction of natural habitats. It can also 
challenge the positive association of international law with nature—epitomized by international 
environmental law—that presents the former mainly as a vehicle for the protection of the latter.   
International law does protect the Earth's flora and fauna. But, at the same time, it also enables the 
privatization of land and natural resources, the commoditization and commercialization of natural 
species, and the extraction of valuable minerals resources (sometimes at a high environmental cost).7 
Without international norms that facilitate these processes, nature could not be exploited to satisfy the 
demand of global markets and the particular economic interests associated to them. For this reason, my 
study attempts to unearth the historical role that international law has played in the emergence of the very 
socio-economic dynamics, structures, and processes whose devastating effects on nature it now tries, to 
a certain extent, to keep under control.  
 
 
II 
                                                 
5 And this despite the fact that this system is also responsible for widespread human inequality, which according to the last 
Human Development Report hinders the improvement of standards of living for the 2.2 billion people living in poverty. See 
Sustaining Human Progress: Reducing Vulnerabilities and Building Resilience, Human Development Report 2014 (New 
York, United Nations Development Program, 2014) 36-41.  
6 See James Gustav Speth, Red Sky at Morning: America and the Crisis of the Global Environment (New Haven, Yale 
University Press, 2004) 1-2. 
7  See, for instance Daniel A. Omoweh, Shell Pretroleum Development Company, the State and Underdevelopment of 
Nigeria’s Niger Delta: a Study in Environmental Degradation (Trenton, NJ, Africa World Press, 2005) and Steven R. 
Donziger, ‘Rainforest Chernobyl: Litigating Indigenous Rights and the Environment in Latin America’ 11 Human Rights 
Brief (2004) 1-4. 
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International legal historiography has experienced a considerable revival since the publication of Martti 
Koskenniemi’s seminal The Gentle Civilizer8 and Antony Anghie’s groundbreaking Imperialism, 
Sovereignty and the Making of International Law.9 Edited volumes have recently also explored in depth 
the contributions of the most influential figures in the development of international law to the legal 
evolution of particular ideas, institutions, and vocabularies across the globe.10 In addition, several 
individual works have contributed to broadening our understanding of the history of international law.11 
Still, despite this increasing attention to the past of the discipline, the historical engagement of 
international law with nature remains largely undertheorized.12 Nevertheless, the history of international 
law necessarily encompasses a broad range of inquiry. So, where to start this analysis? 
 In the conclusion of his critical work on the history of international law, Anghie speculated about the 
possibility of writing the—colonial—histories of different branches, doctrines, and concepts of 
international law, such as humanitarian law, human rights law, property law, sources doctrine, good 
governance, contracts, etc. According to Anghie, analysis of the discipline’s past could potentially shed 
light on the historical formation of legal techniques and vocabularies of imperial domination that have 
historically led to widespread social inequality, exclusion, and, hence, human suffering.  
Inspired by Anghie’s invitation to investigate the influence of European imperialism on different areas 
of international law, the present study revisits the imperialist history of the discipline in order to analyze 
its environmental dimension. Underlining the importance of imperialism in understanding the history of 
international law, Mickelson has similarly claimed that ‘a historical context’ of ‘international 
environmental law’ that fails to include the colonial period is a truncated one.13 However, the historical 
                                                 
8 Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870-1960 (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2001).  
9 Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2004). 
10 The most representative volume is Bardo Fassbender and Anne Peters (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the History of 
International Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012). See also Alexander Orakhelashvili (ed.), Research Handbook on 
the Theory and History of International Law (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011). 
11 Some of the latest representatives of this burgeoning field are Stephen C. Neff, Justice Among Equals: A History of 
International Law (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2014); Arnulf Becker Lorca, Mestizo International Law: A Global 
Intellectual History 1842-1933 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2014) and Andrew Fitzmaurice, Sovereignty, 
Property and Empire, 1500-2000 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2014). 
12  The only work on the topic that I am aware of is Ileana Porras, ‘Appropriating Nature: Commerce, Property, and the 
Commodification of Nature in the Law of Nations’ 27 Leiden Journal of International Law (2014) 641-660, 
13  See K. Mickelson, ‘South-North, International Law, and International Lawyers’ 11 Yearbook of International Law (2000) 
52-81, 53. 
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emergence of environmental law has been sufficiently historicized,14 and the colonial past does not offer 
many elements for explaining the emergence of environmentalism and its translation into legal jargon in 
the last decades of the twentieth century.  
Still, information about the alarming pace at which humans are destroying the environment suggests 
that something has gone wrong in the way humans had historically built their relationship with nature. 
Due to the importance of European colonialism in shaping the way in which the world was knitted 
together, one feels compelled to look at this long episode of human history in search for answers. In a 
world of rampant environmental degradation and social inequality (it has been predicted that by 2016 
the richest 1 percent of the world population will have the same wealth as the 99 percent poorest15) it 
seems sensible to examine the historical formation and effects of legal rules and theories that facilitated 
the extension of certain economic practices over the Earth as well as the exploitation of its natural wealth. 
While critical scholars from various streams of thought have illuminated how during the course of 
European colonialism non-European peoples were included and excluded from the realm of international 
law and how the latter was deployed in order to control and dominate non-European populations, there 
is still a need for a more in-depth understanding of the impact that international law has historically had 
on non-European ecosystems. Imperialism was largely driven by the intention of acquiring natural 
resources in overseas territories and getting access to profitable trading routes. These activities produced 
dividends of immense value to imperial powers. It is by now clear that international law created a 
vocabulary to justify imperial rule and the economic activities of European colonists, but the effect of 
that vocabulary on nature and its importance as a legitimating tool of Empire has not yet been sufficiently 
explained. Was the appropriation of non-European ecosystems a side effect of the historical 
legitimization of imperialism or, conversely, did it occupy central stage in the development of legal 
arguments, theories, and doctrines of imperial rule? 
This work offers a two-fold perspective to explore the historical relationship between international 
law and nature. It contends that the law of nations and international law were often used to legalize the 
privatization and commodification of natural elements. International law and its old relative offered 
                                                 
14 See, for instance, Tuomas Kuokkanen, International Law and the Environment: Variations on a Theme (The Hague, Kluwer 
Law International, 2002). For a more recent study see Peter H. Sand (ed.), The History and Origin of International 
Environmental Law (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2015). 
15 See https://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/file_attachments/ib-wealth-having-all-wanting-more-190115-
en.pdf  
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‘authoritative vocabularies’ of private economic rights—namely private property rights, the right to 
trade, and the right to occupy—applicable to inter-commonwealth relations.16 
Louis Warren has aptly described private rights (from an environmental perspective) as an ‘expression 
of how natural goods can be conceptually separated from the earth and tied to people’.17 In the context 
of European imperialism, in which the production, extraction, and exchange of natural products created 
enormous dividends, private rights became crucial. They helped separate an ever-increasing amount of 
natural goods from the Earth, tying them to an elite group of international economic operators. 
International law and imperialism contributed to the ‘material appropriation’ of non-European nature 
through the universalization of private economic rights, as well as their geographical dissemination.  
International law provided the legitimizing vocabulary that allowed the seizing of natural elements in 
a concrete, material sense. The right to private property also disentangled the individual from the realm 
of nature. Humans were no longer ruled by nature; it was now nature that was under human power—if 
not in practice, then at least on a conceptual level. The institutional mechanism of individual ownership 
transformed humans from being a mere part of nature (being in nature) to being—if illusorily—the 
rightful owners of the Earth (being over nature). While private property placed nature in the hands of 
particular human beings, the right to trade allowed it to be assigned an economic value, and thus become 
a source of wealth. Once transformed into objects of possession, natural elements could be commodified 
and exchanged for a monetary value. The development of particular legal theories that fostered the 
universalization of private economic rights during the era of European imperialism, normalizing their 
application as a way to relate to nature, helped the global process of appropriating different ecosystems 
and transforming the Earth into a source of economic value.  
This is only half of the story. Private rights could have been introduced in the colonies without the 
need of transferring non-European ecosystems into the hands of the colonists. However, that possibility 
would have betrayed the main motivation of colonialism. If European imperialism was to be 
economically profitable and enrich the metropolis, Europeans ought to have a preponderant access to the 
land and natural resources of the colonies. Then, if that was the ultimate goal, how could Europeans deny 
the populations of Latin America, North America, the East Indies, Australia, etc. the use and exchange 
of the natural elements in the vast territories they inhabited? In fact, non-Europeans had been in control 
                                                 
16 For the historical importance of this vocabulary in understanding the phenomenon of imperialism see Martti Koskenniemi, 
‘Empire and International Law: The Real Spanish Contribution’ 61 University of Toronto Law Journal (2011) 1-36. 
17 Louis Warren, ‘Owing Nature: Towards an Environmental History of Private Property’ in Andrew C. Isenberg (ed.), The 
Oxford Handbook of Environmental History (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014) 398-424, 399.  
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of those resources for millennia before the arrival of European colonists, and even under the alien regime 
of private rights brought by Europeans they could have continued to do so. 
It was obvious that Europeans wanted to appropriate the natural resources of the colonies. Yet, the 
question remained, why would they have a better entitlement to non-European ecosystems than non-
Europeans would? International law helped answer that question by articulating a theoretical justification 
for European appropriation. Scholastics, natural lawyers, and international lawyers either developed or 
incorporated in their legal treatises theories that explained the socio-economic development of different 
peoples by reference to their capacity to exploit their natural surroundings. Non-Europeans’ 
backwardness, primitiveness, and stagnation was largely predicated on their inability to exploit nature 
and to civilize it, that is, to govern and convert wild nature into a sound civil society. In contrast, 
Europeans’ mastery of nature proved their progressive character and superiority. 
The degree of modification of non-European ecosystems became a hallmark that was used to define 
the social development of the peoples that inhabited them. Europeans constantly found an invented 
wilderness in the colonies that, by extension, defined the character of the peoples that inhabited it. At the 
same time, this standard of judgement also worked the other way round. Often, the alleged backwardness 
of non-Europeans became the vivid proof that their natural environments were also in a wild condition. 
And, because for Europeans the utilization of the Earth was the cornerstone of human development and 
a sacred Christian mandate enshrined in the Bible, there was a compelling need to put the underutilized 
resources of non-European territories into production. Importantly, for Europeans it was clear that they 
were best suited for the task. 
By defining the right use and the right user of the world’s natural resources, international law 
contributed to the ‘conceptual appropriation’ of non-European nature. It created a conceptual prism 
through which to look at non-European natural habitats, classifying and assigning a series of legal 
entitlements over them. Importantly, this prism was also inextricably linked to the social condition of 
non-European populations.  
The material and conceptual appropriation of nature functioned together. The latter provided a set of 
ideas that made the former possible. Still, the way in which the legitimization of the material and 
conceptual appropriation of non-European nature took place throughout the colonial era was different in 
different periods. While there are notorious parallels in the manner they operated in different historical 
contexts, there are also important differences that make each period unique. Following a temporal line 
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allows this study to create a narrative that pinpoints relevant continuities while paying attention to context 
and, hence, acknowledging the discontinuities inherent in the complexity of the colonial past.  
Accordingly, this study is divided in five parts. The first part consists on an environmental history of 
Western imperialism. Part I lays the ground for the other four parts, which follow a historical trajectory. 
In turn, each part contains two chapters. Part II of the study looks at the Spanish colonization of Latin 
America. While Chapter 2 is dedicated to the legitimization of the material appropriation of Latin 
American ecosystems, Chapter 3 explains how Latin American nature was appropriated in a conceptual 
sense. Part III of the study is structured along the same lines. In this case, the geographical focus moves 
to North America and the East Indies, and the temporal focus to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 
Chapter 4 dwells on the material appropriation of non-European environments during the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries, and Chapter 5 examines the conceptual appropriation during the same historical 
period. But Chapter 5 also introduces a change into this narrative. It expounds how during the European 
Enlightenment the material and conceptual dimensions of the European appropriation of non-European 
nature fused. Both strands functioned together as part of a socio-economic and environmental theory of 
historical development, known as stadial theory, which informed the occupation of non-European 
territories. 
The fusion of the material and conceptual perspectives in a progressive philosophy of history and 
especially the translation of the latter into a legal theory of occupation was vital for the legitimization of 
the appropriation of non-European territories, particularly during the first half of the nineteenth century. 
Accordingly, Part IV shifts its attention to the phenomenon of settler colonialism. Chapter 6 examines 
the theoretical foundation of this phenomenon, focusing on the evolution of the doctrine of occupation 
and stadial theory from 1900 to 1950. Chapter 7 complements this perspective by looking at how these 
philosophical and legal theories were applied in practice in the settler colony of New South Wales and 
the U.S.  
The last part of the study, Part V, explores the phenomenon of Western imperialism at the turn of the 
twentieth century. Chapter 8 clarifies the changing nature of the doctrine of occupation in its application 
to Africa, a change that posed a considerable challenge to the way in which the appropriation of non-
European nature had been previously justified. Chapter 9 elucidates how this challenge was met through 
legal evolution. The translation of the social implications of this idea into a program of colonial 
administration resulted in the creation of a dual mandate. Chapter 9 explains how one of the two social 
spaces that materialized because of the fulfilment of this mandate provided an ‘economic/environmental’ 
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sphere of action in which the homo economicus could freely continue exploiting nature in order to fulfil 
the cosmopolitan aspiration of engendering progress.  
 
 
III 
 
History has become increasingly relevant to critical analyses of international law. This critical 
perspective, which started in the late 1980s with the work of authors such as David Kennedy and Martti 
Koskenniemi, shocked the identity of the discipline by challenging the very objectivity and neutrality of 
international law.18 Since then, critical scholars have attempted to dispel the illusion that international 
law is a rational and progressive instrument for ordering international life and controlling its most 
irrational tendencies. For these authors, international law is both a reflection of the structural power 
dynamics that characterize the contemporary world, as well as a constitutive element of those very 
dynamics. As an ‘authoritative vocabulary’, it can be used to further different agendas and interests. So, 
a relevant part of the work of critical scholars has consisted in engaging with the question of who uses 
international law, for what purposes, as well as who is excluded from its use.  
A decade after the first wave of critical studies in international law, part of this scholarship turned its 
attention to history.19 This was a logical move because the identity of international law is not only related 
to its contemporary substance and function but also to its role in shaping recent human history. The idea 
we have about what international law ‘is’ is inextricably linked to what we think it has ‘been’. For this 
reason, critical scholars set to debunk a series of myths that have traditionally influenced the perception 
of the development of international law. One such myth presents the discipline as an instrument of 
progress.20 One of the results of this myth has been to conceal the relationship between international law 
                                                 
18 David Kennedy, International Legal Structures (Baden-Baden, Nomos Verlag, 1987); Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology 
to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006).  
19 See supra footnotes 8 and 9. This turn was part of a larger trend whereby scholars increasingly engaged with the history of 
international law. See Matt Craven, ‘Introduction: International Law and its Histories’ in Matthew Craven, Malgosia 
Fitzmaurice, and Maria Vogiatzi (eds.), Time, History and International Law (Leiden, Martinus Nifhoff Publishers, 2007) 1-
26. 
20  See Thomas Skouteris, ‘Engaging History in International Law’ in Jose María Beneyto and David Kennedy, New 
Approaches to International Law: The European and the American Experiences (The Hague, Asser Press, 2012) 99-122, 110 
and 15-16. 
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and Western imperialism, a relationship that is crucial to understanding the emergence of international 
law.21 
 The present work is situated within the contemporary corpus of critical international legal 
historiography and, particularly, Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL). In line with 
the latter, one of the main goals of this work is to show how international law has contributed to shaping 
the relationship between the West and the non-West (be it nations, communities, territories). This is no 
neutral enterprise, as that relationship has been historically characterized by an asymmetry of power. In 
other words, international law has often been—if unintentionally—a vehicle of domination and 
oppression, having a very tangible and detrimental effect on the lives of hundreds of millions of people.  
This study is informed by the conviction that one of the basic elements of the structural power 
asymmetries that currently shape global life is the West’s environmental hegemony over non-Western 
territories. By environmental hegemony, I understand the capacity of the West to appropriate nature—
land and natural resources—in Latin America, Africa, and Asia, and also its capacity to define how nature 
and resources ought—and ought not—to be used. That hegemony is no new phenomenon: it has been 
historically built throughout the colonial period, and international law has been an important factor in its 
genesis. It is then an urgent task—and the goal of my dissertation—to explore how imperialism and 
international law contributed to Western environmental hegemony. 
But why does history matter? Why is the past still relevant? And, importantly, how does the present 
work intend to conduct a critical inquiry into the past? These are relevant questions to answer before I 
move on to explain some of the implications of this study.  
At the end of the nineteenth century, Sigmund Freud revolutionized the understanding of the human 
mind with his study of the unconscious. Freud found out that the extent of the mind that humans can 
consciously access is only part of a larger whole. A big portion of the human mind, he claimed, remained 
unconscious, and thus mostly inaccessible. The realm of the unconscious was formed by repressed ideas, 
emotions, impulses, and desires which, no matter how repressed they were, still had a huge influence on 
people’s lives. This meant that, without understanding the influence of the unmanifested dimension of 
the mind on peoples’ lives, humans were missing fundamental information about their ‘real’ self.  
                                                 
21  Anghie’s work on imperialism has been fundamental to dispel ‘the myth of Westphalia’, the narrative that situates the 
emergence of international law in a European context, thus obviating the imperialist dimension of the discipline. See supra 
footnote 9. See also, Antony Anghie, ‘Towards a Postcolonial International Law’ in Prabhakar Singh and Benoît Mayer (eds.), 
Critical International Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014) 123-142. 
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But Freud’s unconscious had another vital component. A very important part of what is repressed is 
composed of painful memories. According to Freud, the human mind represses traumatic experiences, 
storing them in the hardly accessible unconscious realm. For this reason, a fundamental part of the work 
of psychoanalysis, the science that Freud helped build, was trying to make the repressed memories come 
to the surface of the mind, and hence bringing them to consciousness. Only by bringing the past back 
and understanding it, no matter how painful that past was, could the individual liberate from its influence 
and take full control and responsibility of her/his life. As long as the past remained hidden and 
unconscious, the individual was doomed to repeat the same emotional patterns and roles, moving in 
circles.  
For the same reason that the comprehension of our life’s story is vital to our present, understanding 
the history of how our globalized world came about politically, economically, socially, etc. is vital to 
having a better grasp of contemporary life. This is so because, in the collective realm as in the personal, 
only what is revealed can be made conscious, understood, and transformed. How can we suitably tackle 
the roots of poverty if we are convinced that it is the result of laziness or ignorance, for example, rather 
than the product of a particularly complex set of structural historical processes, a crucial part of which is 
Western imperialism? How can we stop degrading life-support systems if we do not understand why and 
how we started destroying nature in the first place? These are big questions with no easy ready-made 
answers, but, in my opinion, only their inquiry can help us respond to the most urgent challenges that 
humanity faces at present. Without that information, it is likely that the recipes we prescribe as cures are, 
at best, innocuous and, at worst, will aggravate the problem.  
Even if the history of international law is considered a relevant undertaking, there is still a need to 
explain how this study has approached it. As with most critical scholars doing history, the present work 
underlines continuity. In concrete, it traces the historical trajectory of the persistent idea that the colonial 
exploitation of non-European nature was key to human progress, and that the institutions of trade, private 
property, and occupation that the law of nations and international law universalized were the most 
suitable instrument to realize the cosmopolitan mission of exploiting the underutilized natural resources 
of the world.  
History is a vast universe. Only by understanding the incommensurable complexity of a single human 
life can one start to comprehend the infinite intricateness of the past and the multiple challenges of its 
study. Like a kaleidoscope, the past is an almost endless canvass with myriad lenses whose rotation show 
different ‘parallel universes’. Focusing on continuity is a political choice that stems out of a personal 
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sense of urgency derived from the conviction that similar patterns to those described in the book are 
currently negatively affecting nature as well as a large part of humanity. In the closing chapter, I will 
outline a possible line of inquiry to explore these contemporary trends.  
But focusing on continuities and tracing the intellectual history of a particular set of ideas does not 
mean that context and discontinuity are not important. In fact, attention to context is the best way to trace 
the evolution of the underlying assumptions about non-European nature and non-European peoples that 
have informed the development of international law. Besides, recognizing discontinuities can only enrich 
the analysis and make it more nuanced. For example, a very tangible challenge to the kind of continuity 
to which this study is devoted (one that underlies the contribution of Western scholars and intellectuals 
to a series of interventions in non-European territories that resulted in environmental degradation and 
social domination) is the fact that some of the protagonists of this study were also concerned about the 
destruction of nature and the violence of imperialism.  
So they, for example, raised alarm about the environmental consequences of industrialization, or 
underscored the need for conservation in their home countries or the colonies. To a certain extent one 
could pick some of the same authors analyzed in this study and construct a rather different historical 
narrative. In the conclusion, I will engage with this fact and try to assess some of the implications of 
conservation for non-European peoples.  
Despite its focus on nature, this research is not only an environmental study. The double perspective 
that informs it, the distinction between the material appropriation of nature and the conceptual 
appropriation which helps in articulating the thesis, allows also to pay attention simultaneously to two 
general impacts of Western imperialism: one environmental, the other social. On the one hand, through 
the legitimizing role of the law of nations and international law, imperialism contributed to the localized 
degradation of non-European ecosystems. This aspect of the study will be the focus of Part I, which 
consists of one chapter. Devoted to a summary exposition of colonial environmental history, Chapter 1 
will also seek to establish the link, if indirect, between that history and the history of international law. 
 On the other hand, the focus on the material and conceptual appropriation of nature, a part of which 
was the justification of the transfer of natural resources from non-Europeans to colonists, helps elucidate 
the impact that the justification of Western interventions on non-European ecosystems had on non-
European societies. An important social effect of the transfer of resources was that non-Europeans lost 
control over their means of subsistence, affecting their social well-being. And even when non-Europeans 
were allowed to keep what they possessed, and were therefore given a chance to subsist, they lost access 
12 
 
to most of their continents’ natural wealth, a fact that limited the horizon of possibility for their societies 
to attain the good life. 
The fact that the conceptual appropriation of non-European nature was based on non-Europeans’ 
incapacity to master natural habitats had important social ramifications. European commentators 
believed that non-Europeans were still fused with nature. In some cases, non-Europeans were completely 
assimilated to their surroundings and often compared to animals. Most frequently, they were placed in a 
continuum with nature, not completely identified with it, but neither clearly differentiated. While 
European societies were judged to have completely emerged from nature, in the colonies the social realm 
was still deemed to be enmeshed with the natural sphere. Once reality was artificially constructed this 
way, European imperialism naturally became the most suitable instrument to operate that separation. 
The belief that non-Europeans' relationship with nature was obsolete and retrograde, and the violence 
with which imperialism sought to correct that imbalance had a psychological effect on non-European 
peoples too. The inferiority of their social condition predicated on their way of relating to nature did not 
only affect their productive systems and the elements of their cultures related to them. It also penetrated 
deeper into the texture of non-European societies, challenging their very worldviews: the place they 
assigned to nature in their social world and the way they thought peoples and nature ought to relate. 
Besides, the alleged non-European inferiority in mastering nature affected non-Europeans' possibilities 
of resistance, as any attempt to fight Europeans in order to protect their sources of provision could be 
judged as opposition to a progressive use of the same resources. For the Europeans, defending 
‘wilderness’ (as they thought non-Europeans did when they defended their territories and ways of live) 
amounted to opposing the unfolding of history, understood as a continuous trajectory of human 
betterment, progress through the domination of natural laws and natural forces, and the projection of 
human productive power over nature.  
Due to the twofold social and environmental lens of the research, this work is not only an attempt at 
identifying an understudied area of international legal history and at least partly filling this gap, but it 
also (and perhaps more importantly) constitutes an effort to offer a novel prism with which to look at the 
whole phenomenon of Western imperialism and international law’s contribution to it. Nature was at the 
center of legal doctrines and theories of imperial rule. Moreover, its variants as the evangelizing mission 
and the civilizing mission (to which theorists of imperialism constantly refer) were not only operations 
intended to reform non-European peoples. Because people and nature were placed in a continuum, the 
mission to introduce progress in the colonies entailed governing and civilizing both people and nature. 
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The imperialist mission of uplifting backward non-European peoples and taming non-European wild 
natural habitats were two sides of a single colonial project that ran like a thread across time and space 
throughout Western colonial history. They were part of the same effort, oriented to reforming and 
governing the natural-social wilderness outside Europe. And that mission was predicated on what Anghie 
has called the dynamic of difference, the subordination of non-European peoples to Europeans, a 
hierarchy that stemmed partly from an assessment of non-Europeans’ capacity to master nature. 
This is, indeed, an ambitious project, one that temporarily runs from Montesino’s speech in Hispaniola 
in 1511 to the Stockholm Conference in 1972, and geographically covers from America to the East Indies, 
Oceania, and Africa. Despite ambition of scope, the present work does not claim to have exhausted the 
subject matter. On the contrary, by having revealed and start mapping a large conceptual area that had 
remained largely unexplored, it hopes only to have opened a new window into the past and to offer a 
novel prism to look at it.  
  
 
IV 
 
One of the challenges of writing international legal history, and any academic work for that matter, is 
overcoming the biases of the vocabulary at our disposal. The language that we use to reflect on legal 
history has been shaped by power structures related to imperialism, gender, race, class, etc. that have 
been more easily challenged in practice than in linguistics.22 The use of the plural form of the masculine 
noun ‘men’ to designate both men and women is one of the clearest reminders that the power structures 
of the past are still part of daily communication. And even if it seems just a symbolic gesture in redressing 
this gender imbalance, I have decided to substitute ‘men’ as an indicator of both genders for more 
inclusive terms such as ‘humans’ or ‘human beings’. This decision could of course be presented as a 
cosmetic choice with no influence on and engagement with the social world in which power dynamics 
are constructed and gender dynamics operate. This is a fair criticism from a practical perspective, but the 
act of naming differently is a political act nonetheless, one that I feel is still important to maintain. 
There is also the issue of how to refer to non-European territories, political entities, cities, etc. Many 
of their pre-colonial names have been substituted by denominations in European languages, be it Spanish, 
                                                 
22  The linguistic legacy of imperialism in the African context has been famously raised in Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o, Decolonizing 
the Mind: The Politics of Language in African Literature (Nairobi, East African Educational Publishers, 1986). 
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English, French, Dutch, etc. I have tried, as much as possible, to retain pre-colonial denominations. 
Similarly, finding the right term to refer to the societies that came under European rule has proven 
difficult. Part of this difficulty lies in the fact that there were thousands of political formations in the 
continents that the Europeans colonized. Placing societies as distinct as the Mexica, the Kayapo, the 
Zulus, the Comanche, or the San under a generic name does not do justice to any of them. In addition, 
there were often no pre-colonial generic names to designate the continents or groups of people that 
Europeans conquered. Each society had its own terms, so there were a variety of denominations.  
Despite all these challenges, an analysis that explores continental or even global processes faces the 
necessity of using a general vocabulary, at least to a certain extent. But when naming the non-European 
societies under colonial rule, one confronts the colonial legacy present in the terms generally used to 
refer to them. I have avoided using words such as ‘Indians’, ‘Amerindians’, ‘aborigines’, ‘natives’, or 
‘indigenous’ because of their colonial ring and pejorative connotations. They convey an image of non-
European peoples as backward, weak, dependent and inferior.  
Referring to the colonizers as Europeans, despite the fact that this denomination is somewhat 
anachronistic, I have decided to refer to the colonized as ‘Latin Americans’, ‘North Americans’, 
‘American peoples’, ‘Australians’, ‘Australian peoples’, etc. In doing so, my aim is to place both 
colonizer and colonized in a conceptual plane of linguistic equality. I am aware that these terms are 
indeed idiosyncratic and even problematic in one way or another. But, perhaps, their novelty and 
strangeness can help break—if only shortly—the powerful association of non-European peoples with 
primitiveness and backwardness that pervades Western imagination and Western vocabulary.  
The terms I have chosen have their own conundrums, and remain ultimately Eurocentric. Terms like 
‘Latin Americans’ or ‘Australians’ are today used to refer to the inhabitants of Latin America and 
Australia, indeed mixed societies. Referring to the pre-colonial population that the Spanish encountered 
in America as Latin American is anachronistic, as the term Latin America started to be used only from 
the mid-nineteenth century. Most of these terms come also from continents that were named using 
European denominations. As is famously known, the name America was given in honor of a single 
individual: Amerigo Vespucci, an Italian explorer who first identified America as an autonomous 
landmass.  
 To differentiate between the colonizers and the colonized I have used the terms Europeans and non-
Europeans, substituting the former for the more comprehensive Westerners once the U.S. started to 
colonize the territories west of the Appalachian Mountains. I have also resisted, as much as possible, use 
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of the expression Third World. Even though many scholars from Africa, Asia, and Latin America accept 
the term, to me "third" comes always after, and is always less, than "first" and "second".23 Once the term 
has lost the specificity that it acquired in the sixties, seventies, and eighties of the last century, and 
considering the powerful images of backwardness, social instability, despair, and violence also 
(unfortunately) associated with the term, I again prefer using alternative terms such as non-Western 
nations or, instead, naming the continents where the Third World countries are situated.  
A final important point about the dichotomy First/Third World is that, as with all generalizations, it 
cannot completely account for the complexity of the reality it attempts to capture. One aspect of that 
complexity is the fact that there is a First World in the Third World and a Third World in the First. The 
former is composed of powerful and influential political and economic elites who have, since 
independence, generally aligned to Western and, nowadays, Chinese interests. The latter is formed by all 
those who live under the poverty line in the West, a part of which is comprised by destitute and 
marginalized immigrants and, most recently, by refugees from the Middle East escaping war. 
Another vital term for the purpose of this study is nature. The definition of nature and the 
conceptualization of the relationship between humans and nature are far beyond the scope of the present 
work. The debate about the boundaries between the social and the natural is one of the aspects of this 
wide-ranging topic. This debate is manifested in recent discussions about the meaning of wilderness, 
another relevant term for this study.24 Importantly, when I use nature in this study, I am not referring to 
a romanticized idea of a pristine realm untouched by humans. Nature is continuously undergoing change, 
even without human intervention. Every living creature and life process leaves an imprint that somehow 
modifies the web of life of which we are part. Ice ages and the extinction of the dinosaurs prove that 
nature changes, even dramatically, without human intervention. This is why I have avoided using nature 
and wilderness as synonyms. So, when I use the latter word in the following chapters, I am just conveying 
the way in which the colonists perceived and characterized non-European ecosystems. 
Nature also has myriad meanings. In this work, the term nature refers to the phenomena of the physical 
world taken together, excluding humans and human creation. In order to avoid repetition by using a term 
that appears on almost every page of this work, I have decided to use interchangeably words such as 
                                                 
23  My six year old son will never want to be third. For him, the best is always the first and the second best is the second. This 
is an intuitive association that most of us consciously or unconsciously share. 
24  Wilderness has been the focus of recent scholarly attention. See J. Baird Callicott and Michael P. Nelson and (eds.),Great 
New Wilderness Debate (Athens, University of Georgia Press, 1998) and Michael P. Nelson and J. Baird Callicott (eds.), The 
Wilderness Debate Rages On: Continuing the Great New Wilderness Debate (Athens, University of Georgia Press 2008). 
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nature, environment, the physical world, ecosystems, natural habitats, physical surroundings, non-human 
nature, etc. Many of these names have started to be used just recently. So, these words are anachronistic, 
in the sense that they were not part of the linguistic repertoire of the historical actors that are part of this 
study. It is thus important to bear in mind that I am not putting them in the mouths of the protagonists of 
this story, but that it is the author of this work who is using them.  
  
 
V 
 
This study is a historical narrative, and as such has its own biases and, certainly, limitations. The 
historical narrative that forms this study is the result of knitting together certain facts, ideas, and 
bibliographies, while at the same time excluding others. In choosing to analyze the works of Western 
intellectuals, the focus of this study remains Eurocentric. Moreover, I have revisited the canonical authors 
of the history of international law, those traditionally regarded as fathers of the discipline, such as Vitoria, 
Las Casas, Grotius, Pufendorf, Wolff, Vattel, Wheaton, Westlake, and Oppenheim, a list that most 
students of international legal history could recite by heart. I have also included other important 
intellectuals, who did not write specifically about law but whose role in theorizing Western colonialism 
and international affairs is now generally acknowledged: Acosta, Locke, Lafitau, James Mill, John Stuart 
Mill, and Lord Lugard. Although writing about them puts emphasis on Western intellectuals25 and their 
ideas, and on Western institutions and power, the purpose is to show their historical contingency rather 
than reify them.  
A critical engagement with colonial history faces other challenges. Placing emphasis on the deleterious 
effect of Western power upon non-European populations runs the risk of unintendedly presenting the 
latter as mere victims, instead of agents of their own history. This tends to perpetuate an image of non-
European peoples as weak historical actors while reinforcing the very power structures that critical 
thinking is committed to expose and contest. One way of avoiding this shortcoming is to underscore the 
                                                 
25  And hence it detracts attention from a wider history in which ‘indigenous’ and Mestizo intellectuals like Titu Cusi 
Yupanqui, Guaman Poma or the Alva Ixtlilxochitl brothers played a relevant role. In this sense see Titu Cusi Yupanqui, 
History of How the Spaniards Arrived in Peru, translated, with introduction, by Catherine Julien (Indianapolis, Hackett 
Publishing Company, 2006) and Gabriela Ramos and Yanna Yannakakis (eds.), Indigenous Intellectuals: Knowledge, Power, 
and Colonial Culture in Mexico and the Andes (Durkham, Duke University Press, 2014). I am indebted to Arnulf Becker 
Lorca for having revealed to me the existence and importance of these non-European authors and the body of literature on 
them. 
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complexity, sophistication, and accomplishments of non-European societies, something that Chapter 1 
attempts to do to a certain extent. Before Europeans could impose their rule over most of Africa, America, 
Asia, and Oceania, these continents housed rather refined societies, great urban areas, erudite centers of 
knowledge, powerful empires that displayed wealth and military prowess. Even at the height of Western 
imperialism, the emergence of powerful non-European empires such as the Comanche and the Zulu are 
testament to the capacity of non-European populations.  
Another way of placing non-Europeans on the central stage of world history is to bring to light their 
resistance to Western imperialism. There is now a large body of scholarship focused on non-European 
strategies of resistance.26 In the light of these recent studies Western imperialism becomes a less one-
sided process. Non-Europeans adopted a variety of ways to protect their societies and lifestyles from 
European encroachment. Accommodation, imitation, mediation, adaptation, and open resistance were 
used alternatively and even simultaneously by different societies. Importantly, resistance was not only a 
political, cultural, or military phenomenon. Western legal constructs were also used to resist the power 
of Western legal imperialism.27  
The result of acknowledging the power of pre-colonial societies, the fact that the West has only 
recently been materially superior to countries such as China (a fact that seems to be again changing)28, 
and non-European resistance is that it creates a much patchier historical picture, one that questions the 
necessity that is often associated with the phenomenon of Western imperialism. In this light, imperialism 
becomes a less robust and vigorous phenomenon and one more open to contestation. Showing that 
imperialism can be successfully fought and even, at times, defeated opens a space of possibility and 
encourages contemporary resistance against neo-colonialism and all forms of direct or indirect human 
oppression. This, of course, is not incompatible with acknowledging the traumatic effects of colonialism 
and neo-colonialism. 
                                                 
26  See, for instance, A. Dirk Moses (ed.), Empire, Colony, Genocide: Conquest, Occupation and Subaltern Resistance in 
World History (New York, Berghahn Books, 2008) and Gord Hill, 500 Years of Indigenous Resistance (Oakland, PM Press, 
2009). Together with this general literature there is a large number of works that explore resistance in specific locations such 
as, for example, Rolena Adorno, Guaman Empoma: Writing and Resistance in Colonial Peru (Austin, University of Texas 
Press, 1986); Susan Schroeder (ed.), Native Resistance and the Pax Colonial in New Spain (Lincoln, University of Nevada 
Press, 1998); Barbara Rush, Imperialism, Race and Resistance: Africa and Britain 1919-1945 (London, Routledge, 1999) and 
Peter H. Russell, Recognizing Aboriginal Title: The Mabo Case and Indigenous Resistance to English-Settler Colonialism 
(Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2005). 
27  See Saliha Belmessous, Native Claims: Indigenous Law Against Empire 1500-1920 (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2012). 
28  For an insightful study of this question see Kenneth Pomeranz, The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of 
the Modern World Economy (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2000). 
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To end with, this study is approached with the humility of acknowledging that there is neither an easy 
way to access the past nor the minds of the protagonist of this story. All of them were complex 
individuals, acting in multifaceted historical scenarios, whose works are thus open to different 
interpretations. For this reason, it is worthwhile stating from the outset that the objective of examining 
their theories is not to pass judgment upon them, but rather to expose the limitations and harmful effects 
of the specific ideologies that structured the way they looked at the world. Perhaps when the lenses that 
framed their worldview are revealed we can perceive in our own lenses certain familiar elements that 
link to theirs. Hopefully this will allow us to start questioning the result of wearing various ideological 
lenses and even help us in taking them off as much as is possible. 
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Part I 
 
LAYING THE GROUNDWORK: IMPERIALISM AND THE ENVIRONMENT 
 
 
1 Western Imperialism, Non-European Ecosystems, and Environmental 
History (1492-1922)
 
 
 
 
 
Western imperialism has historically had an indelible impact on non-European ecosystems. By taking 
and trading plants and animal species from one continent to another, European colonization 
revolutionized the distribution of species around the world, homogenizing the biological composition of 
the Earth.1 It also transformed environmental relationships across time and space by building economic 
relations that fed on natural resources from European colonies. The environmental history of Western 
imperialism, encompassing more than four centuries and spreading geographically through several 
continents, is a complex one. For this reason, a detailed analysis is beyond the scope of the present 
chapter. However, in order to substantiate the thesis that international law has historically contributed to 
legitimizing the exploitation of non-European nature, it is important, at least, to offer an overview of the 
environmental impact of Western imperialism. 
Whereas it is possible to establish a rather clear link between the economic ethos of imperialism and 
the legitimizing role of international law, it is more difficult to demonstrate that this legitimization, and 
the intra- and transcontinental economic relations that were webbed together as a result, led to widespread 
environmental degradation. This is so because for centuries the general impact of Western imperialism 
on non-European natural habitats was paradoxical to say the least. Against what would seem 
commonsensical, the aggregate effect of European world expansion was the blossoming of non-European 
                                                 
1  Alfred W. Crosby Jr., The Columbian Exchange: Biological and Cultural Consequences of 1942 (Westport, Duke 
University Press, 2003).  
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ecosystems rather than their overall deterioration. One would think that as European colonists and their 
economic institutions and practices advanced in the colonies, nature shrank. But the truth is actually the 
contrary—nature expanded as European colonialism progressed. 
The main reason for why environmental history betrays our presupposition is a simple one. As 
Westerners attempted to conquer the world, imperialism brought about a population collapse of immense 
proportions. Non-European populations in Latin America, North America, Oceania, and Africa 
disappeared by the millions. Most of them perished because of the effect that European germs had over 
a population weakened by the traumatic shock of the violence that accompanied Western inroads into 
their territories. Many other millions lost their lives while their bodies were being hunted and traded 
across the Atlantic Ocean as free labor.  
A century after the arrival of the first colonists, the pre-colonial populations of Latin America, North 
America, and Australia were just a fraction of what they used to be. The slave trade deprived Africa of 
millions of men, affecting reproduction patterns, production systems, and social structures. All around 
the world great states collapsed and whole societies vanished forever. In many cases, the productive 
activities that were needed to sustain empires and feed millions slowly came to a halt. Because of 
depopulation, the pre-colonial impact of millions of people upon nature radically diminished once 
Europeans appeared on the scene. Survivors and newcomers kept tilling, trading, mining, and altering 
ecosystems, but their numbers were a fraction of the pre-colonial populations. As a result, non-European 
ecosystems had time to bounce back in myriad places that had been under intense human use for 
centuries.  
 The link between international law’s legitimization of an exploitative approach to non-European 
ecosystems and widespread environmental degradation is more elusive, then, than it would seem at first 
glance. In fact, the contrary is closer to the truth: by legitimizing Western imperialism, international law 
unintentionally contributed to the expansion of non-European natural frontiers for centuries. That said, 
international law cannot wash its hands of the current degradation that affects non-European natural 
habitats. This is so because, on the one hand, international legal theories helped in consolidating an 
economic approach to the colonies that from the very beginning paved the way for the localized 
destruction of non-European ecosystems. The natural resources of whole continents were subordinated 
to the needs of a few European nations. And there, where Westerners set their eyes on exploiting a 
particular natural niche, the destruction of nature followed unremittingly.  
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On the other hand, in time, the cumulative effect of the particular exploitative approach that 
international law helped consolidate ended up producing widespread ecological damage. That took place 
several centuries after Columbus landed in Hispaniola. By then, important transformations had taken 
place in all ambits of life. Population in the colonies had grown exponentially and, with the invention of 
new machines and tools, so had the transformative power of humans over nature. By the time of the 
Industrial Revolution, the environmental impact of Western imperialism had grown exponentially 
compared to Columbus time, but the exploitative approach to non-European ecosystems was present 
from the very beginning. From day one, colonists were extracting and exploiting natural habitats to their 
economic advantage. More importantly for this analysis, that exploitative approach informed the 
direction of international legal theories, which at the same time reinforced the ecological dynamics that 
came about as a result of Western imperialism.  
The following pages are an attempt of giving a snap shot of different moments of that complex history. 
This chapter can be read in two different ways. On the one hand, one could read it from start to end to 
get an overview of the environmental history of Western imperialism, before proceeding to the parts of 
the manuscript dedicated to analyze the legal dimension of that story. At the same time, Parts 1, 2, 4 and 
5 correspond to Parts II, III, IV and V of the present study. So, the reader could also familiarize with the 
environmental history of particular geographical locations and particular historical periods before 
immersing in the international legal historiography. 
 
1. The Conquest of Latin America and Non-European Ecosystems  
A broken myth: Latin American nature before Spanish conquest 
The idea of paradise has for centuries captured the imagination of those who tried to describe Latin 
American nature before the arrival of Columbus. This image is a myth with old roots. Already at the 
moment of Spanish arrival to Latin America, Columbus himself was fascinated by what he saw as a 
pristine wilderness, beautiful, green, and fertile, full of birds and naked people.2 It is still possible to find 
in recent literature the persistent idea that Latin Americans lived in harmony with nature without altering 
it.3 Accordingly, if Latin Americans were nature’s protectors they could not have had an adverse impact 
                                                 
2 William M. Denevan, ‘The Pristine Myth: The Landscape of the Americas in 1492’ 82 Annals of the Association of 
American Geographers (1992) 369-385,369. 
3  See, for instance, Kirkpatrick Sale, The Conquest of Paradise: Christopher Columbus and the Columbian Legacy (New 
York, Knopf, 1990). See also Stanwyn G. Shetler, 'Three Faces of Eden’ in Herman J. Viola and Carolyn Margolis (eds.), 
Seeds of Change: A Quincentennial Commemoration (Washington, Smithsonian Institution Press, 1991).  
22 
 
on the ecosystems of the western hemisphere.4 The ‘ecological Indian’ and paradisiacal Latin America 
were two variants of the same ideological construction. In reality, and contrary to what this myth 
suggests, Latin American nature was thoroughly modified before the arrival of Spanish and other 
European colonists.  
The same could be said about the territories of all the other continents that Europeans tried to bring 
under their control. The idea that pre-colonial non-European populations, by virtue of their very nature, 
had reached an absolute ecological balance is mere romanticization.5 Furthermore, it is very difficult to 
generalize, as pre-colonial societies varied enormously: whereas the environmental activities of some 
drove their own societies almost to the verge of extinction, others attained sustainability. The approach 
to ecosystems of large empires was not the same as that of smaller societies inhabiting the rainforest. But 
all them, to a greater or lesser degree, modified their surroundings and left traces of their activities. It 
would be impossible to provide a detailed account of the environmental impact of pre-colonial societies 
all over the world. Therefore, I have decided to focus mostly, but not exclusively, on Latin America. The 
environmental history of pre-colonial6 Latin America can help the reader imagine what was going on in 
other continents at the time.  
For centuries, the environment of Latin America received the imprints of successive generations that 
inhabited the same lands. Each of these communities transformed their environment differently, but they 
all left an enduring mark. Population dynamics is one of the factors that explains the impact of Latin 
American peoples on their surroundings. In 1492 the continent was home to millions. Estimates today 
vary from 30 to 70 million, with some studies that suggest even larger figures.7 Mesoamerica, for 
                                                 
4  The idea of the ‘ecological Indian’ has experienced a recent revival. The association of the peoples of Latin America and 
indigenous groups at large with the conservation of nature has been used as part of a counter-hegemonic discourse that blamed 
modernity and the West. Arguably, the myth of Latin America’s wilderness has also had the contrary political effect: it 
legitimised economic profitability and political domination by privileging the diffusion of the West into the vacuum of the 
non-West. See Andrew Sluyter, ‘Colonialism and Landscape in the Americas: Material/Conceptual Transformations and 
Continuing Consequences’ 91 Annals of the Association of American Geographers (2001) 410-428, 413 
5  In this sense, Williams affirms that: ‘Any picture of an ecological, precolonial, precapitalist golden age of common 
property rights, sustainable use, and happy peasantry is overdrawn, hopelessly romantic, and barely plausible.’ See Michael 
Williams, Deforesting the Earth: From Prehistory to Global Crisis, an Abridgement (Chicago, The University of Chicago 
Press, 2006) 320. An informative discussion of the implications of romanticizing Latin Americans can be found in David 
Richar Lewis, ‘American Indian Environmental Relations’ in Douglas Cazaux Sackman (ed.), A Companion to American 
Environmental History (West Sussex, Wiley-Balckwell, 2010) 191-213. 
6  When I use the term pre-colonial I am referring to what predated the phenomenon of Western colonialism. There were so 
many empires and successive layers of colonization, not only in Latin America but around the world, that would make it hard 
to find populations that had never been conquered or forcedly mixed with others.  
7  Schewering, for example, suggested more than 80 million. See Karl H. Schewering, ‘The Indian Populations of Latin 
America’ in Jan Knippers Black (ed.), Latin America, its Problems and its Promise: A Multidisciplinary Introduction 
(Boulder, Westview Press, 2005) 39-53. Dobyns proposed a number between 90 and 112 million in Henry F. Dobyns, 
‘Estimating Aboriginal American Population: An Appraisal of Techniques with a New Hemispheric Estimate’ 7 Current 
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instance, was inhabited by a range of 8 to 25 million before the arrival of the Spaniards. Even the 
supposed wilderness of the Amazon Basin was home to as many as 5 million people.8 
But mere population numbers are not enough to explain the environmental dynamics of pre-colonial 
Latin America. The economic activities of those peoples are as important as sheer numbers. The presence 
of vast empires in Latin America before the arrival of the Spaniards explains why nature was thoroughly 
utilized. In his palace of Nezahualcóyotl, the King of the Mexica Empire Moctezuma offered 1,000 meals 
a day to his family and acolytes.9 Among its many wonders, the palace included a zoo and 40 temples.10 
Equally remarkable was the grand market of Tlatelolco, visited daily by sixty thousand people.11 
According to Miller, in Tlatelolco visitors could buy myriad products such as ‘lumber, bricks, paint, 
tools, firewood, pottery, cookware, utensils, home furnishings, bedding, mattresses, jewelry … thread of 
many colors, cakes, and candies of honey and of chocolate. One could also sit down to a meal in an open-
air restaurant or get a haircut’.12 The palace and the market were just some of the marvels that could be 
found in Tenochtitlan, the capital of the Mexica Empire and one of the biggest urban centers in the world 
at the time. Considering the amount of resources necessary to keep the Empire running, one can start to 
imagine the environmental impact of the various polities that dotted the continent.  
The main productive activities in Latin America were farming, hunting, and gathering. In Mexico, 
Central Latin America, the Caribbean, the Andes, the Coastal Pacific, and portions of the Amazon basin, 
agriculture was widespread. The environmental impact of these practices was, in some areas, larger than 
in contemporary Europe.13 Extensive tracts of forests were cut in order to open space for cultivation. 
Clearing forests for agriculture was a very old process. In the lowlands of Mesoamerica, there is 
evidences of Olmec land alteration in the region surrounding the Laguna Pompal that goes back 4.830 
years before our era.14 In addition to the demands of agriculture, Latin Americans expanded pockets of 
natural grasslands by using fire to clear forests in order to attract animals that could be easily hunted.15 
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14  Michelle Goman and Roger Byrne, ‘A 5,000-Year Record of Agriculture and Tropical Forest Clearance in the Tuxtlas, 
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Different cultures such as the Maya, Inca, pre-Inca groups, and the Amazonians practiced raised field 
agriculture.16 Hundreds of thousands of raised field platforms extended over the vast plains of the high 
Andean plateau in the northern Lake Titicaca basin.17 The sophistication of engineering techniques of 
water management that these fields evidenced is truly monumental.18 Of all the Latin American societies, 
it was the Mexica who developed the most advanced system of raised agriculture.19 The infrastructure 
that accompanied this type of agriculture included terraces, irrigation works, drainage ditches, 
causeways, canals, dams, reservoirs, and diversion walls, among others.20 Complex systems of canals in 
the northern coast of Peru and in the Salt River Valley in Arizona irrigated more land in ancient Latin 
America than is currently used for cultivation in those same regions.21 In the Valley of Mexico, careful 
composting and the addition of manure to the land improved raised agriculture, making the land 
extremely fertile.22 The productivity of these areas—enhanced by mild winters—was eight times superior 
to that of Europe during the same period.23 Moreover, whereas Chinese agriculture—one of the most 
advanced in the world at the time—supported fewer than 3 people per hectare in the fifteenth century, 
Mexica's raised fields could support 15.24 These humanized landscapes that occupied thousands of 
hectares were anything but wilderness. 
The Amazon provides another example of the kind of impact that Latin Americans had on their physical 
surroundings. There is increasing evidence that the tropical forests in the Amazon Basin, as elsewhere, 
are partly anthropogenic in form and composition.25 Even in the Amazon, the natural area that humans 
had more persistently associated with the idea of wilderness, it is now evident that different communities 
engaged in a variety of types of agroforestry, managing and manipulating the rainforests for food and 
other resources.26 They introduced several tree species that bore fruit in different seasons of the year. 
These practices enhanced the capacity of the forest to cover the demands of their diet. It has been claimed 
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that at least 11.8 percent of the non-flooded Amazon forest currently consists of species that have been 
directly or indirectly introduced by humans.27 Researchers have also found that, together with the thin 
mineral soils of the forest, there are deposits of deep, black, fertile earth called black soil or terra preta 
(in its Portuguese denomination).28 This suggests that two thousand years ago the Amazonian population 
intentionally increased the fertility of the land by recycling the nutrients of their culture back into the soil 
through the deposit of ashes, rotting vegetation, animal remains, probably human stool, and charcoal.29 
Scientists are now studying the composition of this terra preta with the aim of applying it to Africa in 
order to improve poor soils.30 
What is evident from all this data is that by 1492 the effect of Latin American peoples on the landscape 
of the two continents was noticeable to say the least.31 They modified the vegetation and animal 
composition of the continent. They altered the soil, improving it at times, but also causing erosion.32 
Anything resembling a paradise was an illusion. The inhabitants of Latin America adapted nature for 
their benefit prior to the arrival of Columbus and, significantly, had done so for millennia. So was their 
environmental impact positive or negative? Did they follow sustainable practices when using nature to 
satisfy their needs?  
It is difficult to give a definitive answer to the question of sustainability, because the interaction with 
the environment was as diverse as the Latin American peoples themselves.33 Their impact was sometimes 
negative. For instance, there is evidence of soil erosion and human induced drought in Mesoamerica 
before conquest. However, there is no agreement about the degree and significance of these phenomena 
in comparison to the colonial use of those same lands. Some studies concluded that the level of erosion 
in pre-colonial times is comparable with the later period of Spanish colonization, and that it was almost 
catastrophic at times of dense population.34 Other studies contradict these findings, suggesting that 
whereas severe erosion did occur and was associated with the settlement of small populations, it 
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decreased at times of higher population density after settlement.35 Accordingly, the latter studies 
conclude that the inhabitants of Mesoamerica adapted their practices in a sustainable way.36 
The worldviews of Latin American peoples and their understanding of the human-nature relationship 
were one of the factors that most strongly influenced the way Latin Americans interacted with the 
ecosystems of the continent. Again, the heterogeneity of Latin American societies gave rise to a variety 
of views regarding nature, its use, and humans' place vis-à-vis non-human nature. But even though there 
were important differences between non-sedentary, semi-sedentary, and sedentary peoples, and between 
groups within them,37 there were still general conceptions. For instance, most societies worshiped several 
gods and respected spirits related to nature.38 Aztec, Mayan, and Incan societies worshipped natural 
deities such as the sun, the moon, the rain, maize, mother-earth, etc.39 Despite reverence to natural 
elements, Latin Americans, not unlike Europeans, regarded nature mainly as a source of provision and 
consumption.40 The difference between the former and the latter is that Latin Americans did not draw a 
clear line between the human and natural realms; the natural and social life spheres were intermingled.41 
Living things were imbued with spirit and, hence, they were not just natural matter that could be treated 
in any way one wished. They were also supernatural, which limited Latin American peoples’ willingness 
to destroy it en masse for consumption.42 
So, in comparison to Europeans, Latin Americans placed themselves on a more equal footing with 
plants, animals, and even inanimate objects.43 This does not mean that their conduct was exclusively 
guided by positives sentiments, of trust, respect, and fondness. In fact, their attitudes were ambivalent.44 
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While they venerated an array of natural creatures, at the same time they feared nature’s inner power.45 
The Maya, for instance, had an almost paranoid terror of the forest.46 But in general, and for different 
reasons, most societies in the Americas approached nature with a deep sense of respect.47 Nearly all of 
them made apologies when they hunted or cut trees in order to prevent the spirits from taking vengeance 
on those who harmed them.48 But Latin Americans' worldviews were complex and did not always amount 
to a respectful use of ecosystems or caring treatment of natural elements. In certain cases, religious 
practices fostered the destruction of nature. It was common, for example, to carry out rituals where 
animals were sacrificed to appease the gods.49 
Sacredness permeated every aspect of material life.50 Religious and economic practices were not 
compartmentalized; on the contrary, they interpenetrated one another. Consequently, activities such as 
agriculture or hunting were partly considered sacred.51 Again, this does not mean that Latin Americans’ 
spirituality led necessarily to sound ecological practices. In fact, there are current examples of Latin 
American societies who descend from pre-colonial populations that engage in un-ecological behavior, in 
contravention of religious doctrines, which suggest that the same may have happened in the past.52 
Besides religion, attachment to a particular location set limits on the human use of ecosystems. In 
general, geographical attachments tended toward sustainability.53 The preservation of landscapes was 
often vital in order to preserve the group’s collective memory, as particular sites were linked to the 
cultural and spiritual achievements of a given society.54 Geographical attachment stemmed also from 
practical considerations. In the densely populated Middle and South Eastern parts of Latin America, 
venturing outside the limits of one’s group risked invading another’s territory and provoking 
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confrontation, sometimes with fatal effects. So safeguarding the fertility of the land was a powerful driver 
of behavior. Latin Americans had learned empirically how far they could push nature's carrying capacity 
in a given area. In cases of weak military power, preserving the soil fertility was essential.  
Following Miller, we can conclude that:  
 
Some cultures obviously crashed and their failure to achieve sustainable lifestyles may have played a role. For the 
most part, however, Indians expected the future to be very much like their present and generally farmed in one 
year with an eye focused carefully on the next. By the fifteenth century, most Indians, like most Europeans, had 
settled into sustainable patterns of producing food.55 
 
Every activity that the peoples of Latin America undertook left an imprint on the natural habitats of Latin 
America. Their relationship with the natural world was complex. In general, they believed in a continuum 
between the natural and social realms, which prevented a total domination of the former by the latter. 
Religious as well as practical considerations fostered connectedness with nature, but were, at times, 
overridden by competing factors such as consumption or population pressures, especially within large 
empires who could reap the benefits of controlling much territory and using the natural resources of 
larger geographical areas. This notwithstanding, and in spite of alleged failures,56 Latin Americans 
generally modified their landscapes in stable, supple, resilient ways.57 Far from perfect equilibrium, their 
lifestyles, even in the biggest empires, did not produce an overwhelming or irreversible damage to nature. 
A line, even if more nuanced than has been generally recognized, can still be drawn between their 
practices and those introduced by European colonizers. The idea of nature as an objectified reservoir of 
natural resources for personal benefit and its separation and subordination to the social realm were alien 
to the Latin Americans’ worldview.  
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The environmental impact of Spanish colonialism in Latin America 
Columbus’ voyages to Latin America took place during the era of discoveries characterized by the 
emerging Portuguese and Spanish imperial powers, their maritime hegemony and their capacity to annex 
vast territories overseas. In a broader historical perspective, these voyages were part of a period of cross-
cultural interaction of unparalleled dimensions.58 The search for trading routes and the colonization of 
new lands gave rise to three interrelated phenomena: the creation of a global system of communication 
through the seas; the global exchange of biological species with profound implications for humans and 
nature; and the intensification of intercontinental trade, which affected previous patterns of production, 
consumption, supply, and social organization worldwide.59 
In the new milieu of imperial expansion, Latin America’s natural resources were of outmost 
importance. Latin American and African labor extracted gold and silver at a high human cost. These 
precious metals gave European merchants the resources they needed to trade in Asian markets, fostering 
Asian economies as a result.60 As Latin American riches were being drained, their monetary value went 
to the hands of the newcomers, their Latin American allies and economic elites located in distant centers 
of power.61 At the same time, the colonists’ demand for certain European commodities that could not be 
found in Latin America increased European exports. New needs on both sides of the Atlantic fostered 
the development of a transatlantic trade controlled by an influential European commercial class.62 
The geographical expansion and intensification of trade had important environmental consequences. 
Spaniards were far more plunderous than Latin Americans when they decided to exploit a specific natural 
resource. The search for elements of the environment that could be turned into tradable commodities was 
a colonists’ obsession.63 The importance of two of these goods for the Latin American colonial enterprise, 
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namely silver and sugar, overran the value of any other product.64 The impact of their extraction and 
production on Latin American ecosystems was deep and lasting. 
Whereas the Latin American peoples worshipped nature, colonizers worshipped their god and 
venerated gold and silver. It is said that ‘once Columbus landed in the New World … he praised God 
and enquired urgently after gold’.65 The mining industry was one of the main engines of social and 
ecological transformation in colonial Latin America. Mines entailed the establishment of complex 
settlements and large populations, which attracted other economic activities and stimulated at the same 
time the growth of colonial agriculture and pastoralism.66 Trees were cut for timber to build wooden 
props that would support tunnels in the mines. In addition, the land was deforested in order to make room 
for cattle and cultivation. This produced severe localized impacts. In the mining town of Potosí in the 
Viceroyalty of Peru67 not a single tree grew around the city at the end of the sixteenth century.68 The 
tentacles of the mines in what is today Bolivia reached as far as Chile, Paraguay, and Argentina, which 
were inserted in a provisioning network staggering in its size and complexity.69 Caribbean islands also 
lost a sizable part of their forest cover to provide wood for the construction of the ships that carried silver 
to Spain.70 
In addition to deforestation, the most adverse impact of mines on humans was neither the consequence 
of axes nor burning, but rather mercury. It is quite likely that mercury pollution from silver mines in 
Mexico and Peru was the largest source of industrial pollution in the early modern era (1500-1800).71 As 
mercury accumulated in plants and animal tissue, its effects spread far from the initial source, creating 
long-lasting circles of toxicity.72 Unlike deforestation, the impact of mercury surpassed the continental 
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reach. Nriagu claims that ‘it would seem likely that the Latin American silver mines were partly 
responsible for the high background concentration of mercury now being reported in the global 
environment’.73 
Sugar plantations reduced soil fertility and caused deforestation, producing a harmful effect on the 
environment.74 Before sugarcane could be planted, large portions of land had to be cleared. Therefore, 
sugar plantations became a rival to other uses of the land, including woodland. Furthermore, as the 
processing of sugar required large quantities of fuel, producers cleared forests that would have otherwise 
remained intact.75 The environmental consequences of sugar plantations were severe in the smaller 
Caribbean islands.76 In the coastal area of Brazil, the victim of sugar plantations and other activities 
associated with settlement was the 1.3 million square kilometers Atlantic forest, one of the most diverse 
and delicate eco-systems on Earth, home to more than 60 percent of all terrestrial living species.77 
Paradoxically, in spite of the clear ecological costs of mining and plantation agriculture, the Spanish 
and Portuguese conquest triggered a process of environmental recovery. The lethal impact of 
colonization on the pre-colonial Latin American population reduced the human pressure on the regions’ 
landscapes.78 With tens of millions fewer human beings utilizing natural habitats, the pressure on 
ecosystems reduced drastically. As a result, soils, forests, water, and wild life, which had been under 
intensive use by the peoples of Latin America for millennia, were suddenly given some centuries to 
regenerate.79 The Amazon offers an example of the contrast between the colonists’ greedy attitude toward 
nature and their more destructive practices, and the larger picture of environmental regeneration that was 
indirectly caused by colonization: 
 
The impact on the landscape was paradoxical. While the extractivist explosion was causing serious damage to 
ecosystems in the floodplain and uplands, depopulation was allowing forest to recolonize areas where it had been 
                                                 
73  Jerome O. Nriagu, ‘Mercury Pollution from the Past Mining of Gold and Silver in the Americas’ 149 The Science of the 
Total Environment (1994) 167-181, 179. 
74  The production and trade of sugar propelled both the colonial economies of the Caribbean islands and the cost of the 
Brazilian and African slave trade. Sugar trade was very profitable. Merchants could get at destination twice to four times the 
purchasing price at Brazilian ports. See Stuart B. Schwartz, Sugar Plantations in the Formation of Brazilian Society: Bahia, 
1550-1835 (New York, Cambridge University Press, 1985) 3, and Richards, The Unending Frontier, 388. 
75  Ibid., 413. 
76  See David Watts, ‘Ecological Responses to Ecosystem Shock in the Island Caribbean: The Aftermath of Columbus, 1492-
1992’ in Robin A. Butlin and Neil Roberts (eds.), Ecological Relations in Historical Times (Oxford, Blackwell, 1995) 268-
279, 272-277. 
77  Carlos Galindo-Leal and Ibsen de Gusmão Câmara (eds.), The Atlantic Forest of South America: Biodiversity Status, 
Threats and Outlook (Washington, Island Press, 2003) 3.  
78  Dore, ‘Environment and Society’, 7. 
79  Miller, Environmental History, 56. 
32 
 
cut back in the late prehistoric period, especially the upland savannas and the flood plain. These were precisely 
the areas that would be visited and used as collection sites by nineteenth-century natural scientists and 
misconstrued as virgin and primeval. Meanwhile, Europeans were introducing new forms of land use with 
increasing impacts: new forms of plantation agriculture, notably cacao, sugar, and coffee, as well as cattle 
ranching.80 
 
Apart from the population collapse of Latin America, there were three other factors that helped the 
preservation of nature.  
First, Europeans took centuries to control the whole continent, finding groups that successfully resisted 
their advance in the vast territories of Patagonia, Northern Mexico, the North Latin American West, and 
parts of the Amazon, among others.81 These were vast areas that contained rich ecosystems, many of 
which had not been subjected to the same population and consumption pressures as the lands of the 
Anahuac82 and Tawantinsuyu83 empires. In these extensive territories, the environment was less exploited 
than anywhere else in the Hemisphere. 
Second, the impact of the colonists on the environment was not merely negative. The Spanish practiced 
conservation in specific locations. The long-distance transhumance and land conservation techniques in 
sheep rising implemented in New Mexico are a good example. They contributed to the softening of the 
environmental burden of settling in Latin America.84 The governments of the Iberian Peninsula also 
sought to preserve their empire’s natural resources. Spanish legislation in the viceroyalty of New Spain 
protected Latin American agricultural production from the damage caused by the livestock of Spanish 
herders.85 Similarly, the Crown of Portugal showed determination to preserve the Brazilian Mangrove 
forests.86 
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These measures of conservation did not stem from a caring attitude toward nature, but rather from a 
reaction to the destructiveness of the conquerors. Although Crown and conquistadores shared the 
objective of exploiting Latin America’s natural resources, their perspective was somewhat different. The 
conquerors’ short-term interests clashed with the Crown’s long-term goal of assuring the economic 
viability of the colonies.87 So the effectiveness of regulations varied depending on profitability. When 
the exploitation of a particular natural resource did not offer much in return, legislation was often 
implemented. In contrast, if the returns derived from the exploitation of particular natural elements were 
high, the law was easily circumvented.88 
Finally, the strong monopolies that the Spanish and Portuguese Crowns established over colonial 
commerce reduced the magnitude of the colonists’ environmental impact.89 The biggest threat to the 
system was contraband, which flourished mainly in the Caribbean islands, helping England, France, and 
the Netherlands get their hands on the transatlantic commercial exchange. This notwithstanding, the vigor 
and even harshness with which the Iberian Peninsula enforced its monopoly for three centuries prevented 
colonial trade from running at full speed.90 
Despite these positive dynamics, colonization in general contributed to environmental degradation. 
Why then did the Iberians undertake such short-term, devastating activities in the colonies? What were 
the reasons for their unsustainable behavior? 
As previously mentioned, the chief reason was the fervent pursuit of profits. But greed did not operate 
alone. There were other reasons for their destructiveness. In many cases colonists found landscapes that 
would have seemed rather fertile for a common European observer but hid vulnerable soils.91 So, 
unwittingly, they introduced unsound economic activities that depleted the soils and caused erosion. In 
addition, Latin America was so vast and depopulated that nature’s capability to absorb human impact 
might have seemed unlimited. Colonists naturally assumed that if environmental degradation rendered a 
specific economic activity unprofitable there was always the possibility of moving to new unexploited 
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lands.92 In Latin America, colonial economic activities seemed like islands in what looked like a sea of 
wilderness. Finally, few colonists settled permanently in Latin America. Their goal was to travel, get rich 
as swiftly as possible, and return to civilized Europe to enjoy a good retirement and the status that came 
with wealth.93 Consequently, Europeans tended to treat Latin American landscapes with less care than 
those at home.  
As we have seen, the change from regional to global trade within centuries was the chief reason for the 
intensification of the assault on nature that resulted from Spanish and Portuguese colonialism.94 The 
existence of a transatlantic trade and a global demand animated the exploitation of landscapes that could 
produce precisely those needed marketable commodities. But it is worth noting that the difference 
between the Spanish and Portuguese, on the one hand, and the people from Tawantinsuyu and Anahuac, 
on the other, was the scope of the trade and the number of people involved in it (as producers and 
consumers), and not their acquisitiveness, which was a common trait of all these empires.95 
The consideration of colonization as a positive or negative environmental process depends on two 
factors. The first is the time frame considered. Nature recovered during the first three centuries of 
colonization. In contrast, during the following centuries the use of natural resources intensified, causing 
widespread ecological degradation. By then, important demographic, economic, and social changes like 
population growth, the expansion of markets, and especially industrialization and urbanization were 
underway. However, these processes were based on previous economic and ideological patterns of 
behavior introduced at the time of conquest that proved environmentally unsustainable. That is to say, 
the colonists’ approach to Latin America, characterized by the intensive commercial use of natural 
resources, remained unaltered or rather intensified during the centuries following the arrival of the first 
colonizers. The second factor to take into account is the explanation of the recovery of some of Latin 
American natural habitats at the time of European penetration. This positive outcome was to a very 
limited extent attributable to the sound practices introduced by the colonists, the main factor being (as 
previously mentioned) the depopulation of the continent. Considered as a whole, however, the 
environmental ‘balance sheet’ of colonization was quite negative. Moreover, in particular locations, the 
scale of environmental change they introduced and the damage that resulted from it was unprecedented. 
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2. Environmental Impact of European Imperialism (1600-1800) 
North America 
Nature was profoundly reshaped during the colonial period. Between 1600 and 1800 the territorial sway 
and capacity of Europeans nations for transforming the environment expanded considerably. Parallel to 
this development, the number of economic actors engaged in intercontinental exchanges of commodities 
grew rapidly. But even in places where European imperial powers could not impose their will, like China 
and Japan, nature also experienced the increasing pressure of human economic activities. In fact, one of 
the most significant and profound environmental trends of the Early Modern Era, the natural or forced 
settlement of previous nomadic groups in order to practice settled agriculture or what had been called by 
Bayly ‘the great domestication’, took place in places as diverse as the Indonesian islands, Scandinavia, 
Russia, or Brazil.96 Population growth and the consolidation of larger centralized states, able to guarantee 
a certain degree of security, encouraged pioneer settlers to occupy uncultivated land in vast natural world 
frontiers.97 
  All around the world, settlers affirmed their presence and power in territories which had been 
previously inhabited and used by shifting cultivators, hunter-gatherers, and pastoralists. In different 
locations the new settlers violently clashed with earlier populations. So, the process of environmental 
transformation of vacant lands was coupled with a process of social reconfiguration marked by the 
displacement of earlier groups to the margins of newly born landed empires. North America was one of 
the largest natural frontiers opened up by European colonization during the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries. The pattern of environmental alteration in this region of the globe is a good example of what 
took place in other colonial territories at the time. North America is also relevant because of its role in 
the legal and political arguments of Grotius, Locke, Vattel, and Wolff.  
  Before the arrival of Europeans, North America was a mosaic of societies, languages, and religions.98 
As with their Southern counterparts, the peoples that inhabited the Northern part of the American 
continent ‘developed sophisticated cultures, created and lost empires, produced stunning works of art, 
engaged in sophisticated agriculture, and had a rich history of their own before Columbus ever set foot 
                                                 
96 Christopher Alan Bayly, The Birth of the Modern World 1780-1914: Global Connections and Comparisons (Malden, 
Blackwell Publishing, 2004) 49-50.  
97 Ibid.  
98 Neal Salisbury, ‘The Indian’s Old World: Native Americans and the Coming of Europeans’ in Peter C. Mancall and James 
Hart Merrell (eds.), American Encounters: Natives and Newcomers from European Contact to Indian Removal, 1500-1850 
(New York, Routledge, 2000) 3-25, 5. 
36 
 
in the continent'.99 North American societies were in constant flux, partly as a result of intensive social, 
political, and economic interactions between one another. Trade, one of the activities that most intensely 
stimulated contact between different groups, had already started ten thousand years before the arrival of 
the first colonists.100 
  As in the Southern part of the Western Hemisphere, social change and social interaction left a 
noticeable mark on the environment. North America was far from being the unspoiled wilderness that 
the first colonists depicted.101 The wild character of North American ecosystems was associated with the 
nature of its population. The old derogatory image of North American peoples as an extension of their 
wild environment has its antithesis in their contemporary characterization as living in perfect harmony 
with nature. Both are myths that have more to do with past and present European stereotypes than 
reality.102 For millennia the numerous societies of North America thoroughly and extensively modified 
their environment. They built extensive networks of roads, trails, and causeways, introduced irrigation 
systems, terraced fields, and founded cities like Cahokia, which in its apogee could have housed as many 
as 20,000 people, not an insignificant number at the time.103 North Americans had an impact on the land, 
water, fauna, flora, and all the other elements that constituted the basis of their material life. Hunting, 
fishing, agriculture, and the widespread use of fire were the main human activities that contributed to 
environmental alteration.104 
  An intensive use of natural resources placed some of the societies of North America near the limits of 
what was ecologically viable. For example, the exploitation of soils and surrounding forests, together 
with climatic factors, drove Cahokia to an ecological crisis of unprecedented dimensions, which its social 
and political institutions could not prevent.105 By the end of the fourteenth century the inhabitants of the 
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city had fled, regrouping in small farming villages in the countryside around their former settlement.106 
Excessive hunting may have also contributed to the extinction of certain animal species.107 
  Despite the undeniable impact of North American peoples, the environment that the first European 
settlers found remained abundant and fertile. Sustainability was the result of the combined influence of 
two main factors. First, European germs decimated North Americans. Of all infectious diseases, smallpox 
was the most severe. It travelled faster than the colonists, making major inroads on several North 
American societies in the seventeenth century even before the Europeans appeared on the horizon. The 
result was a population collapse of unprecedented dimension. Of the several millions of North Americans 
that inhabited the continent before conquest, only one million survived at the end of the eighteenth 
century.108 With considerably less people to compete for natural resources, the human pressure on the 
environment decreased, and animals, vegetation, and land had precious time to recover from intensive 
use.109 
  The second reason for natural abundance in North America had to do with North Americans’ way of 
living. Despite concrete failures they had generally established sustainable patterns of environmental 
alteration.110 The fact that nature bounced back from intensive use when the original population 
diminished has been considered clear evidence of the fact that, in spite of environmental degradation, 
nature’s capacity for regeneration was never lost.111 
  The arrival of the Dutch, English, and French transformed the pattern of natural alteration. The 
establishment of colonies entailed a profound reconfiguration of North American nature. Plantation 
agriculture was one of the activities that had a more lasting and adverse impact on the environment.112 
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To take one example, the cultivation of tobacco in Virginia had contributed by the mid seventeenth 
century to the deforestation of half a million acres of land.113 The loss of forest cover caused floods, 
siltation, and erosion.114 Similarly, cotton plantations in the South provoked soil erosion, which became 
evident by the end of the eighteenth century.115 As in Latin America, the widespread availability of forests 
and fertile soil discouraged settlers from adopting protective measures of land use.116 When the soil 
became depleted it was relatively easy to resettle, pushing the natural frontier further into the interior of 
the continent.  
  Besides agricultural toil, hunting contributed to environmental deterioration, impairing wild life and 
threatening the survival of particular animal species. The economic value of beaver furs for the English 
and French hat industries fostered commercial interests in hunting.117 North America’s original 
inhabitants did most of the hunting. The Iroquois, for instance, negotiated with English traders, 
particularly the Hudson’s Bay Company, which had acquired the preponderant commercial position in 
the northern colonies.118 The mid-eighteenth century trade in furs resulted in the killing of two million 
beavers.  
  The participation of North Americans in these killings and their role in the nearly extinction of the 
bison119 attests to the complexity of their environmental behavior.120 One explanation of their paradoxical 
destructive attitude toward their own environment and source of provision points to the weakening of 
former hunting taboos because of colonization. According to Martin Calvin, once the Micmac of the 
North were convinced that their former religious beliefs no longer protected them from diseases and 
warfare, which sharply increased after the arrival of the colonists, they abandoned their old religious 
practices, including taboos that prevented excessive hunting.121 A more likely explanation of North 
Americans’ participation in the fur trade emphasizes their increasing dependency on markets 
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overwhelmingly controlled by the Europeans, to which they were driven by the scarcity of the natural 
resources that had traditionally sustained them, creating the need for an alternative source of provision.122 
  Of all the environmental changes that resulted from the establishment of European settlements in 
North America, the destruction of forests was the most notorious. Forests were at the heart of the settler 
economy. The felling of trees provided space for cultivation as well as fuel, timber, and building 
materials, among other commodities. The first settlers left trees almost untouched, as they found 
abundant vacant land to settle and cultivate.123 However, the beginning of the eighteenth century marked 
a change of that pattern. As the colonies prospered, the intensive use of forests accelerated even further 
during the second half of the century. The institution of private property, the requirements of the market, 
the dispersion of settlements and the association of the alteration of nature with the idea of progress 
reinforced the economic satisfaction of the needs of the settlers.124 
  Nevertheless, despite the increasing pressure of the colonial economy on North American ecosystems, 
colonists’ numbers and simple tools limited their general impact. It was not until the independence of the 
U.S. and its process of industrialization and expansion to the West that the North American environment 
faced large-scale degradation.  
Sugar Islands 
The legitimation of global trade and its increase during the Early Modern Era had a deleterious effect on 
nature. Trade imperialism helped the emergence of the Dutch and British Empires. Under the control of 
only a few nations, the appetite for all kinds of goods in European markets drove intercontinental 
exchanges of commodified natural elements that often resulted in the exploitation of natural habitats in 
colonial territories. The Caribbean islands are a good example of the kind of environmental pressure 
elicited by intercontinental trade. In fact, at the time, they were like miniature laboratories where the 
environmental effects of global trade could be observed and measured.125 Once the Europeans got used 
to sweetening their palate with sugarcane, their craving for sugar became one of the main engines of the 
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Atlantic economy, thoroughly transforming Caribbean landscapes. Sugar plantations also stimulated the 
Atlantic slave trade, a large and profitable scheme of human suffering. 
  Sugar cane was the main commodity produced in Caribbean islands. The British deforested and 
established sugar plantations in the Lesser Antilles, including Antigua, Anguilla, Barbuda, Montserrat, 
and Barbados, which was relatively bigger than the other islands.126 After the Treaty of Paris in 1763, 
they also acquired from the French the islands of Saint Vincent, Dominica, Grenada, and Tobago.127 The 
British soon turned the production of indigo, coffee, cotton, cocoa, and food for consumption in these 
islands into sugar plantations. Sugar fields were also prevalent in Jamaica at the end of the seventeenth 
century. The French copied the intensive system of sugar production that the English had introduced to 
Barbados and applied it in Martinique, Guadeloupe, and Saint-Dominique (today Haiti).  
  By the end of the eighteenth century, the Caribbean islands produced an aggregate amount of 180,000 
metric tons of sugar for European markets. In the second decade of the nineteenth century, the figure 
rose to 265,000.128 Production increased despite Haiti’s independence, which detracted 60,000 metric 
tons from the total amount of the trade. Because sugar was a scarce commodity, its traffic became 
extremely profitable. Although producers and merchants benefited, cane growing took a hefty human 
and environmental toll. When Caribbean islands were first occupied, the pre-colonial Taíno population 
was almost entirely obliterated. Those who survived served as labor force in the plantations, perishing 
thereafter. Eventually, they were substituted by indented European settlers, and later by less expensive 
African slaves.129 
  The effect of sugar production on the environment of Caribbean islands was particularly noticeable 
due to their reduced territorial extension. But sugar extended also to the Brazilian coast, where plantations 
mushroomed in the great Atlantic forest. The Antilles’ unique ecosystems were more vulnerable to large 
human-induced changes than the extensive frontiers of Brazil or North America, where plantations and 
the market economy took much longer to produce widespread environmental damage.130 
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 The main environmental alterations to the Caribbean landscapes were caused by the substitution of the 
tropical rainforest by less varied fields of sugar cane.131 In addition, the boiling of the sugar cane syrup, 
in order to get the crystals that we are used to consuming, demanded even more wood to produce the heat 
required. Due to the environmental pressures of sugar cane plantations, in a few decades, by around the 
mid-seventeenth century, the once exuberant tropical forests of the Caribbean islands were almost totally 
gone.132 
 Due to the undeniable environmental impact of colonial trade in Caribbean islands, most planters, 
especially in the British islands, introduced certain measures of conservation when they realized that 
yields were diminishing due to soil exhaustion. For instance, they kept patches of forested land within 
their plantations and adopted innovative techniques of land management.133 However, their efforts were 
not enough to restore the sustainability of the islands’ economy. Ultimately, the Caribbean islands could 
only keep up their level of production by extending even further the frontier of cultivated land, and 
importing all the essentials (timber, fertilizers, and provisions) that were necessary for the production of 
the plantations and in general for the continuation of life on the islands.134 
 The destruction of the forest had several environmental effects. It damaged the biodiversity of the 
islands as it reduced habitats, driving several animal and tree species to extinction or the verge of 
extinction.135 In addition, the reduction of vegetation and the intensive use of land produced soil 
exhaustion and erosion.136 In smaller islands like Barbados, the almost total disappearance of the forest 
caused a considerable reduction of rainfall and even the warming of its climate.137 Tropical forests were 
resilient and, sometimes, they reclaimed land in abandoned sugar plantations and states. However, in 
many cases nature was so degraded that forests could never bounce back and revert to its pre-colonial 
condition.138 
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3. A Changed Scenario: The Industrial Revolution  
 
In 1750, most people lived in what have been called ‘agrarian empires’, and their main occupation was 
to till the land.139 This was in part the result of the ‘great domestication’. This name designates a process 
of settlement and sedentarization that transformed nomadic frontiers into sites of permanent cultivation. 
In addition to this environmental transformation, a growing number of households in northwestern 
Europe began to relocate their productive resources between 1650 and 1850 ‘in ways that increased both 
the supply of market-oriented, money-earning activities and the demand for goods offered in the 
marketplace’.140 The new desire to acquire ceramics, paintings, prints, maps, books, furniture, silver, 
glass, and textiles, and the industrious effort undertaken in order to accumulate the capital needed to 
purchase them, have been referred to as the ‘industrious revolution’.141 
The great domestications and the industrious revolution amplified the environmental impact that 
humans had on the ecology of the Earth. Built on these former processes came the major economic, 
social, and environmental changes of the long nineteenth century. The agrarian and industrial revolutions 
that started around 1750 and continued during the following centuries—slowly at first, then swiftly—
altering the face of the Earth from the mid-nineteenth century. They generated growth processes that 
interacted in complex ways and gave rise to even more growth, generating an everlasting spiral of 
economic expansion that resulted in the overexploitation of natural habitats worldwide.142 
The agricultural revolution started in Britain during the second half of the eighteenth century due to 
several interrelated factors. In the seventeenth century, British farmers imported various agricultural 
techniques from the Netherlands, particularly the four-field rotation method that enabled the fixing 
nitrogen to the soil.143 As a result of the doubling of the British population (from 6 to 12 million) from 
1760 to 1820, the demand for agricultural products piqued, providing a powerful incentive for further 
improvements.144 The intensification of the agricultural production required to feed a growing population 
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would have exhausted the soils were it not for Peruvian guano, a natural fertilizer. Its utilization allowed 
increased productivity without depleting the fields under cultivation. In 1841, Britain imported 1,800 
tons of guano from Peru, an amount that increased to 219,764 tons only four years later.145 
The upsurge of land productivity due to fertilizing and technology accelerated the process of enclosure 
in the late eighteenth century.146 Deprived of their means of subsistence, a growing number of peasants 
looked for a wage salary in the cities, contributing to an urban demographic explosion. Despite the 
quickening of the tempo of agrarian transformations, the extent of the change should not be 
exaggerated.147 Yield increases were relatively minor compared to the rate of population growth. Once 
the Corn Laws were repealed, Britain had to import food during the nineteenth century in order to satisfy 
internal demand.148 This notwithstanding, the British model became a blueprint for the modernization of 
cultivation and the transformation of agricultural landscapes worldwide.  
The origins of the Industrial Revolution were as multifaceted as the causes of the agricultural 
revolution. Improvements in manufacturing began with the cloth trade.149 At first, farmers combined 
cultivation with fiber separation, spinning and weaving as a way of diversifying their sources of 
income.150 The success of these new economic activities soon encouraged most families to dedicate their 
time to textile-related tasks. The desire to compete with Indian calicoes and muslins and the restriction 
on imports from India provided the springboard for the mechanization of the textile industry.151 
Production was divided into separate and simple tasks, and the first factories began their operations.152 
The seeds of change had already been planted. The rationalization and modernization of manufacturing 
and the standardization of production were soon replicated in the old artisan trades.153 
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The combination of high wages and cheap coal fostered the substitution of human laborers by machines, 
providing the incentive and the means to modernize production.154 The exploitation of coal required a 
series of innovations in mining that were later applied to other industries.155 In spite of these rapid 
changes, industrialization was confined to certain areas in northern and central England before the 
railway appeared.156 Developments in transportation and communication gave the Industrial Revolution 
a wider scope by cutting the costs of moving goods across frontiers.157 As the world became smaller, 
production and trade blossomed. From 1870 to 1890 iron production in the main producing countries 
more than doubled.158 In the case of steel, the increase was twentyfold.159 The market integration of the 
Atlantic economy (a key factor for Europe’s rise to dominance in the world economy during the 
nineteenth century) after 1860 was predominantly the result of reduction in transportation costs.160 These 
changes surpassed the European ambit. In India, for example, the introduction of the steamboat 
substantially enlarged the grain trade.161 
During the nineteenth century, the integration of the world economy accelerated, reaching historic 
heights. The volume of global trade from the beginning of nineteenth century to the first decade of the 
twentieth century increased twenty-five-fold.162 As a proportion of economic output, it surpassed the 
level reached at the beginning of the twenty-first century.163 Thanks to new communication technologies, 
information on prices, supply, and demand travelled rather swiftly, creating new possibilities for long-
distance trade.164 Besides, by 1880 the cost of certain commodities, like food grains, depended on their 
price on the world market.165 This process of homogenization and standardization applied to weights, 
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measures, time, and currency, further contributing to the creation of a rationalized international market 
economy.166 
A sound financial infrastructure facilitated the exchange of goods within and between nations, as well 
as the construction of railways.167 In England, merchant bank houses such as Barings, Rothschild, and 
Hope had already started their lending business during the eighteenth century.168 Yet, in the nineteenth 
century, their financing of economic activities acquired capital importance. The Barings House, for 
instance, acted as financial agent for business groups that operated in the British Empire.169 The Bank of 
England, the stock exchange, and the gold standard established the foundations of the new international 
monetary system and provided the financial structure that glued the different pieces of the international 
capitalist economy together.170 
The creation of machines and the use of fossil fuels gave humans the possibility of altering and 
manipulating natural forces almost at will. ‘Industrial beings’ could easily perforate the subsoil, cultivate 
enormous areas of cash crops as monocultures, cut tress and kill animals at a faster rate than ever before, 
and easily transport all that was valuable in nature to distant centers of consumption. The conjunction of 
European imperialism and the emerging global capitalist economy propelled the forces of environmental 
change to Latin America, North America, Africa, South Asia, and Oceania. The world was now an 
immense reservoir of commodities. Exploration and colonization gave Europeans the possibility of 
studying non-European ecosystems in order to find plants and natural species whose cultivation and 
extraction had the potential of being profitable for the metropolis.171 Overall, the knowledge, techniques, 
and technologies produced within industrial societies allowed humans to manipulate and alter natural 
ecosystems in ways that were unthinkable before this era.  
European overseas expansion during the first half of the nineteenth century mainly took the form of 
settler colonialism. This process was part of a larger phenomenon whereby European farmers displaced 
the ‘original’ inhabitants of Brazil, Argentina, Canada, the U.S., Australia, South Africa, and other 
territories in order to grow cash crops for export.172 The reduction of Ocean freight rates made the 
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cultivation of the far corners of the world economically profitable.173 In the so-called temperate ‘Neo-
Europe’, settlers of European descent used European agricultural machinery to extract more surplus from 
the land.174 
After U.S. independence in 1783 an ‘Anglo-world’175 was born. Great Britain established settlements 
in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa, while the U.S. extended west of the Mississippi 
over a vast area of land. A constant transfer of goods, people, and ideas interconnected this conglomerate 
of Anglophone settlements.176 It constituted a sub global network of staggering proportions.177 So, during 
the first half of the nineteenth century, the Industrial Revolution went hand in hand with the settler 
revolution that saw Anglo-Saxons and their economies occupying large areas of the Earth and creating 
vast empires. 
The Industrial Revolution, population growth, and the increase of natural products had an effect on 
colonial territories and their people. Cotton provides a good example. The annual consumption of cotton 
in Great Britain during the first years of nineteenth century was only 24,000 tons.178 Less than 20 years 
afterwards that amount had grown to 120,000 tons.179 As the amount of cotton consumed in Great Britain 
continued to grow, and textile factories were established in New England, the demand for cotton climbed 
sharply. Cotton plantations mushroomed in the southern U.S. to feed the growing international market. 
In states like Georgia, which cultivated cotton, the value of the territories of the Cherokee and the Creek 
increased exponentially. As we shall see in Chapter 8, this fact was to have enormous implications for 
the very survival of these North American societies. The U.S. administration under Andrew Jackson 
decided to implement a policy of removal, freeing vast tracts of land for industrial agriculture.180 
The demand for natural products in settler colonies grew exponentially. Grapes, oranges, dates, 
bananas, pineapples, vines, silk, arrowroot, tobacco, olives, wheat, wool, meat, whale’s products, etc. 
were produced in Australia.181 Millions of sheep and cattle trod the grazing lands where game hunted by 
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Australian peoples used to feed.182 Soon they depleted the biodiversity of this complex ecosystem, 
impairing the survival of Australian peoples. In the south of the U.S. commercial agriculture specialized 
in the production of indigo, corn, rice, sugar, tobacco, and cotton.183 Whenever and wherever a profitable 
industry was born out of the cultivation of food or the extraction of natural products, the systematic 
exploitation of ecosystems followed.184 The result was a vast clearance of land for agriculture; massive 
hunting that decimated and drew species to the verge of extinction or actual disappearance; the building 
of cities, roads, ships, bridges, and locomotives that demanded the increasing destruction of forests; the 
industrial extraction of minerals from the subsoil, etc.  
All these economic activities were projected to a global scale. As settler nations consolidated, cities 
doubled or tripled their size, and a mass market for consumption was created. As a consequence, the 
demand for natural products intensified. This demand was satisfied by opening new territories to the 
acquisitive impulse of Western imperialism. At the end of the nineteenth century, European colonial 
powers set their sights on Africa and Asia. Africa, in particular, offered the prospect of new riches and 
profits by merely extending the invisible hand of the global market to the interior of the continent. As in 
other European colonies, both African and Asian peoples and nature suffered from the greed of the 
colonists. In spite of the depopulation caused by African conquest, the scale of human induced 
environmental change in Africa intensified during the nineteenth century as a result of the subordination 
of local economies to the requirements of the new international commodity markets of coffee, cocoa, 
groundnuts, palm oil, cloves, rubber, ivory, wood, and minerals.185 
By the end of the nineteenth century, colonial production everywhere was tied to the world market. 
Javanese peasants, for instance, produced tobacco, sugar, and rice. The Cape of Good Hope concentrated 
on wine and hides for the European market. In Australia, the production of wool for the textile industry 
skyrocketed. British settlers in West Africa focused on extracting palm oil.186 New products such as tea, 
rubber, nickel, and oil, which were cultivated or extracted in temperate zones and tropical areas, deserts, 
and even arctic forests, complemented old trades.187 Nineteenth century geographic expeditions pushed 
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hard to unveil the secrets of the world’s last natural frontiers.188 Once those frontiers were opened, they 
could be conquered and integrated as part of the growing reservoir of natural products that fed 
international markets. 
Apart from driving the exploitation of natural habitats, the Industrial Revolution had another important 
environmental consequence. It reinforced the Enlightenment assumption that the control and command 
of nature led to material improvement and social progress.189 As the natural frontier expanded and the 
bounty of nature was squeezed, standards of living continued growing. In the nineteenth century, there 
was still ample room to intensify that process. This was, at least, what the Europeans believed. Whereas 
the industrial landscapes of Europe were a vivid proof of the advancement of European civilization, most 
of the world’s habitats seemed still to Western observers to be rather underutilized.  
 
4. Settler Colonialism and the Exploitation of Nature 
U.S. expansion and environmental degradation in North America (1800-1860) 
The extension of U.S. power west of the Appalachians to the Pacific Coast was the beginning of a new 
empire. There were two main victims of that process of expansion. North American societies were 
decimated and reduced to reservations. Alongside, the demands of the market economy that drove U.S. 
expansion resulted in the degradation of myriad ecosystems. Mechanized agriculture, industrial mining, 
overhunting, ranching, the timber industry, railways, ships, roads, urbanization, etc. left a lasting impact 
on the environment. As important as these activities were, they could not have taken place without an 
institutional apparatus and an ideological framework to support them. International law as well as the 
U.S. legal system acknowledged the imperative of the market, promoting a particular worldview that was 
to have deleterious environmental consequences in the U.S. and the rest of the colonial world.190 
From the eighteenth century, the landscapes of the southern U.S. were a succession of plantations. 
These agricultural enterprises enormously reduced the biodiversity of the region.191 At different historical 
periods rice, sugar cane, indigo, tobacco, and cotton were grown extensively. Louisiana provides a good 
example to put into perspective the mushrooming of agricultural plantations. At the beginning of the 
eighteenth century, in 1802, there were only seventy-five sugar plantations, which produced a combined 
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5 million pounds of sugar.192 Twenty years later that amount had increased to 30 million, reaching a 
maximum of 459 million pounds by mid-century.193 The cultivation of rice, indigo, sugar, and tobacco 
caused deforestation and soil erosion.194 Still, the impact of these staples was not comparable to the 
environmental transformations that resulted from cotton plantations. 
In England, the Industrial Revolution moved to high gear through the textile industry. Accordingly, 
the demand for raw textile materials grew exponentially during the first decades of the nineteenth century. 
By 1800, seventy percent of the 58 million pounds of cotton imported by Great Britain came from the 
southern U.S.195 Eventually New England started to compete with British industries, increasing even 
further the demand for cotton. The cotton industry was one of the main engines of economic growth in 
the U.S. It resulted in an increase in population and fostered investment, transportation, labor, and 
industrialization.196 Cotton was the most important staple of the American South and occupied most of 
the fields planted in South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and extended as well to 
Tennessee and Arkansas.197 
Only the effects of tobacco were as detrimental to North American soils as the impact of cotton. Cotton 
depleted the ground of nutrients and caused severe erosion.198 This had enormous environmental 
implications considering how widespread cotton plantations were in the American South. By 1860 cotton 
destined for domestic consumption as well as export occupied more than 7 million acres of land in the 
region.199 Almost every region in the American South had more than 80 percent of its territory dedicated 
to agriculture.200 There, where cotton was cultivated, erosion ensued.201 But erosion was not the only 
effect of the Southern economy on ecosystems. Hunting reduced the number of deer by hundreds of 
thousands, contributing also to the disappearance of elks and buffalos from the region.202 Cattle 
completely destroyed native herbs and compacted the soils of pastures and forests.203 Mining caused 
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deforestation and the pollution of riverine ecosystems.204 Overall, the natural abundance of Southern 
landscapes reduced significantly.  
Buffalos were one of the animals that suffered most from the impact of hunting and the shrinking of 
natural habitats. From a starting point of somewhere between 30 to 60 million bison before European 
colonialism, buffalo were reduced to only a few hundred by the mid-1880s. Although the Bison steadily 
disappeared from the South of the U.S. at the beginning of the nineteenth century, there were still millions 
of them in the immense grasslands of the interior.205 The introduction of the horse and the rifle among 
the Comanche facilitated Buffalo hunting, making the bison the cornerstone of their economic and social 
lives. European market demands for bison products further spurred on their killing. Several other North 
American nations, such as the Cherokees, Chickasaws, Choctaws, and Creeks, also had an active role in 
the killing of bison.206 By the 1850s, a combination of climatic factors, religious ideas, and overhunting 
by the Comanche had severely reduced bison herds.207 
However, the final blow to the survival of bison came from U.S. markets and U.S. hunters. First, the 
locomotive entered the U.S. prairies, allowing the transportation of goods from the East to the West coast 
in less than a week.208 Then, the leather of the buffalo was applied to the belts of steams engines in 
Europe and the U.S. Due to this new industrial use of bison hides, demand skyrocketed.209 Accordingly, 
the sale of bison hides became extremely profitable in U.S. industrial cities and a new industry was 
organized around their extraction in the 1870s.210 In less than two decades, U.S. hunters killed buffalo 
by the millions (they sold 14 million hides) and almost exterminated them.211 North American peoples 
suffered terrible loss. As bison withered away, their economy suffered a major setback, and thousands 
starved and perished.212 Avid hunting for profits took place with the connivance of the federal authorities, 
eager to diminish the supplies of the Comanche and other North American peoples who still resisted their 
authority.213 
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 The environmental effects of territorial expansion and its accompanying economic growth were visible 
all over the U.S. The West Coast provides another good example of this trend. The industrialization of 
mining, agriculture, pastoralism, and fisheries drove environmental change. The gold rush in the West, 
especially in California, had deleterious consequences for the environment. Hydraulic mining entailed 
the use of an immense amount of water (some companies used more than a billion cubic feet of water) 
to move land in search of gold ores. In California, the power of water moved 1.5 billion cubic yards of 
debris from the Sierra Nevada foothills between 1855 and 1885.214 The amount of sand, soil, and gravel 
washed away reached as far as the San Francisco Bay and represented eight times more than the earth 
displaced for the construction of the Panama Canal.215 
As in the South, mining caused the destruction of mountain and riparian ecosystems. Hills and 
mountains around the mines became deserts of stone. Erosion of agricultural lands, deforestation, 
siltation, and flooding followed hydraulic mining.216 Another widespread mining system, hard-rock 
mining, equally polluted the water and air.217 In addition, Californian companies decided to add mercury 
to the process of mining, provoking the most destructive and long-lasting effect on nature.218 The 
quicksilver mine of New Almaden (south of San Francisco) alone produced 1.7 million pounds of 
mercury per year.219 Tons of mercury filtered into the rivers and the atmosphere of the U.S. West Coast. 
Its toxicity entered the food chain and accumulated in animal tissue, reaching concentrations 100,000 
times higher than those of the environment around them.220 
  Biodiversity in the U.S. was reduced as dramatically as its forest cover. Trees were cut to open up 
space for agriculture, fuel, the construction of buildings, railroads, ships, bridges, roads, machines, mines, 
etc. Forest fed the U.S. industry. Accordingly, deforestation intensified as the Industrial Revolution 
gained momentum during the second half of the nineteenth century.221 From 1750 to 1900, 142 million 
hectares of forest were cut to make space for agriculture.222 An additional eight million fell due to the 
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requirements of industry, transportation, mining, and urbanization.223 In total 150 million hectares were 
gone, the equivalent of half the original forest landmass of North America.224 This represented one of the 
largest episodes of deforestation in world history.225 The beginning of industrialization was the main 
reason for environmental degradation. However, the assault on nature had already started with the new 
ideas and practices introduced by the establishment of the first colonial settlements.  
 As in the rest of the U.S., capitalism and the legal, political, and ideological structures that sustained 
it drove environmental destruction. Referring to the West Coast, Sowards has argued that ‘capitalism 
exploited nature to fuel economic expansion’, producing the devastation of the ‘regions’ resources by 
reducing them to commodities whose only value was their market value’.226 As we shall see in the 
following chapters, the law of nations enabled the extension of the logic of appropriation to the world’s 
vast supposedly unexploited territories and vacant ecosystems from which capitalism fed. This logic was 
not only applied during the U.S. expansion. Far from the U.S., there were other savages and natural 
habitats, which, according to the law of nations, could also be occupied, improved, and civilized. 
Australian ecosystems: before and after British colonization  
The size of the pre-contact population of Australia when the British explored the western coast in 1788 
remains disputed, with figures ranging from a minimum of 300,000227 to a maximum of 1.5 million.228 
Several authors agree on an intermediate figure of about 750,000.229 The ecological limits of natural 
habitats and factors such as climate change forced Australian peoples to adapt to external environmental 
conditions. For this reason, Australian landscapes were the result of a centuries-long process of 
continuous interaction and mutual adaptation between humans and nature (if one could ever really draw 
a clear-cut line between the two).  
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Despite the view of Australian original inhabitants as a backward and primitive people,230 and their 
surroundings as a wilderness, their social achievements showed a remarkable resourcefulness. The island 
seamen, for instance, could differentiate sea locations by the taste of salty water (apparently every part 
of the sea had a distinct taste), the patterns of waves and swells, and the disposition of the stars.231 They 
built vessels, fished, sailed, and participated in the cinnamon trade across the Indian Ocean.232 The ability 
of adapting house building techniques to the requirements of different settings and weather conditions 
are further proof of an adaptable and sophisticated culture.233 
Three main questions have come to the fore in the debate about the extent to which the peoples of 
Australia altered ecosystems before British colonization. The first disputed issue is their role in the 
extinction of Australian megafauna. Already in the nineteenth century, human agency was identified as 
the main agent of the total disappearance of megafauna.234 In contrast, other authors believed that climate 
change was responsible for the extinction process.235 Current positions do not differ much, with studies 
that alternatively emphasize anthropogenic or climatic causation.236 There are also studies that draw a 
middle line combining both factors.237 In those cases in which the peoples of Australia were found to be 
responsible, overkilling238 and the destruction of ecosystems due to intensive burning239 were 
hypothesized as causes for the Pleistocene extinctions. 
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The peoples of Australia used fire as a resource management technique. Large areas of forests were 
cleared by fire in order to open space for cultivation and attract animals to pastures.240 The nature and 
impact of the use of fire is also controversial. Regarding the first question, whereas some authors define 
that use as judicious and positive,241 others have underlined the negative effects of Australians’ use of 
fire.242 The politics of conservation in ‘modern’ Australian and the alternative depiction of Australian 
peoples as either conservationist or inept managers of resources have complicated this debate.243 
As far as the impact of fire is concerned, views have ranged from the claim that Australian grasslands 
mostly originated from past human-induced fires244 to the contrary thesis that fires have had a minimal 
impact upon Australian vegetation.245 Both these claims seem to be an overstatement. It is now the 
consensus that Australians’ use of fire served to introduce/select particular plant species, which in turn 
maximized productivity, increased biodiversity, and expanded their natural habitat zone. This view is 
supported by evidence of the positive ecological effects of fire practices currently undertaken by the 
peoples of Australia, based on their sophisticated knowledge of ecological processes.246 
 Last but not least, there has been a heated debated concerning the ‘narrative of intensification’. 
According to this account of Australian history, sometime during the Holocene the hunter-gatherer 
communities experienced a series of changes driven by sociocultural factors.247 These included an 
increase in the number of sites and intensity of occupation, the appearance of new types of stone 
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technology, the ‘domestication’ and further manipulation of plants as food resources, and more 
regionalized forms of art.248 
The ‘narrative of intensification’ had the positive effect of challenging environmentally deterministic 
ideas about hunter-gatherer societies. It also questioned the strict divide between hunter-gatherer and 
agriculturalist societies.249 Allegedly, both abstract social types had more in common than was 
traditionally recognized. Nevertheless, there have been a number of criticisms of the ‘thesis of 
intensification’. Some scholars have either underlined inadequacies in the data on which the thesis was 
based or defied the conclusions drawn from it.250 Others have focused on the political implications of 
challenging the opposition between the categories of hunter-gatherers and agriculturalists. Trying to 
squeeze the former into the latter seems like trying to raise hunter-gatherers one-step higher in the ladder 
of social evolution. This could have the counter effect of cementing the very logic of progress that sought 
to be challenged in the first place.251 
Despite the complexity and nuances of these three debates,252 they have all similarly contributed to 
the demythologization of the image of a primeval Australia and a pre-colonial population unable to 
modify and improve their wild surroundings. We now know that the peoples of Australia had a profound 
and lasting influence on their habitats and that their ecological practices were knowledgeable, flexible, 
and dynamic. In spite of the undeniable and broad impact of Australians on the flora and fauna, they 
generally  maintained the productivity of the land.253 Therefore, their relationship with nature was largely 
sustainable.254 Sustainability was not the result of an inherent quality of the peoples of Australia, but 
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rather the historical result of centuries of trial and error undertaken by societies whose survival depended 
on the preservation of their habitats and natural resources.255 
That scenario changed with the arrival of the British. Initially the British settlements in Australia went 
through a period of hardship. But once the colonies eventually boomed in the mid-nineteenth century, 
the environmental effects of the colonial economy on Australian landscapes were numerous. Animals, 
like kangaroos, were killed by the millions, while others were simple exterminated. In order to get timber 
and open space for agriculture and pastoralism, colonists cleared millions of hectares of forest and 
destroyed other indigenous vegetation. Uncontrollable fires that left in their wake degraded landscapes 
further devastated Australian vegetation. In Australia, the most fire-prone continent on Earth, the 
unsound burning techniques of pastoralists, farmers, and gold prospectors could sometimes turn 
catastrophic.  
In addition to vegetation, the need to supply water to the main urban settlements exhausted aquifers. 
In the countryside, countless herds of sheep, counted by the millions, caused soil compaction and erosion, 
destroying edible plants and polluting water streams. Finally yet importantly, the nascent mine industry 
generated large amounts of water and soil pollutants that added to the overall ecological footprint of the 
colonists and their way of living.256 Overall, the British settlers’ economic achievements came at the 
expense of ‘severely depleted ecosystems’.257 
The degree of loss of the forest cover in Australia is one of the elements that helps put into perspective 
the impact of the colonial economy. From the establishment of the first settlements to the end of the 
nineteenth century, deforestation amounted to one-third of the pre-colonial forest, approximately 87.6 
million hectares out of 244 million.258 To this day, half of the forests of Australia have either been cut 
down or are  severely depleted.259 In addition, the cultivation of the land after European settlement and 
pastoralism caused the deterioration of two-thirds of all arable land.260 In New Zealand, forests shrank 
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25 percent in relation to their pre-colonial cover.261 In addition, 14 percent of the country was cleared in 
order to open space for a pastoral economy.262 
Between 1700 and 1920 the total disappearance of forests in the temperate world amounted to 315 
million hectares.263 Of this large figure, between 230 million hectares alone came from deforestation in 
the U.S. and Australia.264 An additional 146 million hectares of temperate forest were turned into 
cropland.265 Loss of forests produced a loss of biodiversity and triggered other ecological processes such 
as desiccation, soil erosion, or/and the extinction of species.266 
 
5. European Imperialism (1850-1920): Opening up Asian and African Ecosystems  
 
The impact of nineteenth century imperialism and colonialism on nature was notorious. However, from 
an environmental perspective these phenomena did not constitute a sharp historical break or watershed. 
In fact, they were part of a larger ‘developmentalist paradigm’ characterized by state-building, 
sedentarization, and the intensification of natural resources exploitation that was also underway in Japan, 
the Ottoman Empire, China, Russia, Egypt, and South Asia.267 In China, for example, commercialism 
without capitalism resulted in substantial environmental transformation.268 Deforestation and 
environmental degradation were the price of the escalation of fuel demand triggered by economic 
development.269 
Moreover, the environmental impact of European imperialism was often added to deeply modified 
environments that in several cases had already suffered deforestation and erosion. The Western belief 
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that Africa or South Asia for that matter were still an untamed ‘wilderness’ was at odds with reality.270 
Nature in the supposedly wild African continent, as elsewhere, was largely anthropogenic.271 African 
landscapes were the result of the combination of timeless African muscle, tools, and ideas.272 Some 
habitats revealed the existence of complex civilizations and empires, which skillfully modified their 
surroundings. For instance, the Aksum Empire, situated in the high lands of Ethiopia and Eritrea, 
developed impressive forms of engineering, military capacity, and commercial networks, being an active 
participant in the world economy of the time.273 Its wealth stemmed from a privileged location at the 
center of several trading routes and from ingenuity and creativity in managing the Empire’s ecological 
resources.274 But not all African societies had reached a sustainable ecological balance before European 
colonial powers partitioned the continent. One example of a lack of sustainability was the collapse of the 
Great Zimbabwe in the fifteenth century, partly due to environmental overexploitation.275 
As European imperialism, industrialization, and the capitalist penetration of the non-European world 
progressed during the nineteenth century, the demand for raw materials accordingly intensified. New 
networks of capital, trade, and production increased the incentive to harness ecosystems in search for 
new commodities. The rationale behind the apprehension of the world’s natural wealth was not just to 
make the environment more productive, but also to bring it under the increasing control of the colonial 
administration. Often these two aspects intertwined. Large dams, for example, brought nature into order 
while transforming subsistence agriculture into a commercial activity.276 The increasing exercise of 
power over the environment had a cost. Colonial hydraulic projects in the British Empire, especially 
India, deteriorated riverine ecosystems, causing the diminution of fisheries, the spread of waterborne 
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diseases, seepage, waterlogging, salinity, and malaria.277 Water-loss from evaporation could reduce the 
efficiency of canals by 60 to 70 percent.278 
One of the main environmental effects of Western imperialism in the nineteenth century was 
deforestation. The amount of forest destroyed varied in different locations. Due to the destruction of pre-
colonial populations (which meant less competition for resources) in the non-European temperate world, 
where settler societies existed, the clearing of forests was larger than in the densely populated tropical 
territories acquired by European powers.279 The great availability of timber in the former regions explains 
why deforestation in temperate areas surpassed the felling of forest in the tropical world, which was 
nevertheless considerable. 
 In India, forests were already under considerable human pressure before the beginning of British rule. 
As population grew, they were transformed in fields for agricultural production.280 Under colonial rule, 
two main factors intensified previous clearing. The production of cash crops for export subordinated 
forest to global demands.281 Besides, the imposition of a colonial tax exacerbated land clearing to pay for 
the levies.282 Processes of ecological degradation such as salinization, water-table losses, and soil erosion 
often followed the loss of forest cover.283 As the productive capacity of forests was squeezed, the 
possibilities of the local population to obtain traditional economic products from it sharply decreased.284 
Honey, game, curative herbs, plants, and firewood, among others, became scarcer and less accessible.285 
For Guha, the difference between colonial rule and previous times was not that forest disappeared or 
even that people were subjugated, but rather that the changes ‘had a sweeping and irreversible character 
that they had never previously possessed’.286 
 The colonization of South East Asia engendered a similar pattern of environmental alteration. Forests 
and lands in this region were under intensive use for subsistence and trade purposes long before European 
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colonization.287 Yet, European imperialism introduced new methods of production to satisfy an 
increasing global demand for agricultural products, which increased the human pressure over the land. 
In Java, the Dutch introduced plantation agriculture oriented to the export of sugar, coffee, indigo, and 
tobacco. In order to establish plantations forests had to be cleared.288 The Dutch also concentrated in 
exploiting teak, a hardwood of great value for shipbuilding and construction.289 Annual production of 
teak rose from 16,700 logs in 1733-1765, to 145,000 in 1837-1865.290 
In Malaya, Burma, and British Borneo, rainforests served the imperial needs of the metropolis, 
particularly shipbuilding, which was vital for the maritime hegemony of the British navy. The provision 
of teak was of such a strategic value that Burma’s attempt to control its extraction was one of the main 
factors leading to the third Anglo-Burmese war.291 Burma’s deforestation resulted in the loss of local 
fishery stock, soil deterioration, and the extinction of some animal and vegetal species.292 As in the case 
of India, the local inhabitants found it increasingly difficult to get products that were essential to their 
daily life from shrinking forests, a fact that contributed to their economic hardship.293 
When the Philippines came under Spanish power in 1565, 90 percent of the island was covered by 
forest. By 1900, the percentage had fallen to 70 percent, which was a minor change in comparison to 
what had taken place elsewhere. As in other colonial territories, the subordination of land use to market 
requirements accelerated environmental change. Deforestation during the nineteenth century affected the 
part of the country—central Luzon—in which commercial crop plantations of tobacco, abaca, and sugar 
cane had been established.294 These activities were possible due to the softening of mercantilist 
restrictions and the opening of the island to world trade in the previous century.295 One of the main 
environmental consequences of forest destruction for the inhabitants of central Luzon was the desiccation 
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of lakes and swamps as the water-retentive quality of soils was lost.296 In addition, floods became more 
frequent and severe than ever before.297 
Between 1850 and 1920, the overall felling of forests in South Asia and South East Asia reached a figure 
of 33 million hectares.298 
In Africa, the environmental effect of European imperialism was also considerable. However, nature 
was partly safeguarded by the slow advance of capitalism into the interior of the continent. Human 
pressure on the continent’s ecology was kept in check for centuries due to the depopulation caused by 
the slave trade. In the nineteenth century, violent conquest, displacement of labor, disruption of food 
provisioning, and the introduction of diseases took additional millions of lives and contributed to famine 
crises, some lasting for as long as a decade.299 The cattle rinderpest disease that came from Europe killed 
80 percent of infected animals, leaving pastoral communities in disarray, making them more 
economically vulnerable and, hence, dependent on jobs offered in plantation agriculture.300 The reduction 
of the African population like the collapse of the pre-colonial population in America allowed the 
regeneration of nature, above all in the Savannah areas.301 
Before the 1870s the growing demand from international markets did not generally mean dispossession 
of land or decision-making capacity from Africans and their institutions.302 Events in the southern part 
of the continent altered that trend. The discovery of diamonds in Kimberley in 1866 and gold in the 
Transvaal in the 1880s led to a reorganization of territory and power relations in South Africa as the 
ownership of the mines was allocated to the white elite.303 As a consequence of mining, the value of the 
land suddenly rose and mines mushroomed. There was an imperative need to provide the mines with 
food for its work force and timber for its shafts.304 In order to assure land for these and other lucrative 
enterprises such as cattle ranching and crop exports, the colonial state allocated 75 percent of the land of 
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the South African Union to white settlers, while 40 percent of the African population was concentrated 
in reserves.305 Reserves became places of cheap labor that served as a work force for the mines.306 
The South African model was replicated in other parts of Africa, particularly in the British colonies. 
The result was a division between market-oriented production and the exploitation of natural resources 
mainly by white settlers and rural self-sufficient communities formed by Africans.307 The colonial state 
maintained that division, using coercive power if necessary, in order to assure the success of settlers’ 
economic enterprises.308 French planters ran their plantations more like capitalist firms than settler farms, 
with similar results.309 Intensive cropping methods caused the degradation of soils.310 Erosion was 
particular prominent in areas of European settlement in the South, North, and East of Africa.311 South 
Africa was an extreme case. By the 1930s, the government estimated that agricultural productivity had 
decreased by a quarter in only 25 years because of soil erosion.312 
African land was not the only element of the environment that was affected by the deployment of public 
and private economic power. Imperial hunting provoked a severe reduction of wildlife and the extinction 
of several species.313 In South Africa, hunting was especially important for the diet of pre-colonial 
populations. Nevertheless, the demand of game meat in the white settlements and imperial markets for 
animal products such as ivory intensified the degree of animal killing.314 By the late nineteenth, hunting 
shifted from a commercial enterprise into a cultural and racial expression of white dominance, 
masculinity, and sportsmanship.315 Economic and recreational factors explain the increase in wildlife 
hunting. The number of dead animals was considerable—the ivory trade in the Cape alone accounted for 
the death of 25,000 elephants in 20 years.316 
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As in Asia, forests were also cut in Africa to serve the needs of industrial capitalism. Between 1700 and 
1920 the total disappearance of tropical forest in order to open space for agriculture (part of this land was 
cleared by locals, but cash crop capitalism contributed to a large part of the falling) was 222 million 
hectares. This number added to the 315 million ha cleared in the temperate world for agriculture (mostly 
plantation agriculture) amounted to 537 million ha.317 This number does not take into account the extra 
146 million hectares of grassland turned into cropland in the temperate world.318 
 
Concluding remarks 
The environmental history of Western imperialism is complex and multifaceted. One complicating 
element is the state of non-European ecosystems before the arrival of Europeans. Non-European pre-
colonial societies differed enormously. Empires prospered alongside city-states, confederations, regional 
alliances, rural communities, and other types of political formation. Some societies thrived along the 
coasts; others built their power in plateaus, hills, or the rainforest. Some were movable and nomadic, 
others sedentary, and some alternated between both trends. Independently of their size and complexity, 
none of them was static. They all evolved, changing periodically in an effort to adapt to different 
circumstances and a cluster of factors that shaped their historical trajectory.  
 Their environmental impact was also diverse. In large part, it related to their productive activities, their 
consumption patterns, the nature of their natural habitats, and their population. For that reason, it is 
difficult to arrive at a definite conclusion about non-European patterns of nature alteration. While some 
pre-colonial societies had reached an ecological balance, others were unsustainable. However, despite 
variation, two general trends are evident. The idea that the world outside Europe was a wilderness was 
far from the truth. It would be more correct to say that no inch of nature was unaffected there, where 
humans had established their presence. The pristine and primeval reality that Europeans were thought to 
have discovered was largely their own creation (if for unintended reasons, as we shall later see). Despite 
non-Europeans’ undeniable imprint on the landscape and various instances of natural degradation, it is 
possible to affirm that the populations of America, Africa, and Oceania had reached a certain overall 
balance with their surroundings, largely because of their direct dependence on the products of their 
surrounding nature.  
                                                 
317 Williams, Deforesting the Earth, 318. This figure amounts to the size of a country slightly bigger than India and Mexico 
put together. 
318 Ibid. This figure amounts to an extension of territory two times the size of India. 
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 Western imperialism dramatically changed that scenario. The imperative of acquiring profits out of 
colonial ventures resulted in environmental degradation. Apart from the localized destruction that this 
processes produced, one of the main effects of imperialism over non-European nature was the Europeans’ 
acquisition of a hegemonic power to define non-European ecosystems. As European colonists extended 
their presence and power worldwide, they tended to assume that most of the territories they visited, 
conquered, or administered were still virgin. For them, the world outside Europe appeared mostly as a 
wilderness, waiting to be conquered and easily amenable to their transformative power.319 This 
misconception is understandable, to a certain degree. As pre-colonial populations in various continents 
died by the millions, forests and ecosystems greatly expanded. Nature extended its reach in the colonies 
and so European colonists and commentators alike, who ignored the interconnection between these 
phenomena, naturally tended to suppose that this was an outgrowth rather than a tragic human-made 
phenomenon. 
Once the natural world outside Europe was conceptualized and represented as a prolific blank sheet, a 
virgin space to be conquered, it was easy to argue persuasively that in those wild physical spaces society 
and civilization ought to be forged anew. The power to define the world outside Europe as a wild natural 
canvass gave rise to an even larger power: the power to build material civilization out of wild nature. 
This power, in turn, demanded an authoritative language that legitimized acquisition. Colonial nature 
ought first to be appropriated so that it could then be exploited. This cosmopolitan idea fit perfectly with 
a more mundane imperialistic interest in seizing profitable natural resources. As imperialism advanced, 
slowly but surely the natural environments of several continents became subordinated to the economic 
requirements of few European nations and the wealthy individuals that participated in the colonial 
enterprise.  
Another effect of European imperialism was that it allowed consumption patterns in Europe to surpass 
what was environmentally sustainable. Europeans, with enough purchasing power, could consume as 
many natural resources as they wanted without needing to worry whether those resources could be 
obtained in Europe. Sugar, furs, tropical oils, spices, and exotic fruits added to the range of natural 
products at the disposal of European consumers. Thanks to colonial trade, myriad natural elements from 
Latin America, Australia, South East Asia, Africa, etc. fed international markets and wealthy mouths. 
                                                 
319 According to Arnold, the ‘travelling gaze’ of European travellers and colonists had a disciplining effect on nature, 
transforming it into an object of knowledge. The structuring power of ‘the gaze’ is discussed in David Arnold, The Tropics 
and the Travelling Gaze: India, Landscape and Science, 1800-1856 (Seattle and London, University of Washington Press, 
2006) 28-35. 
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Exporting Europeans’ environmental impact—that is, having consumers that did not directly feel the 
impact of their actions on the ecosystems that surrounded them—facilitated the introduction of 
unsustainable patterns of nature alteration. This reality has not changed; it has actually intensified. Today 
huge urban populations can consume an unlimited number of natural resources without seeing and 
realizing the destruction that their consumption patterns cause. 
An ever-growing amount of non-European territories was increasingly used in order to fulfill the 
consumption demands of wealthy outsiders, often at the expenses of the needs of the local populations. 
Environmental hegemony was the cornerstone of European and U.S. political and economic hegemony. 
Conversely, the inability to control and utilize their surrounding natural wealth explains the 
impoverishment of non-European regions and populations. For this reason, the environmental dimension 
of Western imperialism is an essential piece of the imperial puzzle. 
 In order to acquire a hegemonic position over non-European nature and exploit the world’s ecological 
niches Western nations needed a sound ideological basis. A universal legal language that allowed the 
manipulation and exploitation of nature was an indispensable part of the ideological repertoire of 
colonists. Since the conquest of America, the law of nations provided a vocabulary of private power that 
facilitated the appropriation of natural resources. Transcontinental and global economic power demanded 
legal institutions to privatize and commodify nature in a way that could be presented as universally 
legitimate and globally applicable.  
As Western imperialism extended its tentacles over non-European territories, international legal 
commentators claimed that private property rights could be exercised in the new territories. Sometimes 
that justification was based on the fact that pre-colonial populations had already enjoyed them before the 
arrival of the Europeans. It was then natural that the same kind of rights would be guaranteed to the 
newcomers. In contrast, European intellectuals argued, at times, that backward non-Europeans did not 
have a notion of private property rights. In those cases, European scholars claimed that private legal 
entitlements engendered cosmopolitan progress. Intellectual power created compelling narratives and 
theories whereby private property rights came to define the kind of power that humans ought to have 
over nature in the colonies. All around the world the administrative and private power of the colonists 
put those narratives and doctrinal creations into practice. 
 For all these reasons, the environmental aspect of the international legal legitimation of colonialism 
deserves attention. As Andrew Fitzmaurice has claimed ‘… particular attitudes to the exploitation of 
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nature … permeated the entire experience of European expansion’.320 In the following chapters I would 
try to provide an outline of those attitudes, the legal instruments that helped put them into practice, as 
well as their legal outcomes.   
                                                 
320 Andrew Fitzmaurice, ‘The Genealogy of Terra Nullius’ 18 Australian Historical Studies (2007) 1-15, 14. 
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Part II 
 
THE SPANISH SCHOLASTICS AND THE COLONIZATION OF LATIN AMERICAN NATURE 
(1511-1590) 
 
 
Christopher Columbus’ arrival to Latin America inaugurated a series of momentous transformations in 
world history. It has, for instance, been related to the emergence of the capitalist world economy,1 the 
beginning of the scientific revolution,2 and even to the origins of modernity.3 These multifaceted processes 
left a profound mark on Latin American pre-colonial societies. In addition, the environment was one of 
the areas in which the enormous implications of the conquest of Latin America were more visible. 
Contemporary historians have, for example, shed light on how the conquest transformed the world’s trade 
and ecology,4 how it affected Latin American nature and environmental relations within the continent,5 
and the way in which it set in motion a process of biological homogenization of planetary dimensions.6 
Before the three Spanish caravels—La Pinta, La Niña y La Santa María—appeared on the horizon, Latin 
America had been mostly hidden to and protected from the intrusion of outsiders. For centuries, its 
ecological, political, social, economic, and cultural reality evolved at a pace in step with the complex 
internal dynamics of the continent. That was radically changed after Columbus’ voyage. From the moment 
the first conquistadores set foot on the continent, Latin America was both physically conquered and 
conceptually constructed.7 
                                                 
1  Anibal Quijano and Immanuel Wallerstein, ‘Americanity as a Concept or the Americas in the Modern World System’ 134 
International Journal of Social Science (1992) 549-554. 
2  Antonio Barrera-Osorio, Experiencing Nature: The Spanish American Empire and the Early Scientific Revolution (Austin, 
University of Texas Press, 2006).   
3  See Matthew J. Lauzon, ‘Modernity’ in Jerry H. Bently (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of World History (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2011) 72-88, 72. 
4  See Charles C. Mann, 1493: How Europe’s Discovery of the Americas Revolutionised Trade, Ecology and Life on the 
Earth (London, Granta Publications, 2011). 
5  Miller, An Environmental History. 
6 See Crosby Jr., The Columbian Exchange. See also Felipe Fernández-Arnesto, 1492: The Year the World Began (New 
York, Harper Collins, 2009) 3. 
7 Jack P. Greene, The Intellectual Construction of America: Exceptionalism and Identity from 1492 to 1800 (Chapel Hill, 
University of North Carolina Press, 1993) 1. See also James Axtell, Natives and Newcomers: The Cultural Origins of North 
America (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001) 35-45. 
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Latin American nature was already described in Columbus’ diaries with an eye toward the possibility of 
finding tradable commodities.8 The urgent need to make sense of Latin America, its nature and peoples, 
stemmed mainly from a desire to exploit its wealth. It was also largely influenced by the self-appointed 
universal mission of the Spanish Crown to integrate ‘the Latin American reality’ within a Catholic 
understanding of the world. For a long span of time though, the conquistadores had the upper hand in 
defining the actual approach to the recently acquired overseas territories, hence shaping Latin American 
life. In their fervent zeal to acquire natural resources, which could yield surpluses, and a labor force to 
make them productive, the conquest of the continent became a double-edged sword which entailed the 
subjugation of its inhabitants on the one hand and the appropriation and commodification of nature on the 
other.  
It was not long before the rapid disappearance of the colonized population drew some members of the 
Dominican order to question the ideological basis of the colonial enterprise and denounce the ignominy of 
Spanish rule in Latin America. The first of these episodes of criticism serves as the chronological beginning 
of this section. After Montesinos raised an inflammatory voice against the destructiveness of the 
conquistadores in 1511, his fellow Dominicans followed suit, exploring in-depth the nature of the 
relationship between the peoples of Latin America and the Spanish monarchs. Ever conscious of the 
harshness of the conquistadores, they tried to protect Latin Americans from them. Importantly, they 
articulated that protection in language that was familiar to the Spanish, introducing legal and religious 
concepts alien to Latin Americans’ worldviews.  
One of the ways in which the search for a more legitimate and humane vision of the Spanish Empire in 
Latin America concretized was the development of a vocabulary of universal rights. Articulated by 
Francisco Vitoria in his famous relectio De indis, these natural rights have been described by critical 
scholars as having contributed to Spanish economic, political, and cultural hegemony in Latin America. 
That being true, there is still a less obvious but equally important dimension of the economic rights that 
Vitoria enunciated, which has received scant attention. In the background of these rights lay a particular— 
Vitorian—understanding of the peoples of Latin America and the Latin American ecosystems. Moreover, 
the universal economic rights of the ius gentium, derived from a specific conception of the relationship 
between the social and natural spheres, paved the way for European environmental and economic 
hegemony. 
                                                 
8 See John Cummins, The Voyage of Christopher Columbus: Columbus Own Journal of Discovery Newly Restored and 
Translated (London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1992) 103. Descriptions of Latin American physical environment abound; 
some can be found on pages 100, 105, 125, 127, 139. 
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The recognition of a series of economic rights in Latin America helped redefine the relationship between 
people and nature on the continent, consolidating a more exploitative pattern of environmental alteration. 
The enjoyment of economic rights as part of the ius gentium in the context of a growing intercontinental 
trade fostered the privatization and commodification of eco-systems, contributing to the exploitation of 
Latin American natural habitats. Accordingly, there is an environmental aspect to the theories of the 
Spanish scholastics that needs to be explored. 
In order to do so, I will examine in the following chapters the colonial arguments of two of the most 
distinguished Spanish intellectual actors during the conquest of Latin America—Francisco de Vitoria 
(1483-1546) and Bartolomé de Las Casas (1484-1566)—in conjunction with the important figures of 
Domingo de Soto (1494-1560) and José de Acosta (1540-1600). Studying these authors together will 
enrich the analysis by pinpointing similarities and differences of emphasis, scope, and/or perspective 
between them. 
Vitoria is credited with being the father of modern ius gentium, a predecessor of international law.9 He 
is also the founder of the influential School of Salamanca, to which Soto belonged as well. One of his main 
pupils, Domingo the Soto developed and adapted Vitoria’s thought. Las Casas, on the other hand, has been 
portrayed as the forerunner of indigenous rights.10 In addition, he is considered one of the main exponents 
of the human rights discipline11 and the founder of modern collective human rights.12 His assertive stand 
in favor of Latin American inhabitants, unlike Vitoria, was not the intellectual pursuit of one who reflected 
from afar. He lived in Latin America and witnessed first-hand the sufferings of its inhabitants, explaining 
the stronger emphasis of his writings and advocacy.  
Finally, José de Acosta made some of the most important ethnological observations about the peoples of 
Latin America. In fact, the publication of Acosta’s Historia Natural de Las Indias in 1590 is the date 
chosen as the chronological end of this section. Even though any chronological choice like this is rather 
artificial, it is true that several decades after Montesinos’ bold challenge to the most destructive aspects of 
Spanish colonization, Acosta’s work closed the circle, producing a manuscript that could serve as a guide 
                                                 
9 On this contentious point, Pagden reminds us that ‘although it is clearly false to speak of Vitoria as the father of anything 
so generalized and modern as “International Law”, it is the case that his writings became an integral part of later attempts to 
introduce some regulative principle into international relations’; that is, into the relationships between different 
commonwealths. See Francisco Vitoria, Political Writings (Edited by Anthony Pagden & Jeremy Lawrance, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1991) xxviii. 
10 G. C. Marks, ‘Indigenous Peoples in International Law: The Significance of Francisco de Vitoria and Bartolomé de Las 
Casas’ 13 Australian Yearbook of International Law (1992) 1-51.  
11 Brian Tierney, The Idea of Natural Rights (Atlanta, GA Scholars Press, 1997). See also Roger Ruston, Human Rights and 
the Image of God (London, SCM Press, 2004).  
12 William J. Talbott, Which Rights Should be Universal? (New York, Oxford University Press, 2005). 
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to the government and evangelization of the peoples of Latin America. Following Las Casas and Vitoria 
to a certain extent, he gave detailed information about Latin American commonwealths, particularly about 
their level of social advancement. Latin American societies’ lack of capacity to master their surroundings 
became one of the most important parameters whereby he assessed the advancement of the communities 
that he observed.  
The pronouncements of Vitoria, Soto, Las Casas, and Acosta are important not only for their direct 
influence in the Spanish conquest and the colonization of Latin American ecosystems. In addition, they 
introduced a number of key legal arguments and conceptualizations—some still in an embryonic form—
that were further elaborated in the law of nations during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, thus 
having a remarkable influence on later thinkers. They linked the concept of dominium rerum, which Vitoria 
and Soto elaborated, for example, to humans’ paramount place in God’s creation and their right to private 
property over the natural realm. This is visible in the works of posterior natural lawyers such as Grotius, 
Pufendorf, Locke, and Vattel.  
The pronouncements of Vitoria, Soto, Las Casas, and Acosta provided theoretical foundation for legal 
theories that, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and in the context of a growing imperialist 
impetus, sought to comprehend and control non-European peoples and ecosystems in settler frontiers. For 
better or worse, the emergence and consolidation of the law of nations and international law, and the 
treatment of non-European populations during the colonial era, are testament to the long shadows cast by 
Vitoria and Las Casas.  
Examination of the doctrines of Vitoria and Las Casas has traditionally oscillated between categorizing 
them as accomplices of colonialism or alternatively praising their altruism and cosmopolitanism. These 
positions miss the point that even if Vitoria and Las Casas had a sincere desire to protect Latin Americans 
from the ills of conquest, their defense ultimately fell prey to the bias in the religious logic and conceptual 
categories that inspired their arguments. Ironically, the bias that universalism imbued in their ideologies 
ended up undermining the very population that the Spanish scholars truly aimed to protect. By separating 
the motivations of Vitoria and Las Casas from the ideology in which they found expression, one is able to 
remain critical while avoiding the pitfalls of personal blame.  
The universalization of hegemonic economic practices and cultural categories during the age of Spanish 
imperialism is of foremost significance not only for its historical relevance but also because parts of the 
conceptual framework they helped to construct are still with us today. Private property and free trade are 
still the corner stone of the contemporary neo-liberal global economic order that many call globalization. 
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Despite the great divergences between these periods, it is still possible to affirm that, embedded in 
particular international legal doctrines, both periods have naturalized rather contested visions of the good 
life, with detrimental effects in the social and environmental spheres. The process of global ideological 
and legal homogenization, which started with the conquest of Latin America and continues in a rather 
different guise in our own times, has created as many opportunities for cooperation as for exclusion and 
coercion. Economic power has largely flexed its muscles, contributing to the fact that (more often than 
not) the features of exclusion and coercion currently shape the life of the largest part of humanity. It is 
partly because of the urgency of the present that knowledge of the past can be useful for understanding the 
historical roots of oppressive agendas that have contributed to and continue to produce—if inadvertently—
rampant human suffering and widespread environmental damage. 
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2  Ius Gentium and the Material Appropriation of Latin American 
Ecosystems 
 
 
 
 
 
To bring light to those in darkness and also to get rich, which is what all of us men commonly seek1 
 
 
The Spanish colonization of Latin American set in motion a process of environmental transformation. 
Spaniards appropriated Latin American natural resources in order to extract profits. Therefore, it is 
possible to argue that Latin American nature was also colonized as result of the conquest of America. 
Analytically, this colonization had two dimensions. On the one hand, a material dimension facilitated the 
factual extension of Spanish power over Latin American natural habitats. On the other hand, Latin 
Americans’ use of ecosystems was conceptualized through the perception of Spanish commentators. 
Certain uses of natural habitats—those of the Spaniards—were judged as more progressive than 
alternative uses by Latin American peoples, hence justifying the preponderant access of the colonists to 
the natural resources of the continent. In this sense, Latin American nature was also conceptually 
appropriated.  
 This chapter is devoted to an examination of the first of these two aspects: the material appropriation 
of Latin American nature. Spanish scholastics, namely Vitoria and Soto, helped in developing an 
economic vocabulary of private power that allowed for that appropriation. This development and its 
ecological implication will be the focus of the present analysis. I will examine the arguments of these 
two authors in conjunction, as, despite nuances, there was a general agreement between them around 
certain legal questions that have important environmental implications. They agreed on the main 
economic rights that Spaniards could enjoy in Latin America. Besides, they shared a common religious 
understanding of the human relationship with nature.  
                                                 
1 Bernal Díaz del Castillo states the reasons that took the conquistadores to America. See Bernal Díaz del Castillo, Historia 
Verdadera de la Conquista de la Nueva España (Madrid, Espasa Calpe, 1968) 607 as translated in Nancy M. Farriss, Maya 
Society Under Colonial Rule-The Collective Enterprise of Survival (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1984). 
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The exploitation of Latin American natural wealth helped in fulfilling Spanish economic ambitions of 
rapid enrichment in the colonies. Exploitation became possible thanks to a series of legal mechanisms 
whereby elements of the natural environment could be separated from the ecosystems to which they were 
part and transformed into merchantable commodities. In Vitoriaʼs lecture De indis, the legal institutions 
that legitimized the material appropriation of Latin American nature were given the status of natural 
rights. The universal conceptual grounding of those rights provided them with a solid intellectual 
foundation. In addition, their inclusion as part of the ius gentium gave them universal application and, 
hence, global reach. From an environmental perspective, the most important of the natural rights that 
Vitoria recognized as part of the ius gentium were the right to private property, intercontinental trade, 
and the so-called law ferae bestiae, the old Roman relative of the doctrine of occupation.  
Important as these rights were for the appropriation of Latin American ecosystems, it is still difficult 
to imagine how their mere existence and recognition could foster an exploitative environmental 
approach. After all, the pre-colonial populations of Latin America had appropriated and traded elements 
of Latin American ecosystems for millennia. The rights that Vitoria acknowledged as applicable to the 
Latin American context helped the localized destruction of nature only because they functioned in a 
wider imperial socio-economic context in which Spanish power was linked to the worldwide exploitation 
of natural wealth. What is more, apart from enhancing the economic power of the Spanish Crown, the 
rights to private property, trade, and occupation operated within a particular understanding of the 
relationship between humans and nature in Latin America derived from a specific Christian conception 
of the boundary between the natural and social spheres. The preeminence of the latter over the former 
created the ideological space in which Spanish economic rights over Latin American ecosystems could 
be exercised without the sense that one ought to be concerned about the destruction of nature. 
In order to examine the past without falling into presentism and anachronism, it is of foremost 
importance to bear in mind from the outset that the way in which we look at nature today is radically 
different from Vitoria and Soto. Our world and that of the Spanish scholastics are incommensurable. As 
Ileana Porras reminds us, concepts like ecosystems, ecology, and sustainability, among others, have 
novel currency and affect our perceptions and the implications we draw from the world.2 Vitoria and 
Soto looked at nature in a completely different way than we do today. They understood nature primarily 
through their religious lenses. Today, rid of a religious understanding of the natural world, many of us 
                                                 
2 Ileana Porras, ‘Appropriating Nature: Commerce, Property, and the Commodification of Nature in the Law of Nations’ 
27 Leiden Journal of International Law (2014) 641-660, 649.  
74 
 
wear different ones. So again, the point of analysis of Vitoria’s and Soto’s ideas is not to pass judgment 
upon them, but rather to examine the type of glasses they wore in order to ascertain the historical and 
current implications of the power attached to certain ideas and worldviews. This effort will not be in vain 
if we become aware of certain parallels between the types of ideological glasses they wore and the ones 
we currently wear. 
 
Spanish conquest and the Duda Indiana  
The Spanish conquest of Latin America is one of the most destructive episodes in human history. The 
combination of Spanish germs and violent conquest brought about a population collapse of 
unprecedented proportions.3 The decay of the Latin American population was a swift phenomenon. One 
and a half centuries after Columbus’ first voyage, the pre-colonial population was reduced to 10 percent 
of its original figure. In other words, tens of millions of individuals perished.4 Witnessing the destruction 
of the very population they were supposed to convert, members of the Dominican order began to question 
the way in which Spanish colonization was being carried out. In particular, the brutality with which the 
Spanish undertook the conquest of the Taíno population of the island of Hispaniola (the first territory to 
concentrate the attention of Spanish conquistadores) was exposed and denounced by the first Dominicans 
that arrived on the island. The Taíno were completely annihilated. If Spanish conquest proceeded the 
same way, the evangelizing mission was clearly in jeopardy.  
One of the main issues of contention was the imposition of a semi-feudal order through the 
establishment of a forced labor system, the repartimiento, which was later substituted by a similar 
                                                 
3 The reasons for population collapse were manifold. Several of the causes of death, like harsh labor, disruption of previous 
system of production, displacement of male adults for work, and allocation of women for the newcomers are attributable to 
the destructiveness of the conquistadores. However, the main reason was disease. But its enormous impact can only be 
correctly explained in conjunction with conquest. Germs were so devastating because they affected an already weakened 
society in which the normal mechanisms for demographic recovery were no longer in place. See George Raudzens, 
‘Outfighting or Outpopulating? Main Reasons for Early Colonial Conquest, 1493-1788’ in George Raudzens (ed.), 
Technology, Disease and Colonial Conquest, Sixteenth to Eighteenth Centuries: Essays Reappraising the Guns and Germs 
Theories (Leiden, Brill, 2001) 31-57, 36-39. See also Massimo Livi Bacci, Conquest: The Destruction of the American Indios 
(Cambridge, Polity Press, 2008) and Elliott, Empires, 59-63. A concrete example of the lethal effect of mines on workers’ 
health in colonial Latin America can be found in Kendall W. Brown, ‘Workers’ Health and Colonial Mercury Mining at 
Huancavelica, Peru’ 57 The Americas (2001) 467-496. 
4 Matthew Restall, Seven Myths of the Spanish Conquest (New York, Oxford University Press, 2003) 141. Importantly, 
germs travelled faster than conquerors, so in many areas the Latin American population was declining even before direct 
contact with the Spaniards. 
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institution called the encomienda.5 In fact, the spark that ignited the first reaction against the mistreatment 
of Latin American peoples originated precisely as a denunciation of that system of labor on the island of 
Hispaniola. On the 21st and 28th of December 1511, on the island of Hispaniola, Fray Antonio de 
Montesinos (1475-1540) took the crowd that assisted to mass by storm. He ascended to the pulpit of the 
church and delivered a diatribe to the conquistadores that was to shake the foundations of the Spanish 
Empire in Latin America for the first time. In his sermons, Montesinos unmasked the greed and 
ruthlessness of the encomenderos who, he held, were using Latin Americans for their own economic 
benefit, paying scant attention to their well-being and religious instruction. Montesinos’ denunciation 
aroused a fierce reaction in Hispaniola. His accusation that the conquistadores were in mortal sin planted 
the first seeds of the duda Indiana, the doubts of conscience about the goodness and morality of Spanish 
colonialism. There was nothing more frightening for the ruthless catholic colonists than the threat of 
eternal damnation. Soon the controversy reached the royal court in Spain. The legitimacy of the Spanish 
colonial enterprise in Latin America was at stake and, hence, the Spanish King took special interest in 
the question, spurring a long-lasting debate. 
From the outset, the law was an essential element of the Spanish expansion in Latin America. Upon 
setting foot on the continent, Columbus celebrated a legal ritual whereby he took possession of the lands 
discovered in the name of the Queen and King.6 The relevance of the legal form was reflected in the fact 
that Columbus’ first expedition included a public notary (escriba) but not a priest. Securing rights over 
the newly acquired Latin American lands was not a concern exclusive to the Spaniards. Other colonial 
powers such as the Dutch, the English, the French, and the Portuguese celebrated different kinds of rituals 
by which they claimed a right over Latin American land as a way of initiating colonial authority.7 
The Latin American colonial acquisitions of the Crown of Spain were, from the outset, shielded 
against European colonial rivals. In 1493, one year after Columbus voyage to Latin America, the Pope 
Alexandre IV issued a series of Bulls—Inter caetera I, Inter caetera II, Eximiae devotionis—in which 
he donated in perpetuity all Latin American territories to the Spanish Crown in exchange for 
                                                 
5 The repartimiento was the first denomination of the forced labor system that allocated Latin Americans as workers to the 
Spanish conquerors. Whereas the repartimiento originated in Hispaniola under the control of Fray Nicolás de Ovando, a royal 
official, and was later extended to other Caribbean islands, the encomienda appeared once the Spanish started the inland 
conquest of Latin America, becoming institutionalized during the conquest of Mexico under the leadership of Hernan Cortés. 
See Jonathan C. Brown, Latin America: A Social History of the Colonial Period (Belmont, Thomson Wadsworth, 2005) 84-
95. 
6 Stephen Greenblatt, Marvelous Possessions: The Wonder of the New World (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1991) 
55. 
7 Patricia Seed, Ceremonies of Possession in Europe’s Conquest of the New World (Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1995). 
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evangelization.8 According to the power conferred by the Pope in the Bull Inter caetera II, the Spanish 
Crown was the owner of all the water and land west of the meridian, situated 100 leagues west of the 
islands of Cabo verde and the Azores.9 Not satisfied with the unilateral line decreed by the Pope, the 
Crown of Portugal initiated negotiations with Spain in order to demarcate their mutual spheres of 
influence in Latin America. On 7 June 1494, they signed the Treaty of Tordesillas, which resolved 
colonial tensions between the two naval powers. In the treaty, the line of demarcation of Spanish power 
in Latin America was moved from 100 to 370 leagues west of the island of Cabo Verde.10 The east of 
that line comprised the eastern part of what is today Brazil. The inclusion of that territory within a 
Portuguese sphere of influence lay the foundation for the Portuguese Empire in Latin America. 
The external legitimacy of Spanish colonial power, however, did not resolve the thorny question of 
what to do with the myriad polities the Spanish had come across in their inroads in Latin America. What 
was the right treatment of the new Spanish subjects? Moreover, what was the legal ground whereby 
Spanish power could be legitimately exercised in Latin America? In order to resolve these questions, 
Ferdinand, the Spanish monarch, summoned a commission of theologians and officials.11 One result of 
these early deliberations about the ethic of the conquest was the promulgation of the Leyes de Burgos in 
1512, which legalized and regulated the system of forced labor whereby Spanish masters subjected Latin 
American peoples. These laws were, however, insufficient to settle the controversy surrounding Spanish 
conquest. While they provided legal certainty to the internal social and economic life of the new Spanish 
territories, they still did not say anything about the just basis for the wars of conquest.  
After Montesinos’ accusatory speech, Ferdinand was aware of the urgent need for finding a formula 
that would specify the legal basis for the Spanish ‘wars of pacification’. So, a group of theologians 
gathered at the monastery of San Pablo in 1513 and came up with a doctrine that was translated into legal 
terms by the royal jurist Juan López de Palacios Rubios. The purpose of this pronouncement—the 
requerimiento12—was to appease the doubts of conscience that could be generated by the subjugation or 
even killing of Latin Americans. The requerimiento was, basically, an ultimatum, compelling Latin 
                                                 
8 Carlos Alberto Roca Toco, ‘De Las Bulas Alejandrinas al Nuevo Orden Político Americano’ 5 Anuario Mexicano de 
Historia del Derecho (1993) 329-369, 329.  
9 Ibid.  
10 Ibid.  
11 Lewis Hanke, The Spanish Struggle for Justice in the Conquest of America (Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 1949) 23. 
12 ‘Requerimiento (Proclamation read to the American-Indian natives by the Conquistadores after their landing)’ in Wilhem 
G. Grewe (ed.), Fontes Historiae Iuris Gentium (Berlin/New York, de Gruyter, 1988) Vol II, 68-70. For the historical origins 
of the requerimiento see István Szászdi León-Borja, ‘Requerimiento’ in J. Michael Francis (ed.), Iberia and the Americas: 
Culture, Politics and History (Santa Barbara, ABC-CLIO, 2006) 903-904. 
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Americans to accept Spanish sovereignty, surrender to the power of its King and the Pope, and accept 
the preaching of the gospel. Abiding by these terms guaranteed protection and a lack of compulsion to 
convert to the new faith. Their rejection was interpreted as a declaration of war, which in the event of 
defeat justified enslavement and dispossession of the Latin Americans’ property.  
This ritual, performed in front of people who could not even understand its meaning, evidenced the 
bias of the Spanish legal process, as it forced Latin Americans to decide between given alternatives, 
foreclosing the possibility of an equitable dialogue.13 Due to these shortcomings, Spanish theologians 
and intellectuals soon disputed the suitability and legal validity of the requerimiento.14 This controversy 
was part of a broader debate about the just title of Spanish colonial possessions in Latin America and the 
legitimacy of war.15 Besides the short-term effects of Montesinos’ courageous campaign, his sermons 
inaugurated a long-lasting and humane line of argumentation about Latin American affairs.16 Inspired by 
his brave Dominican colleague and ever conscious of what was at stake in terms of power for his own 
order17 and the church at large, other Dominican friars like Francisco Vitoria and Bartolome de Las Casas 
engaged in the defense of Latin Americans, affirming their freedom, status, and even their capacity to 
hold property. 
The advocacy of some members of the Dominican order can be portrayed.18 Without denying a real 
preoccupation for the Latin Americans’ wellbeing, an alternative view underscores the complex power 
struggle that stemmed from the attempt to control the colonization process. In this context, the different 
agendas of the Church, the conquistadores, and the Spanish Crown in Latin America intertwined, 
converged, and collided. More often than not, the interest of the monarchy in checking the growing 
influence of the conquistadores aligned with the desire of the religious orders to guarantee the ethical 
character of the Catholic presence in Latin America while increasing their own niche of power in the 
new colonial society, often in competition with other religious orders.19 
                                                 
13 Greenblatt, Marvelous Possessions, 59. Seeds convincingly argues that the Requirimiento did ‘not intend to be internally 
persuasive (as in a consensual relationship)—but only to obtain an external compliance’. See Seed, Ceremonies, 98. 
14 Ibid., 95.  
15 Helen Rawlings, Church, Religion and Society in Early Modern Spain (New York, Palgrave, 2002) 102. 
16 Ibid. 
17 For Seed the most vocal position adopted by the Dominican Order with regard to the poor treatment of the Latin American 
population can be explained by the desire to challenge the Franciscan religious monopoly in Latin America. See Patricia Seed, 
‘“Are These Not Also Men?”: The Indians’ Humanity and Capacity for Civilization’ 25 Journal of Latin American Studies 
(1993) 629-652, 634. 
18 This is the line of thinking famously defended in Hanke, The Spanish Struggle. 
19 The clash between Crown and colonists is described in Elliott, Empires, 117-152. Their struggle for land rights is described 
in Anthony Pagden, Lords of all the World: Ideologies of Empire in Spain, Britain and France c. 1500-c. 1800 (London, Yale 
University Press, 1995) 92. The argument of an alliance between Spanish friars and monarchy can be found in Daniel Castro, 
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The destructiveness of the conquistadores compromised the mission to convert Latin America peoples 
to the Catholic creed. How could religious orders and the Dominicans in particular spread the gospel if 
the population to evangelize was speedily disappearing or so utterly afraid that it fled in their presence? 
Moreover, was it convenient that the reported atrocities of Catholic colonists were associated with the 
designs of the Emperor and the Pope for the newly ‘discovered’ lands and peoples? The reputation of 
Catholic Spain in Europe and for that matter of the whole Christendom was at stake at a crucial moment 
for the future of the Church. Therefore, the Dominicans understood the urgency of finding an alternative 
and more benign way of fulfilling Spanish economic, political, and religious interests in Latin America. 
That way, they could resolve the thorny duda Indiana about the morality and legality of Spanish 
imperialism. This was the context in which Francisco Vitoria dictated two of his most famous theological 
lectures—De indis et De iure belli relectiones—in which he dealt with the moral and legal aspects of the 
Spanish conquest. 
 
Francisco de Vitoria between gentleness and expediency 
Francisco Vitoria is one of the main points of reference for studies of modern international thought and 
international legal historiography. This privileged place stems from the fact that his scholarship was a 
response to some of the most important transformations of the early modern world, providing sixteenth 
century Christianity with a road map to navigate the turbulent waters of an expanding and changing 
globe.20 
He was one of the most important political thinkers of the sixteenth century21 and perhaps the most 
reputed theologian in Catholic Europe at the time.22 He occupied the Prime Chair of Theology at the 
University of Salamanca from 1526 to 1546.23 In 1539, he presented his conclusions about the Spanish 
claim to dominion in the Indies. Even though doubts about the requerimiento and the validity of Spanish 
legal title to Latin America had been around for quite a while, there was scant open discussion of the 
                                                 
Another Face of Empire: Bartolomé de Las Casas, Indigenous Rights, and Ecclesiastical Imperialism (London, Duke 
University Press, 2007) 152-153. 
20 See Koskenniemi, ‘Empire’, 12. 
21 This is the place awarded in Seed, Ceremonies, 98. 
22 Ruston, Human Rights, 70. 
23 Ramon Hernandez, ‘The Internationalization of Francisco de Vitoria and Domingo de Soto’ 15 Fordham International 
Law Journal (1991-1992) 1031-1059, 1037. 
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issue until the complex civilizations of Anahuac and Tawantinsuyu fell prey to Spanish power.24 These 
were advanced societies with enormous, sophisticated, and rich cities. Their destruction and the pillage 
that went with it did not go unnoticed. Vitoria was particularly concerned about the nefarious way in 
which Pizarro and his men had proceeded during the conquest of Tawantinsuyu.25 
In this context, the authoritative voice of Vitoria reopened the debate about the valid titles for Spanish 
sovereignty in Latin America. According to Pereña, he gave the first scientific response to the ethical 
and legal doubts on the Spanish conquest—the so-called duda Indiana.26 In both lectures, Vitoria’s 
arguments were fashioned in the old scholastic tradition, mixing theology and law.27 Then, Vitoria’s 
innovation lay in having answered the question of the legitimacy of the Spanish conquest of Latin 
America by reference to the ius gentium or the laws and customs shared by all human beings as part of 
one community.28 
In the relectio De indis Vitoria examined and systematically rejected seven different legal titles for 
Spanish Dominion. The first two titles that Vitoria did not recognize as valid were based on the rights of 
jurisdiction of the Emperor and the Pope in Latin America, which constituted the legal foundations of 
the requerimiento.29 Therefore, Vitoria’s conclusions challenged the official position on the legal basis 
for Spanish colonial rule.30 After discarding other possible titles like discovery, forced evangelization, 
Latin Americans’ sins, or even their voluntary acceptance of Spanish rule, he moved from a divine to a 
secular law ius gentium, which he described as that which natural reason prescribed to all human beings. 
Under ius gentium, the Spaniards had a set of rights in Latin America that entitled them to travel, sojourn, 
trade, participate in the commons, be citizens, and preach and proclaim the gospel.  
                                                 
24 David A. Lupher, Romans in a New World: Classical Models in Sixteenth-Century Spanish America (Ann Arbor, 
University of Michigan Press, 2003) 69. 
25 Ibid., 69-70. 
26 Luciano Pereña, ‘La Escuela de Salamanca. Notas de Identidad’ in Francisco Gómez Camacho and Ricardo Robledo 
(eds.), El Pensamiento Económico de la Escuela de Salamanca (Salamanca, Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca, 1998) 43-
64, 46. 
27 China Miéville, Between Equal Rights: A Marxist Theory of International Law (Leiden, Brill, 2005) 174. Lupher has also 
underlined the medieval roots of Vitoria’s ‘modernity’. See Lupher, Romans, 69. 
28 Annabel S. Brett, Changes of State: Nature and the Limits of the City in Early Modern Natural Law (Princeton, Princeton 
University Press, 2011) 13. 
29 Soto also denied that the Pope and the Emperor were Lords of the whole world. See Domingo de Soto, Relección ‘De 
Dominio’, edición crítica y traducción, con introducción, apéndices e índices porJaime Brufau Prats (Granada, Universidad 
de Granada, 1964) §27-33 135-163. 
30 It was then natural that Charles V might have interpreted Vitoria’s lecture as a challenge to his authority. Therefore, in 
November 1539 the Emperor protested to the prior of the Dominican monastery of San Esteban where Vitoria resided. See 
Luis Frayle Delgado, Pensamiento Humanista de Francisco Vitoria (Salamanca, San Esteban, 2004) 42-43.  
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At first sight, Vitoria’s system of reciprocal and universal rights seems perfectly objective. Closer 
scrutiny reveals, however, that his arguments were imbued with Spanish religious and cultural 
categories.31 Reciprocity disappeared when in the third part of his lecture Vitoria referred to 
evangelization, tyranny, free acceptance of Spanish rule and Latin Americans’—doubtful—incapacity. 
All these bases for Spanish title operated unilaterally. It was inconceivable that the Latin Americans 
could preach to the Spaniards, that the later voluntarily accepted Latin American dominion, or that the 
Spanish political and legal institutions could be lacking or could result in tyranny.32 In his apparently 
reciprocal system, the conviction of Spanish superiority informed the legal status of Latin American 
peoples.33 
His bias notwithstanding, in theory, the Spanish rights recognized by Vitoria could have still been justly 
applied, that means, enjoyed without damage being inflicted to the pre-colonial population. So, in order 
to form a complete picture of his doctrine, we still need to examine the guarantees he designed to protect 
the Latin Americans from Spanish encroachment, or what has been called his thin ‘conception of 
justice’.34 In this sense, it is fair to acknowledge that Vitoria denounced the conquistadores’ massacres, 
plundering, and capture of Latin American Princesses.35 
Vitoria also insisted that the enjoyment of Spanish rights was subordinate to the wellbeing of the Latin 
Americans. Spaniards ought to use persuasion at all costs. He even affirmed that a war could be just for 
both sides when ‘there is right on one side and ignorance on the other’.36 Vitoria’s insistence on gentle 
behavior reveals a sincere concern about the fate of the Latin Americans.37 However, gentleness 
coexisted with expediency, creating legal grounds for Spanish commercial and political power.38 The 
right to evangelize further expanded Spanish authority, providing a definite legal rationale for 
                                                 
31 Anghie, Imperialism, 17-18. See also, Brett Bowden, ‘The Colonial Origins of International Law. European Expansion 
and the Classical Standard of Civilization’ 7 Journal of the History of International Law (2005) 1-23, 12-13. 
32 A similar argument can be found in Carl Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum 
Europaeum, first edited in German in 1950, translated by Gary L. Ulmen (New York, Telos Press, 2006) 113. 
33 Tzvetan Todorov, The Conquest of America: The Question of the Other (New York, Harper Collins, 1982) 146. 
34 This is the expression used in Georg Cavallar, ‘Vitoria, Grotius, Pufendorf, Wolff and Vattel: Accomplices of European 
Colonialism and Exploitation or True Cosmopolitans?’ 10 Journal of the History of International Law (2008) 181-209, 188-
190.  
35 Francisco de Vitoria, ‘On the American Indians’ in Anthony Pagden and Jeremy Lawrence (eds), Francisco de Vitoria, 
Political Writings (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991) 231-292, intro. §3 238. In the same volume see, Letter to 
Miguel de Arcos, Appendix A 331-333. 
36 Vitoria, ‘On the American Indians’, 3.1 §6 282.  
37 Robert A. Williams Jr., The American Indian in Western Legal Thought: The Discourses of Conquest (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1990) 97. 
38 For Anghie, the notions of equality and reciprocity in Vitoria’s thinking fade away when confronted with the harsh realities 
of Spanish colonization. Once Vitoria’s arguments are contextualized, they become justifications for Spanish rule. Anghie, 
Imperialism, 21. 
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domination. The final guarantor of the legal system was the use of force. For Vitoria, war was justified 
in cases were hostile attitudes against the Spaniards persisted, impeding the fulfilment of their rights.39 
There is a pervasive tension in Vitoria’s lecture between his conviction that the Spanish conquest had 
to be carried out in a civilized manner and his endorsement of the colonial enterprise. Vitoria did not 
hesitate to denounce Spanish violent conquest of Tawantinsuyu—even vehemently, in his letter to 
Miguel de Arcos.40 At the same time, he never challenged the legitimacy of Spanish presence per se. 
Thus, he stated: ‘I myself have no doubt that force and arms were necessary for the Spaniards to continue 
in those parts; my fear is the affair may have gone beyond the permissible bounds of justice and 
religion.’41 Vitoria adopted a middle ground with regard to the justice of Spanish colonization. This is 
evident in his affirmation, at the beginning of De indis, that the matter of the barbarians ‘is neither so 
evidently unjust of itself that one may not question whether it is just, nor so evidently just that one may 
not wonder whether it might be unjust’.42 
The accommodation of divergent elements in the agendas of the Spanish Crown and his religious order 
with respect to the conquest of Latin America generated a subtle ambivalence in his relectio that was 
also manifest in his treatment of Latin American mores.43 In order to show that Latin Americans were 
not natural slaves he had to demonstrate that they had rationality and exercised self-government. The 
status of natural slaves would have prevented their having dominium (both private and public) over their 
territories, thus rendering ius gentium inapplicable to the situation. So, when Vitoria examined the 
rational capacity of the peoples of Latin America and their social achievements, he famously concluded 
that: 
 
They are not in point of fact madmen, but have judgment like other men. This is self-evident, because they have 
some order (ordo) in their affairs: they have properly organized cities, proper marriages, magistrates and 
overlords (domini), laws, industries, and commerce, all of which require the use of reason...44 
 
Yet, when at the end of his lecture he considered a final title for Spanish dominion based on the Latin 
Americans’ incapacity for self-government derived from their alleged lack of intelligence, Vitoria stated 
                                                 
39 Victoria, ‘On the American Indians’, 3.1 §8 283.  
40 See Cavalllar, ‘Vitoria’, 191. See also supra footnote 35.  
41 Vitoria, ‘On the American Indian’, 3.2 §12 286. 
42 Ibid., intro. §3 237. 
43 For a similar view on Vitoria’s ambiguity see Lupher, Romans, 81. 
44 Ibid., 1.6 §23 250. 
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that he did ‘not dare to affirm or condemn it out of hand’.45 A proof of the supposed child-like nature of 
Latin American peoples was the fact that they did not have proper laws, magistrates, and manufactures.46 
Consequently, they had to be placed under the tutelage of the Spanish crown.47 In account of his previous 
affirmation, Vitoria’s sudden hesitation about the nature of Latin Americans’ polities seems 
contradictory.48 
Vitoria’s safeguards for the Latin Americans remained also detached from the context of Latin 
American conquest.49 He wrote his lecture after forty years of Spanish colonial presence in the continent. 
The gap between his doctrines and the unkind reality of conquest left the Latin Americans in a Catch 22. 
Their survival rested upon opposing the Spanish by all necessary means. However, that sort of resistance 
was precisely what the doctrines of Vitoria outlawed. Although this limitation applied only to cases 
where the Spanish did not harm the natives, this prevention was unrealistic. Columbus treated the Taínos 
of Hispaniola rather well before wiping them out, and Cortes and Pizarro displayed good manners as part 
of their strategy to conquer great empires. Waiting to resist gave the Spaniards comparative advantage 
and reduced the already limited space for maneuver that the Latin Americans had.50 As Greenblatt puts 
it: ‘Words in the New World seem always to be trailing after events that pursue a terrible logic quite 
other than the fragile meanings that they construct.’51 
Vitoria’s distance from what was going on in Latin America disappeared at the end of his lecture when 
he inquired on the consequences of his doctrines on the Spanish titles. In the hypothetical case that Latin 
Americans had given the Spanish a friendly treatment or justly defended themselves, Spanish inroads in 
Latin America would have become illegitimate. This state of affairs would have challenged the viability 
of the Spanish Empire in Latin America. In view of this possibility, and with a remarkable awareness of 
the need to offer some grounds for Spanish rule to the Emperor, Vitoria affirmed ‘that it is clear that once 
                                                 
45 Ibid., 3.8 §18 290. 
46 Ibid. 
47 In order to help them, the Crown would administer their territories and appoint ‘prefects and governors for their towns’. 
Ibid. 
48 I will offer an answer to Vitoria’s ambivalence in Chapter 3, pages 115 to 118. 
49 The same opinion can be found in Schmitt, The Nomos, 109. Vitoria’s failure cannot be attributed to ignorance, as the 
Dominicans received detailed reports of what was happening in Latin America. See James Brown Scott, The Spanish Origin 
of International Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1934) 77.  
50 This is not a mere retrospective judgment. A very similar line of argumentation can be found in the writings of Vitoria’s 
contemporary Bartolomé de Las Casas. See Bartolomé de Las Casas, In Defense of the Indians, edited and translated by 
Stanford Poole (Illinois, Northern Illinois University Press, 1992) 171. Pufendorf also argued against receiving ‘a great 
multitude armed and with hostile intent ... especially since it is hardly possible that the native inhabitants run no danger from 
such a host’. See Samuel Pufendorf, De Jure Naturae et Gentium Libri Octo, Vol. II, edited by James Brown Scott and 
translated by C.H. Oldfather and W. A. Oldfather (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1934) Bk III Ch III §10 366. 
51 Stephen Greenblatt, Marvelous Possessions, 63. 
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a large number of barbarians have been converted, it would be neither expedient nor lawful for our prince 
to abandon altogether the administration of those territories’.52 In this retroactive justification of Spanish 
power, Vitoria remained sensitive to the reality on the ground, offering the Spanish crown a 
legitimization of its rule based on concrete historical deeds. In the search for expediency, justice was 
undermined, as he seemed to have forgotten the threshold of protection so firmly upheld before. His 
words evidence that he took evangelization for granted without distinguishing whether conversion was 
the product of a spontaneous and peaceful process or a result of the use of force.  
A final important aspect of Vitoria’s work relates to the Eurocentric character of the cultural milieu of 
the debate about the colonization of Latin America. Vitoria, as almost all his contemporaries, was 
completely indifferent to the lack of Latin American agency in the formulation of the legal theories that 
were to govern their relationship with the Spaniards. Their legal status depended, inter alia, on the 
rational arguments articulated by a single scholar, whose doctrines displaced the will of the 
approximately 2,000 social groups that existed in Latin America at the time. Vitoria, as with the 
overwhelming majority of the participants in the conquest of Latin America, suffered from the malady 
of Columbus who had ‘… discovered Latin America, but not the Americans’.53 
The absence of Latin Americans will also operated within Vitoria’s system. Intervention against 
tyrannical rules overrode Latin Americans’ consent to those practices.54 Likewise, in the name of a large 
portion of Latin American converts—even if conversion was unlawfully obtained, as ‘by threats, terror 
or other impermissible means’—the Pope could replace their sovereign with a Christian one, and could 
do so unilaterally without the request of the Latin Americans.55 Finally yet importantly, all sources used 
by Vitoria belonged to the Western tradition. There was no room in the ius gentium for Latin Americans’ 
interpretation of their own social, political, legal, cultural, or economic institutions.56 
 
                                                 
52 Vitoria, ‘On the American Indians’, 3.8 §18 292. There is a genuine concern in Vitoria´s remark regarding Latin American 
converts. However, his preoccupation stemmed from their condition of Christians rather than their latin American origin. 
53 Todorov, The Conquest of America, 49.  
54 Vitoria, ‘On the American Indians’, 3.5 §15 288. 
55 Ibid., 3.4 §14 287. 
56 Williams, The American Indian, 101. 
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Privatizing and commodifying Latin American nature: dominium rerum and trade  
The figure of Vitoria has been particularly relevant for recent critical studies on the history of international 
law.57 Placing Vitoria in a colonial context, these works have shed light on how his legal doctrines 
facilitated Spanish political and economic power in Latin America. The previous section built on those 
previous critical works. My intention in this section is to continue this line of inquiry, albeit from a novel 
perspective, by exploring the other side of the coin of Spanish economic hegemony in Latin America: its 
power to redefine Latin American nature and transform its use.  
Apart from subjecting several Latin American societies to Spanish rule, Spanish colonization set in 
motion a process of environmental change.58 Therefore, Vitoria’s theories need to be re-examined from 
this perspective in order to determine their environmental ramifications. To that end, I will also consider 
the doctrines of Domingo de Soto in conjunction with Vitoria’s, as the former’s conception of dominium 
can shed light on the latter’s views. It is my contention that an often overlooked but important 
consequence of Vitoria’s arguments in his relectio De indis was the possibility of appropriating Latin 
American ecosystems for personal enrichment. The Spanish right to war indirectly led to this result, as 
in the case of defeat it was legitimate to dispossess Latin Americans of their land and natural resources.59 
This notwithstanding, the appropriation of Latin American natural resources was also directly legitimized 
by the natural rights discourse that Vitoria elaborated as part of ius gentium. Vitoria’s articulation of a 
series of natural economic rights provided the Spanish with the legal vocabulary through which they 
could apprehend Latin American natural resources, trade them across the Atlantic, and transform them 
into wealth. 
Vitoria opened his relectio by enquiring whether before the arrival of the Spaniards ‘these barbarians 
… had true dominion, public and private’.60 His purpose was to determine ‘whether they were true 
masters of their private chattels and possessions, and whether there existed among them any men who 
were true princes and masters of the others’.61 Vitoria took into account the economic and political power 
of Latin American peoples. In order to protect the Latin American population against the conquistadores 
it was not only important to ascertain whether the peoples of Latin America enjoyed private property 
                                                 
57 See, for instance, Anthony Anghie, Imperialism, 13-31; Bowden, ‘The Colonial Origins’ 9-13; Miéville, Between Equal 
Rights, 173-78 and184-90.  
58 See supra Chapter 1, pages 29-35. 
59 Vitoria, ‘On the American Indians’, 3.1 §8 283. 
60 Ibid., 1.1 §4 239. 
61 Ibid. 
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rights but also whether they were the true lords of their own domains.62 Of these two questions 
(sovereignty and property), the issue of ownership is the most relevant for the analysis of the 
environmental implications of Vitoria’s thinking. 
With regard to ownership, Vitoria’s query established from the outset the legal foundations for all the 
ulterior discussion on the possible just titles whereby ‘we Christians were empowered to take possession 
of their territory’.63 So, while formulating the problematic he wanted to resolve, he already chose the 
legal angle from which to look at the matter. He could have alternatively posed the question of how Latin 
Americans related to their possessions: did they, for instance, have a legal regime of common or private 
property or a mixed system? This question may sound anachronistic, but we know that in Columbus’ 
first letter from Latin America the Admiral had stated that ‘he could not well understand whether’ the 
inhabitants of Latin America ‘had private property, or not’.64 Palacios Rubios had also written that they 
had no private property and that they farmed in common the few lands they cultivated.65 However, 
Vitoria’s query presumed that dominium rerum was the institutional arrangement that represented the 
way in which the inhabitants of Latin America related to their territories.  
By a simple question, Vitoria had fit Latin Americans’ commonwealths in the legal mold that was in 
line with his and his contemporaries’ worldview and their conception of the human relationship to the 
material world. His understanding of dominium rerum as a private power over material reality was based 
on a particular notion of ownership and use of land66 that (once universalized) was applied to the Latin 
American continent in disregard of the alternative ways in which its inhabitants may have related to 
nature.67 Regardless of Vitoria’s intent and political project, his neglect of the way in which Latin 
Americans related to the land can largely be explained by contextual and structural conditions, such as 
                                                 
62 See Patricio J. López Díaz-Valentín, ‘Relación de Dominio y Ley en la Situación Americana dentro del Pensamiento 
Vitoriano’ in Juan Cruz Cruz (ed.), Ley y Dominio en Francisco Vitoria (Navarra, Eunsa, 2008) 301-306, 302. 
63 Vitoria, ‘On the American Indians’, 2. 251-252. 
64 The First Letter of Christopher Columbus to the Noble Lord Raphael Sanchez Announcing the Discovery of America, 
reproduced in fac-simile from the copy of the Latin Version of 1493 with a new introduction (Boston, Published by the 
Trustees, 1891) 13. 
65 Juan López de Palacios Rubios, Libellus de insulanis oceanis quas vulgus Indias appellat per Ioannem Lopez de Palacios 
Rubios decretorum doctorem regiumque consiliarum editus (BNM, 1513) f. 4r [p.9] as cited in Anthony Pagden, The Fall of 
Natural Man: The American Indian and the Origins of Comparative Ethnology (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
1982) 51. 
66 See Woodrow Wilson Borah, Justice by Insurance: The General Indian Court of Colonial Mexico and the Legal Aides of 
the Half-Real (Berkeley and Lon Angeles, University of California Press, 1983) 38. 
67 For an overview of Middle American systems of property see Thomas M. Whitemore and B.L. Turner II, Cultivated 
Landscapes of Middle America on the Eve of Conquest (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001) 41-44.  
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the Eurocentric perspective from which the debate about the rights of Latin American peoples was 
conducted.  
The increase of human power over the environment that the universalization of private property entailed 
is illustrated by Soto’s definition of dominium in his De iustitia et iure in contradistinction to other types 
of power over nature. ‘Dominium’, he asserted, ‘is to be distinguished from possession, use or usufruct 
… for dominium is not simply the ability to use something and take its produce, but to alienate it, give it 
away, sell it or neglect it.’68 The law was the only limitation to the amplified power that the owner had 
over his/her property.69 Similarly, Vitoria maintained that ‘wild beasts and all irrational beings are subject 
to the power of man’.70 
Vitoria’s and Soto’s understanding of the process of formation of private property rights was related to 
their religious beliefs. According to Vitoria, God had conferred the world to humanity as a whole.71 Soto 
cited Genesis 1 to prove the original regime of common property.72 Vitoria argued that under natural law 
things remained common during the ‘natural state’, the historical period that spanned from Creation to 
the original sin.73 After the Fall, and due to the fact that natural law did not prescribe but just 
recommended common ownership, things were privately divided through human law74 by consensus.75 
This type of agreement had three important features. First, it could be imposed on a minority because, 
according to natural law, what the majority decided was the rule.76 Second, it was virtual, in the sense 
that everyone could take for its own use what had not been already taken.77 Finally, in order to have 
universal validity this virtual consensus was recognized as part of ius gentium.78 So, ius gentium was of 
foremost importance for the process of privatization of the world’s natural resources that had remained 
common before the Fall.79 
                                                 
68 Domingo de Soto, De iustitia et iure libri decem, introducción por Venancio Diego Carro, traducción por Marcelino 
Gonzalez Ordoñez (Madrid, Instituto de Estudios Políticos, 1967) Book IV, 1.1, 280. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Vitoria, ‘On the American Indians’, 1.4 §20 248. 
71 Francisco de Vitoria, De iustitia, q62, a1, n10, p. 69, as quoted in Teodoro López, ‘Propiedad y Dominio en Francisco 
Vitoria’ in Cruz, Ley y Dominio, 71-91, 71-72 and footnote 2. 
72 Soto, De iustitia, Book IV, 3.1, 295. 
73 ‘A principio mundi omnia erant communia’ (at the beginning of the World everything was common); in Vitoria, De iustita, 
q62, a1, n9, p. 67 as quoted in López, ‘Propiedad y Dominio’, 83. [translated by author] 
74 Ibid., q62, a1, n20, p. 75. 
75 Koskenniemi has footnoted that by ‘a distinction between binding and merely recommendatory provisions of natural law’ 
Vitoria presented the character of the divisio rerum ‘in terms of private property’. See Koskenniemi, ‘Empire’, 14. 
76 For Vitoria, this was a way of maintaining peace. Ibid., q62, a1, n22, p. 79. 
77 Ibid., q62, a1, n23, p. 79. 
78 Ibid. See also Soto, De iustitia, Book IV, 3.1, 297. 
79 Brett contends that the division of dominia was for Vitoria and Soto the main distinction between ius gentium and natural 
law. See Brett, Changes, 197.  
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For the Spanish scholastics, this religious narrative was not a metaphor, but a description of reality. The 
expulsion from paradise marked the beginning of the world, as they understood it. Once Vitoria accepted 
the institution of private property as the way of dividing the world that God had given to humanity in 
common, and once it became universally applicable by virtue of ius gentium, it acquired providential 
historical force and a totalizing geographical ambit difficult to resist. 
Vitoria and Soto’s treatment of dominium as control and power over material reality was at odds with 
the Latin Americans’ complex and diverse conceptions of nature.80 This concept transformed their bond 
with their environment—with the lands they cultivated, the minerals with which they crafted handicrafts 
and jewelry, the trees they used for timber and construction, the animals they hunted, etc.—into a material 
relationship between subject and object, owner and owned. The former term of these opposites was active 
and related to the latter in terms of superiority.81 Conceptualized through the specific vocabulary of the 
ius gentium, nature became a mere material entity to be possessed. This particular understanding of nature 
stripped it of religious and cultural readings that were significant to Latin American peoples.82 The idea 
of ownership reduced the content of Latin Americans’ relationship to their territories to a simplified 
economic version of what had previously been, while the institution of private property altered the form 
of that relationship to suit private interests. This paradigmatic shift toward the privatization of natural 
resources did not per se lead to environmental exploitation, but it furnished the legal apparatus that made 
it possible.  
In his inquisition on possible grounds for denying Latin American peoples the status of proprietors, 
Vitoria first dismissed allegations of sinfulness and their status as non-believers.83 Likewise, he then 
rebutted accusations of irrationality as unfounded.84 The proof was that their cultures were somehow 
developed.85 Accordingly, he concluded that ‘the barbarians undoubtedly possessed as true dominion, 
both public and private, as any Christians’.86 Soto was of the same opinion, namely, that Latin Americans 
had rights of jurisdiction and property over their territories.87 Vitoria was well aware of the threat that a 
                                                 
80 Vitoria argues that ‘we do not speak of anyone being the “owner” of a thing (dominum esse) unless that thing lies within 
his control’. Vitoria, ‘On the American Indians’, 1.4 §20 248. For Soto’s view see supra footnotes 69 and 70. 
81 See López, ‘Propiedad y Dominio’, 82. 
82 The literature on pre-colonial Latin American beliefs and views of nature is rather large. For an introduction, see Lee M. 
Penyak & Walter J. Petry (eds.), Religion in Latin America: A Documentary History (New York, Orbis Books, 2006). See 
also Lawrence E. Sullivan (ed.), Native Religions and Cultures of Central and South America (New York, The Continuum 
International Publishing Group Inc., 2002). 
83 See Vitoria, ‘On the American Indians’, 1.2-1.3 240-246. 
84 Ibid., 1.4 §20 247-248. 
85 Ibid., 1.6 §22 250. 
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contrary conclusion would have posed to the wellbeing of the Latin Americans and the survival of the 
very population his Dominican order so fervently wanted to convert. His conclusion prevented Latin 
American colonization from being conducted in an unruly fashion. Anarchy suited the avid 
conquistadores but hindered peaceful evangelization. The legal certitude of Latin Americans’ right to 
property was a guarantee against the despoliation of the greedy conquerors, which Vitoria deplored. As 
far as he was concerned, Spanish ‘men’ were no longer to operate in a legal vacuum of impunity in Latin 
America.  
 Besides, Vitoria was aware of the theoretical correlation between Latin Americans’ rationality, their 
having dominium, and the applicability of ius gentium. After all, property was one of the institutions that 
‘learned men’ and royal lawyers for that matter most commonly associated with the presence of a civil 
society.88 Had he found Latin Americans irrational they could have not had dominium.89 Moreover, 
without the capacity to hold property there was no chance of a political life and, hence, legal protection 
against ‘invaders attempting to seize their lands’.90 If that was the case Vitoria could not have resolved 
the ‘Indian question’ by recourse to ius gentium, which in the face of the Lutheran challenge to the power 
of the Pope and the Emperor, provided a timely and universally valid legitimization of the Spanish 
presence in Latin America.91 It offered as well the possibility of peaceful evangelization, avoiding 
Lutheran charges against a corrupted and decadent imperialist Catholicism imposed by force.  
Rationality and private property were the lynchpins over which Vitoria would later in his lecture build 
his arguments regarding ius gentium. Sanctioned by ius gentium, private property acquired universality 
and defined in retrospective the way Latin Americans related to their territories before the arrival of the 
Spaniards.92 
Having found that Latin Americans owned their territories, Vitoria maintained (in the third part of his 
relectio) that their right to private property was not absolute. The rights that nations enjoyed under ius 
gentium could limit it. By reference to ius gentium, he managed to reconcile an initial respect for Latin 
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89 Vitoria adhered to Aquinas postulate that only those who can govern their acts could own property. Vitoria, ‘On the 
American Indians’, 1.4 §20 248. 
90 Anthony Pagden, ‘Dispossessing the Barbarian: The Language of Spanish Thomism and the Debate over the Property 
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Americans’ property with the introduction of a series of legal entitlements that would eventually bolster 
Spanish economic/environmental power in Latin America.  
The exceptions to Latin Americans’ ownership that Vitoria recognized were part of a series of rights 
that governed relations between different commonwealths. Some of those rights, like the rights to travel 
and sojourn, seemed a priori neutral.93 As important as these entitlements were, there was still the need 
for a further right—the right to trade—that would give the Spanish Crown access to Latin America’s 
wealth. Only the revenues that the Crown expected to derive from the ‘trips of discovery’ could cover 
the huge military and administrative expenses of keeping afloat the Spanish Empire. For this reason, 
Vitoria’s right to trade nicely suited Spanish imperial ambitions.  
Vitoria elaborated various arguments in order to justify trade. First, he looked at bilateral relations 
between the Spaniards and the Latin Americans. Based on reciprocity, he held that commerce benefited 
them both. The latter could import commodities they did not have in exchange for gold and silver.94 
Mutual gain represented a reasonable foundation for international trade. Yet, could Latin Americans 
understand the value that gold had for the Europeans? Columbus affirmed that gold was a treasure, the 
possessor of which could impose his will on the world.95 While acknowledging the exaggeration of this 
claim, it is true that gold had great value in European and Asian markets during the sixteenth century. 
Because the Spanish and not the Latin Americans were commercially operating on both sides of the 
Atlantic, only they could know and capture the value that concrete commodities had for different 
commonwealths. A language of rights that presumed the parity of both sides obscured this information 
asymmetry.  
Due to the introduction of the right to trade in Vitoria’s ius gentium, European merchants’ profitable 
and preponderant place as intermediaries between Latin American and European markets received legal 
sanction. Vitoria was in principle opposed to profits derived from unequal trade because they amounted 
to the sin of avarice.96 However, the merchants’ personal enrichment could be acceptable as a way of 
compensating transportation costs.97 In other words, personal enrichment was justifiable if it enabled the 
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95 Cecil Jane (ed.), Select Documents Illustrating the Four Voyages of Columbus, Vol. II (London, Hakluyt Society, 1930-
1933) as quoted in Urs Bitterli, Cultures in Conflict: Encounters between European and Non-European Cultures, 1492-1800 
(Cambridge, Polity Press, 1989) 75. 
96 See the discussion in Koskenniemi, ‘Empire’, 19-20. 
97 Ibid. 
90 
 
development of commerce in cases in which it would have otherwise not been possible. Accordingly, it 
is unlikely that Vitoria would have condemned capital accumulation, as it was in fact European merchants 
and their ships that made that intercontinental trade possible in the first place.98 
Moving from bilateralism to cosmopolitanism, Vitoria invoked the fellowship of humanity as a further 
defense of trade.99 In the naturalist tradition, trade was considered as one of the channels through which 
human knowledge could be shared between different communities.100 The absence of trade hampered the 
establishment of political, economic and cultural ties between different polities. For this reason, Vitoria 
concluded that ‘the barbarians can no more prohibit Spaniards from carrying on trade with them, than 
Christians can prohibit other Christians from doing the same’.101 In addition, Latin American rulers were 
compelled by the law of nature to love the Spaniards and, hence, they could not ‘prevent them without 
due cause from furthering their own interests’.102 This justification of trade encapsulates, perhaps better 
than any other, the irony of the Spanish conquest. As Martti Koskenniemi has put it, love was ‘often 
difficult to distinguish from a desire to dominate’.103 Linked to sentiments of love and fraternity, 
commerce was internationalized, acquiring a positive cosmopolitan character that would be preserved in 
the law of nations over the following centuries. Coercion, the fact that trade was imposed on the Latin 
Americans through the threat or the actual use of force by way of the right to war, remained invisible in 
Vitoria’s legal theories.  
Vitoria’s right to trade exemplifies the shortcomings of the humanitarianism that often permeates the 
cosmopolitan justifications of universal rules. The general interests of an abstract humanity were invoked 
as the basis of a right that ignored the particular interests of the concrete millions of humans that inhabited 
Latin America, whose opinion on the matter became irrelevant as a source of law. Cosmopolitanism 
cloaked the unequal colonial setting in which economic domination came about.104 It was actually 
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Spanish economic rights—dressed as universal—and their monetized market economy that displaced the 
individual rights of Latin American peoples.105 
At least, Vitoria’s defense of free trade seemed to offer a choice of trading partners. According to him, 
Christian Kings could not deter their subjects (turned merchants) from trading with other nations. 
However, this small niche of liberty within which Latin Americans could have freely maneuvered clashed 
with the interest of the Spanish Crown in developing a trade monopoly in Latin America. This forced 
Vitoria to limit the freedom of commerce he had so firmly upheld before when later in the text he 
defended Spanish commercial monopoly: 
 
… And since it is the pope’s special business to promote the Gospel throughout the world, if the princes of 
Spain are in the best position to see to the preaching of the Gospel in those provinces, the pope may entrust 
the task to them, and deny it to all others. He may restrict not only the right to preach, but also the right to 
trade there, if this is convenient for the spreading of the Christian religion … Besides, the princes of Spain 
were the first to undertake the voyages of discovery, at their own expense and under their own banners; and 
as since they were so fortunate as to discover the New World, it is just that this voyage should be denied, and 
that they alone should enjoy the fruits of their discovery106 
 
The authority of the Pope was enough to limit Latin American trade only if it was established that a 
monopoly on commerce was conducive to evangelization. Vitoria knew, of course, that it was in the 
interest of the Pope to limit the presence in Latin America of those nations that had embraced the 
Reformation. This could play to the advantage of the Spanish Crown. A trade monopoly authorized by 
the Pope could be used not only against Protestant nations but also against Catholic rivals. But Vitoria 
was also aware that the Pope’s power was of no use against nations that no longer recognized his 
authority. Hence, he complemented the possibility of an exclusive Papal trade concession with the 
allegation that the burden of colonization had to be compensated by the exclusive enjoyment of eventual 
benefits. Here, Vitoria was reasoning like an investor. He understood that it was risky to advance 
                                                 
105 For Brown: ‘One of the great changes of the Conquest, particularly within the former Inka Empire, was the introduction 
of the market system. Previously, the economy had been based on redistribution and reciprocity … the coming of the 
Spaniards, however, imposed the rule of an external social group with a totally alien economic culture in the form of monetized 
markets’. See Jonathan C. Brown, Latin America: A Social History of the Colonial Period (Belmont, Thomson Wadsworth, 
2005) 205. For an overview of South American systems of exchange before Spanish conquest see Bruhns, Ancient South 
America, 278-289. 
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financial resources without the security of returns. Yet he presented the question of Spanish trade 
monopoly in cosmopolitan terms. It is ironic that he used one of the supreme cosmopolitan ideals—
love—to justify free trade, whereas another—justice—served the contrary function of restricting it.  
Vitoria’s right to trade was detached from the reality of the Spanish occupation of Latin American 
territories. From the outset, Spanish violence was a pervasive feature of conquest. Since Columbus and 
his ‘men’ landed in Hispaniola, they acquired and used the land and its fruits for their own gain and did 
so by recourse to all available means. The forceful apprehension of Latin American riches continued 
unabated as colonization intensified, with the full involvement of the Spanish Crown soon afterwards 
and the defeat of the prosperous Empires of Anahuac and Tawantinsuyu.  
Although Latin American peoples were allowed to carry on internal trade, the exchange of the main 
commodities—spices, gold, silver, and sugar—was under the absolute control of Spain. These goods 
were exchanged solely between Spaniards, who forcefully appropriated them in Latin America and who 
gladly received them at home. Consequently, trade entered ius gentium, hiding a theft of continental 
proportions because it was predicated on the exchange between two theoretically equal trading 
partners.107 In practice, profitability derived from violent conquest and forceful imposition of Spanish 
terms. While apparently an exception to the general rule of Latin Americans’ ownership, intercontinental 
trade allowed a select European elite to control the main international circuits whereby the natural wealth 
of Latin America was exported to Europe and Asia.  
 
The law ferae bestiae 
The right to carry on commerce did not exhaust the Spanish economic entitlements sanctioned by ius 
gentium. According to Vitoria, in case the Latin Americans had allowed other foreigners to extract natural 
resources (like gold inside the earth or pearls in the sea) from their lands, they were automatically 
compelled to offer the Spanish the same advantage.108 This sounded paradoxical considering Vitoria’s 
defense of a trade monopoly. How could Spain justly deny other nations what Latin Americans could 
not, namely participation in the exploitation of their own wealth? Without the capacity to decide with 
whom they were going to negotiate the use of their natural resources, Latin Americans’ sovereignty was 
considerably eroded. What is more, the limitation of Latin Americans’ alternatives operated under the 
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dubious premise that they had willingly opened their resources to foreign exploitation to begin with. 
Again, the context in which Latin Americans’ consent was obtained did not matter. 
 In spite of its undeniable economic value, the right of participation in the commons assured the Spanish 
Crown and conquerors only a meagre part of Latin America’s mineral resources. Even if the Portuguese 
or the French enjoyed certain rights of extraction in Latin Americans’ territories, their value paled in 
comparison with what—so the Spanish rightly thought—remained unexplored and unoccupied.109 So, 
Vitoria complemented the right of participating in the commons with a right over unoccupied things. He 
affirmed that goods without owner (here he again mentioned gold and pearls) could be acquired by their 
first occupier, whatever their location.110 This virtual consensus, from which private property stemmed, 
meant that the whole world had not yet been divided and many natural resources were still vacant, waiting 
to be occupied. For Spain, this right had a strategic economic value as it gave access to Latin America’s 
gold and silver with which to finance the costs of empire.  
 Soto differed from Vitoria on this point, affirming that the Spaniards had no right over Latin American 
unoccupied gold.111 The human race was geographically divided in regions so that the inhabitants of each 
region had a right over the common things that are within the confines of their particular realm.112 
Moreover, in his lecture De dominio he asserted that ownerless goods belonged to the first occupant only 
with regard to their use but not their dominium.113 This meant that even in the case that some of the 
world’s lands had not yet been divided they could be used but not owned by the first occupant.114 
 When in his lecture Vitoria introduced the right over unoccupied things, he referred to the law of wild 
beasts or ferae bestiae as enunciated in the Roman Institutiones of Justinian. According to this law, ‘wild 
animals, birds, and fish, that is to say all the creatures which the land, the sea, and the sky produce, as 
soon as they are caught by any one become at once the property of their captor by the law of nations’.115 
Based on the examples of the Institutiones and Vitoria’s own examples (gold, pearls, and fish) it seems 
that he was referring only to movable things. However, at the end of his lecture he mentioned again the 
right of occupation stating that: ‘Item multa etiam sunt, quae ipsi pro desertis habent velt sunt communia 
                                                 
109 El Dorado was the idealised incarnation of that certitude. See Jorge Magasich-Airola & Jean-Marc de Beer, America 
Magica: When Renaissance Europe Thought it had Conquered Paradise, forwarded by David Abulafia, translated by Mónica 
Sandor (London, Anthem Press, 1994) 69-98. 
110 Vitoria, ‘On the American Indians’, 3.1 §4 280. 
111 See Brett, Changes, 25. 
112 Ibid. 
113 Soto, De Dominio, § 21, 121. 
114 Ibid., §23, 127. 
115 Ibid.  
94 
 
omnibus volentibus occupare…’116 In this passage, it is less clear that the he is solely referring to 
movables.117 In principle, there is nothing to suggest that multa could not be interpreted as including 
immovable property in general, and (deserted) land in particular. 
 On the one hand, Vitoria could just be referring to movables, as earlier in his lecture he had restricted 
the Spanish right of occupation to those types of things. Moreover, in his treatise De iustitia Vitoria 
explained that after the divisio rerum, many things remained undivided and, therefore, belonged to the 
first who occupied them.118 He then illustrated this statement by giving concrete examples, mentioning 
only movables such as animals, birds, and fishes.119 In addition, in his commentary on Aquinas’ Secunda 
Secundae Vitoria stated that once the world was divided ‘those lands belong to those infidels, and … 
since therefore they are true owners, if they do not want to donate them, it follows that we cannot now 
retain or capture them. Just as, in the matter of the Indians, certainly no one can capture land from 
them.’120 But this conclusion was similar to his affirmation in the first part of his relectio De indis that 
the peoples of Latin America were the owners of their territories, a conclusion that did not prevent the 
applicability of the law ferae bestiae and the appropriation of unoccupied goods. 
 On the other hand, in the second part of his lecture Vitoria makes clear in his dismissal of the right of 
discovery as legitimate title for Spanish power in Latin America that the territories or countries of Latin 
American peoples were within the scope of application of the law ferae bestiae.121 In other words, 
occupation could theoretically be applied to unoccupied lands. Again, Vitoria’s argumentation closed the 
possibility of applying the law ferae bestiae to the whole of Latin America’s natural products, movable 
and immovable. But as he later drew an exception related to unoccupied movables, it would be plausible 
that exceptionally deserted places would also fall within the scope of the right of occupation. 
 Vitoria’s doctrine facilitated the seizing of Latin American natural resources that had not been 
previously utilized, creating an umbrella of legal possibility for the activities of Spanish conquerors and 
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merchants who exploited every natural product of marketable value (animals, trees, plants with medical 
properties, minerals, fruits, fish, edible plants, etc.). Put simply, through this right the Spanish greatly 
expanded their power over Latin American natural habitats.122 
 The ecological implications of the right to occupation were far reaching. Nature was placed under a 
logic of appropriation whereby its value was measured in relation to the commodities it offered and their 
economic value. Land, resources, and any other natural element of economic significance were 
potentially capable of being privately owned. This was not an inconsequential possibility, considering 
the huge profits to be made from the trade in Latin American goods. In theory, if Latin Americans did 
not rush to exploit vacant natural resources as intensively as the colonizers, they risked losing economic 
control over their environment. Independent of who was going to be its new owner, and due to the 
possibility of appropriation, nature was to be more exploited than ever before.  
Two factors contributed toward increasing the impact of the right of occupation. Spaniards’ perception 
of Latin American nature was conditioned by their idea of wilderness. Portions of forest opened to attract 
game or certain agroforestry systems123 to collect different kinds of nuts might have looked to their eyes 
as unoccupied grasslands for cattle and idle trees waiting to be transformed into timber. Even if Latin 
Americans were actually using particular landscapes, Spaniards logically tended to suppose a lack of 
occupation in places where they could not detect the environmental impact of human activities. In this 
context, the Spaniards, who could impose their standard when judging the occupation or lack of 
occupation of a particular environment, enjoyed the upper hand in deciding how far their private property 
rights could encroach upon Latin American nature.  
 Another element that amplified the influence of the right of occupation was the fact that it entered the 
law of nations at precisely the historical moment in which Latin America became more depopulated and, 
hence, more unoccupied.124 Even if Vitoria was aware of this phenomenon when he formulated the 
doctrine of occupancy, he could not have fully comprehended its environmental implications. Following 
his reasoning, once nature bounced back, extending over places that had previously been cultivated or 
deforested, the only way Latin American peoples could retain their historical rights of ownership over 
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the environment was to reoccupy those landscapes. This was a burdensome task for a rapidly shrinking 
population, whose freedom of movement became quite restricted because of the conquest.  
 Due to these two factors, wilderness enormously expanded, both conceptually through the Spanish 
appropriation of its meaning and factually due to its application to particular geographical locations and 
the depopulation of the continent. As Latin Americans died, land and commodities were plentiful for the 
taking.125 Nature blossomed, and so did the economic possibilities of the Spanish adventurers and those 
Latin Americans who rapidly adapted to and benefited from Spanish institutions.126 Moreover, the new 
conception of private property allowed the neglect of one’s possessions.127 In consequence, there was no 
actual limit to the amount of land either that the Crown could grant to the newcomers or that the latter 
could seize.128 
One of the results of these changes in the conception of dominium once it was applied to the land was 
the formation and slow but steady consolidation of a new institution: the latifundia and a sort of land 
nobility that were to shape Latin American political, economic, and social life for centuries to come. But 
‘land grabbing’ became only noticeable at the end of the sixteenth and during the seventeenth century.129 
At the time of Vitoria, the economic value of land was minimal, not only because gold or silver were 
more profitable but also because there was just too much of it.130 
The importance of the rights to trade and to acquire common or unoccupied natural resources can hardly 
be exaggerated. As far as movables are concerned, and for reasons not attributable to Vitoria, these rights 
transformed what seemed to be the rule at the beginning of Vitoria’s disquisition—Latin American 
ownership—into the exception. Most of the continent’s abundant natural resources were opened for 
European—mainly Spanish and Portuguese—acquisition. Both rights were intertwined, reinforcing one 
another. The right of occupation was the basis of Spanish trade. Without the property of Latin American 
commodities, Spanish colonists would have had to buy timber, sugar, gold, or silver from the Latin 
Americans, considerably reducing their returns. Conversely, trade gave purpose and incentive to the right 
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of occupation. The demand for Latin American commodities in international markets made the 
apprehension of natural resources extremely profitable.  
The legal doctrines of Vitoria and the School of Salamanca provided a paramount contribution to one 
the most important historical changes unfolding at the time: the emergence of a global economic 
system.131 This system set in motion a much-resisted process of global social restructuration of a greater 
magnitude than ever before, which displaced people to the margins or attracted them to the center of the 
new global social and economic order in formation. While millions of Latin Americans slowly grew 
impoverished, a powerful commercial European and Latin American elite consolidated its economic and 
political power. Their interests would influence colonial policies for centuries. However, it is worth 
stressing that none of these changes was natural: 
 
Before 1492, most of the preconditions that would be critical for the eventual rise of industrial capitalism were 
present not merely in parts of Europe but also in parts of Asia and Africa. After 1492, in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries, Europe acquired three additional preconditions. One was the very considerable 
accumulation of wealth from the mines and plantations of Latin America and from trade in Asia and Africa. The 
second, closely related to the first, was the huge enlargement of markets outside of Western Europe for products 
either produced in Western Europe or imported and then re-exported; that is, a very great and almost constantly 
growing demand. Third, and most important of all, the social sectors involved with capitalism took political power 
on a wide scale in western Europe, something that had not happen elsewhere except on very small terrains. This, 
the bourgeois revolution, allowed the emerging capitalist class-community to mobilise state power towards its 
further rise...132 
 
The ius gentium legitimized the exercise of a very subtle form of environmental hegemony and economic 
violence, which allowed the transfer of innumerable natural resources to Spanish hands, paving the way 
for the eventual impoverishment of the peoples of Latin America. Military force was the final guarantor 
and closure of the system. For Vitoria, the Spanish could only resort to war in order to protect themselves 
against Latin Americans’ desire to destroy them.133 This characterization of war as self-defense 
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concealed the fact that the exercise of private economic rights by an external social group already 
constituted a sort of violence, less manifest than military confrontation, perhaps, but as destructive in the 
long run. The Spanish control of trade and encroachment on Latin American natural resources worked 
to the material disadvantage of the Latin Americans, imperiling their well-being. Nevertheless, this sort 
of structural economic violence was an invisible component of Vitoria’s system. Resistance against 
economic oppression was transformed by the law of nations into an attack that triggered the Spanish right 
to war.134 
Because the economic rights of the Spaniards were part of the law of nations, any interference with 
their collective or individual135 enjoyment could be interpreted as a wrong, the only reason that according 
to Vitoria justified waging a war.136 Moreover, once a wrong was committed the right to war legitimized 
an offensive use of force against one’s enemies.137 This type of war expanded Spanish economic power 
immensely. As Vitoria affirmed, it was ‘the general law of nations (ius gentium) that everything captured 
in war belongs to the victor’.138 By virtue of war, the conquistadores acquired Latin Americans’ goods, 
territories, and even control of their bodies (by making them slaves).139 It was logical that as the Spanish 
carved a sphere of power which allowed them to move freely within the continent (right to travel) and 
control and exploit the economic resources of Latin America (right of trade and occupation) the Latin 
Americans would try to oppose, even forcefully, the Spanish presence in their territories. But challenging 
Spanish economic power by any means created precisely the legal grounds to increase Spanish economic 
hegemony. Vitoria’s system justified a vicious circle of destitution and violence, which actually came 
about due to the conquistadores’ rapacious behavior and the Crown’s economic interests in the mineral 
resources of Latin America.  
 
The conception of nature in Vitoria and Soto 
Vitoria’s legal doctrines legitimized the introduction of economic practices that in the hands of the 
Spanish conquistadores had an adverse effect on the Latin American environment. First, under the right 
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to private property, nature became an object of privatization. Every natural element could be seized in 
order to serve the particular interests of its owner. For Soto, the distinctive feature of dominium was that 
the power of the proprietor over its property could be exercised solely for its own benefit.140 Second, 
rights to participate in the commons and occupy vacant resources defined who was to be the main owner 
of Latin American natural resources. Both rights transferred innumerable elements of natural ecosystems 
to the Spaniards—even though Latin Americans still retained a fair amount of land for a long time—
placing them under the control of those who most profited from their exploitation. Finally, the right to 
trade gave nature a new function. It served the purpose of satisfying individual consumption at one end 
of the spectrum and the accumulation of capital at the other end. Whereas nature’s commercial value was 
taken into account in Vitoria’s formulation of ius gentium, the religious and cultural values that it had 
previously became irrelevant before the law.  
Despite their potential use in transforming nature, the economic rights that Vitoria acknowledged 
created only the possibility of environmental exploitation in Latin America, not its necessity. They 
operated in a larger ideological context that could have offered a counter ideology that prevented the 
destruction of nature. After all, and despite the strong economic incentive to commercialize nature, 
nothing impeded the private owner from preserving it and using it sustainably. Therefore, in order to 
ascertain whether there was a counterbalance to the exclusive economic value of nature in the ius 
gentium, it is important to consider the way in which Vitoria and Soto conceived nature and the human 
relationship with it.  
Both Spanish scholastics were strongly influenced by Saint Thomas Aquinas, the most famous of all 
Dominicans. When Vitoria was still a student in Paris, Thomism was already his favorite system, from 
which he incorporated all other doctrines into his reasoning.141 This admiration continued later during 
his professorship, to the point of encouraging the use of Aquinas’ texts as the reference for university 
studies in theology.142 Aquinas was also the most cited author in Vitoria’s lecture De indis. Heavily 
influenced by the Christian doctrine, St Thomas’ views about nature influenced those of Vitoria.143 In 
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fact, as Pagden claims, the whole School of Salamanca explained the natural world and humanity’s 
position within it by reference to Aquinas’ theories.144 
 In question 96 of the first part of the Summa Theologiae, Aquinas dealt with the question of human 
mastery over animals in the state of innocence. After having examined the matter, two of his affirmations 
were of capital importance for the scholastic conception of the relationship between humans and non-
human nature. St Thomas stated that before the Fall, non-human nature was subjected to humans so that 
‘nothing disobeyed’ them.145 This power was derived from the fact that humans had been created in 
God’s image and thus stood above the rest of creation. In consequence, animals were ‘rightly subjected 
to his government’.146 Another proof of human mastery over non-human nature stemmed from the idea 
of the Chain of Being. In the hierarchical ordering of creatures, the imperfect creatures were placed at 
the service and ‘for the use of the perfect’.147 So, Aquinas affirmed: ‘as the plants make use of the earth 
for their nourishment, and animals make use of plants … man makes use of both plants and animals’.148 
 Another important element of Aquinas’ understanding of nature is related to the Fall. For Aquinas, as 
for the Spanish scholastics, human mastery over non-human nature diminished because of the Fall. 
Human original sin tainted the human relationship with non-human nature. Thomas noted that due to 
humans disobedience to God, creatures that had otherwise obeyed humans were no longer naturally 
subjected to their power.149 Whereas in paradise natural products were obtained effortlessly as nature 
cooperated with humans, after the Fall nature turned its back on a fallen humanity. Fortunately for human 
beings, something had not changed since the time of innocence: non-human nature remained 
subordinated to the satisfaction of human needs.150 But the price of human disobedience was high. After 
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the Fall, the need for hard labor in order to extract from nature the products of human subsistence had 
grown exponentially. 
 Finally, it is worth mentioning that for Aquinas the difference between humans and the rest of God’s 
creation was a matter of kind rather than a question of degree. An abyss separated the quality of their 
respective essences. This becomes obvious in his disquisition about the quality of the world after the 
judgment. Pondering whether non-human nature will survive God’s judgment, he concludes that: 
 
Now animals and plants were made for the upkeep of human life; wherefore it is written (Gn. 9:3): “Even as the 
green herbs have I delivered all flesh to you”. Therefore when man’s animal life ceases, animals and plants should 
cease. But after this renewal animal life will cease in man. Therefore neither plants nor animals ought to remain.151 
 
This conclusion was a consequence of humans’ double dimension: part animal, part rational being. 
Whereas the animal nature of humans was corruptible and mortal, the rational soul was incorruptible, 
having therefore the potential of immortality. In contrast, animals and plants were corruptible ‘in their 
whole’.152 There was a fundamental asymmetrical logic in the way Aquinas treated the essences of 
different beings according to their level of perfection and perfectibility.153 The result of the imperfection 
that characterized non-human nature was that they were not to be perpetuated in the renewal of the 
world.154 
There are few explicit references to nature in De indis. The first can be found in the discussion of 
whether Latin Americans’ sinfulness was a reason for denying them dominium over their lands. As St 
Thomas, Vitoria’s ideas about nature were influenced by his religious condition. So, he cited Genesis in 
order to explain that dominium was founded in the image of God: ‘Let us make man in our own image, 
after our likeness; and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea and over the fowl of the air, and 
over the cattle, and over all the earth ...’.155 This reference to the Bible was part of a larger disquisition 
in which Vitoria rejected the notion that sinners did not have dominium.  
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Vitoria’s views were common among the Spanish scholastics, and particularly within the Thomist 
tradition.156 In the History of the Indies,157 Las Casas gave a similar explanation of the creation of the 
natural world and humanity’s position in it. Explaining the topics to be covered in Chapter 1 of the first 
book, he stated: ‘This chapter deals with the creation of heaven and earth. - How God gave it, with all its 
lower creatures for human mastery. - How this mastery diminished as a consequence of the original 
sin…’.158 Similarly, he stated that God had created nature for the health and utility of human beings, 
describing it as a ‘world machine’ dedicated to mankind.159 For Soto, humanity’s resemblance to God 
stemmed from the fact that they too had power over the world’s irrational creatures.160 
At the time of Vitoria, the Christian interpretation of humanity, nature, and their mutual relationship 
was based on the creation of the world as narrated in the Genesis. At the beginning of human history, 
God’s mandate was clear: be fertile and increase, fill the earth and master it. The difficulty in deciphering 
the meaning of God’s will in this passage and, for that matter, in the Bible at large is that there is no fixed 
meaning attached to biblical words, making permanent interpretation necessary.161 So the biblical 
implications of human mastery over nature are not completely clear. How then should humanity relate 
to the environment?  
There have been two main interpretations of the way in which Christianity understood and fulfilled 
God’s mandate. According to one position, dominion over nature facilitated its actual domination and 
eventual exploitation, because the power conferred to humanity was unlimited.162 A more lenient view 
of Christianity holds that identifying dominion with domination misrepresents the function assigned to 
humans in the divine scheme. In reality, dominion over non-human nature could be interpreted as a 
responsible and restricted mandate, enshrined in the notion of stewardship.163 Humanity was assigned a 
superior position in regard to nature in order to care for and protect it and not to spoil it.  
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Vitoria did not explain his interpretation of the purpose of human dominium. He was silent as to the 
type of power that it entailed. Therefore, we cannot judge Vitoria’s ideas about humanity’s relationship 
to nature based solely on this statement. We can only know that his ideas were inspired by religious 
beliefs, as later in the text he reiterated that dominium was based on humanity’s resemblance to God.164 
Unlike Vitoria, Soto explicitly explained that the objective of human dominium was to create a right to 
subjugate the Earth and dominate animals and the natural elements.165 
Later in Vitoria’s lecture, there is a more revealing reference to nature. He refuted the argument that 
even irrational creatures might have dominion, asserting that ‘… wild animals have no rights over their 
own bodies (dominium sui); still less can they have rights over other things. The major premise is proved 
by the fact that it is lawful to kill them with impunity, even for sport.’166 
 Vitoria started his disquisition about animals claiming that they, as all irrational creatures, could not be 
proprietors. In the Thomist tradition, human resemblance to God implied that animals were ‘objects of 
human dominium rather than subjects of dominium themselves’.167 His position reflects the common 
anthropocentric theological assumptions of his time and the doctrinal legacy of St. Thomas168 and 
Aristotle.169   
 In De iustitia, Vitoria had also referred to passages in the Genesis 1:26-28170 and Psalms 7:8171 in order 
to prove human mastery over nature.172 He drew on Aristotle to defend humanity’s superior place in the 
Chain of Being in comparison to non-human nature.173 The Chain of Being was based on the Christian 
belief that all creatures were ordered in a scale of perfection from the lowest to the most noble: God. For 
Vitoria, low creatures existed for the sake of higher ones, who could thus use and abuse them at will.174 
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Tierney affirms that, for Vitoria, ‘through the exercise of the gifts of reason and will man could dominate 
the rest of created nature; and this was fitting since, by virtue of these gifts, man was made in the image 
of God and so endowed with a power analogous to God’s absolute dominion.’175 
Vitoria granted humans a broad power over nature based on the opposition of proprietor to property 
and the right of possession for the former over the latter. The Dominican scholar understood human 
ownership in absolute terms. Humans could resort to the ultimate way of controlling another entity: its 
destruction.176 In Soto, we find the same right to kill animals as a prerogative of dominium.177 Even 
though both scholastics only referred to animals, the same treatment was extendable to the rest of non-
human nature, considering that animals occupied a higher place than flora or inanimate nature in the 
Chain of Being.  
 Vitoria and Soto’s views on human ascendancy over animals make clear the kind of power that these 
authors derived from human dominium. For most authors of Second Scholasticism, human superiority 
over non-human nature was a necessary consequence of humans having been created in the image of 
God.178 Contrastingly, based on the same Christian premises, Las Casas arrived to the contrary 
conclusion. Humans could not use animals and other natural life as they pleased. They had to realize 
God’s plan for the fulfilment of nature’s perfection. For him, human superiority over the environment 
was limited by God’s program, the content of which was, nonetheless, left undefined.179 These kind of 
limits are absent from Vitoria’s and Soto’s texts. In principle, humans did not need to justify 
unsustainable practices because the most extreme of them, the destruction of nature, could be freely 
performed—even for pleasure (according to Vitoria). Dominium demarcated a personal space of absolute 
power over one’s property. As far as human power over nature was concerned, being a proprietor was 
like being a demi-God. It is evident which of these contrasting interpretations—that of Vitoria and Las 
Casas—fitted better with the economic ethos of Spanish imperialism.  
Still, we should be cautious when interpreting the views of Vitoria and Soto on human dominium, as 
well as its environmental implications. Even if from a contemporary environmental sensitivity their 
views appear distinctly anthropocentric, there was still a clear limit to this anthropocentrism. For them, 
the purpose of the absolute power that humans had over nature was not personal enrichment. The School 
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of Salamanca was in principle opposed to the accumulation of capital.180 Human power over God’s 
creation resulted from the need for human preservation.181 The satisfaction of basic human needs had 
become severely compromised after the Fall because nature no longer spontaneously supplied humanity 
with its bounty.182 Therefore, the natural corollary of the need to transform nature more thoroughly in 
order to subsist was to grant humans the power to do so. It was the task of the Spanish scholastics to 
develop the legal institutions conducive to that end.  
It is true that for Spanish scholastics there was no constraint to human power over nature and that, as 
Vitoria affirmed, it could even be exercised for mere pleasure. In this sense, their views seem compatible 
with and even favorable to the exploitation of nature. But there was still a limit to the scope of 
applicability of human environmental power based on the necessity of securing sustenance. But this limit, 
derived from a particular religious notion of human history and which could have acted as a 
counterbalance of the profit motive, was never incorporated into the secular ius gentium. More 
importantly, the utilization of nature for mere subsistence did not fit nicely with the ambitions of the 
European monarchs and economic elites who, in the process of European world expansion, realized the 
important gains to be made from the worldwide exploitation of ecosystems.  
 
Concluding remarks 
It is likely that without the obsession of the conquistadores for quick wealth and the enormous dividends 
that Latin American natural resources gave the Crown, Latin American nature would have fared better. 
In spite of the different priorities of the conquistadores and the Spanish Crown when it came to the use 
of Latin American natural habitats, in the context of increasing material ambitions, the Spanish economic 
rights that Vitoria sanctioned were used to legitimize economic domination and environmental 
exploitation in Latin America.183 Ideas about nature provided the ideological background in which 
concrete economic practices flourished. At the same time, those practices and their value for empire 
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shaped ideas, which eventually tended to conform more and more with the economic ethos of 
imperialism.  
Latin America helped create an incipient but vibrant global economy, in which considerable power was 
accumulated, albeit in only a few hands, by the appropriation, extraction, and exchange of natural 
products. It was thus only a matter of time before the fragile, non-legal limits that Vitoria and Soto had 
established were finally transcended. In fact, following centuries witnessed the rise of other European 
powers and economic operators with similar dreams of wealth. In order to satisfy their ambitions, they 
seized innumerable natural resources in Latin America, Asia, the Pacific, and Africa. The history of 
colonialism is also a history of economic elites (mostly of European origin) and their ascending power 
over nature worldwide.  
Latin Americans had occupied, consumed, used, and traded natural resources for centuries.184 They had 
also shaped nature significantly, and not always sustainably. However, the legal infrastructure provided 
by Vitoria allowed for the privatization and exchange of nature-as-commodity on a continental scale. 
The use of that power to apprehend and exploit Latin American ecosystems entailed a substantial 
intensification of the pre-colonial pattern of nature alteration. In the absence of any limit to the 
materialization of Spanish economic rights, the fact that, for instance, the exploitation of timber and the 
establishment of huge mines and innumerable sugar plantations displaced more sustainable uses of the 
same ecosystems was considered not only legal but also desirable. Legitimized by the economic rights 
that the ius gentium recognized, the exchange economy of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (in 
which Latin American natural resources played a pivotal role) took shape, becoming one of the main 
engines for some of the most significant and deleterious environmental changes of the Early Modern 
era.185 
Despite being aware of the novelty and importance of the moment in which he was writing, it would be 
disingenuous to make Vitoria responsible for the historical and ongoing human and environmental 
tragedy that has resulted from centuries of global wealth accumulation. Perhaps more striking than the 
historical construction of this drama at a time in which the world’s natural habitats seemed almost infinite 
is the continuation of human and environmental suffering in the face of today’s awareness of the dreadful 
impact of global economic arrangements on both peoples and landscapes. No intellectual effort seems to 
be able to help humans wake up from the dream of owning nature and prizing what is freely (though not 
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necessarily unlimitedly) at our disposal (like air, water, and food). It may be that it is not the brain but an 
organ situated in the chest of our persona that this message needs to reach. 
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3  Between Rationality and Bestiality: The Nature of Latin Americans 
and the Conceptual Appropriation of Latin American Nature 
 
 
 
 
 
Wild men … are like uncultivated land that produces weeds and useless thorns, but has within itself so much 
natural virtue that cultivating and farming it gives domesticated, healthy and useful products.1 
 
 
The development of a vocabulary of economic rights that allowed the material apprehension of 
ecosystems was just part of the way in which Latin American nature was colonized. As important as 
those instruments were, there was also a need for an ideological justification of that appropriation. That 
justification was partly developed in the context of debates about the nature of Latin American peoples. 
Assessing the level of rationality and social sophistication of Latin American peoples was vital to define 
their place in the new colonial society as well as the way in which Spaniards ought to relate to them—as 
master or primus inter pares (first among equals). 
 Some Spanish commentators argued that Latin Americans were similar to animals. Accordingly, they 
could perform the same function as domesticated animals in the new colonial economy: that of a free 
labor force. Spanish Dominicans strongly disagreed with this characterization. Forced labor was a 
hindrance to evangelization. Weakened, demoralized, and fearful, Latin Americans were less inclined to 
convert. Besides, only rational creatures could understand the redeeming message of God. Therefore, 
Dominicans strongly emphasized Latin Americans’ rationality and capacity to receive the Gospel, but 
fell short of affirming the parity of the pre-colonial population with the Spanish.  
Vitoria recognized that Latin American societies were somehow deficient. Likewise, Las Casas and 
Acosta identified a certain kind of barbarism that affected some Latin American societies. One of the 
reasons that explained their backward condition was their deficient control of nature. Most Latin 
American societies lacked the capacity for scientific knowledge of their surroundings as well as the 
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technical tools to exploit them. Because of these shortcomings, they had developed a limited mastery 
over nature. Many Latin American peoples were mere hunters, thus lacking the social sophistication and 
capacity to alter ecosystems that was characteristic of agricultural societies. 
The natural corollary of the belief that Latin Americans could not deeply alter the ecosystems of the 
continent—the great Empires of Tawantinsuyu and Anahuac being an exception—was the belief that 
most Latin American natural habitats were wild and unused. Neither Vitoria, nor Las Casas or Acosta 
for that matter, developed this line of reasoning in-depth. As friars, they were less interested in the 
exploitation of natural resources than in evangelization. Still, they were convinced that Spaniards could 
create more sophisticated societies by exporting their superior agricultural techniquyes and capacity to 
exploit nature. This did not mean that they ought to displace Latin Americans, but rather to instruct them 
in their superior methods. 
Of more importance, perhaps, than the concrete deployment of these ideas in the Latin American 
context was the influence that they had in the history of the law of nations, and in later debates about the 
nature of the colonial population and their capacity to transform their environments. The belief that 
Spanish colonists and Europeans in general had a superiority in mastering nature vis-à-vis the populations 
of the continents that Europeans colonized is what I have termed the ‘conceptual appropriation of nature’. 
This is the story to which I now turn attention. 
The conceptualization of a progressive way of using ecosystems, and a backward one, redefined how 
nature ought to be utilized in the colonies. As shown in the previous chapter, European commentators 
had developed the legal tools to materially apprehend nature. As this chapter will demonstrate, they also 
created an ideological justification to do so. The rationale that presented Europeans as efficient 
manipulators of colonial environments, and that manipulation as socially more progressive than pre-
colonial uses of those environments resulted in a compelling urge to transfer colonial natural resources 
to the hands of the colonists. The Catholicism of Vitoria, Las Casas, and Acosta played a relevant role in 
this story too. The fact that Latin American societies revered natural deities was interpreted as a sign of 
backwardness. Nature’s sacredness imposed insurmountable limits to its scientific observation, technical 
manipulation, and economic exploitation, preventing precisely the kind of human power that redounded 
in social amelioration. Infidel belief in the power and aliveness of nature were tolerated in the early stages 
of Spanish colonization but later became punishable, even by death.  
The fact that Latin Americans treated nature as a living entity was a definite proof of their 
backwardness. Latin American worship of what for the Spanish were clearly inferior entities was the 
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ultimate proof of social inferiority. Evangelization served to break this retrograde myth, and introduced 
a novel way to look at nature, one that for the Spanish scholastics was undoubtedly more progressive. 
Nature was God’s creation and was to be subordinated to human interests. The religious element 
reinforced the conceptual appropriation of nature. The progressive mastery of nature associated with 
European imperialism was not only a secular project oriented toward human social advancement; it was 
a way of fulfilling humans’ preeminent place in God’s creation and their mandate to fill the world and 
master it. The next pages describe the first historical steps in the development of this narrative of progress 
predicated on the colonists’ environmental mastery and preeminence. 
 
Non-assimilability and the fusion of Latin Americans with nature  
The destructiveness of Spanish conquest gave rise to moral doubts. Those who ventured to the other side 
of the Atlantic wanted to believe that their behavior in the conquest of Latin America was either ethically 
correct or at least justifiable. In this sense, Christianity offered the conquerors a solid rationalization of 
their conduct.2 Their enemies were also God’s rivals and, consequently, they lived outside the scope of 
the moral law applicable to believers.3 Few colonists doubted that God had vested in them the power to 
carry the gospel to the furthest corners of the world.4 Thus, they felt they were part of a global mission 
of evangelization.5 
 The religious ideology of Spanish imperialism was not specifically designed for Latin America. It first 
emerged and was consolidated within European borders during the Medieval Era. The concept of just 
war sanctified crusades against Muslim infidels for the glory of the Holy Church.6 Contrastingly, the 
Iberian Peninsula, a land of diverse peoples, traditions, and faiths, enjoyed relative freedom of worship 
for centuries under Muslim rule.7 In general, Jews, Muslims, and Christians could practice their religion 
without fear in Muslim areas and Christian territories.  
                                                 
2 The link between Christian religion and Spanish imperialism is explicit in Arnold J. Bauer, Goods, Power, History: Latin 
America’s Material Culture (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001) 46. 
3 Francis Jennings, The Invasion of America: Indians, Colonialism and the Cant of Conquest (Chapel Hill, The University 
of North Carolina Press, 1975) 4. 
4 Rawlings, Church, 100. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Jennings has described the use of papal bulls to enslave and take lands and property from pagans: Ibid., 4-5. It is worth 
noting that religious wars were also motivated by economic and social factors. See James Muldoon (ed.), The Expansion of 
Europe: The First Phase (Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1977) 4-5. 
7 Rawlings, Church, 1. 
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Freedom of religion ended abruptly during the last stages of the Reconquista or the War of 
Reconquista.8 In 1492, harsher religious policies forced the Jews to leave Spain. Soon afterwards, 
Muslims were given the choice of conversion or exile. Attaining internal homogeneity by purifying the 
emerging Spanish nation from alien beliefs was the first step toward the dissemination of the new 
common faith. Once internal cohesion was achieved, evangelization contributed to the unification and 
consolidation of the power of Spain over its distant kingdoms.9 In Latin America, preaching the gospel 
was part of a broader process of Hispanicization.10 
The Bull Inter caetera divinae issued by Pope Alexander VI on 1493 gave the Crown of Castile ‘full 
and free power, authority and jurisdiction’ in Latin America under the condition of Christianizing the 
lands that Columbus had claimed for his royal sponsors.11 After 1542 concerns about mistreatment of 
Latin American peoples forced the Crown to remove them from the direct supervision of the conquerors, 
increasing the authority and role of religious orders in the process of colonization.12 
Christianity contributed to colonization in two different ways. First, it created distance between 
colonizer and colonized by distinguishing Christian from infidel, which legitimized the use of violence 
as an instrument for conquest. Then, once Spanish occupation consolidated, it dissolved previous 
dichotomous categories, bringing both Spaniards and Latin Americans under the unifying umbrella of a 
common faith. The new religious fellowship facilitated the processes of homogenization and 
normalization, which were desperately needed for the cohesion of an empire that encompassed 
innumerable subjects and myriad different groups, some quite rebellious.  
In spite of Christianity’s undeniable contribution to the consolidation of the Spanish empire, 
evangelization was not unproblematic. If colonizer and colonized were considered as part of the same 
religious community, the separation and subordination of the latter to the former was no longer tenable. 
This obstacle was easily overcome in practice as Latin Americans were forbidden religious education, 
priesthood and learning Latin, the language of the Church.13 Spaniards retained the upper hand in 
deciding the correct meaning of religious doctrines. This power was used to their advantage. Without the 
capacity to influence the only ideology at hand to interpret reality, Latin Americans could not 
problematize and challenge their subjugation from within the colonial society. Because the possibility of 
                                                 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid. 
10 John H. Elliott, Spain, Europe & the Wider World 1500-1800(New Haven, Yale University Press, 2009) 168. 
11 ‘Bull Inter Caetera of Pope Alexander VI’ in Grewe, Fontes Historiae, Vol II, 103-109. 
12 Shammas, ‘The Origins’, 33. 
13 Seed, Ceremonies, 121. 
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Latin Americans using the Catholic doctrine as an element of emancipation was prevented from the 
outset, Catholicism became profoundly sedative. It naturalized power hierarchies, discouraging any 
attempt to unveil their historical formation.  
Spaniards justified this sort of discrimination by reference to Aquinas’ distinction between rational 
creatures who could be fully Catholic and those who could just accept but not entirely understand 
Catholicism and, hence, were not fully rational.14 In the new ideology of empire, this moral classification 
turned into a political distinction between people of reason (Spaniards) and people who were not entirely 
reasonable (Latin Americans).15 
The question of Latin Americans’ rationality was part of colonial debates since the beginning of the 
sixteenth century. In Christian thinking, reason was considered both humanity’s main attribute and the 
dividing line between humanity and the animal world.16 In consequence, for those who wished to uphold 
Latin Americans’ lack of rationality, comparing them with animals was a convincing way of undermining 
their status. So, for example, when Palacios Rubios17 was informed that Latin Americans still worshipped 
idols, he reacted to the news by describing them and all unbelievers as irrational animals.18 Similarly, the 
licenciado Gil Gregorio compared them to ‘talking animals’, and for the conquistador Jofré García de 
Loaysa they were like soulless parrots in human guise.19 Latin Americans were also compared to horses, 
assess, birds, fishes, spiders, and brute beasts. Their association with animals was a repeated feature of 
the early literature of discovery.20 
The influential voice of the humanist21 philosopher and theologian Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda (1490-
1573) joined the debate on the nature of Latin American peoples. Sepúlveda had worked at the service 
of both Pope Clement VII and the Spanish king Charles V once he became Emperor.22 A famous advocate 
                                                 
14 Ibid., 119. 
15 This doctrine—a deformed version of Aquinas’ original idea—served to reinforce the subordination of Latin American 
peoples. Ibid., 120. 
16 Seed, ‘Are These Not’, 636. 
17 As previously mentioned, he was the royal jurist who wrote the requerimiento. 
18 In his own words: ‘Los Sarracenos que como animales carentes de razón, adoran a los ídolos, despreciando al verdadero 
Dios.’ See Seed, ‘Are These Not’, 638. 
19 Pagden, The Fall, 93. 
20 John H. Elliot, The Old World and the New (London, Cambridge University Press, 1970) 42. Against this opinion, Gómez 
Canedo affirms that the theory of Latin Americans’ animality did have only marginal importance in colonial debates. See 
Lindo Gómez Canedo, ‘Hombres o Bestias? (Nuevo exámen critico de un Viejo tópico)’ 1 Estudios de Historia Novohispana 
(1967) 29-51. 
21 A discussion on the meaning of Sepúlveda’s legal humanism can be found in Anthony Pagden, ‘The Humanism of Vasco 
Quiroga “Información en Derecho”’ in Anthony Pagden (ed.), The Uncertainties of Empire: Essays in Iberian and Ibero-
American Intellectual History (Aldershot, Variorum, 1994) 133-142, 135. 
22 Albert Hernandez, ‘Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda’ in Miguel A. De la Torre and Stacey M. Floyd-Thomas (eds.), Beyond the 
Pale: Reading Theology from the Margins (Lousville, Westminster John Knox Press, 2011) 79-86, 80-81. 
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of the submission of Latin American peoples to Spanish rule, he came close to endorse their bestiality in 
his Democrates Secundus Sive de Justis Causis Belli apud Indios,23 where he assessed the justice of 
Spanish wars of conquest. They were, he affirmed, ‘as inferior to the Spaniards as children are to adults, 
women are to men … and finally, I shall say, almost as monkeys are to men.’24 It was hard to find in 
them any vestige of humanity.25 Sepúlveda expressed Latin American’s inferiority by reference to 
standards of age, gender, and rationality familiar to his contemporary audience. These hierarchical 
opposites encapsulated the particular nature of Spanish superiority according to Sepúlveda. Each 
comparison widened the gap that separated colonizer and colonized while constructing their identities by 
the opposition between self and other.26 The final reference to apes, even if cushioned by the adverb 
‘almost’, carried a special emphasis. Apart from being childish, inexperienced, feminine, and impotent, 
Latin Americans were mentally deficient too. The faculties of their mind had, for Sepúlveda, an exclusive 
mechanical nature, similar to those of ‘beasts, birds and spiders’.27 
Several commentators on colonial matters identified rationality, civility, and Christianity with Spanish 
origin. Contrastingly, by comparing Latin Americans to inferior creatures such as animals, they attributed 
them irrationality, incivility, and paganism. The opposing nature/humanity construct brought together 
features that belonged to the mental, social, and religious spheres. The advocates of the thesis of Latin 
Americans’ lack of humanity assimilated them to the environment. In so doing, they used an extreme 
formulation of the ‘state of nature’28 a century before this concept would fully crystallize in European 
political thinking. In its moderate version, the ‘state of nature’ described the condition in which humans 
lived before entering civil society—an existence that lacked all the elements that Europeans generally 
associated with civil life.  
                                                 
23 Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda, Tratado sobre las Justas Causas de la Guerra contra los Indios, con una advertencia de 
Marcelino Menendez y Pelayo y un estudio por Manuel García-Pelayo (México, Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1941). 
24 Ibid., 101 [translated by author].  
25 Ibid., 105. 
26 For Seed, the identification of Latin Americans with animals was a definition of them as ‘radically Other than the 
Spaniards’. See Seed, ‘Are these Not’, 638.  
27 Sepúlveda, Tratado, 109. 
28 Spanish scholars used the image of the state of nature but not the term, as it had not yet been coined. It is, nevertheless, 
important to distinguish this term from the ‘state of integral nature’, ‘state of innocence’, or ‘state of grace’, that for the 
Spanish scholastic designated the period from the beginning of the world until the Fall. This prehistoric age preceded the pre-
political/civil ‘state of nature’. Christian thinkers borrowed this image from Roman Golden Age narratives which, according 
to St Ambrose, had been adopted from Hebrew Scriptures. For a detailed account of the historical formation of the term see 
Peter Garnsey, Thinking about Property: From Antiquity to the Age of Revolution (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2007) 107-135. See also López, ‘Propiedad’, 83. 
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The theory of the natural slave and its applicability to the peoples of Latin America was at the crux of 
most discussions of their character. ‘Created by nature to wander aimlessly through forests, without laws 
or any form of government’, the natural slave lived in a kind of ‘state of nature’.29 St Thomas Aquinas, 
after all, considered reason (man’s speculative intellect) as the sole element that allowed ‘him alone 
among God’s creatures to exploit the potential in the natural world’.30 In consequence, the more Latin 
Americans blended with nature, the less rational they appeared, and the less they could claim legal parity 
with the Spaniards. Their condition as natural slave would justify their subjection to forced labor. At the 
other end of the spectrum, rationality—the capacity to transcend nature, humans’ first home, in order to 
create both a political community and a material culture that would become humans’ final home—would 
have placed Latin Americans as subjects of the Spanish Crown, and therefore entitled them to the 
Crown’s protection.  
The discourse on Latin Americans’ bestiality was not homogenous. In its most radical formulation, 
Latin Americans were considered almost part of the eco-system, or in the words of Bernardino de Minaya 
‘a third species of animal between man and monkey created by God for the better service of man’.31 
Despite the literal meaning of these words, the advocates of the extreme interpretation of Latin American 
bestiality never actually doubted their human nature.32 Their real intention was rather to emphasize Latin 
Americans’ lack of rationality so that it would seem absolute and immutable, preventing Latin Americans 
from ‘catching up’ with the Spanish.33 Their inferiority was the basis for a legitimate system of legal 
inequality. 
Asserting Latin Americans’ incapacity for progress was part of a strategy to influence the debate on 
their proper treatment, in consideration of their economic value as labor force.34 Spanish commentators 
knew as well as Vitoria that ‘wild beasts and all irrational beings are subject to the power of man, even 
more than slaves’.35 The president of the Audiencia of Mexico, Bishop Ramírez de Fuenleal explained 
the behavior of the apologists of Latin Americans’ lack of reason, stating that ‘those who wish to hold 
                                                 
29 Diego de Covarrubias, De iustitia belli adversus indos, f. 40as cited in Pagden, The Fall, 96. 
30 Pagden, The Fall, 72. 
31 Ibid., 104 
32 See John H. Elliott, The Old World and the New 1492-1650 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press) 42-43. See also 
Seed, ‘Are These Not’, 638.  
33 Ibid., 638. For all Christian confession, ‘the dividing line between human and animal agency’ was taken as ‘the ultimate 
dividing line between the political and the non-political’. See Brett, Changes, 60. 
34 For Elliott: ‘The equation between bestiality, irrationality and barbarism was easily made; and those who made it could 
then proceed to draw on Aristotelian doctrine to justify Spanish domination over the Indians as both natural and necessary.’ 
See Elliott, The Old World, 44. 
35 See Vitoria, ‘On the Latin American Indians’, 1.4 §20 248.  
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these (Indians) in subjection as beast’ do so in order ‘to benefit themselves’.36 The Spaniards regarded 
animals and the environment at large as commodities. Thus, those who were almost like a natural 
resource could be equally possessed,37 dispossessed, and used in the Spanish mines and encomiendas 
without remorse or doubts of conscience.  
The problem with this radical position was that the absolute irrationality of the peoples of Latin 
America amounted to their incapacity to receive the Christian creed.38 These types of allegations not only 
threatened the role of religious orders in Latin America, but could also put in jeopardy the political 
authority that the papal bulls had granted the Spanish Crown.39 Aware of this risk, some authors adopted 
a middle position between full rationality and complete irrationality. Sepúlveda, for instance, upheld 
Spanish superiority while making room for evangelization. Despite comparing Latin Americans with 
animals and denying them any trace of humanity in certain sections of his work, he still maintained that 
they were capable of improving. Their inferior condition was not permanent and, consequently, evolution 
was possible. Through the evangelizing mission, they could be enlightened and converted by their 
Spanish masters.40 Thus, Sepúlveda wondered: 
 
What could be more convenient to the barbarians than being subjugated to the imperium of those whose prudence, 
virtue and religion would transform them from barbarous, so that they barely deserved to be called human beings, 
to civilized men as far as they can be; from inept and libidinous, into truthful and honest, from impious and servants 
of the devil, into Christians and worshipers of the true God.41 
 
In Sepúlveda’s vision of empire, nature provided a standard to appraise the humanity of Latin American 
peoples. Their partial or absolute comparison to animals was the ultimate and most powerful tool to 
conceptually capture (and construct) the dreadful condition in which the Spanish had found them. 
According to Pagden, Sepúlveda and other humanists like Vasco de Quiroga believed that Latin 
Americans lived in ‘what was in effect the state of nature’.42 
                                                 
36 Paso y Troncoso, Papeles de la Nueva España, vol. XV, pp.162-5 as quoted in Seed, ‘Are These Not’, 645. 
37 See Beatriz Pastor Bodner, The Armatour of Conquest (California, Standford, 1992) 210-211. 
38 Elliott, The Old World, 43. 
39 As Seed puts it: ‘to challenge Spanish authorities for failing to Christianise the natives was to challenge them for failing 
to exercise political power legitimacy in the New World.’ See Seed, ‘Are These Not’ 635. 
40 Pagden, The Fall, 117-118. 
41 See Sepúlveda, Tratado, 135. 
42 See Pagden, ‘The Humanism’, 138. 
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 Less radical than the thesis of some of his contemporaries, the doctrines that Sepúlveda upheld in his 
Democrates Secundus still had dire implications for the peoples of Latin America. Their condition of 
natural slaves, a status that Sepulveda vindicated, legitimized just war. Therefore, they could only be 
converted after military defeat and pacification. However, the aftermath of conquest did not represent an 
improvement of their situation. Survivors had to accept assimilation. This was so, because the condition 
of natural slave could only be transcended by reception of the Christian credo. This was the logic behind 
the encomienda system:43 evangelization in exchange for compulsory work.44 Less deadly than war in 
the short term, this system of forced tutelage was nevertheless considerably harsh and injurious in the 
middle term, and accounted for innumerable deaths. Importantly, Sepulveda advocated the subjection to 
the encomienda even for those peaceful Latin Americans who had converted to Catholicism and 
recognized Spanish sovereignty.45 
The rather negative terms with which Sepúlveda described Latin Americans conveyed the impression 
that the cultural distance between them and their Spanish masters was an abyss. In consequence, the strict 
patronage under which Latin Americans were placed had to be extended in time because the extreme 
character of Latin Americans’ natural inferiority delayed evolution. Conversion looked, at best, like an 
arduous and lengthy process, the duration of which was uncertain. All these considerations called for the 
perpetuation of the encomienda system.46 Sepulveda’s idea of evolution put all the power in the hands of 
the Spanish, which created the possibility of manipulation. Those who judged the religious improvement 
of the Latin Americans were the most interested in denying it in order to maintain the status quo. 
Montesinos complained that the encomenderos tried to delay evangelization by depriving the Latin 
Americans time for religious service.47 Even presupposing the good will of the Spanish conquistadores, 
                                                 
43 As above mentioned, the encomienda was a system of forced labor whereby Latin Americans were assigned to a Spanish 
colonist in return for a small wage, protection, and evangelization. For an overview of the encomienda see Robert G. Keith, 
Conquest and Agrarian Change: The Emergence of the Hacienda System on the Peruvian Coast (Cambridge, Harvard 
University Press, 1976) 27-54. 
44 Articles three to ten and Article twelve of the Laws of Burgos (1512-1513) regulated the encomenderos’ duty to provide 
religious services and Christian education to the Latin Americans’ assigned to them. See Ronald D. Husey, ‘Text of the Laws 
of Burgos (1512-1513) Concerning the Treatment of the Indians’ 12 The Hispanic American Historical Review (1932) 301-
326, 309-313. 
45 See Sepúlveda, Tratado, 175. 
46 Fray Bernardo de Mesa, a royal preacher, recognized the difficulty of converting the Latin Americans: ‘no one of sound 
mind could say these Indians do not have the capacity to receive our faith … but I dare to say that there is in them such a little 
aptitude by nature and habit that in order to bring them to the faith … a great deal of work is necessary.’ See Las Casas, 
Historia, Vol III Book III Ch IX 462 [as translated in Seed, ‘Are These Not’, 640-641]. 
47 Seed, ‘Are These Not’, 634-635. 
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evolution was only possible under the assumption that the Latin Americans would passively accept 
indoctrination, that is, ‘the imposition of a certain kind of hegemony’.48  
Inspired by religion, Sepulveda’s conception of the evangelizing mission trapped Latin Americans in 
a vicious circle. Resistance to assimilation, even if moderate, could be interpreted not only as a rejection 
of the gospel but also of the very idea of religious and human progress. That negative response would 
only confirm Sepulveda’s prejudice about Latin Americans’ low rationality, impious customs, and 
minimal capacity for social advancement.49 The simpler Latin Americans’ mores were considered, the 
more justifiable violence seemed. In turn, violence would just strengthen the desire to resist Spanish 
presence.  
Sepúlveda’s views on the conquest of Latin America were incompatible with the position adopted by 
Las Casas and the School of Salamanca—Vitoria and Soto, among others. Even if Las Casas and Vitoria 
did not agree on all matters, their defense of Latin Americans rationality was in stark opposition to 
Sepúlveda’s vision of Spanish empire in Latin America. Hence, Sepúlveda’s opponents moved behind 
the scenes and used all their influence in order to prevent the publication of Democrates Secundus.50 
They achieved their objective, something that Sepúlveda deeply resented. 
Sepulveda’s intellectual efforts to convince Spanish political and religious elites of the convenience of 
the encomienda and the subjugation of the Latin Americans threatened the advocacy campaign that 
Sepúlveda’s fellow Dominicans had for decades been waging in favor of Latin American peoples.51 
Growing international concern and even criticism of Spanish colonial practices created hesitation among 
royal circles and religious authorities about the right course of action in Latin America.  
The stakes were high and, thus, the pressure of the advocates of a benevolent colonial approach in Latin 
America intensified. Following the recommendation of the Council of the Indies, the Emperor decided 
to suspend the ultramarine wars of conquest until the question of whether colonial expansion was just or 
unjust could be discussed and settled. This context led to the famous but inconclusive Valladolid debate 
between Sepúlveda and Las Casas. In Valladolid, both authors exposed their arguments for and against 
the wars of conquest.52 The clash between Sepúlveda and Las Casas was the result of irreconcilable 
                                                 
48 Ibid., 635. 
49 As Seed maintains: ‘Refusing, resisting, or even misunderstanding this foreign religion were interpreted as “stupidity”, 
lacking the capacity for assimilation, being little better than beasts.’ Ibid., 647. 
50 Pagden, The Fall, 110-111. 
51 Hanke, The Spanish Struggle, 113. 
52 The arguments of Sepúlveda and Las Casas can be found in Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda y Fray Bartolomé de Las Casas, 
Apología, traducción castellana de los textos originales latinos, introducción, notas e índices por Ángel Losada (Madrid, 
Editorial Nacional, 1975). I have presented a brief summary of the main arguments of both contenders in Manuel Jiménez 
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visions about the right course of action for the Spanish in Latin America. It was also an ‘ethnological’ 
quarrel between those who predicated the non-assimilability or quasi-non-assimilability of the Latin 
American peoples and those who understood them as part of the same human and legal community.  
 
Under the same universal legal umbrella: Las Casas and Americans’ civility  
Las Casas stands far above those who opposed the injustices of Spanish imperialism. His contribution to 
international law is confined to the field of human rights and indigenous rights, which has afforded him 
little space in international legal monographs.53 Contrastingly, his multifaceted life and work has 
attracted more attention from the social sciences than any other participant in the colonization of Spanish 
Latin America.54 He is a controversial figure, described in divergent ways as both the father of European 
anti-colonial struggle55 or an advocate of ecclesiastical imperialism56. 
Touched by Montesinos’ sermon, Las Casas experienced a crisis of conscience that led him to a radical 
change in life. He renounced his slaves and his position as encomendero, and started a fierce crusade to 
defend the Latin Americans that ended only with his death. Based on his first-hand experience in Latin 
America, he criticized the cruel and inhumane treatment to which the new subjects of the Spanish Crown 
were subjected, particularly through the encomienda system57 and the institution of slavery.58 Both 
systems of labor placed Latin Americans under the tutelage and command of the conquistadores, who 
often mistreated them. As an alternative, he suggested they ought to be under the direct jurisdiction of 
the Spanish king.59 In recognition for his efforts to promote justice in Latin America, the Crown60 
awarded him the title of ‘protector of the Indians’.61 
                                                 
Fonseca, ‘The Colonization of Latin American Nature and the Early Developments of International Law’ 12 Journal of the 
History of International Law (2010) 189-225, 213-214. For a general analysis of the debate see Hanke, The Spanish Struggle, 
111-132. For a legal analysis see Marks, ‘Indigenous Peoples’ 22-37. For a cultural perspective see Todorov, The Conquest 
of America, 151-167. 
53 The absence is notorious in Wilhelm Georg Grewe, The Epochs of International Law (Berlin/New York, De Gruyter, 
2000); Anghie, Imperialism; Miéville, Between Equal Rights; and Bowden, ‘The Colonial Origins’.  
54 Castro, Another Face, 2-3. 
55 See Robert J. C. Young, Postcolonialism: An Historical Introduction (Oxford, Blackwell Publishers, 2001), 75. 
56 See Castro, Another Face, 13, 21, 63, 67, 156 and 182. Castro concedes that Las Casas was anti-colonialist with respect 
to conquistadores and encomenderos, but charges him with being an instrument of imperial power. Ibid., 152. 
57 See Lesley Byrd Simpson, The Encomienda in New Spain: The Beginning of Spanish Mexico (Berkeley, The University 
of California Press, 1950) 36. 
58 See Hanke, The Spanish Struggle, 20-22. 
59 Rolena Adorno, The Polemics of Possession in Spanish American Narrative (New Haven, Yale University Press, 2008) 
75. 
60 The title was actually given by the Regent Cardinal Cisneros. See Castro, Another Face, 151. 
61 Williams Jr., The American Indian, 95.  
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Las Casas used all tools at hand in his struggle against the colonists’ violence. He even pressured the 
King, threatening to deny absolution to the conquerors. His multifarious activities included the 
undertaking of utopian projects in Latin America, the display of polemic skills in the colonial Audiencias 
and royal courts, the selection of priests to be sent to Latin America, and the exercise of intellectual 
influence through intensive and extensive activity as a writer.62 He obtained partial victories, like the 
issuing of the New Laws in 1542 in order to protect the Latin Americans.  
However, some of his achievements were short-lived. Strong opposition in Latin America, which 
threatened to produce a fracture in the imperial edifice, forced the King to revoke part of the New Laws 
only three years after their promulgation.63 His project of introducing Spanish settlers in Latin America 
ended in fiasco. The whole scheme was based on an illusion, and settlers disagreed with Las Casas about 
the best way to fulfil Latin America’s golden promise.64 They had travelled to Latin America to lead and 
gain profit, not to obey and work.65 Finally, the evangelization of Mayan territory was problematic too. 
Mayans were not as peaceful and persuadable of Christian superiority as Las Casas had assumed. Their 
beliefs were not mere abstract ideas that could be easily dismantled—they were a social construction, 
inextricably linked to the Mayan way of life. Thus, their disruption entailed the destruction of the 
foundation of Mayan societies.66 
Like Vitoria, Las Casas used old sources creatively in order to cope with the new moral dilemmas 
presented by the Spanish conquest.67 As part of his eclectic repertoire, he combined theological, moral, 
and humanitarian arguments with legal reasoning.68 Presenting his ideas in legal terms was a way of 
exercising more pressure on the Spanish Crown.69 A second feature of Las Casas’ writing was his direct 
knowledge of the conquest.70 This gave him an advantage over his rivals, whose theories could be 
dismissed because of their lack of connection with what was actually taking place on the ground. Even 
Vitoria did not escape criticism for this reason. In the Valladolid debate with Juan Ginés de Sepulveda, 
                                                 
62 Elias Sevilla-Casas, ‘Footnotes on Las Casas’ Ideological and Political Practice’ in Elias Sevilla-Casas (ed.), Western 
Expansion and Indigenous peoples: The Heritage of Las Casas (The Hague, Mouton Publishers, 1977) 15-29,17. 
63 See Hanke, The Spanish Struggle, 17-22. See also Adorno, The Polemics, 75. 
64 Anthony Padgen, Peoples and Empires (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 2001) 76. 
65 Ibid. 
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in Another Face, 8, 11, 53-54. 
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68 Brian Tierney, The Idea, 286. See also Pennington, ‘Bartolomé’, 161. 
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he affirmed, referring to Vitoria, that ‘the circumstances that this learned father supposes are false’.71 
Hence, some of Sepulveda’s arguments inspired to a certain extent by Vitoria were rejected because they 
were ‘based on false information’.72 
The ‘protector of the Indians’ never questioned the legitimacy of the Spanish presence in Latin 
America.73 Of all possible just titles, the Pope’s donation for evangelization was the only one that passed 
his close scrutiny.74 However, he maintained that the powers conferred to the Spanish Crown in the Bull 
Inter caetera divinae were not unlimited. The Pope had granted the Spanish Crown lordship over Latin 
America (dominium jurisdictionis), but not material ownership (dominium rerum).75 In his opinion, the 
Latin Americans were to be tribute-paying free vassals of the King of Spain, which would have liberated 
them from the jurisdiction of the conquerors and allowed them to retain both property and local 
government.76 This conception entailed, for example, that everything taken away from the Latin 
American peoples had to be restituted.77 Latin Americans’ individual rights stemmed from their 
collective political rights.78 Qualified political freedom was the precondition for the exercise of the right 
to evangelize.79 
 Las Casas’ doctrine changed in the last period of his life, under the influence of two events. The first 
was the accession of Philip II to the Spanish throne in 1554 and the hardening of royal policy in Latin 
America due to the Spanish economic crises.80 The second, related to the former, was that the 
encomenderos of Peru decided to offer 4 million ducats of gold to the King in exchange for perpetual 
rights over their encomiendas that very same year. The acceptance of this bid would have transformed 
their descendants into an extremely powerful kind of hereditary nobility.81 The desperate state of the 
Spanish treasury made Philip hesitant. After several years of debates—that lasted until 1562—he was 
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finally convinced of the risk of losing control over such important territories, so he rejected the 
proposal.82 
Awareness of a harsher approach to the Latin Americas and the possibility of an increase of the 
conquistadores’ power induced Las Casas to further restrict Spanish political power. In his last works, 
he still derived the Crown’s rights to its overseas territories from the Papal mandate to evangelize, but 
conditioned it to the Latin Americans’ free acceptance of its rule.83 Without their consent, the King 
enjoyed only a right to their kingdoms, but not a right over them.84 This was the latest elaboration of Las 
Casas’ lifelong quest for a legal guarantee of the freedom and protection of the Latin Americans within 
the confines of the power exercised by the Spanish monarchy.85 
The cornerstone of Las Casas’ defense of Latin American peoples was their portrayal as fully human. 
Las Casas, as the members of the School of Salamanca, emphasized their rationality and civility—
denying, by contrast, the accusation of animality—as a way of claiming the legal parity between the 
Spaniards and the Latin Americans. Vitoria, for instance, mentioned in De indis the existence of ‘properly 
organized cities’ and the fact that Latin American societies possessed ‘marriages, magistrates, overlords 
(domini), laws, industries, and commerce’.86 
The presence of sophisticated material cultures and sound polities in Latin America was the most 
conclusive proof of the rational capacity of those who had created them. The attributes of Latin American 
polities in De indis belonged to a modified list of Aristotle’s requirements for a true civil society.87 None 
of them was superfluous. For Europeans, life’s complexity reflected the degree of sophistication of 
particular societies.88 It was clear that Latin Americans were not animals and did not live as such. They 
had transcended nature, using reason as the vehicle to do so. First, the possession of industry allowed 
them to master the environment and to ascend from a life fused with nature. Once they mastered their 
natural habitats, they emerged from natural life and created civil communities with all their recognizable 
features: laws, lords, magistrates, priests, marriages, industry, and commerce.  
Las Casas’ portrayal of Latin American societies’ civilized features was more prolific than Vitoria’s. 
His Apologética Historia was fully dedicated to proving that Latin Americans had achieved full civil life 
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through a description of their physical surroundings and their moral, cultural, and material 
accomplishments.89 Following Aristotle’s criteria of civility, Las Casas demonstrated that Latin 
Americans possessed prudencia monástica, económica, and política—that is, capacity to govern 
themselves, their households, and their polities.90 He concluded that Latin Americans had created sound 
civil societies. He built that conclusion on an examination of the six types of citizens (peasants, artisans, 
warriors, rich men, priests and judges, and rulers) that, according to Aristotle, integrated a happy polity.91 
All these social classes were definitely present in the most advanced Latin American societies.  
To give more weight to the argument of Latin Americans’ full rationality and capacity to receive the 
gospel, he complemented the description of their material culture with a detailed account of their natural 
milieu. His aim was to refute environmental explanations of Latin Americans’ barbarism, derived from 
theories that linked human backwardness with poor physical environments.92 As he recognized, only 
‘miserable regions’ gave rise to barbarians without ‘proper marriages, nor human commerce’ who ‘lead 
scattered lives in the woods and mountains alone except for their women, ‘as not only tamed but also 
wild animals do’.93 Las Casas never doubted that some humans could resemble wild beasts. He just 
believed that Latin Americans did not fall into that category. The positive image of Latin American 
nature that his writing conveyed evidenced that, environmentally deterministic theories of human 
wilderness and barbarism, were not applicable to Latin America. 
 Las Casas described the territories that he visited in his trips to Latin America in superb terms. For 
example, he depicted Hispaniola as a fertile, happy, and excellent island.94 He extended that positive 
characterization to continental areas, which he described as fertile, soft, healthy, happy, and gracious.95 
Even the fields of Latin America—acquiring human attributes—‘laughed’.96 The quality of the Latin 
American environment was so good that the worst of its regions surpassed the best provinces of the rest 
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of the world.97 In Historia de las Indias, Las Casas went as far as comparing Latin American nature to 
the Garden of Eden. Uncertain of its exact situation, he nevertheless did not hesitate to emphasize the   
 
Regarding the suspicion that the Earthly Paradise could be located in that region, the Admiral was not wrong, 
considering the novelties and changes he found, mainly the softness and mildness of the air, the freshness, 
greenness and beauty of the forests, the gracious and happy disposition of the land each piece and part of which 
seems a Paradise; the abundance and impetuous grandiosity of so much fresh water...98 
 
This comparison was not exceptional. Latin American nature was also portrayed as a paradise in the Short 
Account of the Destruction of the Indies.99 In spite of the fact that he did not explicitly mention the word 
paradise, his description suggested it. For instance, Puerto Rico and Jamaica were described as ‘lands 
flowing with milk and honey’.100 
Las Casas’ idyllic description of Latin America paralleled the depiction of its inhabitants. In fact, the 
fertility of the former suggested the kind disposition of the latter.101 In Las Casas, Latin Americans are 
depicted as living an ideal form of primitivism.102 Notwithstanding an abundant nature, Latin Americans 
did not live in a natural state. Their copious and temperate environment definitely housed advanced 
peoples.  
The idealization of Latin American nature also emphasized, by contrast, the horrors of the Spanish 
conquest.103 Destruction was more intolerable when contrasted with the preciousness of what was being 
destroyed. Finally, the ideal portrait of Latin America had a religious purpose as well. Describing the 
continent as a paradise on Earth, Las Casas was more convincing in his assumption that its population was 
fit to receive the Gospel.104 How could creatures that inhabited what resembled the Garden of Eden be 
unwilling to receive and accept the word of God?105 
                                                 
97 Ibid. 
98 Las Casas, Historia, Vol I Book I Ch CXLI 43.  
99 Bartolomé de Las Casas, A Short Account of the Destruction of the Indies, edited and translated by Nigel Griffin with an 
introduction by Anthony Pagden (London, Penguin Books, 1992) 55, 71-72.  
100 Ibid., 26. 
101 Vitoria also acknowledged the fertility of the Latin American environment. He asserted that: ‘Also God and nature are not 
wanting in the supply of what is necessary in great measure for the race.’ Vitoria, De indis, Sect I§23 127. 
102 See José Rabasa, ‘Utopian Ethnology in Las Casas’s Apologética’ in René Jara and Nicholas Spadacini (eds.), 1492-1992: 
Re/Discovering Colonial Writing (Minneapolis, The Prisma Institute, 1989) 263-289, 273. 
103 Brading, The First America, 74. 
104 Ibid. 
105 This association is evident in the Dominican’s reference to Yucatán, which he compared to the paradise. See Las Casas, A 
Short Account, 71.  
124 
 
Unlike most of their contemporaries, Vitoria and Las Casas lifted Latin Americans from a condition of 
assimilation with nature, apparently equaling them to the Spaniards. This was essential for their inclusion 
in the same religious, political, and legal community. Only then could ius gentium and its language of 
rights be deployed, with all their regulative power. The inclusion of the Latin Americans in the human 
family was the prerequisite for the universal character of the rights that Vitoria and Las Casas defined as 
applicable to all commonwealths and peoples.  
Despite rejecting the idea of a kind of ‘state of nature’ in Latin America, Vitoria and Las Casas adopted 
the same assumptions about the relationship between the social and natural environmental spheres as 
those whom they wished to contest. They too considered nature and civility as opposites, and applied the 
latter term to define the condition of the colonial subject. Human equality was achieved at the expenses 
of drawing a clear-cut line between humanity and non-human nature, thus entirely separating the social 
and natural spheres.106 Vitoria and Las Casas understood and expressed that division in hierarchical 
terms.107 The difference with other authors was that they placed Latin Americans in the social/human 
and not the natural/animal side of the divide. Vitoria’s consideration of nature was not much higher than 
writers such as Sepúlveda. It was precisely the low status of animals that made Latin Americans’ civility 
shine by contrast.  
The separation between the natural and social realms and the subordination of the former to the latter, 
were at odds with Latin Americans’ worldviews.108 As a result, while defending the status of Latin 
American societies, Vitoria and Las Casas were inadvertently introducing an understanding of the 
environment completely alien to that of the myriad societies they tried to protect. Their defense was 
based on emphasizing the traits that the Spaniards regarded as sophisticated and undermining those that 
they deemed barbaric, irrespectively of Latin Americans’ opinion about their own practices. 
In addition, ironically, the affirmation of Latin Americans’ capacity to master nature hindered their 
relationship with the environment in a very concrete sense. Vitoria’s and Las Casas’ universalism was 
instrumental to a certain extent. For them, Latin American and Spanish equality stemmed from the fact 
that God had created them equally able to receive the Christian faith.109 The privileged status that Latin 
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Americans enjoyed in their theories rested on their religious assimilation by the Spaniards and their 
condition as possible converts. Eventually, in the religious environment of the counter-reform, Latin 
Americans’ approach to nature, which entailed talking to animals and worshiping living creatures, was 
considered idolatrous. Continuing these practices risked accusations of heresy and even execution.110 
The cosmopolitanism of Las Casas and the School of Salamanca was tainted by religious bias because 
they based human egalitarianism on the capacity to adhere to a particular creed.111 In this sense, Ruston 
affirms that ‘Las Casas was not arguing as a political theorist, but as an evangelizing bishop, and his 
conviction that the gospel has to be received freely, without any type of coercion was the origin of all he 
has to say about political liberty’.112 
For Las Casas, the main attribute of the Latin American peoples was their resemblance to Christians.113 
To be sure, his archetype was not the greedy conquistadores who wrongly called themselves Christians, 
but those who, as with the Latin Americans, followed the dictates of evangelical poverty so highly 
appreciated by the Dominican Order.114 Latin Americans were trapped by an egalitarian logic that did 
not differentiate between humans, thereby erasing their particularities, or rather applying a given 
particularity in disguise. Apparent equality became a barrier for real knowledge of the myriad diverse 
societies that populated Latin America, and their ways of interpreting the world. As Todorov has 
remarked: ‘If it is incontestable that the prejudice of superiority is an obstacle in the road to knowledge, 
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we must also admit that the prejudice of equality is still a greater one, for it consists on identifying the 
other purely and simply with one’s own “ego ideal” (or with oneself).’115 
One of the shortcomings of applying a homogenizing reasoning was that the voice, perspectives, and 
worldviews of Latin American peoples, which included their particular understanding of nature and the 
way to relate to it, were ultimately displaced by more imperative European goals.116 Once the appearance 
of equality based on the denial of difference entered the language of rights, the imperializing tendencies 
of ius gentium (as formulated by Vitoria) and universal rights (as conceived by Las Casas) started to play 
out.117 While protecting Latin Americans to a certain extent within the new colonial society, they also 
made it more difficult to find a conceptual vocabulary for them to rebel against and ultimately break 
away from its economic, political, social, religious, and cultural imperialistic traits. 
The application of a universal legality based on a concrete understanding of nature erased alternative 
conceptions. Even if there were common elements in the way Spaniards and Latin Americans approached 
nature, Vitoria and Las Casas could not grasp the specific way in which Latin Americans’ social life was 
still embedded in the natural world. The economic rights enunciated in the law of nations were based on 
the conception of nature as a commoditized material entity. The strict conceptual distinction between 
nature and civility reinforced this vision. Property rights gave a concrete power over nature, the exercise 
of which affirmed the superiority of those who could master and transform the environment.  
Las Casas’ insistence on Latin Americans’ consent to Spanish rule was remarkable. It opened up the 
possibility for their relative freedom. Despite this concrete gain, however, their cultures and beliefs 
nonetheless receded when confronted with the universal religious logic that legitimized Spanish 
colonization. This was not exclusively down to Vitoria or Las Casas, but the ‘by-product of a discourse 
of conquest enforcing a vision of the world focused on one right way of life for all humankind’,118 which 
included only one right way to relate to the environment. 
 
Difference among ‘equals’: assessing Latin Americans´ social status 
The economic activities, material culture, and political institutions of Latin American peoples were living 
evidence of the fact that they had already overcome the ‘state of nature’ when the Spanish first arrived 
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to the continent. The relevant question, then, was whether their social achievements stood in parity with 
those of the Spanish. If both populations were at the same or even similar level of social advancement, 
the imposition of external religious, economic, social, cultural, or political standards was difficult to 
justify. Moreover, the question of how advanced and progressive peoples could adopt a faith other than 
Christianity remained. For the religious scholars of the period, this possibility was counterintuitive 
because Christianity was the most definite feature of a sophisticated society. Hence, to fit the Spanish 
religious scheme, Latin Americans had to exist in an intermediate grey zone between the ‘state of nature’ 
and full civility, the only space where evangelization was possible.  
For the Spanish scholastics, the transition from ‘the state of integral nature’119 to the ‘state of nature’ 
was a defining moment of human history. During the ‘state of innocence’,120 immaculate humans enjoyed 
the rewards of a plentiful nature that effortlessly satisfied all necessities.121 Things change after the Fall, 
when humanity became tainted by the original sin. The same disobedience that condemned humanity 
also corrupted nature. As a result, it lost its spontaneous fertility.122 Soto interpreted this transformation 
as an act of rebellion against humanity in retaliation for their offence to God.123 Following St Thomas, 
Las Casas too believed that human mastery over nature had diminished as a consequence of the original 
sin.124 
Only through hard work,125 industry, and the creation of a Christian civil society could humans recover 
their ascendancy over the natural world and recreate—if imperfectly—God’s paradise on earth; hence, 
coming full circle.126 Achieving social complexity demanded taming, utilizing, and exploiting nature. It 
is important to recall that Vitoria and the School of Salamanca situated the emergence of the institution 
of private property at precisely that moment. The privatization of the world’s resources was then naturally 
understood as part of a progressive path toward the perfection (understood as Christianization) of 
humanity. For Soto one of the reasons for the division of common property was precisely the avoidance 
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of laziness and passivity.127 Agricultural progress could only be achieved by mobilizing individuals’ 
longing of and love for what belonged to them.128 
The perceived inferiority of Latin American societies meant that their place above a condition of quasi-
assimilation with nature—to which authors such as Sepúlveda condemned them—could not be exactly 
the same as that of the Spaniards. It had to be somehow incomplete. Moreover, the heterogeneity of Latin 
American societies complicated any general categorization about their level of social sophistication. As 
Las Casas recognized, the same territory, Florida, could house both civilized and barbarian groups.129 
Thus there was a need for a theory that explained the difference within Latin American societies and 
between the colonies and the metropolis. How could ius gentium and the common rights of humanity 
preserve their universality while making room for the particularity of those to whom the law applied as 
members of the same legal community? 
At the end of his lecture, Vitoria introduced a final title for Spanish dominion based on Latin 
Americans’ lack of intelligence and their limited capacity to govern and administer their territories—a 
title that echoed the doubts that contemporary commentators of Vitoria had about Latin Americans’ civil 
capacity.130 Latin Americans’ inferiority was for Vitoria a ground for Spanish power that he neither dared 
to affirm nor entirely condemn;131 in other words, it could ‘provide legal grounds for subjecting the 
Indians’.132 Vitoria did not deny the fact that their commonwealths had legal, social, and political 
institutions. He was just unsure about their proper quality.133 His hesitation in regard to this title suggests 
that, for him, Latin Americans had not yet fully emerged from the natural state. 
The deficiency of Latin Americans’ agricultural systems was one of the elements whereby Vitoria 
explained the inferiority of their societies.134 Their inability to master the environment and make the land 
productive made them more dependent upon nature. For Europeans, agriculture was the supreme mode 
of converting nature’s potential into actuality.135 Husbandry was indispensable for the constitution of a 
civil society, solely within which a refined social life was possible. A sound system of land cultivation 
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generated the surplus necessary to free parts of the community to engage in the enlightened activities 
indispensable to achieve social progress. Without proper agriculture, Latin Americans’ complete 
evolution was not possible. Another deficiency related to Latin Americans was the imperfection of their 
arts and crafts, that is, the knowledge to create the artefacts and tools to dominate and transform the 
environment.136 Furthermore, Latin Americans did not have manufactures or the capacity to transform 
nature’s products into derivative commodities through human industry.137 Technology, industry, and 
proper agriculture were indispensable features for sound civil life. 
Another proof that Latin Americans were close to the ‘state of nature’ was their comparison with the 
Spanish peasantry. Latin Americans, Vitoria stated, seemed ‘insensate and slow-witted’ because of their 
‘evil and barbarous education’.138 That was not completely exceptional, Vitoria continued, as even 
‘amongst ourselves we see many peasants (rustici) who are little different from brute animals’.139 Latin 
Americans were to the Spanish what the Spanish peasants were to their town dwelling countrymen. Life 
in the countryside was closer and more dependent on nature: more brutish, ignorant, and less polished 
than the type of existence that was possible in the city. This statement about the deficient nature of Latin 
Americans’ rationality has to be read in light of Victoria’s earlier characterization of the Latin Americans 
as ‘cowardly, foolish, and ignorant’ in his discussion about the first just title based on human natural 
partnership and communication.140 Notwithstanding their comparison with animals (by their association 
with peasants), Latin Americans possessed, like Spanish peasants, full potential for improvement.  
In Vitoria’s scholarship, cultural difference was not the manifestation of an unbridgeable gap between 
the Spanish and the Latin Americans that rested on the latter’s deficiency. On the contrary, colonizer and 
colonized were united by their capacity for progress. In consequence, the difference between both social 
groups lay in the degree of fulfilment of that potential. Whereas the former had reached their apex, the 
latter had not yet entirely evolved because of an educational deficit. So, the civilizing effect of Spanish 
presence in Latin America became irresistible. Latin Americans’ incompleteness would disappear once 
they were exposed to the influence of the superior Hispanic commonwealth. If the Spanish proceeded 
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gently within the (ample) margins of the rights granted by Vitoria, they could be the tutors of the Latin 
Americans while acquiring a big part of their natural resources.  
It is important to notice that Vitoria did not fully endorse Latin Americans’ inferiority. Basing Spanish 
rights on such a justification was unnecessary, as he had already presented several legal grounds to 
legitimize Spanish power and property in Latin America. Moreover, using the deficient nature of the 
Latin Americans as an argument for Spanish imperial rule was risky. Even the Spanish participants in 
colonial debates could not find a common position on the issue. Therefore, it was possible that rival 
nations would regard any justification of Spanish rule based on the personal characteristics of the 
colonized population as a biased attempt at domination. In comparison, Vitoria’s international legality 
offered a more neutrally robust legitimization of conquest.  
 Why did he still utter his doubts about the quality of Latin Americans’ commonwealths and the nature 
of their inhabitants? One possibility is that he wanted to convince his audience about the convenience of 
the economic rights that were part of ius gentium. After all, the legality of the conquest did not equate to 
its morality. And as the duda Indiana (the doubts about the legitimacy of Spanish presence in Latin 
America) gained notoriety, the ethical dimension of the conquest became more relevant than its 
legality.141 The imperfection of Latin Americans’ societies and political systems together with the 
Spanish capacity to perfect them made the latter’s power in Latin America seem necessary. 
Evangelization was part of a larger project of social restructuring. By the same token, transferring vacant 
natural resources to those who could better exploit them was not only in line with ius gentium, but was 
also the most natural course regarding the Christian mission of taming the Earth. Latin Americans’ 
inferiority in mastering nature gave Spanish economic rights an environmental purpose. Vitoria never 
put all these elements together, but their unconnected presence in his lecture on De indis conveys the 
impression that the Spanish had a superior civil capacity, and hence a greater capacity to master nature.  
Las Casas’ idealized account of the peoples and societies he found in Latin America shared some 
parallels with Vitoria’s. For example, agriculture was for him too intimately connected with social 
amelioration. Thus, he criticized the destruction of agricultural landscapes by the Spanish conquistadores 
in the Kingdom of New Granada because it turned a ‘fertile and populated area’ into a ‘scorched 
wasteland’.142 Without ‘native people left to work the land’ the whole area of New Granada would soon 
turn, he argued, into ‘one vast empty desert’.143 Likewise, he complained about the devastation of ‘vast 
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and prosperous areas’ turned ‘into a wilderness’.144 Wilderness was the reverse of civilization, a vacuum, 
an empty place where religion and government—the elements that Spanish commentators generally 
associated with the idea of human advancement—were ‘unknown’.145 
One should not rush to the conclusion that Las Casas’ perception of wild nature was negative. In fact, 
the contrary seems true in the History of the Indies, where he praised rivers, forests, hills, and other 
natural elements. This notwithstanding, no matter how edenic Latin American environment seemed at 
first glance, it was also to a certain extent incomplete. Only by cultivating the Earth would nature reach 
its perfection. After the Fall, agriculture had become the chief way whereby humanity could improve its 
condition. In consequence, the apparent contradiction between Las Casas positive and negative 
consideration of Latin America’s untamed landscapes disappears. In spite of his superlative description 
of nature before cultivation, once this activity was undertaken, its demise, which hindered the 
advancement of Latin Americans’ commonwealths, represented a drawback. Agriculture was the 
foundation of a proper civil society. Its destruction gave rise to social backwardness and wilderness—
their antithesis. 
 The presence of agricultural systems in Latin America was for Las Casas one of the elements that 
proved Latin Americans had transcended the condition of quasi-fusion with nature.146 Their capacity to 
produce food and govern themselves evidenced the existence of a proper system of administration of 
their polities. However, despite Latin Americans’ capacity for civil life, Las Casas never doubted that 
Latin Americans were barbarians in a certain linguistic sense.147 This limitation did not affect their ability 
for interpersonal communication. Otherwise, the formation of sound polities as those that Las Casas 
described in his works on Spanish America would have not been possible. Although Latin Americans 
had a ‘legitimate, just and natural government’, they still lacked ‘the arts and exercise of letters’.148 
Without these skills they could not accumulate and transmit knowledge about their surroundings. In the 
words of Pagden, for Las Casas, the element that was missing from Latin American cultures was science, 
or the vehicle for a correct ‘understanding of and power to control nature’.149 
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The comparison of Latin America with paradise (a repeated feature of Las Casas’ description of Latin 
American nature) leaves precisely the impression that nature had been barely modelled by the human 
hand. As mentioned above, Las Casas stated that ‘milk and honey’ spontaneously emanated from the 
lands of Puerto Rico and Jamaica, instead of stemming from the ingenuity and skillfulness of its 
inhabitants.150 Contrastingly, he praised the technical capacity of the peoples of Perú for building 
sophisticated irrigation systems.151 However, he also footnoted that Latin American territories were so 
rich that with little effort Latin Americans got abundant provisions.152 Latin Americans’ ability to 
thoroughly transform their environment was for Las Casas limited, not always because they lacked the 
knowledge and instruments to exploit nature, but also because nature was so abundant that their needs 
were satisfied with less human agency.  
But there were certain Latin American societies whose capacity to progressively transform natural 
ecosystems was questionable. The deficiency of Latin Americans’ material culture was more pronounced 
in some tribes of Florida that had no agriculture.153 Although Las Casas described their mores as 
barbarian, he was aware that placing them close to the ‘state of nature’ was perilous, as their inferiority 
could be interpreted as a question of kind rather than degree and, hence, used to their detriment. This is 
why he was careful to stress the transitory nature of Latin Americans’ lack of social progress and mastery 
over nature. That way, the possibility of conversion to Christianity and the achievement of full civility 
was left untouched. 
In the Apologética, Las Casas’ idea of Latin Americans’ improvement was slightly different from 
Vitoria’s. Whereas the latter conceived it as the actualization of what was merely potential, and hence 
related it to human nature, the former understood that actualization as a historical process in which whole 
societies were implicated. Las Casas was thus able to compare different nations at different historical 
junctures. Latin Americans, as other peoples, possessed the seeds for true religion, virtue, and scientific 
knowledge.154 But some of them had stagnated and were far from realizing that potential. So, for example, 
Las Casas affirmed that the barbarians of Florida lived in the ‘first and rudimentary stage’ in which the 
Spanish and other peoples were at the time when humanity first occupied the earth.155 Illustrious nations 
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such as the Romans, Greeks, and even the Spaniards were not so long ago much different from Latin 
Americans. 
Las Casas classical work, Apologética Historia, is full of passages that compare the social and cultural 
achievements of Latin Americans to those of older civilizations like the Romans, Greeks, Egyptians, 
etc.156 A timeline runs throughout the whole book, allowing the drawing of analogies between different 
historical periods on account of their degree of social sophistication. The progress of the Latin Americans 
had just been delayed by historical factors. As a result, the evangelizing mission acquired historical 
necessity. The arrival of the Spanish had brought Latin American history back into mainstream human 
history. 
In his social-evolutionary scheme, Las Casas distinguished various phases of civilization. In the first 
period, humans lived in a condition akin to the ‘state of nature’.157 This kind of periodization is also used 
in the Prologue of Historia de las Indias.158At the time, existence was basic, wild, unsocial, and 
ignorant;159 there was no law, order, industry, human habitation, nor agriculture.160 He acknowledged 
that Latin American societies had, as other nations, lived in that condition in the past.161 Some, like the 
barbarians of Florida, still remained in that early age of human history. Most, however, had emerged 
from that state, acquiring consciousness of their human status and an awareness of its particular 
relationship with nature.162 Once society started to separate from and rise over nature, life’s complexity 
increased progressively, until reaching the threshold of the last epoch. This was the stage in which most 
Latin Americans lived before conquest—they had made the most of their potential as pagans. Their 
evolution demanded a last leap toward progress through conversion to Christianity, which opened full 
access to science and the exploitation of nature.163 
According to Las Casas, change from barbarism to civility demanded the involvement of a prudent 
wise man that could guide backward societies toward political life and knowledge of God through love, 
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peace, and discretion.164 This had actually happened at the outset of human history, as both Cicero and 
Plutarch recalled.165 Humans lived close to nature until a more knowledgeable insider or outsider led 
their transition to civility.166 Las Casas gave historical examples of wise men such as Saturno or 
Lisanias—trendsetters of Italian and Athenian social improvement, respectively.167 
 Before the Spanish came to Latin America, no ‘man’ within Latin American societies had taken on the 
burdensome task of stimulating endogenous change. It is difficult to imagine, in the context of the 
Spanish conquest, a more suitable figure than Las Casas to incarnate the virtues of love, wisdom, and 
good sense required to approach Latin Americans, convert them, and generate social change. It is likely 
that Las Casas had envisioned his role in Latin America in these grandiose terms.168 This might explain 
in part the extraordinary energy and zeal with which he stood up for the rights of Latin Americans. He 
might have conceived himself not only as the mediator between the Spanish Crown and the Latin 
Americans, or the apostle of Christ, but also an agent of human history, an incarnation of the progress 
inherent to the evangelizing mission he so fervently advocated. Las Casas spoke and wrote for his 
contemporary audience as much as for perpetuity. 
The presence of Las Casas and his compatriots in Latin America was the catalyst for the evangelizing 
mission, which had a secular educational aspect.169 Latin Americans’ social evolution meant 
Hispanisation, a process that implicated the peaceful transformation of both Latin Americans’ souls and 
their habitats. The link between the two aspects of the evangelizing mission, the social and the 
environmental, is evident in a remarkable passage in which Las Casas compares wild people and 
uncultivated nature while acknowledging the possibility of molding them both so as to actualize their 
inner potential. After having affirmed the unity of the human lineage, he conceded that there remained 
in the world ‘wild men … who are like uncultivated land that produces weeds and useless thorns, but has 
within itself so much natural virtue that cultivating and farming it gives domesticated, healthy and useful 
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products’.170 In consequence, even backward peoples like some of the inhabitants of Florida were 
reducible to ‘order and reason’.171 
In Vitoria’s thinking, Latin Americans’ backwardness called for Spanish political and economic 
authority. Las Casas had a different approach to the Spanish mission in Latin America. For him, 
colonization could proceed through example, collaboration, and cohabitation. Vitoria believed that 
superior Spanish beliefs and customs had to be—if gently—imposed through the right to preach. The 
‘defender of the Indians’ imagined instead a kind of osmosis, a process of impregnation of the lower by 
the higher culture until the final absorption (or assimilation) of the former into the latter. This is why Las 
Casas felt so distressed about the conquerors’ greed. Their avarice spoiled the possibility of attaining 
peace and redeeming the Latin Americans. Their violence rendered his grand plan delusive. 
Consequently, the more impracticable his ideas turned out to be in practice, the more he tried to restrict 
the conquerors’ power and authority in Latin America, and the more he scrutinized and criticized their 
actions. But, importantly, he never limited the power of the Church and its proselytizing role. 
The limitations he imposed on Spanish power not only stemmed from a conviction about the 
importance of Latin Americans’ freedom per se. Total freedom became necessary only because of the 
conquistadores’ manifest incapacity to embrace Las Casas’ particular vision of a gentle Empire. Before 
he became convinced of their lack of interest for anything but fast wealth, he had tested his ideas through 
two settling schemes in Latin America.172 
The first of these two projects consisted of sending Spanish farmers to the Indies to cultivate Latin 
American soils. The few that finally ventured to Latin America faced hardship upon their arrival. Many 
fell ill and died, and the result was a total fiasco. Nevertheless, the resolute Las Casas was not 
discouraged, and his insistence was rewarded with a land concession established at Cumaná, in what is 
today Venezuela. He believed that in a territory under his personal control and supervision Spanish 
peasants and Latin American villages could coexist side by side. Besides, the economic success of his 
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venture would demonstrate that the encomienda was unnecessary. Unfortunately for Las Casas, reality 
proved bitter again. Spanish conquistadores and Latin Americans were already immersed in a spiral of 
violence when Las Casas reached his destination, which he was unable to end. Even worse, in their 
obsession for fast riches, the farmers that Las Casas had recruited had terrorized the Latin Americans. 
The two failed attempts of peaceful colonization show Las Casas’ association of social progress with 
the colonization and civilization of nature. For Hanke: 
 
The vision which guided Las Casas was of a new World in which Spanish farmers—transplanted with tools, seeds 
and supplies furnished by the King; their native industry, farming ability, and firmness in the faith being their own 
contribution—would take root in Latin America. They would till the soil of Tierra Firme and live side by side with 
the Indians there in such a way that their faith and their skill and industry would insensibly be absorbed by the 
natives, and an ideal Christian community would come into being.173 
 
In this utopian effort to promote the improvement of Latin Americans’ commonwealths through 
agriculture, Las Casas was not different from his admired wise men who had at other historical junctures 
helped nations move forward. Far back in history before Las Casas conceived his agricultural schemes, 
there were concrete examples of similar approaches to social change from which he drew inspiration. As 
Las Casas recalled, Saturno, the father of the Italian nation, for instance, had taught Italians how to till 
the land and seed and collect agricultural products as part of his mission to promote their advancement.174 
Likewise, Zechio Croatino showed the inhabitants of Bohemia how to cultivate the land, helping their 
ascension from an almost bestial condition to a political and reasonable life.175 
Eventually, Las Casas abandoned his initial plan, due to the conquistadores’ immoral conduct rather than 
a change of perspective. Years later, once he had already set strenuous limits on Spanish power in Latin 
America in his last works, he referred to the Yucatán as a place where his utopia could have been realized. 
There, Spanish could have built towns and cities, mingling with the original population. And so, ‘the local 
people might have lived side by side in peace and prosperity with the Spanish, who would then have found 
themselves, had they only proved worthy, in a paradise on earth’.176 It was the Spanish conquerors’ 
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unworthiness, not Latin Americans’ inherent freedom, that convinced Las Casas about the dangers of 
granting economic rights and political power to the Spanish adventurers.  
 
José de Acosta: a reappraisal of Latin American social progress 
Las Casas’ ethnographic description of Latin American commonwealths found a replica in the writings 
of the Jesuit José de Acosta (1540-1600). In a similar vein to Las Casas’ Apologética, Acosta studied the 
natural and social dimensions of life in Latin America in his famous book Historia Natural y Moral de 
las Indias.177 Published in 1590 and available in English since the early 1600s, Acosta’s description of 
Latin American societies soon became influential. In contrast, Las Casas’ Historia de las Indias and 
Apologética Historia Sumaria remained unpublished until the nineteenth century, so his impact on 
posterior authors who reflected on the ‘matters of the Indies’ was not as significant as that of Acosta. In 
fact, it was Acosta’s perspective on the character of the Latin Americans’ habitats and commonwealths 
that gained notoriety at the end of the sixteenth century and continued to exercise an influence on 
speculations about the nature of Latin American societies for most of the seventeenth century.178 His 
doctrines were particularly influential in colonial debates about the nature of North American peoples in 
the English colony of Virginia.179 
The purpose of Acosta’s Historia was twofold. On the one hand, he believed that it was interesting and 
pleasant to describe the qualities of ‘nations’ that were ‘in many ways different from our Europe’.180 
Curiosity was a strong motivation for knowledge. On the other hand, as a Jesuit (a Spanish order that had 
gained conspicuous intellectual and missionary influence at the end of sixteenth century), Acosta felt 
compelled to study Latin Americans’ mores and manners as a way of facilitating missionary work. He 
thought that the more the Spanish familiarized with the way in which Latin Americans lived, the easier 
it would be to win their trust so that they could be peacefully converted to Catholicism.181 In the Historia 
we find the same humane tone that is characteristic of Vitoria’s, Soto’s, and Las Casas’ writings on the 
Latin American peoples.  
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Like these authors, Acosta wanted to rebut the devious idea that Latin Americans were brutes and 
beasts. He explained that one of the reasons to write about them, their ‘customs and polity and 
government’, was to ‘refute the false opinion that is commonly held about them, that they are brutes and 
bestial folks…’.182 For him, Latin American commonwealths exhibited contradictory tendencies of 
barbarism and sophistication.183 It was the second aspect, of course, that he found worthy of reflection. 
Similar to the ‘gentle Dominicans’, the conclusion of the Jesuit was that Latin Americans were rational 
beings and, hence, ‘had a natural capacity to receive good instruction’.184 
But Acosta was also convinced that Latin Americans were inferior to the Spanish.185 They lacked the 
use of letters, the mechanism whereby humans could better understand and shape their reality.186 
Importantly, this difference was for him a question of degree rather than kind. Therefore, he placed Latin 
Americans and the Spanish in a continuum. In his words: ‘There are no peoples so barbaric that they do 
not have something worthy of praise, nor are there any people so civilized and humane that they stand in 
no need of correction.’ 187 
Acosta acknowledged that there was an important degree of differentiation among Latin American 
commonwealths. In his work De procuranda indorum salute, which first appeared in Salamanca in 1588 
(two years before Historia), he affirmed that there was no one sole way of educating, evangelizing, and 
governing the plurality of Latin American peoples.188 He thus came up with a three-fold general 
classification of different kinds of barbarism within which he could comprehend and order the whole 
world.  
People who only slightly deviated from the dictates of right reason and the general practices of 
humankind formed the first category of barbarians.189 Their societies possessed several traits that were 
familiar to Acosta’s own social context: they had sound government, proper laws, fortified cities, 
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magistrates, and a well-organized and prosperous commerce.190 Most importantly, they knew the use of 
letters.191 The Chinese, the Japanese, and certain provinces of the East Indies were examples of this 
distinguished group within the spectrum of barbarism.  
The second type of barbarians also lived in settled polities with magistrates, military leaders, a sort of 
religious splendor, and proper mores.192 All these positive features notwithstanding, they were still 
ignorant of letters and written laws, so had no philosophic or civil science.193 An example of such 
barbarians were the ‘mejicanos y peruanos’, that is, the inhabitants of the empires of Tawantinsuyu and 
Anahuac.194 There was a tone of appreciation in Acosta’s description of their polities. Still, they were far 
behind the type of rationality that he considered ideal. 
At the very bottom of the barbarian spectrum was a miscellany comprised by the lowest ranks of 
humanity. First, there were ferocious and savage human beings that resembled beasts.195 More peaceful 
barbarians, who, nonetheless, were not much different from animals, integrated a second group.196 Naked 
and fearful, they engaged in vicious practices.197 It is striking that in De procuranda, Acosta likened 
certain types of barbarians (including numerous Latin American peoples) to animals. Acosta also 
maintained that even they, in spite of their ineptitude and wilderness, could receive the gospel.198 Even 
in the Historia, he compared some Latin American peoples with beasts.199 Higher among the lowest 
barbarians there was a final group formed by peaceful communities.200 Although they had achieved 
higher levels of rationality than the other two groups and had ‘a certain kind of government’,201 they still 
had a very limited degree of judiciousness, as proven by their childish laws and rites.  
How can we reconcile Acosta’s parallels between some Latin American peoples and animals in De 
procuranda with his affirmation in the Historia that to say that Latin Americans were ‘brutes and bestial 
folks’ was a ‘harmful delusion’?202 In the latter work, Acosta was always very careful not to state that 
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Latin Americans were animals or beasts. He simply compared them to ‘irrational creatures’ to underline 
their lack of civility in contrast to the refined Spaniards.  
One possible explanation for this change is that he may have realized over the course of years that 
separated the two publications that, by assimilating Latin Americans to animals and hence stressing their 
irrationality, he was opening the door to the argument that their limited capacity made them unfit to 
receive the Gospel. The use of Latin Americans’ animality to demonstrate their lack of civility could 
backfire, eventually undermining the evangelizing role of the Jesuit order in Latin America and the 
religious project of the Catholic Church on the continents. For this reason, he was aware he had to tread 
a thin line between identifying the Latin Americans with animals and conveying to his audience the sense 
that some of them resembled their wilderness. 
Many Latin American societies fell within Acosta’s third category of barbarism. He cited, for instance, 
the ‘chunchos, chiriguanás, moxos, and iscaicingas’.203 To these groups he added most Brazilian peoples 
and the inhabitants of Florida, the so-called ‘moscas’ of Nueva Granada, the promiscuous communities 
of Cartagena and its coast line, the population of the vast fields of the immense Paraguay river, and most 
of the peoples that occupied the infinite space that separated the two Oceans.204 
In the Historia, Acosta expanded the classification of Latin American peoples from two to three groups. 
He gave these categories a historical motion by explaining them as different stages of social complexity. 
The most sophisticated of all the societies the Spanish encountered in Latin America were ‘the Kingdoms 
of Peru and Mexico’, which significantly surpassed any other social group.205 They represented the 
finalized social form acquired after hundreds of years of social transformation by the savage and hunting 
communities who had migrated to the continents.206 Between the most barbaric and the most refined 
stages of pre-Spanish social life, there was an intermediate phase in which traits from the superior and 
inferior periods mixed. His description of these three historical periods was part of a larger explanation 
of the origins of Mexica society. 
Acosta recounted the example of the inhabitats of Anahuac (or New Spain), the Chichimecas, a forest-
dwelling people who did not practice agriculture and merely survived from the products of hunting.207 
They were savages and, hence, had no proper communities. They lived like beasts, without government, 
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settlement, or clothes.208 Because of this lack of fixed abode, ‘fighting with them’ was ‘exactly like 
hunting beasts, for they scatter and hide in the roughest and most thickly wooden parts of the 
mountains’.209 These types of humans were not a mere relic of the past, like the Chichimecas. Even at 
the time that Acosta wrote, there were many regions of Latin America in which the same lifestyle could 
be found.210 As he affirmed, this was the ‘kind of wild Indians’ that he referred to in De procuranda 
when he stated that they first had to ‘be taught to be men and then to be Christians’.211 
Other groups like the Otomíes inhabited towns, had some sort of polity, and were not too inept to 
receive Christianity.212 Whereas the Chichimecas lived in a kind of ‘state of nature’, the Otomíes had 
clearly reached proper civil life, but had not yet attained the level of sophistication of the inhabitants of 
the empires of Tawantinsuyu and Anahuac. 
How did the social transformation that drove peoples from one stage to another come about? For 
Acosta, as for Las Casas, the assimilation of inferior social forms into superior ones was a natural 
phenomenon. Once the two were in contact, communication opened channels for purposeful learning and 
spontaneous imitation.213 In other words, it was just a matter of time until the most barbaric peoples 
started to imitate the more refined mores of advanced commonwealths. This mechanism of learning ran 
like a thread through the three stages of Latin American social change. Therefore, Acosta declared: 
 
I am convinced that most of the provinces and nations in the Indies have developed in the same way: the first of 
them were savages and, in order to maintain themselves by hunting, they little by little penetrated inhospitable 
lands and discovered a new world, living in it almost like beasts; they had no dwelling places nor roofs nor 
cultivated fields, nor livestock nor king, nor law nor God nor the use of reason. Later others, seeking new and 
better lands, settled the better parts and instituted order and polity and some sort of commonwealth, though still a 
very savage one. Later still, either from these or from other nations, men who possessed more energy and craft 
than the rest began to subdue and oppress the less powerful, until they formed great kingdoms and empires. Thus 
it was in Mexico, thus in Peru, and thus it undoubtedly is in all places where there are cities and commonwealths 
founded by these barbarians.214 
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There is a clear environmental ring in Acosta’s social ordering. Whereas the first ‘wild Indians’ had no 
productive capacity and skills whereby they could have carved a social niche out of wild landscapes, the 
great and industrious Latin American empires were resourceful enough to settle fertile valleys and till 
their fields.215 In a passage that anticipated the kind of logic that informed the agricultural argument,216 
he maintained that because savage peoples could not ‘reap or sow’ they ‘left the best and more fertile 
part of it (New Spain) unpeopled; and that part was occupied by nations that came from elsewhere’.217 
Acosta also used certain categories to refer to specific Latin American societies (e.g. savage and wild) 
that associated the concrete productive activities (hunting) of those communities with the degree (or lack, 
as in this case) of social complexity.  
The denomination of savage was later adopted by the English to describe the peoples of North 
America during their conquest of the northern part of the continent. Eventually it became synonymous 
with a lack of capacity to efficiently utilize natural ecosystems. In the eighteenth century the category of 
savage formed part of the theories that attempted to provide a historical and ‘scientific’ explanation of 
how societies evolved and improved.  
 Despite the undeniable influence of Acosta’s account in subsequent secularized analyses of North 
American commonwealths and theories of social change, there are still some relevant divergences 
between them. For example, whereas several Enlightenment intellectuals, particularly those in the 
Scottish Enlightenment, understood social progress in linear terms, progress was cyclical for Acosta. He 
believed that most Latin American peoples had ‘risen and multiplied’ from ‘savage and fugitive men’ 
who migrated to the continent from distant territories in search of new lands.218 Although the first men 
who entered Latin America were wild, they had come ‘from civilized and well-governed countries’.219 
For Acosta their lack of sophistication was a consequence of having forgotten their customs during their 
long journey.220 Savagery was not the result of a special effect or defect of Latin America as such. In 
fact, the same backwardness, derived from a lack of memory of refined customs, could be found in Spain 
or Italy where some groups had only a few human traits.221 
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Unlike posterior theories, Acosta’s view of social evolution was still framed within a religious mold. 
The achievements of the empires of Tawantinsuyu and Anahuac were praised because they showed that 
both societies were ripe for the arrival of the Gospel.222 A previous historical event that mirrored this 
situation was the conversion to Christianity of the Roman Empire once it reached the pinnacle of its 
power.223 So, despite recurrent cycles of social improvement and deterioration derived from the need to 
populate the whole world, there was an overall linear advance toward Christianity and progress. 
Ultimately, the history of humanity was one, because ‘every men’ came ‘from one man’ and every 
commonwealth was bound to be evangelized.224 God as creator and redeemer was the initial and final 
point of human history. 
The environmental program of perfecting Latin American nature by abandoning backward practices 
such as hunting, and instead squeezing its bounty through agriculture, was complemented by Acosta’s 
interest in dismantling Latin Americans’ religious beliefs. It was not enough to change the way in which 
certain Latin American peoples altered the environment; it was also vital to change the way in which all 
of them perceived it. In fact, Acosta linked Latin Americans’ general lack of social achievement with 
their low rational capacity to understand how nature really operated. Due to the ‘pitiful condition in 
which many Indians have lived, and still live’,225 it was ‘extremely difficult … to root out of their minds 
the idea that there is no other god or deity but only one, and that all other things have no power or being 
of their own, or operation of their own, than what is given and communicated to them by that supreme 
and only God and Lord’.226 
Latin Americans were like children: easy to trick and, therefore, susceptible to manipulation and 
deception by the devil.227 Nothing was more dangerous than their erroneous judgment about non-human 
nature. Like the Greeks or the Romans, Latin Americans worshipped ‘noble’ natural deities such as the 
sun, the moon, the stars, and the elements.228 Some of them even adored natural elements that seemed 
for Acosta rather foolish like ‘rivers, fountain, ravines, rocks, large stones, hills’ or, actually, ‘anything 
in nature’ that they perceived as notable.229 They also venerated animals in order to avoid their attack.230 
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For Acosta, the reason for this unacceptable behavior was that although God had created all natural 
elements ‘for the service of man, man has been so unsuccessful in ruling and governing them that on the 
one hand he has tried to raise himself to be God and on the other has recognized and subjected himself 
to creatures lower than him’.231 
 Acosta’s tone in this part of his book was condemnatory. He spoke about ‘blind Indians’ underlying 
their ‘sinfulness and perdition’.232 Latin Americans’ conviction of the sacredness of nature was just the 
result of the devil’s mischievous trickery. Convincing them of the right way to conceptualize and 
understand nature became a way of protecting their mind against perverse satanic influences. For the 
sake of their salvation, missionaries could not tolerate ‘childish’ rituals of adoration of the natural 
world.233 Acosta recounted the story in which a Spanish soldier saw Latin Americans chanting and 
reciting a mantra in order to invoke the rain. Instead of letting them go on with their practice, he 
convinced them to build a cross and worship God.234 The effect was miraculous, because soon after they 
did as they were told it began to rain.235 The message of this passage was clear: nature was God’s 
instrument and only the Creator (and to a lesser extent those who followed his creed) could command it.  
It might be too daring to affirm, as Lynn White did in the 1960s, that in general ‘[b]y destroying pagan 
animism, Christianity made possible to exploit nature in a mood of indifference to the feelings of natural 
objects’.236 But Acosta’s religious reconceptualization of the way Latin American nature ought to be 
perceived shifted the power from nature to an external deity. This understanding, which most of Acosta’s 
contemporary countrymen shared, may have contributed to creating a conceptual space for the 
application in Latin America of an economic program of environmental transformation that exponentially 
increased European power while filling the pockets of all those implicated in the exchange of 
commodified natural elements. The story of how the evangelizing mission in Latin America was 
transformed by Protestant natural lawyers into a ‘more secular’ project—or perhaps more exactly into a 
religiously different project—of wealth accumulation will be the focus of the next chapters. In the context 
of European imperialism, that project acquired a globalizing pull, and was to have enormous political, 
economic, social, and environmental implications. 
 
                                                 
231 Ibid., Book V Ch 4 260. 
232 Ibid., Book V Ch 25 261-262. 
233 Ibid., 263. 
234 Ibid., Book VII Ch 27 442. 
235 Ibid. 
236 White, ‘The Historical Roots’, 52. 
145 
 
Concluding remarks 
The works of Vitoria and Las Casas contributed to the historical development of rights applicable to all 
peoples, as well as legal rules that regulated interactions between different commonwealths. The stature 
of these Spanish Scholastics in present-day Latin America is evidenced by streets and squares in their 
memory237 and human rights institutions that have taken their names as inspiration238 while following in 
their footsteps as guarantors of human rights and the rights of Latin American peoples. Notwithstanding 
their humane contribution to colonial debates, there is an equally relevant though less appealing side of 
their legacy. They sketched the legal contours and the ideological tapestry that eventually legitimized 
colonialism—albeit a softer version of it—and cemented an unsustainable relationship to nature in Latin 
America.  
Vitoria’s economic rights created the legal mechanisms for the private appropriation of Latin American 
natural resources. According to the School of Salamanca, private property gave the owner a complete 
power over its possessions, only limited by law. The quasi-sacred nature of private property and the 
possibility of acquiring vacant land in Latin America, together with the regulative power of the Spanish 
Crown, helped the eventual emergence and consolidation of the latifundia or vast landed estates that in 
time led to one of the highest indexes of unequal land distribution worldwide.239 Instead of fulfilling its 
social function, land became commercialized creating affluence at one end of the spectrum but also 
landlessness and impoverishment at the other end.240 In addition, propelled by the universal legal sanction 
of free international trade, economic inequality (a remarkable feature of Latin American societies) 
transcended the geographical borders of the continent and, from the sixteenth century, gradually extended 
across the colonial world.  
Las Casas and Vitoria contributed as well to legitimize the evangelizing mission, which imposed—if 
gently—a novel way of conceiving the human-nature relationship. God had created humans in its image 
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so that they too could rule over non-human nature. A relevant aspect of this environmental power was the 
association of human and social progress with the transformation of nature.241 
Because of this ideological homogeneity, and despite good intentions, the protective responses of Vitoria, 
Soto, Las Casas, and Acosta to the conquest of Latin America lost all the richness, variety, and nuance of 
Latin Americans’ worldviews. This affected the relationship between humans and nature, as the voice of 
those who could utter a radical—in the sense of a radically different—interpretation of its meaning, value, 
and economic function at the time of conquest was silenced. The Dominican and Jesuit friars incarnated 
the humanitarian spirit of their time, one that was characterized by an absolute confidence in a superior 
universal truth and the moral imperative of its dissemination. As a result, the space for alternative visions 
of the good life in Latin America shrank considerably.  
Against doctrines that proclaimed the complete differentiation of colonizer and colonized, Vitoria and 
Las Casas predicated their legal parity. Thus, the regulative power of the rights that belonged to all human 
beings and commonwealths became automatically applicable to Latin American peoples. But the 
universality of the law made possible a hegemonic particularity imposed over other particularities. Then, 
once colonizer and colonized were brought into the same universal legal community, difference coexisted 
with the alleged universal character of the law. The colonial subjects’ need for religious and social 
transformation—conceived of as improvement—and the supposed power of the colonizer to bring them 
about gave the latter’s beliefs, customs, values, and institutions an (illusory) progressive and redemptive 
character. This second imperialist moment (built on the former), in the formation of a universal language 
of rights, subtly incorporated Latin American commonwealths under the institutional apparatus that 
served an alien worldview. Defined as lacking, incomplete, and wanting, at least in some respects, Latin 
Americans’ full identity rested on their oppressors’ recognition and acceptance. For the friars, conversion 
to their religious vision was the first step toward social enhancement.  
Critical scholars have shed light on these moments of inclusion and exclusion during the early 
developments of a vocabulary of universal rights.242 However, the pivotal role that nature played in 
providing a conceptual basis for their genesis is less acknowledged. The fusion of Latin Americans with 
nature served Spanish commentators by emphasizing their lack of rationality and non-assimilability to 
the Spaniards. In reaction to this fundamentally unequal way of defining the colonial subject, Vitoria and 
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Las Casas rejected the extreme version of the ‘state of nature’ as a way of defining the degree of 
civilization of Latin American commonwealths. Nevertheless, their reaction of inclusion naturalized the 
separation between the natural and social domains, a separation that became part and parcel of the way 
in which new universal rules regulated inter-commonwealth relations. In addition, Vitoria, Las Casas, 
and Acosta acknowledged Latin Americans’ inferiority243 with regard to their capacity to master the 
environment. This judgment was based on a conception of the world that emphasized the primacy of the 
social sphere over the natural sphere while associating that preponderance with the characteristics of a 
specific nation: Spain. 
The vocabulary of economic rights developed by Vitoria, Soto, and the School of Salamanca provided 
the legal basis for Spanish economic hegemony in Latin America.244 Those rights allowed nature’s 
constituent elements to be turned into commodities. This shift in the use of Latin American landscapes 
was in line with the religious lens of Vitoria, Soto, Las Casas, and Acosta, according to which post-
lapsarian social improvement could only take place through the exercise of an increasing control over 
nature. Hence, the alleged superiority of Spaniards in mastering the Latin American environment 
reinforced the importance of the applicability in Latin America of the legal instrument that made it 
possible: Spanish economic rights. The legal power to appropriate private land and natural resources for 
personal benefit, together with the representation of that possibility as socially progressive, opened the 
Pandora’s Box of environmental exploitation. The public and private economic forces that imperialism 
set in motion eventually shattered the fragile limits that Vitoria, Soto, and Las Casas tried to impose on 
the unfolding of the Spanish Empire and the emergence of an empire of private economic power. 
The influence of Vitoria’s, Las Casas’, and Acosta’s assessments of the social advancement of Latin 
American societies surpassed the Latin American context. Their idea that certain Latin American 
societies lacked the knowledge and the productive activities whereby they could satisfactorily exploit 
                                                 
243 In practice, the discrimination of Latin American peoples became extreme in the mixed colonial Spanish Latin America. 
After several centuries of cultural imperialism, the descendants of the Latin American peoples still bear the stigmas of racism 
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their surroundings was to have an enormous influence in the following centuries as part of the ideological 
arsenal of imperialism. In the subsequent chapters, we will see how natural lawyers started to find explicit 
links between the material and conceptual dimensions of the colonization of non-Europeans ecosystems. 
Eventually both threads became knitted together in a coherent and general theory of social progress that 
was to have enormous historical implications. The story of how these two components developed and 
became intertwined is the focus of the next section. 
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Part III
 
THE LAW OF NATIONS AND NATURE:  
IMPROVING WILDERNESS IN NON-EUROPEAN TERRITORIES (1603-1776) 
 
 
The Spanish Empire reached its zenith by the end of the seventeenth century. This came after its 
annexation of the Crown of Portugal in 1580—an act which enabled it to acquire the world’s largest 
navy, thus greatly facilitating the patrol of its Atlantic colonial possessions and trade in the East Indies. 
However, despite its modern, powerful military apparatus and political leverage, the foundations of the 
Empire were weakened by structural economic problems and particularly fiscal stress.1 On top of that, 
Spain waged costly wars in order to maintain its European hegemony, which further jeopardized the 
financial sustainability of the empire. Unable to neither compete with the economic dynamism of two of 
its rival European nations—the English and the Dutch—nor find an antidote to counter the ideological 
religious project of the Reformation, the country began to lose its pre-eminence in both the material and 
ideological domains.2 
 Over time, the Dutch Republic and England consolidated their political independence and expanded 
their naval prowess, which enabled them to seize part of the Iberian Atlantic and East Indian trade and 
acquire imperial stature. The commercial expansion of both nations provided a springboard to control 
the world economy to an extent that was historically unprecedented.3 In fact, by the mid-seventeenth 
century, the Dutch succeeded in displacing the Portuguese from the East Indies. Alongside this, they 
were the main trading power in the Baltic, the Mediterranean, and the Atlantic.4 England followed suit, 
extending its commercial reach to the East Indies and the Atlantic while—at the same time—founding 
colonies in the eastern part of the American continent. 
 The emergence of new imperial powers represented not just a reconfiguration of the colonial map but 
also a shift in the course of the history of the world economy. Capitalist relations were slowly 
                                                 
1 Herfried Münkler, Empires: A Logic of World Domination from Roma to the United States (Cambridge, Polity Press, 2007) 
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consolidated in the northern Netherlands and England.5 The successful economic experiences of those 
nations at home ran in parallel with expansionist mercantile ambitions, resulting in the exercise of an 
increasing private economic power over the rest of the world. These developments, coupled with the 
exploitation of African slaves in American plantations by combining pre-capitalist and capitalist relations 
of production, helped the eventual transition to full-blooded capitalism.6 One of the significant 
consequences of these economic changes was the substantial increase of the incentive to exploit the 
world’s natural resources.  
 At the beginning of the seventeenth century, the juridical basis for the exploitation of natural resources 
in the context of European colonial expansion rested mainly on the inclusion of the legal institutions of 
dominium rerum, long-distance trade, and the law ferae bestiae as part of ius gentium, by the father of 
the School of Salamanca, Francisco Vitoria, and to a certain degree by his disciple Domingo de Soto. In 
the opening part of his lecture De indis, Vitoria had concluded that the peoples of America were 
sovereigns of their territory and private owners of their lands. However, in conjunction with these rights 
he also acknowledged a series of legal titles whereby Latin Americans could be ruled by the Spanish. 
Spanish colonists could also exercise private power over Latin American ecosystems by appropriating 
unoccupied natural resources. Spanish material power over the environment was amplified by a Christian 
vision of social improvement, whereby the increase in complexity of a commonwealth was related to its 
capacity to master nature. In addition to personal wealth, this conceptual basis for the transformation of 
natural habitats generated a further impetus to exploit them.  
 In following centuries, European intellectual figures such as Grotius, Vattel, Locke, Pufendorf, and 
Wolff reflected to a greater or lesser extent on the question of whether natural resources (including land) 
could be seized in the colonies. While all of them admitted the possibility of acquiring territory in non-
European lands, they differed on the scope of the right to occupation and on the kind of dominium derived 
from it. Whereas for Grotius and Locke acquisition of land in the colonies entailed its privatization, for 
Vattel, Pufendorf, and Wolff occupation gave rise to sovereignty. In general, the result of these theories 
was the legitimation of the transfer of colonial natural resources to European hands, which facilitated the 
transformation and eventual degradation of nature.  
 There were still important differences between Spanish friars and subsequent authors. Whereas the 
former were in principle wary of capital accumulation, some of the latter, namely Grotius and Locke, 
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had direct economic interests in colonial ventures, or worked for states or companies that profited from 
colonialism. Their personal stakes explained in part why their theories legitimized capital gain and 
enrichment derived from European imperialism. Besides, for Vitoria Spanish rights were meaningful 
only in correlation with the ius predicandi, and Las Casas and Acosta elaborated their theories on the 
mores of the peoples of America in order to promote the evangelizing mission rather than a secular 
project of material accumulation. 
 Once the law of nations lost part of its religious outlook and the commentators that helped its 
development distanced themselves from the ‘anti-capitalist’ bias characteristic of commentators critical 
of capital accumulation such as Las Casas, the link between the institutions of private property and 
international trade with efficiency, material wealth, and social improvement became more explicit and 
robust during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The result of that association was the emergence 
of a commercial approach to natural habitats beyond European borders which was difficult to challenge, 
as any attack against the imperialist economic institutions and legal regimes that supported it could be 
interpreted as an attack against the very idea of social advancement, and ultimately against the necessary, 
teleological unfolding of human history.  
 Chronologically this section starts with the apprehension of the Santa Catalina by the Dutch East Indian 
Company (Vereenighde Oostindische Compagnie or VOC) in 1603, which spurred Grotius’ reflections 
about international trade. It ends with the publication of The Wealth of Nations in 1776, a treatise in 
which commercial societies were elevated to the apex of social advancement, presented as the most 
progressive political formations to which human communities could aspire. Grotius and Smith mark the 
beginning and the culmination of a new wave of intellectual reflections about European imperialism and 
social improvement, with important overtones for non-European peoples and their natural habitats. The 
Wealth of Nations was published before the establishment of the first British colony in Australia, an event 
that would open a new chapter in the history of European imperialism.  
 Apart from commerce, one of the economic institutions recognized as a universal right in the law of 
nations, dominium rerum, greatly facilitated the increase of private power over material reality. In other 
words, its legal universalization went hand in hand with the privatization of nature worldwide. In fact, 
private property and trade operated together. Anchored in legal justifications provided by natural lawyers, 
the extension of inter-continental trade and plantation agriculture overseas fostered the commoditization 
of colonial ecosystems and natural resources in the East Indies and European Atlantic—dependencies 
that had been previously privatized.  
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 During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, spices, furs, fish, sugar, tobacco, indigo, cotton, 
timber products, and food supplies, among others goods were inserted in trans-oceanic networks of 
exchange that linked Europe and America. They fostered innovations in European manufacturing, 
finance and marketing while also strengthening commercial links between Europe, Africa, and Asia.7 
Profits and returns became an increasingly determining factor in the measurement of nature’s value.  
 Because of commerce between the colonies and the metropolis, the environmental constraints on the 
expansion of European production—related to domestic patterns of increasing consumption and 
population growth—were loosened. The natural resources that Europeans needed to sustain their 
economic growth at an optimal level could be obtained in overseas territories,8 providing an escape valve 
for an increasingly unsustainable Europe.9 
 From an ideological standpoint, the idea of improving nature through commercial agriculture was the 
legal rationale for international legal theories of occupation and land acquisition in non-European 
territories. Most scholars truly believed that the transformation of the environment through what they 
considered as superior and universally desirable economic practices—though of European pedigree—
was a positive change that justified their preponderant access to the natural resources. Besides, legal 
commentators did not fail to notice the profitability of this sort of blueprint for environmental 
transformation. They translated that idea of betterment into legal reasoning establishing it as the basis for 
ownership and/or sovereignty over non-European territories.  
 The use of legal arguments based on an environmental logic of efficiency and productivity in order to 
legalize imperial expansion, entailed a departure from preceding Spanish legal theories and their 
                                                 
7 Nicholas Canny, ‘Atlantic History and Global History’ in Greene and Morgan (eds.), Atlantic History: A Critical Appraisal 
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World, 57-75.  
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British Atlantic World 1500-1800 (Hampshire, Palgrave Macmillan, 2002) 51-68, 52. The English used timber from their 
North American colonies in order to preserve their own forests. See Joseph M. Petulla, American Environmental History 
(Columbus, Merrill Publishing Co., 1988) 28.  
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discredited justifications of empire derived mostly from religious categories.10 By avoiding the 
examination of the institutional apparatus, cultural practices, and personal condition of colonial 
populations, the novel and a priori objective legal doctrines put forward by authors such as Grotius, 
Locke, and Vattel seemed more impartial and, hence, more legitimate than the subjective theories of 
Spanish commentators.  
 In North America, supposedly vacant lands and natural resources were appropriated for farms and 
plantation agriculture. The capacity of British settlers to improve North American land was considered 
as a sign of their superiority in mastering nature vis-à-vis backward North American populations. Even 
if Europeans’ superior capacity to manipulate nature was not always translated into explicit hierarchical 
categories, European economic practices and technical expertise were nevertheless impliedly regarded 
as the law of nations’ standard to determine who should be the rightful owner of natural resources in 
North America. Under the impact of conquest and forceful apprehension of natural resources, North 
American societies struggled for survival as much as their southern counterparts under tyrannical Spanish 
rule.  
 Environmental historians have demonstrated that non-European populations were more 
knowledgeable, creative, complex, and sophisticated than international legal theories recognized.11 They 
had also shown that colonial landscapes were ‘less wild’ than international scholars assumed, as the 
impact of its inhabitants (through agriculture, hunting, gathering, use of fire, etc.) had for millennia 
created humanized landscapes.12 The fluidity of the ‘colonial world’—neither completely wild nor 
entirely ‘civilized’ (according to European standards)—could not be captured by the simplified images 
and assumptions with which the commentators of the law of nations had diligently constructed their idea 
of progress.  
 Chapter 4 explores how the legal institution of dominium rerum, free trade, and the doctrine of 
occupation gave international legal validation to European political and economic power in the East 
Indies and North America, enhancing its imperial reach. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 
non-European nature was materially aprehended in this way. In addition, Chapter 5 looks at the way in 
which such practices were turned into cultural markers, becoming the premises for a narrative of social 
                                                 
10 This criterion of civilization permeated Spanish colonial debates on the humanity of the peoples of America. See Seed, 
‘Are These Not’. The evangelization of colonial subjects became the target of severe criticism as a consequence of the Spanish 
black legend promoted by the Augsburg European rivals, especially the Dutch. 
11 See supra Chapter 1, pages 22-29 and 53-56. 
12 Ibid. 
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progress based on environmental superiority that validated Europeans’ privileged access to natural 
resources. Unraveling the interrelation between the economic institutions and the cultural narrative of 
social improvement that underpinned the law of nations during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
is of utmost importance in order to understand the legitimization of the way in which North American 
natural habitats were appropriated. Eventually, the material and conceptual dimensions of the European 
colonization of nature fused, thus providing a rather solid justification of European imperialism that was 
to have enormous implications during the first half of the nineteenth century.  
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4  The Material Appropriation of Nature: Trade, Private Property, and the 
Agricultural Argument in the East Indies and North America 
 
 
 
 
 
If desert and uncultivated places are transformed by cultivation from sterile or at least useless places into fertile 
and useful places, since in this manner industrial products are multiplied and a crop of natural products is 
developed by industry and exertion, which assuredly tends to the perfecting of the condition of the nation.1 
 
 
As in the case of Latin America, private property, trade, and occupation played a fundamental role in 
European expansion during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in the East Indies and North 
America. These juridical institutions allowed what I have termed the ‘material appropriation’ of 
ecosystems in non-European territories, that is, the apprehension and exchange of particular parts of 
nature, such as minerals, animals, medical plants, etc., and the transformation of particular habitats into 
plantations for export to international markets. The transformation of ecosystems into commodities 
reduced biodiversity and had severe localized impacts in the non-European territories in which Europeans 
decided to intensively extract or produce certain natural resources. 
  During the seventeenth and eighteenth century, natural lawyers further developed the rights to private 
property, trade, and occupation that Spanish scholastics had previously ennunciated as part of the ius 
gentium. Grotius, Pufendorf, Locke, Wolff, and Vattel further theorized about these economic 
institutions and theories in their disquisitions on the law of nations. There was no uniformity in their 
treatment of these institutions. Authors disagreed on the scope and applicability of rights of an economic 
nature, particular when it came to their use in non-European territories. However, they all shared the 
conviction that seizing nature and exploiting it in order to improve the world was legal and legitimate.2 
                                                 
1 Christian Wolff, Jus Gentium Methodo Scientifica Pertractatum, Vol I, the Translation by Joseph H. Drake (Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1934) Ch III §279 142. 
2 As Andrew Fitzmaurice has noticed: ‘the fact remains that the natural law arguments of trade, and friendship and 
occupation were used by Europeans to dispossess indigenous Americans and other indigenous peoples.’ See Fitzmaurice, 
Sovereignty, 60.  
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  This conviction was a reflection of the important transformations that were underway in their own 
societies, particularly in the second half of the eighteenth century. In countries like England, the 
Netherlands, or France, the material condition of life had started to improve thanks to the application of 
humans’ increasing scientific and technical power to the transformation of nature. Moreover, this secular 
impulse based on economic factors was still in consonance with Protestant theology. As in the case of 
Vitoria, natural economic rights and Protestant views on the human relationship with nature tended to 
converge toward the same goal of improvement through exploitation. The Protestant way of 
understanding non-human nature was particularly influential in North America due to the strong 
religiosity of the first settlers. The belief that God had commanded humans to dominate nature paved the 
way for economic theories and institutions that helped give concrete expression to that power.  
  Even though the religious and ideological backgrounds of Vitoria and later intellectuals had certain 
similarities, there were also fundamental differences. This explains the different orientations that 
Vitoria’s doctrines and those of later authors had. Neither Vitoria, Soto, Las Casas, nor Acosta for that 
matter were directly invested in the economic dimension of colonization and the material gains derived 
from the exploitation of labor and natural resources in the colonies—in fact Las Casas strongly criticized 
it. In contrast, thinkers like Grotius and Locke defended the economic interest of colonial actors, even 
investing directly in colonial ventures. But even authors who did not have a direct stake in European 
imperialism were interested in the ways in which their nations could flourish by participating in the 
economic gains that colonialism brought about. For them, too, private property, trade, and agriculture 
were the best recipes to that end. 
  Scholars who represented the interests of small European powers put the accent on the freedom of 
commerce, in the possibility of each nation to protect itself from the commercial encroachment of the 
most powerful ones. In contrast, those that represented great maritime empires tried to articulate as 
permissible and expansionist a doctrine of free trade as possible. Similarly, they amplified the scope of 
the right to occupy vacant natural resources and especially land in non-European territories. In North 
America, these theories lay the foundations for the whole appropriation of the continent several decades 
after the American War of Independence. That is, however, a later story, one that only makes sense after 
examining the genesis of the legal and ideological mechanisms at play in the North American context. 
British inroads in North America and Dutch commercial imperialism in the East Indies created the need 
for legal developments that allowed the continuous expansion of international markets and the 
concomitant exploitation of non-European ecosystems. 
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Reformation theology and human power over nature 
Christianity had also influenced the Spanish scholastics’ views about the natural world. Notwithstanding 
nuances in approach, they all believed in a strict separation between the natural and human spheres. Only 
rational creatures could have natural rights. Moreover, some authors like Vitoria, for instance, put non-
human nature at the complete disposal of human beings.3 This approach was in consonance with the 
theology of Saint Thomas Aquinas.4 
 The main treatises on the law of nations during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were written 
after the Reformation had started to alter the religious and political configuration of Europe. 
Protestantism consciously broke with the Catholicism that had inspired the reflections on universal rights 
of the Spanish scholastics. But was there any difference in the way authors from both periods understood 
human power over the natural world? Did the Reformation introduce a novel way of understanding the 
human relationship with nature?  
 The theology of Martin Luther (1483-1546) and Jean Calvin (1509-1564) can be defined as 
‘theanthropocentric’ because of its focus on the relationship between God and humanity and, particularly, 
on the question of human salvation.5 They devoted less attention to examining the status of non-human 
nature and its relation with humans. Still, both authors reflected on the Genesis, offering their own 
interpretation of the divine mandate of human dominion over non-human nature. In this regard, there are 
several parallels between their views and those of Aquinas (who inspired the Spanish scholastics).  
 Luther considered humans in the state of innocence as outstanding creatures and ‘far superior to the 
rest of the living beings’.6 Human superiority was the consequence of three interrelated factors. Humans, 
unlike other creatures had been created in God’s image.7 In contradistinction to animals and trees, which 
were products of the Earth, they had also been created directly by God.8 Finally, there was an important 
distinction (made also by Aquinas) between humanity’s physical dimension, shared with lower creatures, 
and their immortal life, which set them apart from all other animals.9 
                                                 
3 See discussion in Chapter 2, pages 98-105.  
4 Ibid., 41-42.  
5 This is the terms used in Santmire, The Travail, 122-123. 
6 Martin Luther, Luther’s Works. Volume I, Lectures on Genesis Ch. 1-5, edited by Joroslav Pelikan (Saint Louis, Concordia 
Publishing House, 1958) Genesis 1:26, 56 and 2:7, 86. 
7 Ibid., 2:7, 86  
8 Ibid., 84.  
9 Ibid., Genesis 1:26, 56-57; 2:3, 81; 2:7, 85-86 and 2:20 121. 
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 Regarding human mastery over nature, Luther affirmed that God had created Adam and Eve with the 
aim of them ruling the Earth.10 This objective was not mere advice but an express command. This 
command implied a certain kind of power whereby they were placed ‘over the entire animal creation’.11 
There is a clear anthropocentrism in Luther’s interpretation of the function of non-human nature. All 
creation was meant to serve humans, providing them an abode. To demonstrate this point, he cited God’s 
affirmation that: ‘The heaven I have prepared as a roof; the earth in the flooring; the animals—with all 
the appointments of the earth, the sea, and the air—are the possession and wealth; seeds, roots and herbs 
are the food’.12 Briefly, non-human nature had been created with the specific purpose of serving human 
needs.13 
 Human dominion over the earth and its creatures diminished as a consequence of the original sin. For 
Luther, the earth was ‘cursed because of Adam’.14 Non-human nature was innocent and had committed 
not sin, but Adams’ disobedience condemned it to share humanity’s fate of degeneration.15 The ‘course 
of the earth’ was amplified by the impact of the Flood that further transformed it into a barren place and 
a ‘waste’.16 Moreover, the continuance of humanity’s sinfulness made the world further deteriorate day 
by day.17 For Luther, the result of all these changes was the transformation of the Earth from a fertile 
garden into an inhospitable wilderness.18 Luther never explicitly used the word wilderness, but his 
description of the world after the Fall and the Flood conveys the same idea. His words are illustrative:  
 
This course was made more severe through the Flood, by which the good trees were all ruined and destroyed, the 
sands were heaped up, and harmful herbs and animals were increased. Accordingly, where, before sin, Adam 
walked about among most fertile trees, in lovely meadows, and among flowers and roses, there now spring up 
nettles, thorns, and other troublesome sprouts in such abundance that the good plants are almost overwhelmed.19 
 
                                                 
10 Ibid., Genesis 1:26, 66.  
11 Ibid.  
12 Ibid., Genesis 1:29 and 31, 73.  
13 Scott Icker, ‘Luther and Animals: Subject to Adam’s Fall?’ in Andrew Linzey and Dorothy Yamamoto (eds.), Animals on 
the Agenda: Questions about Animals for Theology and Ethics (Urbana/Chicago, University of Illinois Press, 1998) 90-99, 
91.  
14 Ibid., Genesis 3:17,18,19 and 204.  
15 Ibid.  
16 Ibid., 204-206.  
17 Ibid.  
18 Luther reputedly compares Paradise, humans’ first abode, with a garden. See Ibid., Genesis 2:7, 8-2:9, 87- 92.  
19 Ibid., Genesis 3:17,18,19, 205. In another passages Luther adds several dangerous and destructive natural elements and 
phenomena to the former list: ‘frost, lightning bolts, injurious dews, storms, overflowing rivers, settling of the ground, 
earthquakes …’; Ibid., 206. 
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The diminution of human perfection due to the original sin did not degrade humanity to the extent of 
equating humans to non-human nature. There was ‘still a great difference between the human being and 
the rest of the animals’.20 Still, because of the Earth’s corruption, humanity was compelled to work harder 
in order to get what nature had spontaneously furnished before. So, the transformation of wilderness into 
a new garden could not be achieved by ‘the dominion which Adam had but through industry and skill’.21 
 As Luther had, Jean Calvin emphasized the excellence and pre-eminence of humans among all 
creatures.22 Having been created in God’s image, humans were set apart from the rest of God’s works 
and given ‘the highest place in its creation’.23 Their immortal soul and reason placed them above all brute 
animals.24 Notwithstanding the subordination of material reality to the spirit, Calvin did not have an 
entirely negative view of nature; quite the contrary, he recognized ‘the beautiful order of nature’.25 Still, 
that order was completely subjected to God’s power. Calvin frequently referred to nature as the work of 
God. 
 According to Calvin, God’s mandate of dominion over the world enshrined in Genesis gave humans 
authority over all other living beings.26 Humanity was at the center of God’s plan, and material reality 
had been created for its use and benefit.27 God was the sovereign and ruler of nature in an absolute sense. 
After Creation, He continued governing heaven and earth by his providence, so that nothing happened 
‘without his counsel’.28 As offspring of the Almighty, humans were also lords of the whole world.29 This 
power was corroborated by God’s command to subject the Earth to human control.30 According to 
Santmire, in Calvinist theology human power over history and the environment received theological 
validation.31 
                                                 
20 Ibid., Genesis 1:26, 67.  
21 Ibid.  
22 Jean Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, translated by Henry Beveridge (Grand Rapids, WM. B. Eerdmans 
Publishing Company, 1964) Vol I Bk 1 Ch XV §1 159. See also Jean Calvin, Commentaries on the First Book of Moses called 
Genesis, translated from the original Latin, and compared with the French Edition, By the Reverend John King, M.A., of 
Queen’s College, Cambridge, Incumbent of Christ’s Church, Hull (Grand Rapids, Christian Classics Ethereal Library) 
[http://www.ccel.org/ccel/calvin/calcom01.pdf, accessed 26 September 2015] Vol 1, Ch 1 51.  
23 Calvin, Institutes, Vol 1 Bk 1 Ch XV §4 164-165.  
24 Calvin, Commentaries, Vol 1 28. 
25 Ibid., 24.  
26 Ibid., Vol 1 Ch 1 53.  
27 Ibid., Vol 1 28.  
28 Calvin, Institutes, Vol 1 Bk 1 Ch XV §2 174. 
29 Ibid., Vol 1 Ch 1 54.  
30 Ibid., 55. 
31 Santmire, The Travail, 126. 
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 For Calvin, human power over nature was primarily related to the need of subsistence.32 Nonetheless, 
Calvin parted company with Luther on the question of the utility of non-human nature. From a utilitarian 
perspective he affirmed that, in placing nature at the service of humans, God had provided them with ‘an 
immense profusion of wealth’.33 It was legitimate for humans to take an active role in the exploitation of 
the world’s natural bounty in order to increase their riches. Calvin affirmed that humans ‘were not 
intended to observe’ the world ‘as mere witnesses but to enjoy all the riches which are here exhibited as 
the Lord has ordained and subjected them to our use’.34 
 Not unlike Luther, Calvin believed that the Earth was cursed because of Adam and Eve’s original sin.35 
The ‘ruin of man’ extended to ‘all those creatures which were formed for his sake, and had been made 
subject to him’.36 Nevertheless, humans had not completely lost their ascendancy over non-human nature. 
They retained their mastery over the animals, at least to a certain extent.37 For Biéler, the sharing of the 
Earth in human sin also testifies to the fact that for Calvin ‘man, though fallen from his original nature, 
does still remain the king and the purpose of all creation’.38 
 The theology of the parents of the Reformation influenced the theories of Grotius, Locke, and 
Pufendorf. One of the religious ideas that remained more firmly entrenched in their thinking was the 
belief in human power over non-human nature. Importantly, they translated that conviction into a legal 
entitlement to privately appropriate ecosystems. The right to private property gave a concrete institutional 
form to the exercise of human power over nature. It allowed translating human superiority over non-
human nature into a concrete personal power to own and exploit nature. The way they did so will be 
explain in the next section. 
 This influence notwithstanding, secularization gradually changed the ideological context in which these 
writers wrote their works. Tension between the Church and secular power in Europe had existed prior to 
the Reformation, but the ideas that made possible a sphere of secular power separated from the Church 
were not yet in place.39 Besides, secularization did not entail the demise of Christianity in Protestant 
societies. Actually, after the Thirty Years War one of the reasons for the rise of an autonomously 
                                                 
32 Ibid., 54  
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid., Vol 1 26.  
35 Ibid., Vol 1 Ch 3 114.  
36 Ibid.  
37 Ibid., Vol 1 Ch 9 211.  
38 André Biéler, Calvin’s Economic and Social Thought, edited by Edward Dommen, translated from the original French by 
James Greig (Geneva, World Council of Churches, 2005) 208.  
39 Ingrid Creppell, ‘Secularization: Religion and the Roots of Innovation in the Political Sphere’ in Ira Katznelson and Gareth 
Stedman Jones (eds.), Religion and the Political Imagination (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010) 23-45, 30.  
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legitimized political realm was the protection of the plurality of religious beliefs that had come into 
existence after the Reformation. It was rather the influence of the Church in political life that gradually 
diminished during the seventeenth century. 
 
The materialization of human power over nature: private property—Grotius to Vattel 
Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) was born and educated within the elite of the Dutch Republic.40 His father 
was a devout Protestant, holding different posts in the government of the city of Delft, including that of 
major. Grotius was a Calvinist who witnessed with alarm the devastation caused by the religious wars 
that afflicted Europe at the time. The internal division of Christianity was eroding the possibility of 
peaceful coexistence between different European commonwealths.41 One of these divisions affected the 
Dutch Republic as the Remonstrants or the followers of Jacobus Arminius departed from the teachings 
of Jean Calvin, inciting a vehement reaction by part of the Dutch society.42 Grotius’ alleged association 
with the Arminians was one of the reasons that he found himself condemned to life captivity in 1618.43 
 During his imprisonment at Loevestein Castle, he prayed and read the Bible intensively.44 He also 
employed part of his period in captivity writing an apology of the Christian faith, a treatise entitled On 
the Truth of the Christian Religion.45 In this work, he sought to promote Christian unity by underlining 
the difference and superiority of Christianity over non-Christian beliefs.46 In other words, for Grotius, 
the external boundaries of Christianity were more fundamental than internal divisions. Overall, Grotius’ 
work evidences a profound sense of tolerance and moderation regarding the Christian faith. 
 Grotius’ legal and political writing have been described as exhibiting a secularizing impulse.47 This 
impulse derives from his conviction of the importance of disentangling religion and politics in order to 
                                                 
40 Martine Julia Van Ittersum, Profit and Principle: Hugo Grotius, Natural Rights Theories and the Rise of the Dutch Power 
in the East Indies (1595-1615) (Leiden, Brill Academic Publishers, 2006) xxiii-xxiv.  
41 J.P. Heering, Hugo Grotius as Apologist for the Christian Religion: A Study of his Work De Veritate Religionis 
Christianae, translated by J.C. Grayson (Leiden, Brill, 2004) 66-67.  
42 Stephen C. Neff (ed.), Hugo Grotius on the Law of War and Peace (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010) xviii.  
43 Ibid.  
44 Heering, Hugo Grotius as Apologist, 3-4. 
45 Hugo Grotius, The Truth of the Christian Religion in Sixth Books by Hugo Grotius, done into English by John Clarke, D. 
D. and Chaplain in ordinary to his Majesty (London, Printed for J. Knapton, 1719). 
46 Heering, Hugo Grotius as Apologist, 67. 
47 See Mark Somos, ‘Secularization in De Iure Praedae: From Bible Criticism to International Law’ in Hans W. Blom (ed.), 
Property. Piracy and Punishment: Hugo Grotius on War and Booty in the Iure Praedae—Concepts and Contexts (Leiden, 
Brill, 2009) 148-191. Somos is careful to note the distinction between a ‘secularizing’ theory and a ‘secular’ one. It is the 
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avoid future wars of religion in Europe.48 He favored the intervention of civil authority on religious 
matters to promote toleration and avoid dogmatism. Though Grotius’ theories might not constitute a 
sharp break from medieval and late scholastic tendencies, as Vitoria, he applied former theories to the 
particular circumstances of his era, using traditional arguments for new purposes.49 In this sense, he 
provided a conceptual bridge between the late scholastics and modern thinking about natural law.50 But 
there is more to Grotius’ deserved reputation. As he declared in the Prolegomena (prologue) of his 
magnum work De Jure Belli ac Pacis (On the Law of War and Peace),51 no one before him had produced 
a comprehensive and systematic treatise on the relations between different commonwealths or their 
rulers.52 
 Grotius’ ideas about humanity’s place in God’s creation can be found in the Prolegomena of De jure 
belli. In order to prove the existence of a distinctively human natural law, he drew a clear-cut line between 
humans and non-human nature. He declared: ‘Man is, to be sure, an animal, but an animal of a superior 
kind, much further remove from all the other animals than the different kinds of animals are from one 
another.’53 As in scholastic thought, the distinction between humans and animals served Grotius in 
elaborating particular psychological attributes that were uniquely human in order to demonstrate the 
exclusive applicability of natural law to the human sphere.54 
 Sociability was one of the attributes that explained humans’ paramount position within creation. Only 
humans naturally searched for their own good and acted in accordance to general principles.55 Animal 
‘sociability’ was clearly different from that of humans because the former acted guided by ‘some 
extrinsic intelligent principle’ and not by their own intelligence.56 In addition to sociability, knowledge 
and speech were exclusive human faculties.57 Similarly, Grotius considered the ability to make judgments 
as further proof of humans’ distinctive rationality.58 Following traditional Christian theology, Grotius 
recognized that the Supreme Creator had conferred humans all the attributes that elevated them over non-
human nature.59 
                                                 
48 Ibid., 150.  
49 Tierney, The Idea, 317-324. 
50 Ibid.  
51 Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis Libri Tres, edited by James Brown Scott (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1925).  
52 Ibid., Vol II Prolegomena §1, 9. 
53 Ibid., Vol II Prolegomena §6, 11. 
54 Ibid., Vol II Bk I Ch I §11, 41-42. 
55 Ibid., Vol IIProlegomena §6, 11 and §7, 12. 
56 Ibid., §7, 12. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid., §9, 13. 
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163 
 
 The sharp differentiation between human and non-human nature that allowed Grotius to present a 
convincing conceptual foundation for natural law and natural rights did not resolve the question of the 
extent of human power over nature. In a more revealing passage about the legality of waging war against 
pirates, cannibals, and ‘those who act with impiety’, Grotius concurred with Isocrates ‘that the most just 
war is against savage beasts’.60 By drawing an analogy between barbarians and wild animals, he managed 
to demonstrate that the former could be killed with the same justice as for inferior creatures. But that 
statement was made in the context of justifying war against the three categories of people that Grotius 
considered barbarians. So, even if this affirmation points toward a certain general attitude of Grotius 
toward animals, it has to be taken with caution. 
 Grotius’ argumentation on the origin of private property sheds more light on the question of human 
power over the Earth. The passage of Genesis 1:26-28 on the origin of human dominium became the 
cornerstone of his view on the matter. For Grotius: 
 
Soon after the creation of the world, and a second time after the Flood, God conferred upon the human race a 
general right over things of a lower nature … In consequence, each man could at once take whatever he wished 
for his own needs, and could consume whatever was capable of being consume. The enjoyment of this universal 
right then served the purpose of private ownership.61 
 
This familiar statement is permeated by the influence of the ideas of a Chain of Being and humans’ 
paramount place in God’s creation. As already noted, these same ideas had inspired Spanish scholastics’ 
views about nature. Vitoria and Las Casas argued along the same lines, basing humans’ dominium 
proprietatis on God’s mandate to master the earth and its non-human creatures.62 But there were 
innovative elements in Grotius statement. He indirectly referred to the constitution of a new type of 
human dominium over nature after the Deluge, something to which Luther had also alluded. Grotius’ 
account of dominium rerum entailed a direct association between the idea of human mastery over nature 
and the private entitlement to privatize it and, he added, ‘consume’.63 The recognition of divine 
intervention in the formation of private property gave the legal right to use ecosystems for humans’ well-
being a very particular connotation, with important social and environmental overtones.  
                                                 
60 Ibid., Vol II Bk II Ch XX XL. §3, 506-507.  
61 Grotius, De Jure Belli, VolII Bk II Ch II I. 186. 
62 Vitoria, De indis, Sect I, §5, 121 and 122; Las Casas, Historia, Vol I Book I Ch I 23. 
63 In this Grotius departed from Vitoria, for whom dominium was only created by human law.  
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 As far as power over material existence was concerned, being a proprietor was more important than 
being human, because the former status was the only one that granted the power to seize and use nature 
to one’s advantage. Still, at this point of Grotius’ argumentation the human power over nature was 
circumscribed—as in the writings of Saint Thomas, Luther, and the Spanish scholastics—to the 
satisfaction of humans’ basic needs. 
 As with Grotius, Samuel von Pufendorf (1632-1694) was troubled by the European Wars of Religion, 
and paid close attention to the question of religious toleration. Pufendorf was born at Dorfchemnitz in 
the Electorate of Saxony. His father Elias Pufendorf was a Lutheran pastor from Glauchau, and Samuel 
Pufendorf himself was destined for the ministry. He studied theology at the University of Leipzig, but 
soon abandoned it and pursued legal studies. During his life he occupied different positions in the 
Universities of Heidelberg and Lund. He also served as Historiographer Royal for the King of Sweden, 
and at the end of his life, in 1688, Pufendorf was called into the service of Frederick William, Elector of 
Brandenburg, as historiographer and privy councilor. 
 Pufendorf lived his adult life in the aftermath of the Thirty Years War, a time in which the emergence 
of the post-Westphalian order was still under constant threat of attack by the Catholic Counter-
Reformation.64 The fragility of the new religious and political scenario was revealed in 1685 when Louis 
XI revoked the Edict of Nantes, ending religious toleration in a France that became the champion of the 
Catholic creed.65 As a reaction to this event and in defense of toleration, Pufendorf wrote his treatise Of 
the Nature and Qualification of Religion in Reference to Civil Sovereignty.66 In this work, published in 
1687, while advocating for the separation of civil and religious power, he still provided the Christian 
Prince with a wide margin for intervention in Church affairs.67 Princes were even allowed to use force 
against Muslims, Arians, Anabaptists, and Catholics in defense of the true Christian religion.68 
 Pufendorf sought to provide a Protestant basis for natural law by getting rid of the influence of the 
clerical-scholastic tradition and the influence of Thomist political theology.69 He did so by drawing a 
distinction between moral theology and natural law. Whereas the former dealt with individual 
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68 Ibid., 265.  
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conscience, inner spiritual states, and matters of revealed truth, the latter’s goal was external conduct and 
civil political power.70 But this did not mean that either God or religion had no place in Pufendorf’s 
natural law. For instance, Christian ideas were of paramount importance in his disquisition about human 
nature and human power over non-human nature.  
 Pufendorf explored in-depth the human/animal relationship. There are similarities between his and 
Grotius’ treatment of animals. As for the Dutch scholar, in De Iure Naturae et Gentium Libri Octo 
Pufendorf excluded animals from the sphere of natural law.71 This exclusion resulted from the clear-cut 
boundary between humanity and other animate creatures set at the beginning of his treatise. By divine 
design and thanks to its will, humanity was far superior to non-human nature.72 The reason for the 
excellence and superiority of humans in the sacred order of things was that they, unlike any other 
creature, possessed an ‘immortal soul, furnished with the light of intellect’.73 
 Due to their mortal, matter-like existence and great number, Pufendorf saw no need for ‘fostering and 
guarding the security of animals’.74 In fact, he stated that ‘some also reproduce in such numbers that they 
must be exterminated’.75 There was no room for pity, as Pufendorf believed that it could be ‘sufficiently 
demonstrated by reason that no scruple is to be admitted about the killing and eating of animals’.76 The 
justification of this insensitive attitude was the ‘practical state of war’ that confronted humans and 
animals.77 Non-human nature was devalued in opposition to the importance of the human sphere. 
 In contrast to this manifest anthropocentrism Pufendorf adopted, a more lenient approach to animals 
appears in other parts of De Iure Naturae, imposing certain restrictions to human power over them. For 
instance, he maintained that in spite of the extent of human command over non-human nature, nothing 
justified killing for pleasure.78 In this, he disagreed with Vitoria, who argued that animals could be killed 
‘for sport’.79 This notwithstanding, it is still worth noting that these limits did not stem from an 
appreciation of nature’s intrinsic value. Rather, they were based on religious and utilitarian 
considerations. The ‘useless and wanton destruction of animals’ was an offense against God, who had 
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bestowed them to humanity.80 Animals belonged ultimately to the Creator, who ‘is pleased to manifest 
His power in producing and destroying them’.81 Besides, in an argument based on sustainability, 
Pufendorf argued that the destruction of the fauna negatively affected ‘human society’ as it threatened 
the availability of meat for consumption.82 
 Pufendorf’s conception of human dominium over non-human nature was less anthropocentric than that 
of previous natural lawyers. He doubted that God had created everything solely for the sake and benefit 
of mankind, as going by that hypothesis erroneously implied that things which were ‘of no use to man’ 
were created in ‘vain’.83 Still, Pufendorf noted that ‘all nature serves man to the further end that he may 
live his life more advantageously and easily’ and, hence, humans enjoyed considerable power over non-
human nature.84 After the Fall humans were in need of non-human nature for survival. It was then logical, 
as he argued, that they could use, misuse, or destroy plants and animals for their own benefit.85 
 How did Pufendorf understand the historical process whereby humanity came into the possession of 
nature? At the beginning of time, he explained, the Earth was in a state of original negative community. 
Things had not yet been assigned to any particular person, so everything was open to everybody’s use.86 
Then, dominium rerum, a human institution, was introduced either by tacit or express pact.87 In his own 
words:  
 
It is true that God allowed man to turn the earth, its products and its creatures, to his own use and convenience, 
that is, He gave men an indefinite right to them, yet the manner, intensity and extent of this power were left to the 
judgment and disposition of men; whether, in other words, they would confine it within certain limits, or within 
none at all...88 
 
In principle, unless otherwise agreed, the human power over nature incarnated in the legal institution of 
dominium was unlimited. It had lost the main purpose (human sustenance) to which the Spanish 
scholastics and Grotius had constricted it. This amplification of the scope of human dominion over nature 
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was based on realist considerations. Humans were insatiable creatures whose desires far exceeded the 
need of subsistence. Humans craved for ‘luxuries, ambition, honors and the desire to surpass others’.89 
 The most effective way to fulfill humanity’s desire for material wealth was to divide things. Power 
over nature was best exercised through private ownership instead of common property. Against Golden 
Age narratives that underlined the role of private property as an agent of decay, social disintegration, and 
even conflict and warfare, Pufendorf upheld it for precisely the contrary reason.90 He believed that human 
ambition could easily lead to conflict unless the private property of each individual was clearly 
demarcated. It is worth noticing that Domingo de Soto had already used a similar reasoning to explain 
the division of common things. The Dominican was convinced that without privatization, human greed 
would unavoidably provoke conflict and war.91 Therefore, while Pufendorf linked the institution of 
private ownership to the achievement of human harmony, thus acquiring a cosmopolitan connotation, 
private property was also designed to fulfill the desire of material affluence.  
  John Locke (1632-1704), Pufendorf’s contemporary, was born to a religious family that turned from 
the ranks of Anglican communicants to those of Calvinist Presbyterians.92 He grew up as a Calvinist, but 
through his student years at Westminster School and Christ Church he somewhat detached from his 
former religious convictions.93 As his religious views became less dogmatic, he realized that religious 
intolerance had exacerbated internal political conflicts in seventeenth century England. So, for the same 
reason as Pufendorf, he decided to present his views on the issue of religious toleration in A Letter 
Concerning Toleration.94 He also advocated separate roles for Church and State, defending that both had 
distinct spheres of jurisdiction. But, unlike Pufendorf, he did not grant special powers to the Christian 
ruler.95 
 Locke was a Christian and did not doubt his faith. He dedicated most of the first book of his Two 
Treatises of Government96 on analyzing and interpreting Genesis. He paid close attention to the question 
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of human dominion granted by God. His aim was to counter the affirmation of the political theorist 
Robert Filmer, who defended the divine right of Kings to absolute political power.97 Concretely, he 
rejected Filmer’s affirmation that Adam’s jurisdiction over humanity was inherited (by divine right) by 
his heirs. In order to do so, Locke examined Adams’ title to sovereignty by God’s donation as it was 
recounted in Genesis 1:28. God had given Adam power over inferior creatures, but not over other human 
beings.98 Besides, Adam had never had property rights over the entire Earth or inferior creatures because 
God donated them in common to all humankind.99 
  Locke’s analysis of human power over non-human nature was in line with mainstream Protestant 
theology. God set humans apart from and above all other creatures. By making them in His image, he 
offered a share of his power over creation.100 Locke believed that after the Flood human dominion over 
non-human nature was reinstated, albeit in an enlarged manner.101 Human property rights over nature 
increased as ‘other uses of them are allowed’, Locke argued, ‘which before were not’. This theme was 
expanded in the second book, where Locke makes a similar claim, namely that ‘God … has given the 
Earth to the Children of Men, given it to Mankind in common’.102 
 As Armitage has noted, according to Locke ‘it was necessary for human beings to exercise their 
physical and their mental labor upon the otherwise inert creation given to them by God … Human beings 
could neither add to nor subtract from the divine creation but they had a duty to construct it to their own 
devices, both mentally and physically’.103 In Locke’s theory, private property became the corner stone 
of the human project to modify and control nature. God had created the world for humans to enjoy in 
common. But then Locke added ‘by commanding to subdue’ the Earth he ‘gave Authority so far to 
appropriate’.104 The necessity of utilizing nature for survival made human labor the distinctive factor 
whereby ‘God’s gift’ was transformed into proprietary rights.  
 The impact of the secularization of European society in the seventeenth century was not restricted to 
the separation of the civil and religious spheres. Progressively, natural philosophy or the study of the 
‘workings of nature’ started to claim a niche of examination and manipulation of animal species and 
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natural habitats, independent from the religious mold that had constrained it before. Besides, during the 
Early Modern Era the boundaries between the natural and the non-natural spheres were redefined.105 By 
the end of the eighteenth century miracles and marvels—the supernatural and the preternatural—had 
mostly ceased to be part of the realm of the non-natural.106 As a result, God’s intervention in creation 
diminished considerably. Eventually only the artificial remained as a category of the non-natural. But 
during the seventeenth century the line of separation between the natural and the artificial also withered 
away, and nature slowly but surely started to be perceived as an artifact.107 Enabled and encouraged by 
this ideological shift whereby nature gained regularity and predictability, scientific speculation 
flourished. 
There was a clear transition from the religious context of the sixteenth century in which Jean Calvin, 
for example, had naturally claimed that ‘[t]o be so occupied in the investigation of the secrets of nature, 
as never to turn the eyes to its author, is a most perverted study’.108 Partly during the seventeenth century, 
and more generally during the eighteenth, perversion (borrowing Calvin’s term) became more 
acceptable. Even if the author of the world could not be completely dismissed, nature was increasingly 
scrutinized independent of Him. Montesquieu (1689-1755) described that physical world in the opening 
of his De L’Esprit des Lois. That “new” world was formed ‘by the motion of matter and devoid from 
intelligence’ but still governed by certain rules.109 There was a change of emphasis from God as 
‘Governor of the world’ to the rules whereby God ‘could govern the world’.110 
This important change of perspective was complemented by a more concrete motivation to look at 
nature with ‘new eyes’. The geographical discoveries of the end of the fifteenth century had revealed a 
huge number of natural phenomena unknown to Europeans until that time. Old sources of information 
were no longer useful in revealing the material possibilities of the natural wealth hidden in the landscapes 
of America. In this sense, the development of a scientific approach to nature was less the result of rational, 
abstract and uninterested deliberations about reality, but more from a concrete material engagement with 
it.111 
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None of these development amounted to a complete break with Christian doctrine. Actually, such a 
break was not needed, as rationalism and the pursuit of scientific inquiry were reconciled with religiosity 
by intellectual figures like Bacon,112 Newton, and Pascal.113 Moreover, there was already a certain type 
of worldliness in Protestant theology.114 If something, the rise of a worldly approach to reality encouraged 
the manipulation of the environment even more, reinforcing divinely inspired ideas about human 
supremacy over non-human nature.115 All in all, and in spite of the fact that natural philosophy shared 
with religion the role of ideological mediator between humans and their surroundings, there was still no 
secular explanation of the creation of the world and the human position within it. 
 The weakening of religious influence in European society was also visible in the more secular 
foundations of natural law during the eighteenth century, the period in which natural lawyers like 
Christian Wolff (1679-1754) and Emer de Vattel (1714-1767) wrote their important contributions to the 
history of international law. Neither of these authors conceived natural law as completely independent 
from the existence of God. They still regarded God as its ultimate foundation but, as in the case of the 
natural world, it was a distant source. Because it was impossible to know God’s will, the authority of the 
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law of nature derived ultimately from the nature of ‘Man’ and things.116 In the environment of the 
Enlightenment, reason rather than God became the basis for the law of nature.117 
 Christian Wolff was born in 1679 in the city of Breslau, the historical capital of Silesia, which at the 
time was a Protestant part of the Hapsburg Austria.118 Following his father’s footsteps, he received a 
Lutheran education.119 Following his father’s will he studied Divinity at the age of twenty, but soon 
started to divert his academic attention to Mathematics and Natural Philosophy due to their non-
ideological method.120 In the course of his studies he also developed a high esteem for philosophy, a 
branch of human knowledge in which he saw the potential for fostering peace in the midst of religious 
conflict.121 
 In 1707 he started teaching Mathematics at the University of Halle, soon acquiring a remarkable 
popularity among students.122 His intellectual reputation together with his defense of the power of reason 
as the foundation of human life alarmed his rival Pietist colleagues at Halle, particularly Professor 
Joachim Lange, who also resented his academic success. Wolff’s position at Halle became compromised 
after he delivered a farewell speech as Vice-Rector of the University entitled Oratio de Sinarum 
philosophia practica (Discourse on the Practical Philosophy of the Chinese) in which he praised 
Confucianism.123 Eventually, in 1723, after having lost the favor of King Frederick William I, he was 
dismissed from his position at Halle by royal decree, only to make a triumphant return in 1740 after 
Frederick’s death. 
 Although Wolff defended a secular framework for all ethics independent of human sinfulness and the 
need for grace, his thought was far from being part of an Enlightenment secular rationalism.124 Wolffian 
rationalism encouraged free intellectual reflection while still anchoring reason to transcendental ideas.125 
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In his metaphysical philosophy, reason was an instrument for the attainment of virtue and felicity as it 
helped in climbing the ladder that led to the divine perfections.126 
 Unlike Grotius, Pufendorf, and Locke, Christian Wolff’ introduced the legal institution of dominium 
rerum in the first chapter of his Jus Gentium Methodo Scientifica Pertractatum without making reference 
to its religious origin.127 Even in the chapter devoted to ownership by nations there is no reference to the 
Genesis, human dominion over non-human nature, or the need to replenish the Earth after the Fall and 
the Flood.128 
 Born in Couvert, Switzerland in 1714, Emer de Vattel was the fruit of the marriage between an ennobled 
Protestant minister and the daughter of a high rank official of the Prussian Court.129 After having 
completed a degree on humanities and philosophy at the University of Bâle, Vattel moved to Geneva at 
age 19 to further his education in the fields of theology and metaphysics.130 Under the impact of the 
thought of Christian Wolff he developed an attraction to philosophy and literature.131 That influence 
would continue well into adulthood, a fact that he acknowledged in the preface of his work Droit des 
Gens ou principes de la Loi Naturelle appliqués à la conduit & aux affaires des Nations et des Souverains 
(1758).132 After his years as a student his economic situation deteriorated. To make ends meet, he 
unsuccessfully offered his service as a diplomat to King Frederick the Great. Ultimately, he obtained the 
patronage of the Count of Brühl, First Minister of Saxony, and in 1749 he was assigned to Bern as the 
Minister Plenipotentiary for Saxony. Only after the publication of Droit des Gens Vattel was offered a 
position that could satisfy his professional ambition as chief adviser of the Government of Saxony on 
foreign affairs. 
 Christian theology and morality were predominantly absent from the Droit des gens. In one of the few 
references to God in the manuscript, Vattel followed the path outlined by Grotius, Locke, and Pufendorf, 
explaining the origins of private property and human power over non-human nature by reference to the 
Christian God. He asserted that ‘the earth belongs to mankind in general’ because it was given in common 
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to it by the Creator.133 God appeared little elsewhere in Vattel’s scholarship, but the allusion to divinity 
in this passage evidences a justification for the human power over nature still based on Genesis. 
 After making a reference to God’s mandate of dominion, he introduced the division of things whereby 
what was general became particular. In the case of Vattel the partition of the Earth was motivated not by 
the fulfillment of a divine purpose, but by practical reasons. As the world’s population grew there was a 
compelling need to transform and render nature more fertile, which explained the change from common 
to private property.134 The individual enjoyment of property contributed to human happiness. It was also 
the way to procure ‘all the necessaries of life, with its conveniences and innocent and laudable 
enjoyments’.135 This was a recurrent idea since the period of the Spanish scholastics. Privatizing the 
world was the more efficient way of producing what humans needed to survive. The assurance of 
personal enjoyment of what one has produced encouraged work and helped avoid conflicts. In this sense, 
the community was no longer needed. Eventually, natural law theorists like Pufendorf or Vattel expanded 
this notion of survival, widening the spectrum of human needs so as to include the desire to enjoy 
increasing amounts of material wealth.  
 To sum up, the influence of Christianity on the conception of dominium rerum in the law of nations 
during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was notorious. With the exception of Wolff, the biblical 
account of the Earth’s creation inspired the way in which the relation between humanity and nature was 
framed and understood. This common religious treatment of the historical origins of the institution of 
private property did not result in a monolithic narrative. Different authors diversely explained the way in 
which private property naturally stemmed from God’s creation of the world and the human power over 
it. Whereas Locke and Vattel, for instance, derived private property directly from humans’ use of nature, 
Grotius and Pufendorf explained the shift from common to private property in terms of human contract 
(by agreement).136 Different authors offered different reasons for the divisio rerum, putting the emphasis 
on cosmopolitan values, the imperatives of population growth, or the demand of efficiency.  
 All in all, the power that dominium rerum conferred to the proprietors of the natural world was 
expressed by legal scholars in hierarchical terms.137 Notwithstanding the superiority of humans over non-
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human nature, there was still no necessary link between particular Christian ideas about nature, their 
inclusion in the law of nations, and the destruction of natural habitats in European overseas possessions. 
Moreover, several commentators related human ascendancy over the Earth to the need of human 
subsistence. The exception was Pufendorf, who gave free hand for human environmental power as the 
only way to fulfill the panoply of human desires. Humanity could use nature at its convenience. 
 In principle, nothing in the development of the law of nations during the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries suggested that individuals, corporations or states were given carte blanche to exploit nature. 
However, in practice, the considerable economic benefits derived from the privatization and exchange 
of natural resources—obtained in European colonies—in an expanding international market avid for all 
kind of commodities and luxuries encouraged Grotius and later authors to reconcile their religiously 
inspired doctrine of dominium rerum with the accumulation of wealth. The question of how the world 
was originally divided and the institutional way in which human power over nature could be exercised 
acquired a special relevance, and had practical implications in the context of European imperialism and 
colonial expansion.138 Grotius established the legal foundation for the involvement of charter companies 
in long-distance trade, and Locke advocated monetary investment as a way to promote commercial 
agriculture in North America. Eventually, the imperative of capital accumulation became the final 
arbitrator of the question of how much and how deeply nature could be utilized, or—in the language of 
the time—‘improved’.  
 Once they became reconciled with capital accumulation, Christian ideas about nature and the legal 
doctrines in which they found expression created the ideological possibility for the exploitation of the 
environment. Although the ideological religious stratum of these theories did not per se necessarily lead 
to natural degradation, it operated within a larger global social canvas in which economic imperialism 
and capitalist expansion were gaining momentum. In this milieu, the divine mandate to improve and 
master nature linked by Grotius, Pufendorf, Locke, and Vattel to the institution of private property was 
reconciled with the economic interest of European nations and private actors to seize and exploit natural 
resources for profit, which pushed religious ideas that allowed humans to control nature in an 
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unsustainable direction.139 That accommodation was facilitated by the gradual secularization of authority 
that took place in the context of the Reformation, which left the mercantile class more free to pursue its 
worldly interests.140 
 Imperial power over nature neglected meanings, values, and services that could not be translated into 
economic terms. This change deeply affected pre-colonial North American societies. The vigorous 
assault on colonial habitats was the result of the historical intersection of three major and rather complex 
(some older, some novel) phenomena. The first was the Christian understanding and sanction of human 
power over nature. That was the conceptual substratum of a rationalist and secular turn in European 
thinking that emphasized that power and eventually set it free from previous constraining limits. And 
that turn was further strengthened by the need to study and quantify the natural habitats that colonization 
brought within the sphere of European influence in order to obtain economic advantage from their 
exploitation.141 
 Once the religious idea of taming wilderness and mastering nature encouraged North American 
colonists to transform their surroundings, and the desire for profits pushed them further down that road, 
it became particularly difficult to differentiate the ‘improvement’ of nature from its actual degradation. 
If modifying the environment was not only religiously appropriate (the fulfillment of a sacred mandate) 
but also economically desirable (for reasons of efficiency), there was no external ideological point of 
reference for the colonists’ ideology from which to draw a line in order to discriminate between both 
behaviors. In practice, the economic forces unleashed by colonization drew that line in such a way that 
sustainability was largely abandoned in the pursuit of riches, power, and status. 
 
Turning ecosystems into commodities: international trade—seventeenth to eighteenth centuries    
In his search for just titles that could serve as legitimate basis to regulate the relations between the Crown 
of Spain and its American territories in the sixteenth century, Francisco Vitoria had formulated a right to 
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free intercontinental trade that belonged to all commonwealths as part of the ius gentium. In the context 
of the Spanish conquest of America and the expansion of trade in the Atlantic, that right offered concrete 
legal grounds whereby the Western Hemisphere was forcedly incorporated into global networks of trade. 
In the following centuries, the assertive commercial push of the Dutch and the English maritime empires, 
their rivalry, and the rising awareness of the link between intercontinental commerce and the wealth of 
nations furthered the development of legal doctrines that elaborated on or departed from the ideas of 
Vitoria and the School of Salamanca.  
 Hugo Grotius was the main legal advocate for Dutch trade imperialism and its commercial strategy of 
surplus extraction.142 On his mother’s side of the family, some of Grotius’ relatives had been for years 
trading with the East Indies, and later became implicated in running the Dutch East Indian Company 
(Vereenighde Oostindische Compagnie or VOC).143 These early personal ties of affinity and his expert 
legal knowledge were the reasons why in 1603, still in the early period of his career, the Amsterdam 
directors of the Dutch East Indian Company requested his services to write a legal defense of the 
apprehension of a Portuguese vessel, the Santa Catalina, in the East Indies.144 As the Dutch started to 
clash with the Portuguese seaborne empire, they adopted its organizing principles, albeit in a modified 
way, substituting an obsolete state capitalism with more dynamic and adaptable forms of economic 
organization based on private corporations (such as the VOC) backed by state power.145 
 In response to the VOC’s invitation, Grotius produced his famous treatise De Iure Pradae (The Law 
of Prize and Booty) also known as De Indis146. His support for the company did not end with that service. 
He was also a successful lobbyist, gaining political, diplomatic, and military support from the United 
Provinces.147 One of the main objectives of Grotius’ treatise was to provide the VOC with legal 
ammunition to challenge and eventually inherit the Portuguese trade monopoly in the East Indies. In 
order to do so, he argued that the Portuguese were neither the original owners of the territories visited by 
the Dutch, because those lands already belonged to the peoples of the East Indies, nor the possessors of 
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a legal title over them.148 But challenging the legality of the Portuguese East Indian possessions was not 
enough to fully protect Dutch commercial interests—Portugal could have claimed jurisdiction over the 
seas and forbid Dutch navigation. It was crucial to anticipate that possibility, so Grotius’ theory of the 
freedom of the seas presented in Chapter XII of De Iure Praedae, called Mare Liberum (The Free Sea), 
served that purpose. Following Fernando Vázquez de Menchaca, Grotius differentiated sovereignty over 
the sea from sovereignty over the land.149 According to him, and following Roman law, unlike other 
physical spaces, the sea could not be appropriated because ‘it is so vast that no one could possibly take 
possession of it, and since it is fitted for use by all, “with reference to purposes of navigation and to 
purposes of fishing, as well”’.150 
 Opening the Portuguese monopoly to Dutch trade was not Grotius’ only concern. It was likely that the 
VOC envoys faced military opposition in the open waters of the East Indies. If the VOC’s commercial 
enterprise was to succeed, the company would need to exercise military force in a similar fashion to 
states. Grotius responded to this demand through a theory of private war that guaranteed individuals the 
right to use force, punish, and wage war. Those rights, inherent to the individual in the state of nature, 
were not lost after the constitution of a civil society. This notwithstanding, Grotius was careful to 
circumscribe their ambit of application, as their universal validity could have been turned against the 
state. Hence, he asserted that within a civil society individuals had to submit their disputes to civil 
tribunals.151 Private war was only possible in situations akin to the state of nature, that is to say ‘when in 
a given place there is no one possessing jurisdiction, a state of affairs which may exist in desert lands; 
on islands on the ocean or in any region where the people have no government’.152 These were precisely 
the kind of scenarios that the VOC was likely to find in its overseas expeditions.  
 The final piece of Grotius’ work was the legitimization of the relationship between the Christian Dutch 
Republic and the East Indies’ infidel princes. It was common practice for the VOC to sign preferential 
trade agreements with Asian rulers, encouraging them to break previous commercial ties with the 
Portuguese.153 But the question remained whether it was justified to ally with non-Christians against 
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other Christians. This possibility created unease among certain sectors of the Dutch Protestant society.154 
Bearing that in mind, Grotius purposely based his defense of this practice on religious grounds, invoking 
St. Augustine’s doctrine of love toward one’s neighbors. He expanded the meaning of neighbor to 
encompass every human being. In Grotius cosmopolitan vocabulary, loving humanity became 
compatible with the expansionism of a trading colonial power seeking to increase its sphere of economic 
influence. In addition, he presented a more realist justification, asserting the justice of allying and signing 
treaties with infidels ‘for the purpose of defending one’s own right’.155 Finally, Grotius used all his 
persuasiveness to portray the inhabitants of the East Indies as fully civilized while depicting the 
Portuguese and Spanish as cruel and barbaric.156 It was then easier to convince his audience that liberating 
the former from their tyrannical masters amounted to a heroic act. 
 Grotius fine legal architecture was jeopardized by a reconfiguration of forces in the colonial setting of 
the East Indies. His theory of the free seas had opened the door for the arrival of a competing commercial 
power, the English, represented by the English East India Company (EIC), which soon clashed with the 
VOC. The English and the Dutch resolved their confrontation in colonial conferences in 1613 and 1615. 
At the conferences, the English used a line of argumentation inspired by Grotius’ doctrine of free trade 
and navigation.157 Richard Hakluyt had translated Grotius’ Mare Liberum between 1609 and 1616, 
probably at the request of English East Indian Company.158 Mindful of the East Indian context, Hakluyt 
also took into account when writing his translation that the right to free trade was being used to justify 
the English colonization of Virginia.159 
 In response, Grotius appealed to the legal principle of pacta sunt servanda, blaming the English for 
encouraging the inhabitants of the Spice Islands to break contractual relations with their previous Dutch 
allies.160 Grotius avoided incurring a contradiction by reformulating his previous argument in De iure 
praedae for assuring the maintenance of the VOC’s hegemony in the spice trade.161 At the time, there 
were reports of Dutch violence and several cases of harassment and intimidation in the East Indies. 
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However, Grotius ignored allegations of a disproportionate use of force, which could have justified 
breaking legal ties with the Dutch.162 
 Trade was a central concern for Grotius in De iure praedae.163 Its objective was, according to him, the 
creation of profit among the wealthiest citizens, as the accumulation of economic power naturally 
engendered the benefit of the state and its population.164 But Grotius’ theory of trade was not only based 
on practical considerations. Commerce was also in line with God’s will. Moreover, it contributed to 
human friendship.165 This sort of cosmopolitan reasoning extended to nature, which ‘by means of the 
winds … brings together peoples’ and ‘distributes the sum of her gifts throughout various regions in such 
a way as to make reciprocal commerce a necessity for the members of the human race’.166 Ironically, 
nature was used to validate a kind economy based on the exchange of commoditized natural resources 
that ended up encouraging its destruction.  
 Grotius allowed recourse to war in order to secure trade and control supply and prices. The use of force 
was legitimate because, for the Dutch scholar, protecting commerce was equivalent to defending God’s 
plan, human love—expressed in friendship—and nature. Grotius’ favorable view of war was not 
surprising considering that the economic benefits of peaceful trade dwarfed in comparison to the returns 
that could be obtained from the appropriation of the Portuguese colonial possessions in the East Indies.167 
 Grotius theories cloaked both the direct and indirect violence that the VOC exercised in the East Indies 
through the imposition of unequal trade conditions. In addition, the activities of the VOC had an adverse 
environmental impact on the habitats of the East Indies as Dutch intercontinental trade increased the 
incentive to exploit natural products that would satisfy the demand of expanding European markets.  
 Taiwan was the place in which the impact of the VOC on the landscapes of the East Indies was manifest. 
In the fifteenth and sixteenth century, Taiwan’s rich biodiversity and dense vegetation provided a fertile 
habitat to 100,000 Taiwanese people. The Taiwanese practiced shifting cultivation under a regime of 
common property,168 notwithstanding particular families enjoying exclusive use rights over tracts of land 
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on a seasonal basis.169 They complemented their diet by hunting, fishing, and gathering, which reduced 
agriculture’s environmental impact on the land.170 
 In the early seventeenth century, the VOC made a violent entry into Taiwanese history, establishing a 
permanent colony on the island in an attempt to monopolize the profitable trade of the region.171 After 
‘pacifying’ the population of the island, the Dutch imposed a series of treaties on three hundred 
Taiwanese villages, which all accepted, whereby they were compelled to submit to Dutch rule.172 The 
Dutch were not satisfied with the simple subsistence economy of the island, and sought to create markets 
and increase the yields of Taiwanese agriculture. For that purpose, they started exploiting the commercial 
possibilities of different Taiwanese goods. One of the products that proved most profitable was deerskin. 
Its export, in huge quantities, contributed to the decimation of deer populations in the southwest of 
Taiwan.173 
 The Dutch also tried to modernize Taiwanese subsistence agriculture so that they did not have to import 
Chinese rice in order to feed their garrison on the island.174 Unsatisfied with the slow advances made by 
the Taiwanese, the Dutch changed their strategy and tried to attract Chinese settlers by providing capital 
for land clearing and offering tenancy rights.175 By 1661, 35,000 more inhabitants had added 9,800 
hectares of cultivated land to the total area under agricultural exploitation. These changes did not produce 
environmental havoc because there was a vast area of unreclaimed land to be exploited. But they certainly 
did intensify the ecological footprint of the Taiwanese population, affecting the ecological balance and 
population dynamics of the island. Chinese migrants were attracted to Taiwan by the economic prospects 
of exploiting its rich natural frontier.  
 Environmental change in Taiwan was the result of the Dutch’s maximizing approach to the use of the 
island’s natural resources. Eventually Chinese settlers expelled the Dutch, but nevertheless maintaining 
the same economic approach to the Taiwanese natural environment. By the mid seventeenth century, 
because of overhunting and destruction of habitat the deer trade collapsed, forcing pre-colonial 
Taiwanese to look for alternative sources of livelihood.176 
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 It is difficult to exactly quantify the environmental impact of Dutch commercial expansion due to the 
fact that the Dutch, unlike the Spanish, did not in general directly exploit natural resources. Instead, they 
generated the incentive for others to do so. This notwithstanding, Richards maintains that ‘Dutch long-
distance maritime trade had cascading effects on landscapes and peoples throughout the early modern 
world. The tiny population of the republic had an impact on the early modern world’s natural 
environment far disproportionate to its size.’177 
 More than a century after Grotius’ death Emer de Vattel, a Swiss diplomat and a great admirer of the 
British Empire, published one of the most influential books on the law of nations of the eighteenth 
century.178 Similarly to Grotius, commerce occupied a paramount place in Vattel’s conception of the law 
of nations. That was natural considering the growing importance of long-distance trade for European 
polities since the ‘era of discovery’ at the end of the fifteenth century. In the course of the seventeenth 
century, the nature of trade also underwent a change, with the direct intervention of territorial states in 
the incipient global exchange economy.179 By the end of the eighteenth century, this trend consolidated, 
making competition in global markets a question of states.180 This paramount shift influenced Vattel’s 
treatment of commerce in his disquisitions on the law of nations. 
 As he admired Wolff, Vattel placed the attainment of perfection as the highest goal that a political 
community of individuals (state) or states (international order) could achieve.181 The perfection of a civil 
society consisted in guaranteeing the happiness and felicity of all its members.182 To that end, he 
presented a utilitarian recipe for the perfection of a nation, consisting of a cocktail of private property, 
justice, and security against external violence.183 The role of the state in that scheme was twofold. On the 
one hand, it ought to guarantee and protect individual freedom.184 On the other hand, it had to encourage 
economic life by promoting labor, industry, the development of personal abilities, and by ‘proposing 
honors, rewards’ and ‘privileges’.185 
                                                 
177 Ibid., 47. 
178 See supra Chapter 2, footnote 105. 
179 Istvan Hont, Jealousy of Trade: International Competition and the Nation-State in Historical Perspective (Massachusetts, 
The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005) 186.  
180 Ibid., 6-7. 
181 Vattel, The Law of Nations, Bk I Ch II §14 4. 
182 Ibid., §15 4.  
183 Ibid. A similar statement cab be found in Ibid., Ch VI §72 32. 
184 Ibid., Ch VI §76 34. 
185 Ibid. 
182 
 
 Even though for Vattel agriculture was the hallmark of a nation’s economic prosperity, trade was 
necessary so that nations could obtain what they did not produce.186 Besides, he did not fail to notice the 
cosmopolitan potential of trade. It could foster peace in the inter-state European order while bringing 
economic prosperity to European nations.187 There were several other benefits derived from markets. For 
example, internal trade contributed to the circulation of money, industrialization, laboriousness, and 
population growth. International trade, on its part, increased ‘the riches of a Nation’, and could ‘become 
the source of wealth and plenty’.188 Due to the importance of trade for the economic life of a nation, 
Vattel regarded both home and foreign trade as incumbent upon individuals and nations, rather than their 
prerogative and free choice.189 
 For Vattel trade was intimately connected to the institution of private property.190 Logically, once 
private property was institutionalized, free trade became the only way in which ‘economic 
communication’ between individuals could take place, so that everybody got what was needed to survive 
and prosper.191 
 Vattel’s treatment of commerce between nations evidences a pervasive tension between community 
values and individual freedom, between the cosmopolitan attainment of happiness through trade and the 
sovereign right of each nation to decide to what extent it would walk the internationalist path.192 Vattel 
was aware that behind the commercial wheels that were driving humanity toward increasing pleasure 
and plenty lay hidden the threat of Empire.  
 At the outset of the chapter on the mutual commerce between nations, Vattel argued that ‘Mankind in 
general’ gained from trade.193 Consequently, he agreed with Grotius that when the Portuguese sought to 
exclude ‘all other European nations from any commerce with the Indians’ they were committing a gross 
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injustice.194 This judgment was based on the ‘right of all nations’ to trade with one another in freedom, 
what Vattel called the ‘freedom of trade’.195 This was ‘in general’ the right and duty of all nations.196 
 But state sovereignty limited the extent to which the power of free trade could encroach upon nations’ 
liberty. It was a prerogative of the state to decide whether to trade or not and to set its exact bounds.197 
Ultimately, Vattel affirmed that in case of collision the duties of a nation ‘to herself’ were ‘paramount to 
her duties to others’.198 Treaties gave the format where the competing interest of nations could be 
balanced while assuring the respect for their individual will.199 
 The same tension that was at work in Vattel’s treatment of trade between nations affected his position 
on commercial imperialism. Because trade could be curtailed in case a nation did not derive sufficient 
advantage from it, Vattel believed that ‘[w]hen the Spaniards attacked the Americans, under a pretense 
that those people refused to traffic with them, they only endeavor to throw a colorable veil over their 
own insatiable avarice’.200 In contrast to this anti-colonial position, he praised the Dutch and English 
commercial empires: 
 
Holland has amassed immense sums in her marshes; a company of her merchants possesses whole kingdoms in 
the East, and the governor of Batavia exercises command over the monarchs of India. To what a degree of power 
and glory has England arrived! Formerly her warlike princess and inhabitants made glorious conquest, which they 
afterwards lost by those reverses of fortune so frequent in war; at present, it is chiefly commerce that places in her 
hand the balance of Europe.201 
 
It is ironic that Vattel perceived so clearly the contradictions of using free trade as an instrument of 
Spanish and Portuguese imperialism while failing to recognize the negative implications of the Dutch 
and English commercial dominance of the East Indies based on the legality of the freedom of commerce.  
 Vattel’s statement followed a long tradition of demonizing the Spanish Empire in order to disassociate 
the reputation of other colonial powers from its excesses. It was less—if at all—related to a real 
preoccupation for the wellbeing of American peoples. His denunciation brought to light the excesses 
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enticed by Habsburg imperial ambitions. In contrast, his double standard obscured the subtle economic 
domination and structural violence of mighty trading empires that derived their hegemonic position from 
the imposition of advantageous terms of trade through treaties backed by the threat or use of military 
force when necessary.  
 According to Vattel, nations could restrict their freedom of commerce in favor of other nations.202 And 
because the reason for nations to trade was not only the procurement of ‘necessary or useful articles, but 
also’ to turn commerce into a ‘source of opulence’, monopolies were also legitimate so long as the profit 
extracted from the commercial advantage they were provided was not exorbitant.203 The Dutch treaty 
with the King of Ceylon was an example of how a monopolistic agreement could result in the moderate 
enrichment of the Dutch Empire while creating an advantage for all nations.204 Vattel borrowed his 
arguments about monopolies and even the example he used from Pufendorf’s exposition of the same 
topic in De Jure Naturae.205 
 At this point of his argumentation, Vattel introduced a crucial distinction between trade in goods that 
were necessary for survival and those that were considered as luxuries. Whereas it was legitimate to 
profit from the latter, nations could not raise the price of ‘the necessaries of life’ to an excessive level. 
Greed was acceptable in the first case, but unacceptable in case of those things that were vital for 
subsistence. Trespass of that limit gave other nations a right to intervene or, as Vattel put it, ‘to reduce a 
greedy oppressor to reasonable terms’.206 
 In contradistinction to Grotius and Vattel’s endorsement of colonial trade, Pufendorf and Wolff are 
said to incarnate a legal and moral cosmopolitanism that can be counted as one of the ‘great intellectual 
achievements of modern European legal theory’.207 Their high consideration derives in part from the fact 
that they defied Eurocentrism, taking the side of non-European peoples.208 Although there is a degree of 
truth in this affirmation, their cosmopolitanism is, nonetheless, more ambiguous than it seems at first 
glance. In fact, Pufendorf devoted scarce attention to the colonies. In his magnum treatise of more than 
1,300 pages, references to colonies can be counted on one hand. And even if Wolff and Pufendorf 
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strongly advocated nations’ equality (something that Vattel also did), they used double standards, 
denying at times uniform treatment to some non-European peoples and territories.  
 So, for instance, Pufendorf was critical of Spanish imperialism and, accordingly, criticized Vitoria with 
regard to the right to free trade. He was especially vocal against the cosmopolitan value of human 
communication that Vitoria had invoked as legitimate basis for Spanish commerce in America.209 
Pufendorf was aware that if carried to its end point this principle could result in imperialist tendencies, 
and if applied to the European context it could erode the fragile structure of national sovereignty that had 
emerged from the mid seventeenth century after the Peace of Westphalia.210 Although he was in principle 
in favor of the freedom of commerce between nations, he subjected this general right to a series of 
limitations.211 
 The most evident restriction to the free exchange of goods was the right of every country not to export 
what it deemed necessary to guarantee its subsistence.212As we affirmed before, Vattel also mentioned 
this qualification to the right to trade. In addition, there was no legal obligation to export even luxury 
articles if that diminished the profits of the nation.213 Besides, no country could be forced to import the 
goods of another.214 This was precisely why Pufendorf disagreed with what he saw as Vitoria’s 
legitimization of the Spanish attempt to forcefully open American markets to their economic operations. 
This restriction to free exchange derived from the fact that free trade was not always the best economic 
option. Protectionism was necessary to prevent the wealth of a nation from passing to ‘the hands of 
foreigners’.215 
 Christian Wolff also defended a right of states to trade, albeit subject to the same limitation to its scope 
of application: nations could not be forced to trade against their will.216 The outcome of commerce, Wolff 
noticed, was not always favorable; that is to say, trade could enhance the economic position of a nation 
as much as it could lead to its impoverishment.217 It all depended on the balance of payments between 
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the goods sold to and purchased from other nations.218 In consequence, and in order to protect their 
sovereignty, states established trade relations exclusively through their consent and by agreement.219  
 In principle, the legal guarantees that Pufendorf (and Wolff) imposed on the right to trade when 
translated to a colonial context could help non-European polities protect themselves from European trade 
expansionism. In practice, this possibility was foreclosed by his endorsement of trade monopolies, in 
case a European nation made ‘some portion of Africa or India its own, after the fashion which the nations 
usually recognize as imparting dominion’.220 Accordingly, European nations could legally acquire parts 
of Africa or the Indian subcontinent, establishing a monopoly over the flows of commodities in those 
regions for their economic advantage. As he observed, that was an ‘everyday practice’ in accordance to 
‘natural reason’.221 This right was part of a more general right whereby nations could establish trade 
monopolies by pact,222 and this was precisely what the VOC did in the East Indies. 
 Other references to colonies do not shed much light on the question of Pufendorf’s alleged anti-
imperialism. He affirmed, for example, that ‘European nations with colonies in the East and West Indies 
may conclude a truce to be observed in Europe, and continue the war in the Indies’.223 In another passage, 
describing the creation of colonies, he added that ‘colonies may be and usually are planted in different 
ways’.224 One of the manners in which a colony could be established was by way of an ‘unequal treaty’.225 
These statements were neither a critique nor an endorsement of Empire; Pufendorf was just describing a 
matter of fact. Of course, one could still argue that a lack of condemnation during on-going imperial 
domination amounts to an indirect acceptance of the status quo.  
 Free trade had quite positive connotations in the law of nations of the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries. There was a very tangible explanation for the appreciation of the increasing number of 
intercontinental networks of exchange on account of how much long-distance trade was contributing to 
the wealth of European nations and particularly to those individuals immersed in imperial ventures. 
Besides, trade was regarded as an instrument to further cosmopolitan values such as human 
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communication. But achieving fraternity, peace, or love through commerce outside European borders 
proved problematic as soon as it conflicted with the possibility of generous returns. Europeans did not 
hesitate to resort to violence when supposedly equal trading partners did not peacefully accept their 
commercial demands.  
 The economic activities of the VOC in the East Indies were a paramount example of this type of 
European trade imperialism through treaties.226 When the VOC encountered Asian polities that it could 
easily control, like in Southern India, the Malayan Peninsula, or Taiwan, it built fortifications and acted 
as de facto ruler.227 Acting as conquerors did not prevent the VOC from signing unequal treaties, which 
provided a semblance of legality, in which subjugated populations recognized its authority.228 Most of 
the East Indian rulers that submitted to the Dutch had already been vassals of other local sovereigns, so 
they accepted quite naturally the presence of a new powerful actor.229 
 European commercial might and economic hegemony was not translated by legal scholars into a blind 
adherence to the legal institution of free trade. Indeed, many authors uttered critique against conceiving 
trade in absolute terms, so that any other consideration bent to it. They realized that the commercial edge 
of maritime empires, which allowed them to dictate the terms of trade, threatened to undermine the 
economic independence of other European nations. So, they were particularly careful to set clear 
limitations to the scope of the international right to free trade in a way that it would not compromise the 
sovereignty of European nations. Still they thought that it was not contrary to the law of nations that a 
country made commercial concessions to more powerful nations, and even that it granted monopolies 
over part of its trade.  
 The door then opened for charter companies to force Asian rulers to adopt a policy of commercial 
submission to the European companies, while letting them keep their nominal sovereignty.230 Trading 
restrictions that operated with full force within European borders faded away when applied to the wider 
world through the imposition of unequal treaties. In other words, the structural economic violence and 
overt physical force associated with the internationalization of free trade derived from the different 
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standard applied to European and non-European polities, rather than from a strict adherence to the 
principle of free trade. Beyond European borders, protectionism was a fancy legal option. 
 
The agricultural argument 
The Dutch started their participation in the economic life of the Atlantic prior to having acquired 
independence from the Crown of Spain. Before revolting against Spanish rule in the late 1560s, they had 
already operated in the region as traders, sailors, soldiers, and missionaries within the Habsburg 
Empire.231 Once independence was secured, Dutch commercial activity in the Atlantic did not cease; on 
the contrary, it steadily increased. This notwithstanding, trade was shortly interrupted by the Twelve 
Years’ Truce signed with Spain in 1609, which prohibited Dutch merchants from operating in the 
Atlantic.232 But the expiration of the trust in 1621 and the creation of the Dutch West Indian Company 
(WIC) opened a new chapter in the history of Dutch involvement in the Atlantic, culminating with the 
addition of the Atlantic system to the profitable Dutch empire.  
 Without renouncing the model of fort-and-factory whereby they could affirm their power over weak 
East Indian polities without resorting to direct conquest, the Dutch become territorial in the two decades 
after the creation of the WIC. They founded the colonies of New Netherland in the center of the East 
coast of North America, New Holland in Brazil, and occupying several Caribbean islands.233 At about 
the same time they also started to annex some territory by force in the East Indies.234 The establishment 
of settlements entailed a departure from the imperialism of trade and garrison to the permanent 
occupation of territory. This change challenged Grotius’ theories in De iure praedae, which had been 
conceived to deal with a completely different set of circumstances.  
 In De iure praedae Grotius had argued that occupation created private property. During the Golden 
Age, humans had lived under a regime of common property.235 ‘God had given all things’ to be shared 
by ‘the human race’.236 Then, by a natural and ‘gradual process’, goods that satisfied basic needs like 
food and drink (following Grotius’ example) started to be privately possessed.237 In time, even 
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immovable things such as land were appropriated by individuals.238 Appropriation took place through 
occupation, ‘a physical act of attachment’ in Grotius’ words.239 Private property stemmed directly from 
that act.  
 After having explained the origin of private property, Grotius distinguished between two different 
meanings of the term res nullius. On the one hand, this notion referred to things that by their nature were 
not suitable for private acquisition. On the other hand, it encompassed things which had not yet been 
privately appropriated.240 All things that had never been taken possession of could not be ‘the private 
property of any owner’.241 They were still res nullius, and thus open to acquisition.  
 The sea was a typical example of things that were not susceptible to private ownership. The legal 
definition of the sea as common property served the VOC’s commercial ambitions in the East Indies. As 
an example of the second category of things that fell within Grotius’ understanding of res nullius, he 
mentioned wild beasts, fish, and birds.242 These were exactly the kind of movable things covered by the 
law ferae bestiae of the Roman ius gentium.  
 The theory of occupation as Grotius recounted it in De Iure Praedae was soon insufficient on account 
of the Dutch territorial ambitions in the Atlantic. Settlement in North America created a whole new range 
of legal problems. So, the theory of occupation in Grotius’ second major legal treatise De Iure Belli ac 
Pacis can be read, at least to a certain extent, as a response to Dutch territorial expansion.  
One of Grotius’ arguments in De iure belli that could have been applied to give the United Provinces 
power over the peoples of North American was the right to fight ‘those who sin against nature’.243 Tuck 
affirms that on this point Grotius concurred with Pope Innocent IV and, as he himself acknowledged, 
departed from Vitoria and the view of the School of Salamanca, favoring a right that was a clear apology 
for imperialism.244 Grotius went even further, equating those who ‘feed on human flesh’, the barbarians, 
with wild beasts.245 The assimilation of colonized populations in the Americas with animals was an 
infamous though familiar way of dehumanizing American peoples, common in the post-Reformation 
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treatment of the Other and the heterodox.246 The association of humans with animals justified the recourse 
to violence. As already mentioned, Grotius affirmed that ‘the most just war is against savage beasts, the 
next against men who are like beasts’.247 
Grotius complemented this legal entitlement to conquest with other arguments that widened Dutch 
power in North America, directly borrowed from or at least inspired by Vitoria. For instance, he defended 
the right of free passage of persons and goods in foreign lands, the right of temporary sojourn (which 
included building temporary accommodations on the seashore), and the right of exiles to settle in foreign 
lands.248 All these rights suited the cosmopolitan value of human communication, as they provided the 
legal basis for interaction between the world’s commonwealths. In all those cases, the presence of 
individuals from the United Provinces in North America was legitimate.  
Although the rights of free passage, sojourn, and settlement of exiles legitimized the Dutch presence 
and commercial operations in the Atlantic, none of them directly justified the permanent occupation of 
territory. Similarly, the moral imperative of intervention in cases of crimes against nature was of limited 
value in North America where most of its peoples did not practice ritual sacrifices.249 Grotius overcame 
this difficulty by reference to the law ferae bestiae of the Roman ius gentium, that is, to the right of 
occupation over unoccupied movable things.250 For Vitoria, ‘natural partnership and communication’ 
included also the Spanish right to seize vacant movable things in America as recognized by ius gentium. 
As above mention, Grotius himself used it in De iure praedae as part of his theory on the origin and 
acquisition of private property. 
 In De iure belli Grotius introduced an innovative approach to the law ferae bestiae, widening its scope 
of application so as to include both movables and immovables. As a result of this redefinition, vacant 
land became open to occupation. Grotius was not the first to defend that position; Sepúlveda had already 
argued in his Democrates Secundus that ius gentium gave a right over deserted lands to the first who 
occupied them.251 
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According to Garnsey, the fact that Roman law did not sanction the occupation of vacant land was 
probably related to the scarcity of free available land in the Italian peninsula and the more settled 
provinces of the Empire, where the concept of terra nullius must have almost been an empty category.252 
Therefore, the common view in Roman times was that every territory had a ruler who had the potestas 
to decide what happened within it.253 In contrast, there seemed to be plenty of land for first taking in 
America.  
The inclusion of immovables in the category of unoccupied goods was not the only difference between 
Grotius’ account of the origin and development of the right of private property in De iure praedae and 
De iure belli. In contrast with his earlier affirmation that occupation was the direct origin of private 
ownership, in his later work Grotius argued that the division of property took place by agreement, which 
was either direct (division) or tacit (occupation).254 Historically, there had been an explicit agreement, 
the purpose of which was the division of communal property. Thereafter, it was implicitly agreed that all 
those things that had not yet been subject to private property could be seized by the first person who 
appropriated them.255 
What kinds of goods were still ownerless? Among such things Grotius mentioned ‘places hitherto 
uncultivated, islands in the sea, wild animals, fish and birds’.256 Importantly, for Grotius, uncultivated 
land could not only be found in unoccupied territory, but also in territories in which sovereignty was 
clearly exercised: 
 
Again, if within the territory of a people there is any deserted and unproductive soil, this also ought to be granted 
to foreigners if they ask for it. Or it is right for foreigners even to take possession of such ground, for the reason 
that uncultivated land ought not to be considered as occupied except in respect to sovereignty, which remains 
unimpaired in favor of the original people.257 
 
As with the Spanish scholastics, Grotius distinguished between the acquisition of two types of dominium: 
sovereignty (dominium iurisdictionis) and ownership (dominium proprietatis).258 However, he inverted 
the conclusions that Las Casas had made from that distinction concerning Spanish rights in America. 
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While sovereignty remained exclusively in the hands of the inhabitants of a given territory, land 
ownership could be transferred to foreigners by effect of the agricultural argument.259 The distinction 
between imperium and dominium rerum allowed Grotius to respect the sovereignty of North American 
peoples while opening the possibility of appropriating part of the territories they inhabited. Even if in 
principle this right—having universal application—was informed by reciprocity, it was obvious that 
uncultivated land was more likely to be found in the depopulated and vast areas of North America than 
in the over-populated and tiny—in comparison—United Provinces, which were actually struggling to 
win land to the sea.  
 The link between agriculture and private property had an old pedigree in Western thought. The 
association of these two institutions with a period of moral decay after the Golden Age was already 
present in the work of classic Latin poets such as Virgil and Ovid.260 In contrast, natural rights theorists 
presented the introduction of agriculture in conjunction with private property in a more positive light as 
dictated by natural reason—God’s gift to humans. The Spanish scholastics had associated them both with 
the need for making the natural world productive through the application of human industry once it 
became corrupted as a consequence of the Fall. Although some canonists had already argued that the 
practice of agriculture created a right to seize vacant land, it was an axiom in Medieval thinking that no 
land could be acquired against the will of the local sovereign.261 
 The trips of discovery of the early modern era changed that scenario dramatically. To European 
observers, the sheer immensity of America seemed to exceed the needs of the pre-colonial population of 
the continent. The supposed asymmetry between natural resources and population definitely tipped on 
the side of resources as a result of the population collapse that followed the arrival of European swords, 
germs, and systems of slavery and forced labor. In the seventeenth century the amount of land and natural 
resources that the survivors could manage considerably reduced. The logic of the agricultural argument 
perfectly fitted this new situation. 
 The first clear formulation of the agricultural argument appeared in Thomas Moore’s magnum opus 
Utopia, published in 1516.262 Referring to the fictional island of Utopia, situated in America, and to its 
inhabitants, Moore wrote:  
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… if the population throughout the entire island exceeds the quota, they enroll citizens out of every city and plant 
a colony under their own laws on the mainland near them, wherever the natives have plenty of unoccupied and 
uncultivated land ... They think it is perfectly justifiable to make war on people who leave their land idle and waste 
yet forbid the use and possession of it to others who, by the law of nature, ought to be supported from it.263 
 
In this passage Moore anticipated not only the idea but also the vocabulary adopted by later scholars that 
invoked the agricultural argument as a justification for colonial expansion. 
 It is worth emphasizing the economic logic behind the agricultural argument as Grotius formulated it. 
The imperative of productivity entailed looking at the globe’s landscapes with a new economic gaze. 
Every inch of the earth could and therefore ought to be made productive. European industriousness could 
be applied to vacant ecosystems in America for the betterment of humankind.  
From an environmental perspective, the practical application—if partial—of Grotius’ doctrine of land 
acquisition to North America implied the legal predominance of Europeans’ more intensive way of 
relating to nature in the colonies, and the marginalization of the more sustainable—in comparison—
environmental practices of the peoples of North America.264 For the colonialists, as for Grotius, 
exploiting the Earth was tantamount to owning it. 
 Grotius’ agricultural argument turned a blind eye to the North Americans’ ways of transforming nature 
other than cultivation. The colonists’ association of wilderness with what were in reality socially 
modified landscapes was the consequence of a lack of understanding of North American systems of land 
use.265 Several groups in North America selected trees and plants from which they obtained medicines 
and food. They also used fire selectively to open fields in order to attract wild game and assure hunting.266 
Forests and meadows were largely the result of anthropogenic forces. All those managed landscapes fell 
within the legal category of vacant lands, extending the logic of economic efficiency even over natural 
spaces that were already –if differently– utilized and productive. 
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 A final environmental aspect of the acquisition of land and natural resources through the agricultural 
argument is that, as a result of the colonization of North America, the need for ecologically sustainable 
patterns of production, consumption, and population growth in the United Provinces was loosened.267 
Demand and production could endlessly rise, even surpassing the threshold of what was ecologically 
viable considering the limited natural resources of the United Provinces, as the forests and lands of 
America could be used to obtain timber and cash crops that serviced the prosperity of the Empire.268 
 The Dutch landed Empire in North America was short-lived. It disintegrated as swiftly as it was built. 
Despite keeping a considerable commercial weight in the Atlantic, Dutch colonies in Brazil and North 
America fell in the mid-seventeenth century due to the military superiority of competing colonial 
rivals.269 As in the East Indies, the English moved as well into North America. By the beginning of the 
seventeenth century, they had established two settlements in Virginia and New England.270 In order to 
validate colonization, they could invoke their own version of a right to occupy vacant lands as elaborated 
by the Italian Protestant jurist Alberico Gentili (1552-1608), who settled in England from 1580 and taught 
at Oxford, where he became Regius Professor of Civil Law.271 In fact, it was Gentili’s formulation of 
that right that inspired Grotius’ agricultural argument.272 
 In Chapter XVII of the first volume of his major work De Jure Belli Libri Tres Gentili dealt with the 
question of offensive war. He inquired particularly on the right of exiles to migrate abroad and seize land. 
He noted that the establishment of colonies due to the forced migration of exiles was problematic when 
it led to conquest because it was not just ‘that the weaker and less distinguished should give place to the 
more powerful and more glorious’.273 A different standard applied when exiles settled in uninhabited 
places. In that case, occupation was ‘regarded as a law of nature’.274 As an example, Gentili referred to 
the first act of Pertinax, ‘who assigned all the uncultivated land of Italy and the rest of the world to those 
who would take possession of it and improve it’.275 This right was in consonance with Christian theology. 
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As Gentili recognized, God had not created ‘the world to be empty’.276 America was one of the places 
where Gentili identified the existence of empty spaces apt for first taking.277 
 Similar to the Spanish scholastics and Grotius, Gentili distinguished between imperium and dominium 
rerum. According to him, occupation of vacant land only gave rise to private property rights. The 
sovereign of the territories where exiles settled retained ‘jurisdiction over them’.278 
 The early versions of the agricultural argument that appeared in the works of Gentili and Thomas Moore 
provided the architects of the English colonization of North America with a blueprint for agricultural 
development that was in tune with Christian doctrine. After all, the imperatives to fill the Earth and 
subdue it, the reasons that Gentili and Moore invoked, were God’s first commands to humankind. 
However, it was the reception of the theories of José the Acosta, rather than the influence of Gentili or 
Moore, that played an important role in shaping English theories of occupation, particularly in the colony 
of Virginia.279 
 The Virginia Company’s promoters first used the writings of the Salamanca school to defend the status 
of civility and the right to property for North American peoples.280 Justification of the company’s 
economic activity in North America was strictly based on Vitoria’s right of communication through trade, 
which importantly included trading for land.281 And, as Vitoria had argued, the violation of that natural 
right gave a right to wage war.282 
 Eventually a total reversal of this previous position took place between the defenders of English 
colonial venture in Virginia. The writings of José De Acosta were used by William Strachey (1572-
1621), Secretary of the colony, and by the writer Samuel Purchas (1577?-1626) to argue that North 
American peoples belonged to the third category of barbarism according to Acosta’s scheme.283 Having 
neither notion of private property nor capacity to exploit nature, and almost fusing with nature, those 
barbarians were close to the condition of brutes and beasts.284 Concretely, for the purpose of the Virginia 
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colony the Algonquian people of the Chesapeake were defined as being part of that low social 
category.285 
 In spite of the economic and political possibilities created by the legal development of the settlers’ 
entitlement to land, North American colonies did not immediately thrive. The creation of a ‘new society’ 
was an arduous process. Having ‘vacant’ land did not amount to the realization of any of the initial 
expectations about American’s wealth, especially in the absence of precious metals. A new economic 
vocabulary and suitable commercial mechanisms were needed in order to maximize the benefits of 
exploiting the land and natural resources of North America so that the colonies could yield their expected 
riches.  
 Capitalist developments in finance and commerce in the metropolis together with African slave labor 
played a fundamental role in the eventual flourishing and consolidation of the British Atlantic system 
and its colonies.286 Besides, the emergence of an early-modern English elite culture, in which land owners 
and merchants interacted, enabled the application of certain principles of business management to the 
improvement of agricultural land.287 These ideas about the practical improvement of landed states and 
the possibilities for profits derived from greater production travelled with the English colonists to 
settlement colonies worldwide, with important implications for world history.288 
 From a theoretical standpoint, John Locke was a key figure in providing the conceptual vocabulary for 
the transformation of the unhappy English American colonies of the beginning of the seventeenth century 
into the vibrant, prosperous, productive enclaves they became at the turn of the eighteenth century. His 
theoretical standpoints in the Two Treatises of Government sponsored commercial agriculture in North 
America and intercontinental trade between the colonies and the metropolis. In addition, his doctrine of 
land occupation constituted a significant development of Grotius’ embryonic formulation of the 
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agricultural (or agriculturalist) argument.289 All in all, Locke is a key figure in the history of international 
thought.290 
 Locke’s stake in the English colonial venture was even higher than Grotius’ interest in upholding Dutch 
expansionism. The latter was a mere employee for the VOC, while the former was secretary to the Lords 
Proprietor of Carolina and to the Council of Trade and Plantations, and later became a member of the 
Board of Trade.291 He was also an investor, holding shares for instance in the Royal African Company 
that traded in slaves.292 Locke wrote Two Treatises of Government in defense of the settlement in North 
America in the midst of a vivid debate in England about the economic profitability of investing in the 
colonies.293 The main argument against the whole colonial project was the possible negative impact it 
could have on English wealth and population growth.294 Locke rejected this claim, arguing precisely the 
contrary, that English presence in North America would stimulate the local industry.295 He accurately 
predicted that settlers’ demand for goods would create the need for English manufactures. Besides, the 
construction of ships and equipment to carry those goods across the Atlantic would generate additional 
economic possibilities.296 
 Locke’s theory of property—influenced by Grotius—included original ideas. For example, Locke 
established labor as the main criterion to acquire property. In that, he departed from Grotius and 
Pufendorf who had affirmed that property was established through agreement. The inhabitants of 
America, he argued, had a right to the animals they hunted and the fruits they collected.297 The mere act 
of utilizing natural resources resulted in their privatization. The logic behind Locke’s conception of the 
origin of private property that runs like a thread through his second treatise of government was that 
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human industry improved nature, and that this increase in productivity gave rise to a more plentiful 
society.298 Society benefited from the more efficient exploitation of natural wealth that the process of 
privatizing natural resources entailed.  
 For Locke, labor was the decisive factor for land ownership. However, certain type of labor by which 
land was worked—selecting plant’s species, clearing forests to open land for wild animals, non-enclosed 
agriculture—did not count as appropriate ways of creating private property rights. In fact, according to 
Locke, land could only be owned when it was worked through enclosed agriculture.299 
  The other side of improved land (using Locke’s own terminology300) was wasteland; that is to say, 
land that had been neglected from the beneficial and transformative power of human industry.301 This 
particular understanding of unused land provided a wider scope of application for the agricultural 
argument than Grotius’ idea of vacant land. For Locke, even if Americans practiced agriculture, they 
could still lose their land, provided that this activity was not carried out in a proper manner, that is to say, 
in a way akin to English agriculture.302 
 Another important aspect of Locke’s theory of occupation was his conclusion that the appropriation of 
wasteland by individuals was prior to the acquisition of dominium iurisdictionis. No government could 
claim sovereignty over wasteland before its private acquisition and exploitation.303 Human liberty and 
property preceded civil society and could not be destroyed by it. In fact, the lack of personal and 
economic security was of utmost importance for the constitution of polities. As he put it, the ‘chief end’ 
of ‘Mens uniting into commonwealths and putting themselves under Government’ was ‘the preservation 
of their property’.304 
 Locke’s doctrine of material improvement through property rights, a vigorous defense of private 
economic power, provided the English colonists with the possibility of claiming jurisdiction over most 
of North America305, which according to the vision of most English commentators and colonists was 
predominantly a wilderness.  
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 The centrality of agrarian cultivation in Locke’s theory responded to the English colonial strategy in 
North America. The lack of precious minerals explains the ideological shift to cultivation. Most English 
commentators believed that agriculture was a more secure means of prosperity in the long run than gold 
or silver. If developed in a commercial fashion, cultivation was a mechanism that could allow their nation 
to surpass rival powers.306 In the same vein, they criticized mining and grazing, regarded by the Spanish 
and Portuguese as lucrative activities, for benefiting private interests rather than the nation at large and 
fomenting inter-colonial trade instead of trade between the colony and the metropolis.307 The financial 
difficulties of both Empires were vivid proof of the inappropriateness of their economic approach. 
 Was there any limit, according to Locke, to the amount of land that could be appropriated in North 
America? He found two such limits. One was the obligation of leaving as much property free as was 
possessed.308 The other, which rested on the prevention of spoilage, limited the acquisition of property 
to what could be properly cultivated.309 These limits did not stem from egalitarian concerns. They were 
based on economic calculations, reflecting the widespread opinion among English colonial 
administrators that when too much land was appropriated for plantations the returns diminished.310 
 Locke was able to reconcile the restriction of land appropriation with the possibility of capital 
accumulation by bringing into play the concept of money. He believed that ‘as different degrees of 
Industry were apt to give Men Possessions in different Proportions, so this Invention of Money gave them 
the opportunity to continue and enlarge them’.311 It was relatively easy then to distinguish between North 
Americans’ subsistence agriculture, which did not require money, and English plantations, which could 
encompass sizeable tracts of land thanks to the monetary exchange of surplus. It was clear which of the 
two systems Locke valued the most. As he recognized, ‘Trade, then, is necessary to the producing of 
riches, and money necessary to the carrying on of trade’.312 The seemingly egalitarian limits of land 
appropriation that Locke had introduced faded away once money was brought into play. He was sure 
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‘that Men have agreed to disproportionate and unequal Possession of the Earth’.313 Fortunately for his 
own interest, he was on the winning side.  
 Similar to Grotius, Locke’s theory of property implied that the legal prerequisite for land ownership 
was the thorough exploitation of nature. His own words are illustrative: ‘And hence subduing or 
cultivating the Earth and having Dominion, we see are joined together.’314 
 Long after Locke, in the mid-eighteenth century and in the context of an emerging system of states, 
Vattel deliberated on the importance of agriculture as a mean to enhance nations’ wealth and happiness. 
Despite the time span between both authors, some of Vattel’s ideas resembled those of John Locke. As 
with the latter, the former associated cultivation with private property, profits, and trade. According to 
Vattel, ‘The cultivation of the soil’ is ‘the most solid fund of riches and commerce’.315 The goal of 
agriculture was the improvement of the Earth’s fecundity through human effort. In consequence, Vattel 
concluded that within a nation common land did not allow to ‘enclose and cultivate it in the most 
advantageous manner’.316 This conclusion was extendable to the whole world: the Earth did not receive 
‘proper cultivation from wandering tribes of men continuing to possess it in common’.317 In order to 
become fruitful the world’s resources had to be privatized and placed in the hands of the industrious.  
 Notwithstanding similarities, there were also important divergences between the theories of Locke and 
Vattel. Whereas the former was mainly concerned with the relation between individuals and the state 
and, particularly, with the right of the former to possessions prior to the formation of a political 
community, the focal point of Vattel’s exposition of the law of nations was the relations between nations. 
So, Vattel derived both dominium and imperium from the fact that a nation took possession of a 
country.318 Jurisdiction and ownership emerged simultaneously. Hence, colonialism proceeded under the 
premise that once new land was occupied it was automatically incorporated into metropolitan territory. 
In the words of Vattel: ‘When a Nation takes possession of a distant country and settles a colony there, 
that country, though separated from the principal establishment, or mother-country, naturally becomes a 
part of the State, equally with its ancient possessions.’319 
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 For Vattel it was nations rather than individuals that were not only allowed, but actually ‘obliged by 
the law of nature to cultivate the land that has fallen to its share’.320 This obligation provided a criterion 
to judge the use of natural resources. Through this prism, the impetus to transform the globe and render 
it more productive could be invoked against all ‘others, who in order to avoid labor, seek to live upon 
their flocks and the fruits of the chase’.321 Accordingly, those ‘others’ ‘may not complain if other more 
industrious Nations, too confined at home, should come and occupy part of their lands’.322 
Unquestionably, the world belonged to industrious, hardworking nations. 
 The point of departure for this conclusion was the application of the law ferae bestiae to both movables 
and immovables. Vattel highlighted the fact that ‘all mankind have an equal right to things that have not 
yet fallen into the possession of any one; and those things belong to the person who first takes possession 
of them’.323 That rule allowed nations (not individuals) to take possession of uninhabited lands.324 
 Vattel’s use of the agricultural argument became more explicit when he enquired whether a nation’s 
right of occupation of an uninhabited country was applicable to North America, which was undoubtedly 
inhabited but not fully used. He answered this question affirmatively, asserting that North American 
‘erratic nations’ could not take for themselves more land than they needed or were ‘able to settle and 
cultivate’.325 They only had ‘legal possession’ (dominium rerum and dominium iurisdictionis) over those 
regions of North America where their ecological footprint was manifest. Having found ‘land of which 
the savages stood in no particular need, and of which they made no actual and constant use’, the 
Europeans ‘were lawfully entitled to take possession of it, and settle it with colonies’.326 
 The question of the ecological footprint of North Americans in comparison to Europeans was of 
foremost importance. In Vattel’s version of the agricultural argument the use of a particular natural 
habitat had to be ‘constant’. This meant that if a North American nation relocated, providing nature time 
to regenerate, they automatically lost the rights over the lands from which they had moved. Only the 
European’s more intensive approach of permanent utilization of particular landscapes assured full legal 
rights of possession. 
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 Vattel’s formulation of the agricultural argument legitimized the practices of colonizing powers eager 
to extend their sphere of control over North American natural resources. This notwithstanding, Vattel 
still praised the fact that many colonists had purchased land directly from North American peoples.327 
As he noticed, New England settlers did this even though they had ‘a charter’ issued by ‘their 
sovereign’.328 But nothing in his words indicated that buying land was a necessary condition to acquire 
private property. It was just ‘a laudable example’; nothing less, nothing more.329 Even without that type 
of transaction, and following the dictates of nature, it was just to confine ‘the Indians within narrower 
limits’ than they were used to living in.330 
 The association of agriculture, efficiency, and profits by Grotius, Locke, and Vattel with the wellbeing 
and happiness of individuals and nations and the formulation of that association as a standard of land 
appropriation in overseas territories became a legal tool in the hands of individuals, companies, and states 
to further the ends of empire. In contrast to these authors, it has been argued that Pufendorf and Wolff 
stand as anti-imperialist figures whose scholarship provided protection to the territorial rights of non-
Europeans against European encroachment.331 As in the case of commerce, this description is not entirely 
accurate.  
 For Pufendorf, ‘individual dominions’ (private property) originated ‘from division and occupation’.332 
First humans made a pact whereby the primitive community of things was divided.333 But that division 
did not comprise all the goods of the world. So, it was agreed that thereafter the law ferae bestiae applied. 
In other words, each person became the owner of the vacant things that he had appropriated through a 
bodily act of seizure: occupation.334 In the same manner as Grotius and Locke, Pufendorf expanded the 
law ferae bestiae to encompass unoccupied immovable goods, especially land. Again, similarly to these 
authors he concluded that land could be occupied by individuals through cultivation and enclosure.335 
 A second kind of land occupation involved the seizure of land by a group. In the case of a group 
occupying a territory, vacant land was not open for first taking because it already belonged to the whole 
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people.336 Sovereignty marked the limits for the acquisition of property. But in the case of ‘desert places’ 
the ‘supreme powers of the state’ could limit occupation only with regard to the members of the group.337 
In other words, foreigners were free to occupy vacant regions and make ‘them their own’.338 Then 
Pufendorf illustrated his statement by citing the words of Selden about the customs of the Jews: 
‘Anything found in desert places or not owned or cultivated by private persons, or in rivers and torrents, 
belonged to the person who occupied it …’339 
 Importantly, in citing Selden Pufendorf included uncultivated lands in the category of vacant places. 
This reference would fit Pufendorf’s belief that the Earth could not feed an increasing population unless 
it was ‘cultivated and improved’.340 Pufendorf never explicitly referred to North America as an example 
of a place where vacant land could be found and acquired. But if it was demonstrated that agriculture 
was not practiced there, then the acquisition of land in North America would not be contrary to the 
doctrine he put forward.  
 Pufendorf distinction between sovereignty (dominium iurisdictionis) and private property (dominium 
rerum) also seems to indicate that vacant land could be occupied. For him, sovereignty over unoccupied 
places derived from the acquisition of private property, and not the other way around. Only when private 
property had been established in a desert place was sovereignty created. Pufendorf affirmed that 
‘sovereignty is improperly spoken of as existing over a place or territory, the effect of which is that no 
one can take that place for himself without the consent of him who is said to hold sovereignty over it … 
Yet this sovereignty is properly the effect of dominion that has been established over that place, and 
includes some sovereignty over men only as a consequence.’341 Therefore, the occupation of unoccupied 
lands created private property rights first, and then sovereignty.  
 Wolff made explicit the ideological association between agriculture, the improvement of nature, and 
prosperity that underpinned the international legal theories of the era. For him:  
 
If desert and uncultivated places are transformed by cultivation from sterile or at least useless places into fertile 
and useful places, since in this manner industrial products are multiplied and a crop of natural products is 
developed by industry and exertion, which assuredly tends to the perfecting of the condition of the nation.342 
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This did not mean, however, that uncultivated land within the territory of a nation could be freely 
occupied.343 On the contrary, it belonged to the nation at large, and even if its ownership was transferred, 
sovereignty remained the exclusive prerogative of either the nation or its ruler. But a different criterion 
applied to the land not yet subject to ownership and sovereignty, in which colonies could be legally 
established.344 
 Was this standard applicable to North American territories? Unlike Pufendorf, Wolff discussed in detail 
the acquisition of North America’s original territories. It is worth acknowledging that, contrary to the 
doctrines of Vattel or Locke, his arguments offered legal protection to North American peoples. He held 
that separate families owned the territory in which they lived and wandered.345 Even lands not yet in use 
within their territory at a given time could not be acquired as long as their intention was to eventually 
utilize them.346 Furthermore, cultivation was not the only activity that legitimized ownership of 
‘uncultivated wilds’.347 North Americans’ use of the land for grazing cattle and ‘other purpose’ (Wolff 
seems here to be referring to hunting) made it their own. Despite this high threshold of protection, Wolff 
still maintained that: 
 
Since separate families dwelling together in a certain territory own the lands which they have occupied, but the 
other places are the property of nobody; if in a district in which separate families hold their own land there are still 
other lands the use of which can be private or individual, those lands can be occupied by anybody.348 
 
The key to understanding the limitations of Pufendorf’s and Wolff’s cosmopolitanism is the concept of 
the sovereign nation. Within nations/states, no acquisition of uncultivated or uninhabited territory was 
possible. This guarantee helped preserve their independence and equality, undoubtedly, a high 
accomplishment for the international thinking of the time. It also provided an important legal guarantee 
to the Swedish Crown and the Prussian state (to which they gave their services), wary of the risk that the 
imperialist ambitions of certain European neighbors represented to their own independence and 
sovereignty. In addition, the fundamental distinction nation/no-nation, that correlated to the opposite 
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European/non-European polity, left open the door for the colonial projects of the states that employed 
them.349 
Unlike European territories, some non-European territories did not pass the test of nationhood and, 
hence, could not enjoy the same degree of protection afforded to nations. Thus, when referring to the 
property of separate families Wolff noted that no injury was made when land was acquired in those 
territories, as no nation existed.350 Without a nation there was no civil sovereignty, and without 
sovereignty no secure ownership of uninhabited lands. Wolff’s words are illustrative: ‘All the earth is 
open to everybody as long as sovereignty over it has been assumed by no one, and everyone who needs 
them can occupy things in it which have no owner.’351 Pufendorf never explicitly formulated a distinction 
of nation/no-nation applied to non-European territory, but the more protective treatment given to 
European state’s territory vis-à-vis non-European territories is an indication of a conceptual 
differentiation between both spheres. 
 A final important point about the internationalization of free trade and plantation agriculture through 
the law of nations during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries is that these activities, which 
contributed to aggrandize imperial power in non-European territories, seemed in principle rid of the kind 
of religious bias that pervaded the legal arguments of Spanish scholars. International trade was based on 
the consent of East Indian polities. Similarly, the agricultural argument was based on a free-value 
judgment of the condition of North American natural habitats. Any observer could have objectively 
verified the virgin state of the land and natural resources.  
 The apparent neutrality of international trade and the objectivity of the agricultural argument, despite 
their European pedigree and their service to European economic and territorial expansion, protected them 
from the kind of contestation that Spanish religious justifications for colonialism had faced in other 
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European nations. Plantations and markets represented an efficient way of generating and increasing the 
productivity of vacant or under-utilized natural resources. In the context of an incipient and small-scale 
but extremely profitable global network of exchange, how could moral scruples compromise European 
attempts to improve the way that the natural resources of the world were used? In theory, the intention 
behind the economic expansionism of European seaborne empires was merely to establish peaceful 
commercial relations and seize vacant land and natural resources in foreign territories in order to foster 
worldwide efficiency and prosperity, fulfilling God’s mandate to master the Earth. Reality proved 
otherwise. 
 
Christianity, wilderness, and the exploitation of North American ecosystems 
The agricultural argument and the logic of efficient use of natural resources found their way into the 
major treatises of the law of nations in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. For European empires, 
the application of a legal standard of land occupation backed by the idea of improving nature was a 
convenient way of extending their territorial sway into non-European territories, America in particular. 
Moreover, it provided vital access to agricultural commodities in high demand in expanding globalized 
markets. Alongside its legitimating value for the metropolis, the agricultural argument also had a direct 
influence on colonial debates in the English settlements of North America, playing an important role in 
how the American physical environment was perceived, defined, and used.  
 Christian ideas and conceptions about nature set the ground for the fertile application of the agricultural 
argument in North America. In fact, Colonization went hand in hand with a slow but thorough change of 
approach toward the North American environment, whereby a generally sustainable use of natural 
resources by North American peoples shifted toward their increasing private appropriation and 
exploitation. As Shepard Krech, a critic of the concept of the ‘ecological Indian’352 has put it: ‘whatever 
the impact of Indians on land and resources, it didn’t hold a candle to the long-term impact of people of 
European descent.’353 Population growth played a large role in this dynamic. But these important changes 
on the environment were also the result of the influence of the different conceptions of North Americans 
and Europeans in regard to nature.354 As Burton has noted: 
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Of everything the first European immigrants brought to North America, perhaps the most enduring effect on the 
environment and its indigenous peoples would not be the colonists’ tools and technologies, dress, or disease, but 
rather, their ideas and beliefs. For these were the ways they conceptually constructed their “New World”: how 
they determined what was right and wrong behavior, how they were moved to use the environment to meet their 
needs and desires, and how they sought to order their relations among themselves and with their indigenous 
neighbors.355 
 
The ideology that most prominently shaped the colonists’ conceptualization of the North American 
environment was Christianity. The first North American colonies were founded by Protestant radicals 
that had escaped European religious wars and economic crisis.356 Despite variations between settlements, 
a shared Christian faith united them under a common umbrella.357 From their Christian perspective the 
land they had come to occupy and work was generally perceived as a wilderness.358 
 The idea of wilderness had an old pedigree in Christian thought. The word is mentioned in the Bible 
approximately a hundred times.359 In the Holy Scriptures wilderness or desert place designates a territory 
that is not inhabited and it is usually uncultivated.360 Key passages of the Bible refer to the need to 
confront the wild and dark forces of the outside world as well as the inside world of temptation in order 
to achieve redemption. An example of this confrontation was the Jewish nation, which fled slavery in 
Egypt under the leadership of Moses and wandered in trial and penitence in the wilderness of the Sinai 
Peninsula for forty years before arriving to the promised land of Canaan.361 In the New Testament the 
stories of John the Baptist and Jesus are linked by the idea of wilderness. John the Baptist was a crying 
voice in the wilderness that called for repentance and baptism.362 One of those who came to him was 
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Jesus, who immediately after being baptized immersed himself in the wilderness of the desert, where he 
was tempted by the Devil and guided by the Spirit.363 
 For the Puritans who travelled to New England, wilderness was a place of refuge and terror, crucifixion 
and resurrection.364 It was the interface between the world of sinfulness in which they lived and the New 
Canaan to which they aspired. Wilderness was a composite. It had an external dimension denoting a 
barren physical place, and an inner psychological dimension indicating a location in the mind with 
chaotic and evil tendencies. The combination of both states created a powerful religious perception of 
the natural world alongside a desire to transform it.365 
 William Bradford, the founder of the Plymouth colony and its governor for over 30 years, described 
the harbor of Cape Cod where the Mayflower anchored in 1621 as a ‘hideous and desolate wilderness, 
full of wild beasts and wild men’.366 In fact, ‘the whole country, full of woods and thickets, represented 
a wild and savage hue’.367 John Winthrop, a wealthy English puritan lawyer, one of the founding figures 
of the Massachusetts Bay Colony and governor of the same for twelve years, concurred with Bradford 
when he referred to North America as a ‘wilderness where are nothing but wild beasts and beastlike 
men’.368 
 Still, the Christian idea of wilderness and its implications in North America was not monolithic. Among 
New England Calvinists, the Arminians and the Antinomians held different conceptions.369 The former 
conceived the territory of New England as a wilderness that had to be tamed. By contrast, the latter saw 
it as a garden surrounded by wild nature.370 But they both agreed that their new territory was sacred or 
sacred-to-be.371 Differences between both groups disappeared with the second generation of New 
Englanders as New England’s prosperity definitively proved to the heirs of the pioneers that their home 
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in North America was (as it had always been for the Antinomians, or in opposition to its original state 
for the Arminians) the Promised Land.372 
 The religious mission of American colonists consisted to a great extent on taming the wild North 
American environment.373 Their desire to control and master nature was also a consequence of their 
pressing need to survive in an alien environment. Moreover, American colonists were well aware of the 
threat of human degeneration that a wild environment posed to them.374 Either they domesticated the 
land or the land would transform them and turn them into the savages that the first colonists found at 
their arrival. They thus constantly felt the menacing presence of the vast forest and wild animals that 
inhabited them. Paradoxically, the forest and its shadow grew larger as North American peoples, who 
had kept it in check through periodic burnings, started to die in large numbers as a consequence of the 
first wars of conquest and the diseases carried by the colonists.375 
 The first colonists instituted a thorough program of environmental transformation in North America. 
Finding thick and dense forests in the continent, they cut timber in order to open space for agriculture 
and obtain construction materials. They tilled the land, establishing individual farms but also countless 
plantations.376 But from what religious sources did they derive the power to carve a civil society out of 
North American wilderness? Did God allow them to exploit the environment for their benefit?  
 For the Protestant colonists, Genesis was the most important source of knowledge when it came to 
answering these questions. The passages in which God laid out his program for humans and nature were 
of particular importance. After having created all life, God said: ‘Let us make human beings in our image, 
after our likeness, to have dominion over the fish in the sea, the birds in the air, the cattle, all wild animals 
on land, and everything that creeps on the earth.’377 Then he gave humans a specific command: ‘Be 
fruitful and increase, fill the Earth and subdue it.’378 
 New England Calvinists knew well these passages from the Scriptures.379 Several regulations and 
statutes that allocated land for settlers in New England included references to them. Concretely, passages 
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of Genesis and Psalms were cited, stressing that God had given the Earth to humankind in order for them 
to replenish it.380 Enshrined in the new colonial rules, the sacred mandate to subdue nature was integrated 
as part of the legal entitlement to acquire land and settle North American territory. The agricultural 
argument was particularly suitable to this ideological background.  
 The impact of Christianity on the North American environment was not reduced to the role of religious 
ideas. Evangelization encouraged the exploitation of the natural world. The Church’s objective of 
extending its spiritual and earthly power over the populations of the Western hemisphere coincided with 
the settlers’ interest in expanding the natural frontier. Penetration into the continent in search for new 
natural resources offered the Church the prospect of adding new souls to its mass of followers, as well 
as increasing its wealth and possessions, in a religious context in which Catholics and Protestants 
competed to win converts to their religious cause.  
 
The agricultural argument in North America 
On their arrival to North America, the English proclaimed that their Crown was sovereign of the newly 
acquired territories as it had, by discovery, a better legal title than any other European colonial power.381 
So it was a question of the property over the land rather than its sovereignty that was hotly disputed at 
the time of the establishment of the first settlements. During the beginning of the seventeenth century, 
arguments in favor and against North Americans’ ownership were equally strong.  
 The dispute was particularly prominent in the colony of Virginia, where the reception of the writings 
of the School of Salamanca helped shape the view that North Americans were true owners of their 
territories.382 In this first period of settlement, many among both critics and defenders of English 
colonialism highly regarded North American societies. The general understanding was that North 
American peoples lived in civil societies and were able to use their natural surroundings efficiently.383 
 However, this positive understanding of North American peoples soon turned upside down. The 
reception of the writings of José de Acosta served to argue that the Algonquian peoples of the Chesapeake 
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were not owners of their territories.384 Redefining Virginian ecosystems as vacant created the possibility 
of full application of the right to occupy unoccupied natural resources. 
 Despite the wide use of Acosta’s writings in Virginia, even the most fervent adherents to Acosta’s 
debased consideration of North American peoples oscillated between the ambiguous positions of 
justifying their lack of private property and defending the purchase of their land.385 As time passed, the 
opinion that North Americans were the true owners of the land they possessed—as Wolff would later 
defend—prevailed.386 So, in general, the English settlers acquired land from the original inhabitants of 
North America by purchase rather than force.387 In fact, many land speculators even supported—albeit 
with little success—North Americans’ claims of sovereignty and, hence, their capacity to cede land 
directly without having to obtain the permission of the Crown, a possibility that if materialized would 
have played to their economic advantage.388 
 Once there was a general agreement about the issue of North Americans’ land ownership, the disputed 
topic was the extension of that property.389 Did they own merely what they cultivated, or were they also 
the proprietors of the vast continental territories where they fished, hunted, and collected plants and 
fruits? The answer to this question was of utmost economic importance because it related to the amount 
of land available for English appropriation without payment. The recognition of North American 
peoples’ ownership over non-agricultural land would have meant that their possessions could encompass 
virtually the entire continent.390 
 One possible solution to this conundrum was the application of a standard of ownership based on the 
agricultural argument. Accordingly, at the arrival of the English, North American peoples could only 
own as much land as they were cultivating. As a commentator of the period put it, ‘where they have 
subdued, replenished & are actually improving, that is their Property’, but ‘the Natives or Indians should’ 
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not ‘be invested with the Property of all this vast unsubdued, unreplenished, unimproved, unknown, and 
greatest part of this Creation’.391 The improvement of the Earth through human labor became the lynchpin 
of the English colonial edifice.392 The non-legal rationale that informed the agricultural argument gave 
concrete flesh to it and influenced the formulation of property laws and the acquisition of land in North 
America.393 
 In contrast, and despite the environmental footprints that resulted from North American peoples’ 
sustained utilization of their natural habitats, uncultivated territory was persistently perceived by English 
priests, travelers, colonial administrators, and legal and political authors as a wilderness, and described 
in pejorative terms as empty, spacious, void, deserted, and waste.394 There was a psychological aspect to 
this negative representation of the environment. English settlers, who venerated the land they had 
reclaimed, feared untamed nature.395 This was related to their fear of ‘savage’ contamination from North 
American peoples who had allegedly degenerated due to the wild influence of their natural habitats.396 
There was then ample scope and a strong stimulus for the application of English industriousness to the 
improvement of the North American wilderness at the expense of North American peoples and polities. 
The occupation of vacant land was thus used in the seventeenth century to legitimize legal claims to the 
territories of North American peoples.397 
 The reception of the work of José de Acosta in the colony of Virginia, for example, gave theoretical 
ammunition to those who conceived North American societies as backward, and facilitated their 
assimilation to the North American environment.398 The Algonquin peoples of the Chesapeake, for 
instance, were placed in Acosta’s third category of barbarism and deprived of their natural resources and 
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land on the grounds that their savage mores and simple productive activities proved that they could not 
have possessions.399  
 As several colonial texts of the period reveal, the agricultural argument was an important instrument 
for the English appropriation of land previously owned by North Americans, especially during the 
beginning of the seventeenth century.400 In New England, for example, this was the case with the 
introduction of enclosed agriculture, alien to North American agricultural systems.401 The institution of 
private ownership had an important effect on how New England’s colonists perceived nature, as 
landscapes were mainly perceived as commodities.402 In Virginia, settlers also fenced off large tracts of 
land, seizing territories that erroneously seemed to them as not in use.403 
 But enclosed farms constituted just part of the tenure practices whereby Europeans appropriated land 
in North America. Of great relevance was also colonists’ common property: both ‘inner commons’ or 
common areas located in the tillage zone of a given community, and ‘outer commons’ or natural 
resources that were commonly owned in the area beyond local croplands.404 There was a clash of 
‘indigenous commons’ with ‘colonial commons’ throughout all American territory, including Spanish, 
English, and French areas. In fact, private and common property generally acted as complementary ways 
of managing natural resources and land in colonial North America.405 
 In time, as the English got the upper hand in North America, colonial officials gradually tended to 
recognize North Americans as true owners of the places they inhabited and used, even if they were not 
cultivated.406 Change of official policy contrasted with the attitude of colonists, and some colonial 
administrators—under the impetus of a growing population avid of land—did not hesitate to occupy 
uncultivated territories or grant them to settlers.407 Furthermore, even when purchase became the rule, 
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the agricultural argument indirectly influenced land acquisition. This was so because environmental 
degradation had negatively affected North Americans habitats.408 In the early stages of colonization 
colonial wars and the agricultural argument helped in transferring plenty of natural resources from North 
American to English hands. The accelerated depletion of those natural resources during those first stages 
of English settlement made the land less useful to North Americans, who eventually became more 
inclined to sell territories which no longer satisfied their food requirements.409 This notwithstanding, it 
is still worth bearing in mind that the appropriation of territory was not always a non-violent act.410 
 The agricultural argument, which rested on a particular European conception of humans’ relation with 
nature, property, and land, was a deficient intellectual tool for understanding the way in which North 
American peoples related to their natural habitats. Concretely, the English associated the concepts of 
occupation, use, and cultivation, as they all coincided in the English countryside. However, in North 
America, many groups used land that they did not occupy, and occupied land that they did not cultivate.411 
The difference of legal institutions reflected deeper divergences between the environmental practices of 
the North American pre-colonial population and the newcomers: whereas most North American nations 
shifted the areas they cultivated providing nature time to regenerate, in Europe the same agricultural 
lands were farmed year after year.412 
 Although the application of European institutions and legal criteria facilitated the appropriation of 
North American land, the straight use of European categories created a paradox. In Europe, land could 
be owned even if its proprietors decided not to cultivate it. How could Europeans justify the application 
of a different criterion in the case of North Americans’ lack of cultivation?413 The state of nature—a 
conceptual representation of life outside civil society, which applied to North Americans (but not to the 
settlers) and drew them into a backward state of social development—resolved this contradiction. 
According to English commentators, this state was characterized by the absence of a government able to 
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recognize and enforce contracts and property rights in uncultivated lands.414 Grotius, Locke, and Vattel 
also referred to the state of nature in their theories. As I seek to demonstrate in the next section, this 
concept enabled them to base the legal justification of land appropriation in North America on an 
apparently objective criterion of efficient use of natural resources while retaining the conviction of 
European superiority and reintroducing it into the body of the law of nations. 
 
Concluding remarks 
As Soto and Vitoria had previously done, Grotius, Locke, Vattel, and Pufendorf reconciled God’s 
mandate to subdue the earth with a private right of individuals to seize it and exploit it. But these later 
authors had a somewhat different understanding of what God’s mandate to subdue the Earth and render 
it fertile meant. The efficient transformation of natural habitats was not only intended to secure the 
products necessary for survival and a dignified social life. In the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, humanity’s power over material reality, derived from the institution of dominium rerum, was 
increasingly oriented toward personal enrichment, the attainment of which was believed to engender 
general social affluence.  
 The mission of transforming the world’s landscapes did not rest, for instance, upon the head of the 
family or the community at large. It was the individual, or rather the owner, who could sit assured at the 
apex of God’s creation. As a result, the exploitation of natural resources became progressively 
disassociated from the direct achievement of common social goals. This shift was facilitated by the fact 
that most intellectuals of the period reconciled personal affluence and social wellbeing, arguing that the 
individual accumulation of wealth benefited society at large.  
 In the context of colonial expansion, the introduction of common and private property rights placed 
innumerable natural resources of non-European territories in the hands of those who were less interested 
in their protection, or, rather, those who most profited from their exploitation. In this process nature was 
stripped of the multifaceted meanings that societies around the world—including European ones—had 
attached to natural habitats for millennia.415 In the incipiently global capitalist economy that propelled 
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social change in the colonies, nature’s significance was largely reduced to its consideration as a reservoir 
of commodities.  
 For the rising maritime empires of the time it was imperative to find legitimate legal grounds to 
establish settlements overseas. Trade and agriculture, two seemingly secular non-progressive legal 
theories, became the cornerstones of the Dutch and English colonial enterprises. In theory, they 
contributed to the ‘improvement of nature’ while increasing productivity and creating widespread 
affluence.416 In reality, economic humanitarianism hinged upon a tighter control and more unsustainable 
use of the natural realm. 
 Despite the apparent neutrality of the new legal standards, when applied to North America they retained 
a bias inherited from the Spanish legal tradition. For it was rather difficult for Europeans to let go of 
their belief in the cultural superiority of their own mores and economic practices. And, if the colonists 
were not to be perceived as mere exploiters, it was vital to associate their rule and the appropriation of 
natural resources with the progressive character of colonization. As we will see in the next chapter, the 
conviction about non-Europeans’ inferiority was articulated through the theory of the state of nature and 
conjectural history. The ideas and assumptions associated with these theories captured the imagination 
of legal and political scholars, providing a timely narrative of difference and progress that justified the 
subordination of colonial populations. As a result of this narrative, European superiority, which seemed 
in principle dissociated from legal theories of land acquisition exclusively based on the land’s objective 
condition, was reintroduced in the law of nations.   
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5  North Americans  Savagery: From the State of Nature to Stadial Theory 
 
 
 
 
 
In the beginning all the World was America.1 
 
 
The universalization of legal institutions that butressed the political economy of European imperialism 
during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, produced a tangible effect associated to the 
legitimization of the increasing worldwide extraction and exploitation of natural resources. Trade and 
agriculture, for example, functioned as legal standards that validated European commercial presence in 
the East Indies and the establishment of settlements in North America. The profitable establishment of 
plantations and the exchange of natural products (turned commodities) provided an economic incentive 
to transform nature.  
 But the law of nations affected nature at a deeper, conceptual level. The capacity to master natural 
habitats became part of a universal standard of social ordering, whereby European nations arrogated a 
role as improvers of other—inferior—societies and their ‘wild’ environments. The conceptual 
appropriation of nature was possible through the development of an ideological justification whereby 
idle natural resources in non-European territories ought to be transferred from backward non-Europeans 
unable to efficiently exploit them to advanced Europeans capable of creating civilization out of 
wilderness.  
 As this chapter will show, the material and conceptual way in which the law of nations helped the 
appropriation of non-Europeans’ natural environments became fused. The articulation of North 
Americans’ cultural inferiority through a standard of environmental exploitation gave an almost 
irresistible force to the economic institutions that informed that standard. In stadial theory, private 
property and trade were presented as constituent elements of the highest stages of social advancement. 
As a result, the imposition of the particular European economic arrangements that bolstered capital 
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accumulation seemed to be part of a larger necessary process oriented to the achievement of cosmopolitan 
progress.  
 The consolidation of these ideas was the result of centuries of speculation about non-European peoples’ 
use of natural ecosystems. The idea that some Latin American non-European societies were unable to 
master their surroundings was present in descriptions of colonial populations since the sixteenth 
century—it could be already found in the writings of influential scholastics such as Vitoria and Las Casas. 
For the Jesuit José de Acosta, all Latin American societies, excluding the advanced Mexica and Inca 
Empires, lacked that capacity. At the beginning of the eighteenth century, the Jesuit Lafitau continued 
Acosta’s line of enquiry, focusing exclusively on the study of North American pre-colonial societies. 
Important as these reflections were as sources of ethnological knowledge, the analysis of Acosta and the 
conclusions derived from it were superseded by other more influential conceptual ways of representing 
the alleged non-European backwardness.  
 The idea of the state of nature and social evolution captured the European imagination. Contractarian 
theories that explained the origin of civil society functioned by creating an antithetical state to the 
condition of civility. In the context of European imperialism, this state, known as the state of nature, 
transmuted its hypothetical nature into reality, capturing the pre-social condition of non-European 
peoples and, thus, the wild condition of their natural habitats. Eventually, a more sophisticated and 
explanatory theory of socio-economic change replaced the state of nature as the most accurate 
description of these societies. Trying to discover the universal economic norms that helped societies 
climb the ladder of progress, the historical and conjectural theories of Enlightenment intellectuals helped 
to better conceptualize non-Europeans and to explain the relationship between their societies and the 
natural habitats in which they lived.  
 The image of the state of nature and stadial theory provided the theoretical vocabulary to assimilate 
‘savage’ North American peoples with their ‘wild’ environment, making the conquest and 
transformation of both an intertwined imperialist project. For most European thinkers and colonists the 
transition from a natural existence into a full, sophisticated social life in North America was only 
attainable through industry, technology, and goal-oriented toil. These distinctive elements, marks of 
European pedigree, were irrefutable proof of environmental mastery and the grandeur of nations that 
had gradually but assertively proved in practice their theoretical—as theorized by European 
intellectuals—supremacy over the non-European polities and natural habitats that came under their 
sway. Once within their power, Europeans could guide non-European humanity toward what they 
219 
 
thought and believed was a better life and, in so doing, transform non-European nature according to 
those high parameters of progress.  
 
The ‘state of nature’ and North Americans’ savagery  
One aspect of the colonial rivalry between the emergent Dutch and English empires and the older Spanish 
and Portuguese empires was the portrayal of one’s own imperial venture as a more benign undertaking 
than that of rival powers.2 In that vein, the Dutch criticized the excesses of the Portuguese (by then under 
the Spanish Crown) in the East Indies as part of a propaganda strategy to legitimize their seizing of the 
Portuguese commercial monopoly. The English, realizing that while Spanish imperial power was 
diminishing that of the Dutch was on the rise, sought to vilify the violent mercantile expansion of the 
Portuguese and Dutch while celebrating their own peaceful dealings with Asian rulers.3 
 From the outset of their presence in North America, the English and Dutch dissociated themselves from 
the black legend of Spanish imperialism and the dubious religious grounds whereby the Spanish had 
justified the conquest of America and its peoples. Invoking their own previous condition as colonial 
subjects, the Dutch presented themselves as equals to and liberators of the Americans, and claimed that 
the latter had been subjected to the tyranny of the archenemy of the Dutch: the Habsburg.  Based on an 
anti-imperialist agenda, Dutch expansion in the Atlantic was a belligerent move to counter the Habsburg 
aspiration to universal monarchy and world supremacy.4 
 In the case of the English, gentle imperialism was not the only reason to search for a new legal approach 
to North America. Practical considerations recommended basing their presence and power in North 
America neither on conquest nor evangelization. While both titles might have legitimized English 
sovereignty, neither of them constituted an appropriate basis for claiming access to the land.5 
Dispossessing the barbarians based on conquest or evangelization was precisely what the English had 
criticized about Spain’s imperialism in America. But the land question was pressing in North America 
and could not simply be set aside. Due to the lack of precious minerals in the English colonies, 
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agricultural land and exportable natural resources were vital for the new colonial economy.6 If it was to 
succeed, the English settlement scheme in North America had to be based on individual farms, 
commercial agriculture, and transcontinental trade. It was then crucial to find a novel legal criterion that 
would afford direct access to the land and the natural wealth of America.  
 Considering this colonial context and the centrality of landed property, it seems natural that seventeenth 
century Protestant natural lawyers rejected the dissemination of Christianity as a valid ground for 
colonization, and searched for further justifications. They thus exposed religious motives as a mere 
pretext for their rival’s subjugation of non-European populations. Grotius, for example, denied the 
applicability of the right of discovery to those who ‘hold wrong views about God’.7 Similarly, Wolff 
noted that it was contrary to the law of nations to subdue another nation for the purpose of 
evangelization.8 
 But not all Protestant lawyers criticized the doctrines of the Spanish scholastics. Grotius, for instance, 
invoked Vitoria as an authoritative anti-colonial voice, to denounce the dissemination of civilization as 
the gentle façade of Empire. He asserted that ‘[t]o wish to impose civilization upon uncivilized peoples 
is a pretext which may serve to conceal greed for what is another’s’.9 Pufendorf made a diametrically 
opposed reading of Vitoria’s ius gentium, thus adopting a less lenient approach to his theories. He claimed 
that Vitoria’s universalism served an imperial agenda, as Spanish rights under the law of nations were 
used to subject ‘the Indians’ to Spanish power.10 He was particularly disapproving of cosmopolitan 
justifications such as those based on natural society and communication.11 In a similar vein, Vattel 
condemned as unjust the Spanish conquest of the civilized Mexica and Inca empires.12 
 By rejecting conquest and presenting themselves instead as a commercial and agricultural nation in 
North America, the English tried to prove that their own rule was morally superior to that of the Spanish.13 
In this sense, Locke’s defense of trade and agriculture—the so-called agricultural argument—became 
one of the main ideological bases for English imperialism.14 Even when conquest was undertaken by 
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force, as in the case of Virginia, settlers liked to think of themselves as 'improvers' of the land, protesting 
that they were anything but conquerors.15 
 To be sure, whereas at the level of rhetoric the defense of cultivation as a superior model of land 
production was presented as a more legitimate ground for power than the evangelizing mission, in 
practice its defense served the economic interests of the metropolis. In turn, the power of the vocabulary 
of improvement concretely contributed to the dynamic of occupation and colonization: the argument that 
agriculture would naturally create prosperity in the North American colonies encouraged the expansion 
of farms and plantations. 
 Besides, the English claimed that North American peoples, who wanted to prevent the risk of Spanish 
conquest and enslavement, had welcomed them.16 In compensation for offering to share their extensive 
territories, the peoples of North America could enjoy the economic development generated around the 
first English settlements.17 Still, the apparent objectivity and neutrality of the English and Dutch legal 
justifications created a conundrum. How could they reconcile the legitimacy of the agricultural argument 
and the supposedly fair treatment of North American peoples with the conviction—widely shared by 
colonial administrators, scholars, and settlers—of the latter’s inferiority?18  
 Grotius, Locke, and Vattel resolved this problem by justifying the acquisition of property and 
sovereignty in North America by ridding their theories of the standard religious and other culturally 
subjective categories, yet later reintroducing them through recourse to the concept of the state of nature. 
The state of nature, in its ‘modern’ use, was part of social contract theory elaborated by post-scholastic 
natural lawyers in Northwest Europe during the seventeenth century.19 The division of European polities 
along confessional lines encouraged post-Reformation intellectuals to search for a non-transcendental 
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legitimization of political power. The metaphysical character of scholastic natural law made it amenable 
to the interests of the Catholic Church, threatening the sovereignty of Protestant states.20 
 The state of nature was a metaphor used in political philosophy to describe a state of affairs 
characterized by the absence of civil society and political authority. For instance, Hobbes, one of the 
most influential contractarians, argued that because individual security and material well-being were 
compromised in the state of nature individuals had to join to form civil societies by pact, delegating 
political power to a sovereign ruler. In a period marked by severe religious confrontation and violence, 
natural law theorists found in the hypothetical condition of the state of nature and the social contract 
thereof a solid theoretical foundation for a robust state that would guarantee security in a Protestant 
society.21 
 The desacralization of sovereignty and the guarantee of security did not exhaust the implications of the 
state of nature. Projected into non-European territories the state of nature represented as well a backward 
conception of the good life that had to be transcended. In the state of nature material life was 
characterized by extreme simplicity. This state of backwardness could not be transcended without a civil 
society with a vibrant economic life that generated prosperity and material abundance.  
 In this sense, the state of nature could be contrasted to the state of society (incarnated by the mores, 
arts, and industry of European Protestant nations) which was equated with advancement and refinement. 
Even if the state of nature was described in positive terms, civility was always preferable. As Pufendorf 
noted, it was not ‘likely that the human race, even though free from sin, would have remained for all time 
within the limits of a single garden, subsisting on the fruits furnished by nature, without advancing in 
civilization through industry and the inventions of art’.22 
 The ‘material dimension’ of the state of nature was not mere conjecture. Its conceptual value (as a 
contrast to the advantages of living in society) was also used as a powerful image of reality. As imperial 
powers continued expanding, European intellectuals actually adopted the idea of the state of nature 
coupled with a progressive lens to describe how the non-European world (particularly North America) 
truly was, and how colonial populations could be understood and disciplined. For most natural lawyers, 
such as Grotius, Locke, and Vattel, the state of nature described the way in which the peoples of North 
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America lived at the time of European occupation. Grotius never explicitly used the term, but described 
a situation akin to it: 
 
This primitive state might have lasted if men had continued in great simplicity, or had lived on terms of mutual 
affection such as rarely appears. Of these two conditions, one, exemplified in the community of property arising 
from extreme simplicity, may be seen among certain tribes in America, which have lived for many generations in 
such condition without inconvenience.23 
 
Grotius characterized the primitive state of certain North American groups as one of utopian 
benevolence. Even so, the worth of such life was not attributable to the moral quality of those ‘tribes in 
America’ who lived in that condition. On the contrary, absence of conflict was the result of ‘ignorance 
of vices rather than knowledge of virtue’.24 This notwithstanding, humanity did not remain under that 
order eternally. Eventually, humans abandoned their primitive life by turning ‘their thoughts to various 
kinds of knowledge’.25 Once social development was set in motion, ambition pushed individuals to divide 
everything they possessed. Afterwards, they gathered to form countries.26 It was from this perspective 
that the communities of North America had failed to achieve the higher stages of human development.  
 For Grotius, the desire for material and moral progress compelled humanity to leave a stage 
characterized by inherent primitivism. That is to say, ‘men were not content to feed on the spontaneous 
products of the earth, to dwell in caves, to have the body either naked or clothed with the bark of trees or 
skins of wild animals’.27 Instead, ‘they chose a more refined mode of life’ which ‘gave rise to industry’.28 
Once humans decided to apply their industry to the modification of their surroundings, material 
prosperity increased.  
 Similar to Grotius, Pufendorf did not mention North American peoples as example of barbarism and 
simplicity, but his description of these states matched the common features associated with North 
American peoples at that historical time. It is still worth noticing that Pufendorf acknowledged that 
different political communities could change from a regime of common to private property at their own 
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convenience. He affirmed that ‘backward peoples’ did not violate natural law even in cases where they 
retained several of the features associated with primitive community.29 
 Locke explicitly referred to the state of nature in his work. Even though he never actually placed 
America or its inhabitants in that state, his affirmation ‘Thus in the beginning all the World was America, 
and more so than that is now’30 had the same effect.31 Moreover, in the chapter ‘Of Property’ of the Two 
Treatises of Government he drew a clear-cut distinction between the ‘Indian’ who hunts his deer and 
‘those who are counted the Civilized part of Mankind’.32 Locke placed North Americans in inferior 
position vis-à-vis European nations. He had no doubt about the superior environmental mastery of the 
English nation. They had achieved a more sophisticated life than the Americans by applying effort and 
industry to the modification of nature: 
 
There cannot be a clearer demonstration of anything, than several Nations of the Americans are of this, who are 
rich in Land, and poor in all the Comforts of Life; whom Nature having furnished as liberally as any other people, 
with the materials of Plenty, i.e a fruitful Soil, apt to produce in abundance, what might serve for food, raiment, 
and delight; yet for want of improving it by labor, have not one hundredth part of the Conveniences we enjoy.33 
 
Locke traced North Americans’ poverty back to their laziness. The lack of material prosperity 
comparable to European states was not the result of the deficiency of their natural habitats. In fact, they 
inhabited rather fertile and abundant territories. According to Locke, their lack of material progress 
merely derived from their lack of any desire to improve their natural habitats by exploiting their 
economic potential. This explained why God had given the Earth to the ‘Industrious and Rational’ 
‘men’34, represented by the English and their superior material culture.  
 In contrast to the simple material life of North Americans, English economic prosperity had helped 
lift the standard of living for the whole English nation. The benefits of individual wealth accumulation 
had spread to society at large. It was not surprising, then, that even the North American nobility could 
not match the living conditions of the lower classes of English society. Locke was sure that the noblest 
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and richest chief of any polity in North America lived worse than a mere ‘day Laborer’ in England.35 
In Locke’s view, this cross-social and cross-class comparison of status was a definite proof of the 
economic benefits of modern European society compared with more backward ones. 
 Equating the advancement of civil society with the systematic application of industry in order to 
modify nature meant that, in order to transcend the state of nature and promote social progress, natural 
resources had to be thoroughly exploited. According to Aravamunda, Locke believed that ‘out of the 
process of mastering nature arises society, and from society, government’.36 
 In principle, North Americans could follow the path outlined by the English. They were welcome to 
adopt a sedentary life and cultivate both the land and the qualities that English valued.37 Once they had 
embraced English education and culture they could have a share in God’s gift.38 That meant, 
paradoxically, possessing the land and enjoying the natural resources that had once been their own.  
 For Wolff, civilized and cultured nations represented the ideal to which barbarous nations should 
aspire.39 His reasoning for this differentiation was typical of Enlightenment thinking. The divergence 
between these two types of nations rested on the cultivation (or lack of) of intellectual virtues.40 The gap 
between both groups of nations had significant practical repercussions as only civilized could participate 
in the creation of the law of nations.41 The hierarchical ordering of civilized and barbarous nations did 
not exhaust Wolff’s attempt to make sense of cultural difference in the colonial encounter. He introduced 
a third category that he termed ‘separate families’, in which he included North Americans. Wolff did not 
portray them as living in the state of nature, but nonetheless he denied them civil sovereignty and the 
status of a nation, and hence the rights and duties that nations enjoyed.42 
                                                 
35 Ibid., §41 315. 
36 Srinivas Aravamudan, ‘Hobbes and America’ in D. Carey and L. Festa (eds.), The Post-Colonial Enlightenment: 
Eighteenth-Century Colonialism and Postcolonial Theory (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2009) 37-70, 39. 
37 Arneil, ‘The Wild Indian’s Venison’, 67. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Wolff, Jus Gentium, Ch I §52-54 33-35. He defined a cultured nation as ‘a nation which cultivates intellectual virtues, 
consequently desires to perfect the intellect, and therefore develops the mind by training’. A civilized nation was that which 
had ‘civilized usages or usages which conform to the standard of reason and politieness’. Ibid., Ch I §53 34. 
40 Ibid.  
41 Wolff argued that the will of all the nations was tantamount to that which seemed best to the majority. But as in practice 
a gathering of all nations was not possible, what counted was then that which the most civilized nations had in exercise of 
right reason decided. Ibid., Prolegomena §20 17. 
42 Ibid., Ch III §309 157 and §311 159. 
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 In Wolff’s legal framework, the peoples of North America were excluded from what he called the 
supreme state, which was formed by the aggregation of all the world’s nations.43 Consequently, they 
were also excluded from the law that existed between those nations. This denial of international agency 
occurred precisely at the time when it was most necessary, as the arrival of the newcomers threatened 
North American societies, putting their way of living in jeopardy.  
 In practice, a lack of participation signified that they could not influence colonial debates on the legal 
title for land acquisition. The lack of international legal status within the family of nations had deleterious 
consequences because, as Banner reminds us, the law and its hidden structural violence played a 
paramount role in the colonization of North America:  
 
The story of the colonization of the United States is still a story of power, but it was a more subtle and complex 
kind of power than we conventionally recognize. It was the power to establish the legal institutions and the rules 
by which land transactions would be enforced. The threat of physical force would always be present, but most of 
the time it could be kept out of view because it was not needed.44 
 
Still, we should bear in mind that in spite of Wolff’s civilized-uncivilized distinction and his conviction 
that ‘separate families’ could not be regarded as nations, he avoided the kind of rationale that most 
European powers used to submit colonial populations. In a long argumentation on whether ‘separate 
families can be subjected to civil sovereignty’ he concluded that liberty could not be taken away from 
‘those who are unwilling’ to enter civility, and that ‘the desire to promote the perfection of another’ gives 
‘no right to compel him to allow that to be done by you’.45 This was an important corrective to 
imperialistic claims based on the superiority of European mores. Even environmental mastery could not 
be used as an excuse to advance European interest in America. No right of occupation was created for 
foreign nations just because they could exploit nature more efficiently than separate families.46 But, that 
said, Wolff’s ambiguity resurfaced once again, introducing a caveat to his opposition to a standard of 
environmental superiority. His conclusion that Europeans did not have a right to occupy the land that 
                                                 
43 Drawing a comparison between individuals and nations, Wolff argued that nations living in the state of nature combined 
in a supreme state in much the same way as individuals living in the state of nature combined to form a nation. In the state of 
nature the law of nations applies, and this is what forms the necessary law of nations. Ibid., Prolegomena, §1 9-§10 13. 
44 Banner, How the Indians Lost Their Lands, 6.  
45 Wolff, Jus Gentium, §313 159-160. 
46 Ibid.  
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belonged to North American peoples due to their superior mastery over nature applied only as long as 
the land did ‘not remain uncultivated’.47 
 Vattel argued along similar lines as Grotius, Pufendorf, and Locke, by theorizing the state of nature 
as the primitive community of ownership at the dawn of humanity.48 North Americans, he believed, 
had remained in that condition without evolving. This was evident because they still made their living 
from hunting and ‘their flocks’.49 That type of life belonged to an ancient era, to ‘the first age of the 
world’. Therefore, it had to be substituted with the practice of other nations, more ‘industrious’ and too 
‘confined’ in their small European territories.50 Following Locke, Vattel affirmed that Americans lived 
an ‘idle mode of life’.51 For this reason ‘the savages tribes of North America had no right to keep for 
themselves the whole of that vast continent’, and others could thus settle there without injustice.52 In 
contrast with the ‘savages’, the distinctive features of advanced nations were the arts and sciences. 
These were supreme activities, which could only be criticized by the friends of barbarism.53 
 The application of the concept of the state of nature to define the reality of North American polities 
downgraded their environmental, economic, social, cultural, and political achievements. Its ‘colonial’ 
use constituted one of the ‘defining exclusions’54 through which the Other and the self were constituted 
in the era of development of the law of nations. 
 Many other commentators shared similar views. For instance, Hobbes, one of the earliest formulators 
of the concept, had no scruples in affirming that the peoples of North America still lived in a ‘brutish 
manner’.55 Their primitiveness compelled European nations to plant colonists on the other side of the 
Atlantic, forcing North Americans to abandon their nomadic life and settle to cultivate a little of land.56 
In his book De Cive he distinguished (in an illustration) between the state of Dominium, which 
corresponded to European agricultural landscapes, and the state of Libertas, which represented North 
Americans’ reality as one characterized by hunting, scarce cultivation, and savagery.57 Montesquieu 
                                                 
47 Ibid.  
48 Vattel, The Law of Nations, Bk II Ch IX §117 149. See also Ibid., Bk I Ch XVIII §203 84. 
49 Ibid., Bk I Ch VII §81 38. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid., Bk II Ch VII §97 143. Vattel used the word ‘savage’, the common way in which Enlightenment intellectuals referred 
to North Americans. 
53 Ibid., Bk I Ch XI §113 48. 
54 I have borrowed the term from Pahuja. See Pahuja, ‘The Postcoloniality’ 461.  
55 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991) 90. 
56 Ibid., 89. This view accommodated Hobbes’ personal interests as a Virginian landowner. See Tuck, The Rights, 128. 
57 Ibid., 137. The full implications of Hobbes ideas are explored in-depth in Aravamudan, ‘Hobbes’. 
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agreed that only those who cultivated the land were able to form a great nation.58 For the same reason, 
he described hunters and shepherds as savages and barbarous, unable to form a prosperous nation. He 
also situated that type of backward human beings in the continent of America. 
 The use of the state of nature as a criterion to describe the degree of advancement of different societies 
was based on the conceptual assimilation of non-European populations to their environment. North 
American savages fused with the wilderness they inhabited. This analogy is exemplified by Wolff’s use 
of the term ‘uncultivated' to refer alternatively to the culturally backward condition of people as well as 
to the wild state of the environment.59 Similarly, Locke defined nature, undomesticated animals (beasts), 
and ‘Indians’ as ‘wild’.60 Canup has underlined New England colonists’ tendency to regard American 
peoples as the human face of American wilderness’,61 a wilderness that had to be extirpated from North 
America before civilization could ever flourish. So, the colonial agenda of European imperial powers in 
North America was in part justified by one and the same objective of transcending wilderness through 
the exploitation of nature. Human domination over nature as prescribed by God became indistinguishable 
from the domination of inferior peoples like the peoples of North America, who by lack of will or 
capacity still merged with nature.  
 
An early account of progressive history: North Americans in the eyes of Lafitau 
The opposition between the state of nature and civility entailed a distinction between two conditions that 
represented the lower- and higher-most forms of social life. Whereas the former—incarnated by the 
peoples of North America—was characterized by human simplicity and proximity to nature, the latter—
personified by European colonists—implied human sophistication and ascendancy over nature. The 
superiority of the social over the natural sphere was a definite feature of a refined life. But the existence 
of two static states at both ends of the spectrum did not per se explain how humanity—or rather part of 
it—had evolved from a backward social condition to a more complex one.  
                                                 
58 Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, Bk 18 Ch 10 290. 
59 For the application of the term as a measuring stick of human development, see Wolff, Jus Gentium, Ch I §52 33-34. For 
its use to characterise the environment, see (among others) Ibid., Ch III §279 142. Pufendorf also used the term ‘uncultivated’ 
to refer to people that were regarded as socially undeveloped. See Pudendorf, De Iure Naturae, Bk III Ch III §9 363. 
60 Locke explicitly used the expression ‘wild Indian’ (italics in the original). See Locke, Two Treatises, Bk II Ch V §26 305. 
He also referred to nature as the ‘vast Wilderness of the Earth’, Ibid., §36 311. 
61 Canup, Out of the Wilderness, 62. Canup tells how the whole English colonization of New England is marked by the 
anxiety of escaping savagery. In this context, the preservation of English civility was linked to the taming of American nature.  
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 During the Spanish colonization, Christianity had provided the vocabulary of an evangelical mission 
that, together with conversion, allowed it to bridge the material gap that according to Spanish scholars 
separated American commonwealths from European nations. Bartolomé de Las Casas and José de 
Acosta, for instance, associated Americans’ conversion to Catholicism with the transition toward more 
advanced social forms. However, the explicit use of religious categories as a standard for social 
improvement in the colonial context was discredited and, hence, it was no longer a viable option for 
Protestant natural lawyers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.  
 How could, then, European intellectuals conceive the relationship between European and non-
European communities in a progressive fashion without recourse to such a vocabulary? Was there a 
secular vocabulary through which they could theorize the path needed to elevate their colonial subjects 
from the abject condition in which they found them?  
 In addition, the classical theory of the state of nature was affected by a major shortcoming. It tended to 
present the state of nature/civility opposition as exceedingly static, lacking a powerful explanation of 
how colonial populations could be lifted from their backward condition. There was a need for a road map 
to social change, for a dynamic narrative of social amelioration that explained the intermediate steps 
necessary for the transition from the state of nature to civility.  
 Already in the sixteenth century Bartolomé de Las Casas had hinted at such a narrative of social 
advancement in his Apologética Historia Summaria. By comparing American polities to great 
civilizations such as the Greeks and Romans, he intimated that American commonwealths were more 
complex than Spanish commentators usually conceded.62 But, in addition, these comparisons meant that 
while the historical gap that separated Spanish and American commonwealths left the latter’s potential 
for social development intact, it also implied that they lagged behind. In his Historia Natural de las 
Indias, the Spanish Jesuit José de Acosta distinguished different degrees of barbarism in America, and 
explained how American societies had climbed from backwardness to a more refined social life.63 For 
both Las Casas and Acosta the comparison between different commonwealths and the delineation of 
certain stages of social development were also a way to make sense of the diversity that existed among 
the numerous (some more ‘developed’, some less ‘developed’) American polities.  
 During the siècle des lumières the French Jesuit Joseph François Lafitau (1681-1746) continued the 
genre of early ‘comparative ethnology’ in the tradition of its Catholic forerunners. His approach was 
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closer to Las Casas, as he compared the customs of the ‘American Indians’ with those of antiquity in his 
early eighteenth-century opus Mœurs des Sauvages Amériquains, Comparées aux mœurs des Premiers 
Temps.64 The main purpose of his anthropological study of North American peoples was to demonstrate 
the existence of common religious roots that united humanity. But, as in the case of Las Casas, the 
comparison between nations past and present underlined North Americans’ primitiveness. Life in 
America seemed to have almost frozen, evolving under the slower rhythm of a sluggish historical clock. 
 As in the cases of Las Casas and Acosta, Lafitau’s study of North American peoples, the Iroquois and 
Hurons in particular, was oriented towards the missionary objective of ‘spiritual salvation’ of the 
‘barbarians’.65 This entailed, in his own words, the effort of bringing ‘Indian mores … into conformity 
with the laws of Jesus Christ’.66 By showing that North American peoples had religion, customs, and 
worshiped a divinity, he could provide a theoretical basis for evangelization. However, more than the 
issue of salvation, he was interested in countering the trends of theism, atheism, and libertine thinking in 
the France of his time.67 By showing that non-European nations such as the Mohawks, Iroquois, and 
Huron had a notion of God, he could actually prove the universality of the human religious impulse.68 
Lafitau believed that no nation was ‘so barbarous as to have no religion or sanctioned customs’.69 
Furthermore, he proved that the Indians had a notion of the Flood, which demonstrated that the human 
race had a common origin and that, as descendants from Adam, the peoples of America were fit to receive 
the Gospel.70 
 In his depiction of the peoples of North America, Lafitau tried to strike a balance between their positive 
and negative images. First, he rejected the idea of the ‘bad savage’; that of a ‘gross, stupid, ignorant and 
fierce’ creature almost devoid of reason.71 North American peoples had a number of positive qualities; 
                                                 
64 I have used the English translation of the text. Father Joseph Francoius Lafitau, Customs of the American Indians 
Compared with the Customs of Primitive Times, edited and translated by William N Fenton and Elisabeth L. Moore (Toronto, 
The Champlain Society, 1974). 
65 Lafitau knew Acosta’s work well. He cites it at Ibid., Vol I, Ch I 31. 
66 Ibid., 41.  
67 See Mary Baine Campbell, ‘The Dreaming Body: Cartesian Psychology, Enlightenment Anthropology, and the Jesuits in 
Nouvelle France’ in Larry Wolff and Marco Cipolloni (eds.), The Anthropology of the Enlightenment (Standford, Standford 
University Press, 2007) 239-251, 246. 
68 Lafitau, Customs of the American Indians, Vol I, Ch I 29 and 35.  
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70 Ibid., Vol I Ch II 86.  
71 Ibid., Vol I Ch III 90.  
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they even surpassed the achievements of Europeans in certain spheres of life.72 But, Lafitau also claimed, 
there was a dark side of North Americans that revealed their laziness, cruelty, brutality, and viciousness.73 
 Lafitau maintained that in addition to these personal negative traits, North Americans were also 
impaired by collective deficiencies. The main one, he said, was their rudimentary material life. They had 
not developed the arts that had helped Europeans attain a more refined life. For the pious Father Lafitau 
there was always a positive side of Americans’ simplicity, related to the absence of the vices that 
stemmed from ‘luxury and abundance’.74 Still, North Americans’ simplicity seemed to have exceeded 
the limits of frugality for the wrong reasons. It was not their devotion but their laziness that deprived 
them of the comfort of an easy life. Lafitau complained that even long after contact with the Europeans 
they had not yet acquired the material improvements, which would have made their lives easier.75 
 As with Acosta, part of Lafitau’s work revolved around the question of how America was populated. 
He explained this phenomenon by reference to successive waves of migration. The first peoples of the 
world, especially those who hunted, gathered, and fished, needed to relocate as soon as their number 
increased.76 This was so because they were nomadic. They practiced neither agriculture nor herding, thus 
needing vast expanses of land to satisfy their basic needs.77 In contrast, groups that eventually settled and 
lived from cultivation enjoyed a more comfortable life. Still, the rudimentary nature of their methods 
caused soil exhaustion, forcing them again to relocate. Therefore, for Lafitau, the effort to make the Earth 
more productive explained ‘the origin of colonies’.78 
 In the opinion of the French Jesuit North America had been populated throughout different periods of 
migration. As part of this process, the most ‘primitive and uncultivated’ groups were pushed by the most 
‘civilized … inhabitants of Peru and Mexico’ to the shores of the North Sea.79 He gave a familiar 
explanation of the material simplicity that characterized most American commonwealths. Ignorance of 
the most rudimentary arts, like the use of fire to modify their surroundings, was a product of their 
‘laziness and indolence’.80 Had they not been reluctant to undertake too much work, they could have 
advanced in material comfort, following in the footsteps of their more socially advanced neighbors.81 
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 According to Lafitau, hunting and fishing were the main productive activities of the peoples of 
America. They were the sources of provision, clothing, and the fur trade. But they also conveyed a sense 
of primitiveness. According to Lafitau: ‘hunting and fishing were, so to speak, the first occupations of 
the first men whom necessity forced to live in the forests with which the earth was then bristling or on 
the shores of rivers and the sea.’82 By reference to a particular set of productive activities, Lafitau created 
a conceptual temporal line that united North Americans with the ancestors of humankind. In addition, 
there was something else that they shared: their ignorance of the true faith. Due to their misguided 
imagination, North Americans, like certain peoples in antiquity, had turned natural elements like rivers, 
lakes, and fountains (using Lafitau’s examples) into deities.83 
 Lafitau’s work contained only sketchy references to progressive history. He associated different 
productive activities to different degrees of social complexity, and compared North Americans with the 
peoples of so-called ‘primitive times’. But he did not give a comprehensive explanation of the laws that 
stimulated socio-economic historical development. The strength of his treatise lay instead in the detailed 
study of North American society and the ethnographic material he provided thereof, which turned out to 
be useful to Enlightenment intellectuals, rulers, and colonial administrators. Adam Smith (1723-1790), 
for instance, used Lafitau’s anthropological study of North American societies to ground his economic 
theory on the empirical observation of backward societies.84 But Lafitau’s work lacked the kind of 
teleology that would have made his work theoretically relevant in the second half of the eighteenth 
century, a period in which the theories of natural lawyers and philosophers were oriented toward the 
exploration of general rules of socio-economic change that were conductive to the wealth of nations.  
Progressive history: toward stadialism 
Following in the footsteps of Isaac Newton (1642-1727)—who had ‘discovered’ the rules of the physical 
world—Enlightenment intellectuals attempted to unveil the universal rules that governed social 
improvement on a planetary scale. From this progressive perspective, all the world societies were 
considered to have evolved following certain universal parameters. Lafitau’s work had little to say on 
the question of the social progress of humanity. There was another shortcoming in the kind of 
ethnographic work that he undertook. Even though he was less interested than his Catholic forerunners 
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in the evangelization of North American peoples, there was still a clear religious ring to his writings. 
There was still no social theorizing outside the theological framework.  
 A more elaborate progressive narrative could be found in the writings of some Protestant natural 
lawyers during the seventeenth century. In the doctrines of authors such as Grotius, Locke, and 
Pufendorf, there was a—not yet fully developed—association of productive forces, private property, and 
social improvement.85 Different modes of production that corresponded to different social stages were 
hierarchically ordered in regards to their conduciveness to the creation of private property rights. 
 Already in De Iure Praedae Grotius identified different stages in the development of private property 
related to different forms of production. First, the satisfaction of basic needs such as food and clothing 
fostered pastoralism and agriculture, making necessary the extension of the institution of dominium 
proprietatis from movable to immovable things.86 Commerce appeared at ‘a subsequence stage in the 
evolution of property’.87 But Grotius left unexplained the sort of dynamic that drove the transition away 
from pastoralism and agriculture.  
 In the De Iure Belli he filled this gap, linking the change in property regime to the desire for material 
amelioration. ‘Men were not content to feed on the spontaneous products of the Earth’, Grotius 
contended.88 Gathering was the basis of a simple type of life that was no longer satisfactory; the 
perfection of society required a change in the way natural resources were used. So, taking possession of 
land and making it productive through human industry contributed to ‘the advantage of life’.89 The 
increase in human population provided a further stimulus to divide the Earth. In Grotius’ biblically-
inspired account of the origin and development of private property there was a logical correlation 
between material production, social development, and the privatization of natural resources.  
 Pufendorf concurred with Grotius (and also cited him) on the reasons for the transition from common 
to private property.90 Not unlike Grotius, he saw a correlation between human industry and progress 
conceived as material refinement. He agreed with those who believed that:  
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We should bear in mind the disposition of unlettered and agricultural peoples, which is so clearly inclined to ease 
and sluggishness, and averse to labor. And that the more unrefined and simple the life of any people, the less place 
they hold, while a richer and more refined manner of life requires great industry and extended endeavor.91 
 
The increasing sophistication of social life required holding ‘more place’ and applying effort to its 
modification. The exploitation of natural resources provided societies with the conveniences necessary 
for a better life. In a later passage Pufendorf reiterated this idea, by affirming that ‘the nature of man’s 
mind show clearly enough that among a great number of men, who are undertaking to advance life by 
various arts, a quiet and decorous society cannot exist without distinct dominions of things’.92 In addition 
to creating prosperity these private dominions were to serve a higher cosmopolitan goal, as they provided 
the legal foundation for a more efficient system of production that deactivated the ‘bomb’ of population 
growth. The Earth could not have sustained its population without ‘cultivation and improvement’ based 
on land property.93 
 In Pufendorf’s account of the change in property regime, the private appropriation of nature and its 
exploitation marked a first step toward progress. But there was one further step in the transition from a 
simple to a refined life. Commerce had to evolve from barter, or the exchange of goods, to monetized 
markets. The desire for luxuries had made markets grow from a local and national ambit to a 
transcontinental sphere of operations. This shift was notorious ‘in civilized states where citizens are 
divided in different social orders’.94 At the other end of the spectrum were ‘those nations which are 
unacquainted with the use of currency’, nations that, according to Pufendorf, had ‘no part in the advances 
of civilization’.95 One concrete example of the type of advances he was referring to was the decision of 
the nations ‘which have enjoyed a higher level of culture, to set by agreement an eminent price on a 
particular thing’.96 
 For Pufendorf commerce was the foremost driver of economic life and, hence, a notable vehicle for a 
‘more civilized and rich life’.97 The increase in the complexity and refinement of social life was related 
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to the emergence of cities and markets, rather than due to the adoption of any specific political form by 
a certain social community. 
 Thus, the progressive histories of Pufendorf and other seventeenth-century natural lawyers articulated 
the theoretical threads that could be found, in a more developed manner, in later authors who expounded 
a stadial theory of social development that linked progress and material production.  
 To be sure, precedents of the stadial theory could already be found in ancient times. For instance, in 
the work of Dicaearchus, a disciple of Aristotle, he elaborated a three-stage theory of social improvement 
related to different productive activities.98 For that purpose, he drew on Aristotle’s description of the 
various ways of life that humans had historically adopted.99 
 Yet stadial theory, in its most elaborated version, was very much a product of the eighteenth century. 
At that stage, the insecurity originating from the Wars of Religion had largely receded, and the 
improvement of human life through economic activity in England and France had gained central stage in 
the theories of Enlightenment intellectuals. The economic trajectory of the most advanced European 
societies became the focus of intellectual attention. The most prominent European thinkers of the time 
set themselves the task of discovering the natural laws that governed the creation of wealth so as to 
promote, question, or criticize their nation’s international standing and/or grandeur, or to provide an 
explanation of international life grounded in political economy.  
 The Swiss man Emer de Vattel was one of the writers who contributed to this discourse, attempting to 
make sense of historical development based on universal economic categories. He explained the 
transition from a situation akin to the state of nature to a more settled life on the basis of change in a 
society’s system of production. At the same time, this change was related to the origin of private property. 
Society, agriculture, and private property had made their appearance at one and the same historical 
juncture, once humanity was forced to use its natural resources more efficiently. As he argued:  
 
When the human race became extremely multiplied, the earth was no longer capable of furnishing spontaneously, 
and without culture, sufficient support for its inhabitants; neither could have it received proper cultivation by 
wandering tribes of men continuing to possess it in common. It therefore became necessary that those tribes should 
fix themselves somewhere, and appropriate to themselves portions of land, in order that they might, without being 
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disturbed in their labor or disappointed of the fruits of their industry, apply themselves to render those lands fertile, 
and thence derive their subsistence from them. Such must have been the origin of the rights of property and 
dominion.100 
 
But hard work, Vattel argued, was not enough to trigger social advance: ‘Science and the polite arts’ 
were of primary importance to encourage a positive societal change.101 Civilization could only flourish 
through the scientific knowledge of nature and the application of suitable technology to actualize its 
economic potential.  
 Montesquieu went one step further toward stadialism in the Spirit of the Laws, making an important 
association between the laws of different nations and ‘the way that various peoples procure their 
subsistence’.102 He showed that the code of norms of a commercial society was more developed than that 
of an agricultural society. By the same token, the codes of the latter surpassed those of pastoral societies 
in extension and quality. This was so because cultivation implicated the development of ‘many arts and 
much knowledge’.103 Finally, there were the ‘people who’ lived ‘by hunting’, who had the least 
developed codes.104 Actually, they had so few norms that they could plainly be called ‘mores rather than 
laws’.105 Barbarians (pastoral peoples) and savages (hunting peoples) also differed, in that the former 
formed nations that were capable of uniting for a common goal.106 He conceded that each society had its 
own rules and that ‘all nations’, ‘even the Iroquois’ who ate ‘their prisoners’, ‘had a right of nations’.107 
But if law was tantamount (as he believed) to ‘human reason’,108 then it was clear which kind of society 
the enlightened philosopher valued the most.109 
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wretch like themselves’. Ibid., Ch 18 294. In any case, the idyllic side of American peoples was countered by a less positive 
account of their nature and mores. By nature they were cowards, Montesquieu affirmed. In addition, their actions and customs 
were respectively ‘atrocious’ and ‘barbaric’. Ibid., Bk 14 Ch 3 234-235. Besides, as a consequence of their systems of 
production and scattered lives there were no secure marital unions in American societies, and therefore its members mingled 
‘indifferently like beasts’. Ibid., Bk 18 Ch 13 291. For all these reasons Montesquieu might have celebrated the formation of 
a great people in the woods of America. See infra footnote 111. 
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 Montesquieu conceived ‘commercial society’ as the apex of social evolution. In fact, when he referred 
to the European colonies overseas he made a clear differentiation between landed and commercial 
empires.110 He was clearly anti-imperialist with regard to the former. However, he made a more nuanced 
and ambivalent evaluation of the latter. For example, although he acknowledged that trade restrictions 
imposed in the colonies were detrimental for the colonial population, he believed that the injury ‘was 
compensated by the protection of the mother country’.111 
 In Montesquieu’s view, England was an example of the establishment of colonies with the sole goal of 
fostering trade. Without explicitly mentioning England he clearly referred to it, affirming that ‘this 
nation’ in sending colonies abroad did so ‘to extend its commerce more than its domination’.112 
Montesquieu believed that even in North America, where the English had displaced hunting peoples, 
colonization had created some general benefits. Concretely, the application of the metropolitan form of 
government in the American colonies had resulted in ‘the formation of great peoples, even in the forests 
to which it had sent its inhabitants’.113 Equating the territories of North America with forests, and thus 
wilderness, was a reinstatement of the way in which the puritans of New England conceived the alien 
environment of North America. In this case, Montesquieu believed that wilderness was conquered by the 
civilizing effect of government. 
 
Stadial theory: environmental implications  
In the mid-eighteenth century the embryonic ideas on the engines of historical progress of Grotius, Locke, 
and Pufendorf, and the more elaborate reflections of Montesquieu, crystallized in a more detailed stadial 
theory of social evolution that linked different systems of production to different stages of civilization.114 
This more developed evolutionary theory recognized four progressive stages in the scale of global socio-
economic development that were, from most primitive to most civilized: hunting-gathering, pastoral, 
                                                 
110 Montesquieu ideas on empire were rather complex. A full analysis of his views exceeds the limits of this inquiry. For an 
insightful exploration of this theme see Michael Mosher, ‘Montesquieu on Empire and Enlightenment’ in Sankar Muthu (ed.), 
Empire and Modern Political Thought (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2012) 112-154.  
111 Ibid., Bk 21 Ch 21 391.  
112 Ibid., Bk 19 Ch 27 328.  
113 Ibid., 329.  
114 Ronald L. Meek, Social Science and the Ignoble Savage (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1976) 6. Wright argues 
that Pufendorf’s natural jurisprudence was influential in the development of a stadial theory of social progress. See Johnson 
Kent Wright, ‘Historical Writing in the Enlightenment World’ in Martin Fitzpatrick et al. (eds.), The Enlightenment World 
(Routledge, Abingdon, 2004) 207-216, 209. 
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agricultural, and commercial societies.115 All societies could in principle climb up this progressive scale, 
on the condition that their main economic activity evolved accordingly.  
 Significantly, the universal laws of socio-economic progress corresponded and gave prominence to the 
economic practices that the Europeans normally associated with their own societies. As a result of this 
correlation, European economic institutions that facilitated environmental mastery and resource 
exploitation in different colonial settings, namely private property rights, plantations agriculture, and 
international trade, could easily be presented not only as more efficient than those of non-Europeans, but 
also as benchmarks of social progress.  
 Stadialism was not a monolithic theory. Despite the appeal of its implied evolutionary logic, the 
different phases of social change were not always presented as universal or inevitable.116 Besides, a 
number of Enlightenment intellectuals distinguished merely three periods of socio-economic evolution, 
excluding the commercial stage and placing agriculture at the top. In the same breath, others combined 
the agricultural and commercial stages of growth, and presented this fusion as the best way to bring about 
an affluent society.  
 The idea of social evolution based on successive modes of production was adopted by eminent 
intellectuals such as the physiocrats Anne-Robert-Jacques Turgot and François Quesnay, Jan-Jacques 
Rousseau (who inverted its terms), William Blackstone, Nicolas de Condorcet, and Johann Gottfried von 
Herder, among others.117 The Scottish Enlightenment contributed to the most elaborate formulation of 
the theory. Thinkers like Adam Ferguson, David Hume, and William Robertson adopted it in part because 
it allowed Scots to assert their Britishness, and thus their civility, in spite of their different ethnicity.118 
 The four-stage theory of history occupied a central place in the economic thought of Adam Smith.119 
By reference to this model he managed to explain the transition from the simple local economy of the 
first human groups to the long-distance trade that characterized his more ‘globalized’ epoch.120 But, in 
reaction to physiocratic economic prescriptions, Smith cautioned against applying stadial theory as a 
                                                 
115 Patrick Griffin, American Leviathan: Empire, Nation, and Revolutionary Frontier (New York, Hill and Wang, 2007) 29. 
The English colonization of Ireland and Scotland helped develop a social model for integrating different peoples that was then 
easily transplanted to the English American colonies. Ibid., 28-31. 
116 Wright, ‘Historical Writing’, 210.  
117 Meek, Social Science, 174.  
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British political life and the challenge that it posed for Scottish philosophers. Their theories responded in part to the attempt 
to reconcile trade and private wealth with civic life and communal values. See Fitzmaurice, Sovereignty, 149-150.  
119 Hont, Jealousy, 101. 
120 Ibid., 102.  
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sound socio-economic policy guide for European development.121 Europe had historically developed in 
a ‘retrograde’ fashion, thus contravening the natural order of societal development.122 
 Another function of stadial theory was to provide an alternative explanation of the origins and 
development of private property to that offered by contemporary Scottish thinkers who, following Locke, 
used labor as the foundational source of private property.123 Smith realized that combining different 
stages of social development with a labor theory of property, as most Scottish intellectuals had done, was 
problematic. Although property in the first socio-economic stage was tantamount to physical possession, 
it became independent from it in subsequent phases. How could labor then explain the noticeable 
variation of power over the thing possessed that the institution of property conferred in each stage? 
 In the Lectures on Jurisprudence Smith solved this conundrum by pointing to the fact that the laws that 
governed the formation of property were different in different periods of human history.124 In the age of 
hunters ownership of wild animals ‘was conceived to begin as well as to end with possession’.125 So, a 
thing ceased to be mine once I ‘had lost the immediate property of it’.126 The transition from the hunting 
era to the stage of shepherds was ‘the greatest in the progression of society, for by it the notion of 
property’ was extended ‘beyond possession’.127 People agreed that the property of tamed animals was 
not lost when continuous possessions ended, as long as the animals continued to return to their owner.128 
Private property on land appeared later than the introduction of agriculture, after the establishment of 
cities, when the ‘chief magistrate’ apportioned the land between the inhabitants of the community.129 
 There was a clear teleology in Smith’s historical periodization. The system of production, the 
development of laws and regulations to guarantee private property, and the form of government were 
tied together. In the words of Adam Smith: ‘The more improved any society is and the greater length the 
several means of supporting the inhabitants are carried, the greater will be the number of their laws and 
                                                 
121 Ibid., 102-103.  
122 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, general editors R. H. Campbell and A.S. 
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regulations necessary to maintain justice, and prevent infringements of the right to property.’130 
Accordingly, he affirmed that ‘among hunters there is no regular government; they live according to the 
laws of nature’.131 
 Smith postulated the division of labor as the economic principle that guided historical progress. As he 
remarked in the introduction to An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, the soil, 
climate, or extent of the territory of a particular nation were inconsequential with regard to its wealth. 
Prosperity was the result of the skillfulness with which labor was applied and the comparative number 
of useful and useless laborers.132 Therefore, savages, barbarous, and crude peoples lived precariously and 
were deprived the conveniences of life because they were ignorant of the contribution of the division of 
labor to the ‘progress of opulence’.133 In a comparison reminiscent of Locke, Smith placed ‘the meanest 
laborer in a polished society’ above ‘a savage’, based on the former’s superior material life.134 
 Even before the Scottish Enlightenment, socio-evolutionary thinking had been used in English erudite 
circles.135 Since the conquest of Ireland, the English had constructed Irish ‘barbarism’ by reference to a 
standard of social differentiation.136 Later on, they applied a similar notion of ‘barbarism’ or ‘savagery’ 
to North American peoples.137 By the last decades of the eighteenth century the doctrine had spread 
beyond the English debate, becoming a fundamental element in the social thought of the European 
Enlightenment.138 
 Stadialism created a strong link between social progress and the maximization of wealth. Stadial theory 
was the intellectual expression of the material affluence and human happiness that the global economy 
in formation seemed to offer to European societies. This represented a clear departure from the idea of 
utilizing nature in the Spanish scholastics. Spanish discussions of the importance of agriculture and 
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private property merely revolved around the need for human preservation after the original sin. In 
contrast, Enlightenment writers provided detailed economic descriptions of the agricultural stage, related 
to plantations, single crops, and capital returns.  
 Similarly, they offered complex theories of trade, dealing with the role of merchants, investors, and 
charter companies. In this eighteenth century discourse all of these economic activities rested on the 
institution of private property. God as a mediator between humans and nature was gradually substituted 
by a direct desire to comprehend and modify nature that was to an important extent related to the comforts 
and luxuries that European environmental power in the colonies granted to European merchants, 
investors, companies, and societies at large. A theological legitimation of economic activities became 
less relevant in the context of an emerging global capitalist economy buttressed by a robust normative 
and institutional apparatus and a progressive philosophy of history that gave Europeans a novel certitude 
about their destiny as the world’s ‘improvers’.  
 While the four-stage theory of social evolution highlighted the link between civilization and different 
economic practices or types of production, the environmental implications of this connection remained 
largely unexamined.139 From an environmental perspective, we could say that there was a correlation 
between different forms of economic, social, and political organization and the capacity of different 
societies to control and transform their natural habitats. In other words—those of Wolloch—stadial 
theory postulated that ‘the mastery of nature and the rise of human societies had a long and intimately 
connected history’.140 Hunting-gathering, shepherding, cultivation, and commerce affected the 
environment rather differently, especially if the last two stages are considered in their capitalist versions. 
Moreover, the commercialization of all productive activities, due to the existence of international markets 
for colonial products, increased the demand to exploit nature. For example, the environmental 
destructiveness of North American hunting grew exponentially once it was oriented to satisfy the 
growing demand of European markets.141 
                                                 
139 For an exception see John M. Mackenzie, ‘Scots and the Environment of Empire’ in John M. Mackenzie and T. M. Devine 
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 As a result of the idea of social progress, transcontinental trade and commercial agriculture acquired a 
novel connotation in the law of nations. Besides contributing to the improvement of nature and the 
attainment of economic prosperity, they were also regarded as hallmarks of the good social life.142 The 
extent of human manipulation of the natural environment became part of a universal normative standard 
whereby all the world societies could be hierarchically ordered. Nature and progress were intimately 
connected by the belief that the more a particular society exploited its natural resources, the stronger was 
its legal claim for private property rights, the better its laws, and the more developed its socio-economic 
organization. Conversely, the lack of private property and capital-intensive economic activities were 
signs of backwardness. 
 In their accounts of human progress, Grotius, Locke, and Vattel had left North Americans’ potential 
for evolution unimpaired. Savagery was neither the consequence of their inherent natural deficiency nor 
the result of irresistible environmental constraints. According to Locke, Vattel, and Lafitau, savagery 
rather derived, to a certain extent, from North Americans’ indolence and the resulting failure to 
thoroughly modify their environment.143 In the sixteenth century the Spanish scholastic Domingo de Soto 
had claimed that there were still uncultivated lands due to human indolence.144 For subsequent authors, 
the peoples of North America were the paramount example of the lack of material comfort derived from 
sluggishness.  
 In most European intellectual reflections on social change in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 
Europe and North America were respectively considered as the highest and lowest points of social 
evolution. Within this body of scholarship, North Americans’ stagnant social improvement hindered their 
recognition as rightful holders of property rights over their lands.145 But not every non-European territory 
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was equally categorized. There were relevant nuances and hierarchies outside European borders. The 
case of China is illustrative.146 Vattel, for instance, characterized China as ‘the best cultivated land in the 
world’.147 Wolff, whose high esteem for Chinese society is famous, believed as well that ‘from the most 
ancient times’, the Chinese had been ‘prominent among the more civilized nations’.148 The fact that 
Europeans regarded China as an agricultural and trading nation suggests that stadialism influenced the 
assessment of Chinese social standing.149 Not coincidentally, perhaps, China was running at the time 
toward an environmental crisis related to its accelerated expansion of agriculture and commerce.150 
 Even in America, the commonwealths of the agricultural and commercial empires of Tawantinsuyu 
and Anahuac excelled, according to Vattel, all other pre-colonial societies, particularly those of North 
America. Distinguishing between the Spanish illegal conquest of great empires in Central and South 
America and the legitimacy of establishing colonies in the northern part of the continent, Vattel asserted: 
‘Thus, while the conquest of the civilized empires of Peru and Mexico was a notorious usurpation, the 
establishment of many colonies on the continent of North America might, on their confining themselves 
within just bounds, be extremely lawful. The people of those extensive tracts rather ranged through than 
inhabited them.’151 
 It is remarkable that these pre-colonial American empires had the greatest environmental impact on the 
continent prior to the Europeans’ advent.152 The stereotypical depiction of North American peoples in 
legal and political European thought as non-agricultural or agriculturally deficient peoples was at odds 
with reality. Agriculture had been practiced in North America for several millennia already before 
Christ.153 Pre-colonial cultivation covered 50 percent of the dietary requirements of the population of the 
southern regions.154 Further north, 75 percent of the food needs of the Huron were met with products 
obtained from husbandry.155 Besides, the peoples of America contributed their knowledge to the 
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agricultural practices of European settlers. They showed, for example, which seeds fitted better in 
particular kinds of soils.156 
 Furthermore, North Americans’ cultivation often enriched the diet of the new comers. In certain 
colonies like English Virginia, settlers were dependent on the pre-colonial population for supply of 
agricultural products.157 Similarly, in Jamestown and Plymouth they provided corn to English settlers, 
and taught them planting techniques which saved them from starvation.158 Besides, innumerable reports 
written by English colonists at the time acknowledged the presence of local agriculture.159 However, 
despite the pile of evidences to the contrary, Locke, Adam Smith, and several other Enlightenment 
intellectuals still categorized North Americans as an underdeveloped non-agricultural people.160 
 Locke, who according to Armitage had ‘a more thorough understanding of his country’s commerce and 
colonies than that possessed by any canonical figure in the history of political thought before Edmund 
Burke’, completely failed to realize the complexity of North Americans’ productive systems.161 Another 
case in point is Adam Smith, who gave an inaccurate reading of his own sources of ethnographic 
observations about North American societies. In order to construct an age of hunters characterized by 
scarcity and lack of resources he had to omit contemporary references that pointed to the fact that 
gathering and agriculture covered half of the diet requirements of most North American societies.162 
 Actually, Locke and Smith’s conclusions about North Americans’ lack of mastery over nature and 
backwardness contradicted one another. If North Americans’ primitiveness derived from their indolence, 
as Locke had postulated, how was it possible that according to Smith their survival was at stake due to 
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their limited productive capacity? Indolence was the result of abundance rather than scarcity. North 
Americans’ leisure was predicated on their capacity to easily produce from nature what was required to 
subsist. But if the original condition of humankind (that in which Smith had situated the peoples of North 
American) was characterized by material ease and leisure rather than privation and hard work, there was 
then no compelling motivation to ‘ascend’ through the historical stages that Smith had proposed as steps 
toward progress.163 
 Apart from a wide variety of agricultural practices, the peoples of North America managed their 
landscapes in complex ways that did not easily fit the image of savages unacquainted with their natural 
habitats. In fact, their detailed knowledge of soils, fauna, and flora allowed them to manipulate and 
improve their surroundings in order to foster their productive potential.164 Women studied and selected 
varieties of plants based on their nutritional and medical properties.165 North American peoples prospered 
thanks to their ability to use a diverse array of fauna and flora such as maple groves, berry patches, fishing 
spots, clam and oyster beds, hunting sites, and many other natural resources.166 Yet these practices and 
knowledge were either invisible to or devalued in European legal and political thinking. As colonization 
progressed and epidemics made their inroads, North Americans slowly lost territory. As a result, their 
more sustainable environmental practices were increasingly marginalized in the emergent colonial 
economy, which eventually became predominantly oriented to the demands of international markets. 
Gathering, hunting for self-consumption, and so-called ‘rudimentary’ forms of agriculture were, in the 
eyes of European settlers, relics of the past that impeded environmental mastery and stood in the way of 
progress.167 
 The attempt by European colonists to introduce in North America the productive activities and legal 
institutions that characterized the most advanced social stages—namely, the agricultural and commercial 
stage—is not per se enough to explain the environmental destructiveness of European colonization. After 
all, the systems of production that were used as criteria to order societies—gathering, hunting, 
agriculture, and trade—formed part of North American economic structures before the colonialists ever 
set foot in the continent. Moreover, those activities, practiced since immemorial time, had contributed to 
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alter North American nature considerably (and not always sustainably) before European arrival. 
Therefore, their sponsorship by the European colonists, buttressed by the law of nations, did not 
necessarily have to produce a sharp break in terms of the utilization of natural resources. So part of the 
explanation for the introduction of a more destructive approach toward nature has to be found in the 
different conceptions that informed European and North American practices. 
 North Americans’ property systems are indicative of the extent to which the institutions of Europeans 
and North American peoples differed. In North America, productive activities were primarily oriented to 
satisfy the needs of the collective. The lack of incentive for individual accumulation of wealth helped 
preserve nature’s regenerative capacity.168 This social goal, however, did not mean that the land was 
either vacant or always held in common. In fact, activities such as hunting and gathering involved some 
sort of land tenure.169 Moreover, often families and individuals possessed exclusive rights to cultivate 
particular plots of land given to them by the group’s leaders so that they benefited from their 
exploitation.170 However, because the land belonged to the whole community, an exclusive right of use 
did not amount to permanent individual ownership.171 Moreover, the main criterion to allocate land was 
the needs of families and individuals.172 Besides, permanent land ownership and property rights over 
natural resources were not of much value for individuals and groups that were in constant movement. 
Everything that could be possessed became a burden once the group decided to relocate.173 
 North Americans’ change of habitat provided nature enough time to recover. This practice was not the 
result of a strict conservationist attitude. When the supply of natural resources of a certain area decreased, 
North Americans migrated to another region that could better satisfy their needs. Maximization of benefit 
and environmental regeneration were two sides of a single sustainable process of relocation. It was North 
American peoples’ generally sustainable way of living rather than their inherent attempt to preserve 
nature that prevented a total commodification of ecosystems in North America. In the itinerant life of 
most North American peoples there was always a strong link between the use of their surroundings and 
the impact of that use on their lives. If consumption went beyond nature’s capacity of regeneration, future 
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subsistence became compromised. Europeans interpreted that ‘positive dependency’ on nature as a 
weakness that evidenced the cultural inferiority of North Americans. 
 In Europe, the consumption of products coming from North America was assured no matter how North 
American nature was thereby degraded by the economic activities needed to extract or produce those 
commodities. The environmental impact of North American peoples was geographically constrained to 
the territories that a particular society occupied and used. Once European colonialism ensued that 
scenario radically changed. As a result of long-distance trade the limits of European consumption and 
environmental exploitation were stretched to the apparently inexhaustible non-European natural frontiers 
opened by colonization. As long as new territories could be occupied, and their inhabitants easily 
displaced, controlled, or subjugated, the accumulation of material wealth could continue unabated. By 
seizing enormous tracts of non-European nature Europeans became less ‘dependent’ on the environment 
than the peoples of North America. This kind of environmental power, which found legal reflection and 
protection in the law of nations, reinforced their conviction in the superiority of European economic 
institutions and social arrangements. However, transforming wilderness into cultivated and civilized 
landscapes was an arduous enterprise. The coupling of this enterprise with personal wealth produced an 
irresistible force deployed toward the control and exploitation of nature that in the long run was to have 
dire consequences for non-European ecosystems and the social fabric of pre-colonial polities. 
 
Concluding remarks 
The impact of the law of nations on nature during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was significant 
both from a material and a conceptual point of view. The effect of this power was especially notorious 
in North America, where the Dutch for a limited number of years and the British for more than a century 
exercised territorial control.174 
 The role that nature played in the political economy of colonialism—a commoditized realm open to 
exploitation—was cloaked by legal and political discourses that claimed precisely the contrary: that 
prosperity and progress were inextricably tied to European colonists’ privatization, commodification, 
and improvement of colonial natural resources. European environmental hegemony, in contrast to the 
alleged environmental dependency of North America peoples (which indicated their incapability to 
                                                 
174 The French, too, established colonies in North America. French imperialism is, however, outside the scope of the present 
work.  
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manage and dominate their surroundings), reinforced the conviction that only European colonial rule 
could help non-European societies abandon their backward lifestyles and move toward a better and richer 
life. That conviction legitimized further exploitation of non-European nature. 
 Importantly, it does not follow from the above historical analysis that neither the theories of European 
scholars nor the practices of colonists purposely sought to destroy nature. On the contrary, both conceived 
its modification in what for them were obviously positive terms. According to their worldview, a 
humanized habitat seemed naturally preferable to wilderness. It was precisely the powerful idea of 
improvement and progress—projected to the control and intensive utilization of the environmental 
realm—and the correlation of that idea to the normative universalization of capitalist forms of 
production—linked to dreams of material affluence derived from the colonies—that precisely blinded 
Europeans to the adverse social and environmental consequences of their doctrines and actions. 
Backward peoples and wild nature seemed amenable at best, and utterly disposable at worst. 
 European ideas and legal institutions had particular influence on the fate of North American ecosystems 
and peoples. The fact that agriculture was used as the exclusive legal criterion to claim land ownership 
at the beginning of North American colonization meant that, at least in theory, North Americans could 
not keep possession of the territories in which, for centuries, they had hunted, fished or gathered fruits—
all vital activities for their survival.175 In northern North America, where agriculture was not intensively 
practiced, North Americans’ lands and resources enjoyed no legal protection against the colonists’ 
acquisitiveness.176 Even when purchase eventually became the legal basis for the acquisition of North 
Americans’ land, their alleged culturally inferiority legitimized abusive transactions that were otherwise 
uncommon among English colonists who generally treated one another as equals.  
 Apart from material dispossession, colonization worked on a subtler discursive level, creating a 
psychological impact on colonized populations. Redefining the good life in the economic and 
environmental terms that befitted the colonizers and their institutions limited the space for the expression 
and realization of North Americans’ identity and worldviews. Eventually, displaced to the margins of the 
new society in construction, North Americans agonized to redefine their new position. Entering civility 
not only entailed a simple change of behavior, but the acceptance of a total reconfiguration of what 
society and nature had previously meant to North America’s myriad societies.  
                                                 
175 See Cronon, Changes, 63. 
176 Ibid. 
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 The imposition of European mores and standards through universal legal standards mainly pushed 
North Americans in two different directions, while also leaving certain space for maneuvering between 
those positions. Mainly, but not exclusively, North Americans tried to keep and protect their habitats, 
institutions, traditions, and systems of production. Alternatively, they imitated European colonialists, and 
struggled to adapt to a new lifestyle, entering colonial life and accepting the alien economic institutions 
and social arrangements that came with it.  
 The first option led to a life of resistance, retreat, and negotiation, in which more often than not the 
North Americans were dispossessed of their lands and decimated, the survivors becoming strangers in 
their own homelands.177 The second option was at best rewarded with the enjoyment of European status 
and property rights over the natural resources that they had previously controlled. However, often the 
price of voluntary assimilation was considerable,178 as the mirror of the colonizer produced a distorted 
image of those who dared to search in it for their own reflection. Apparently at hand, the model receded 
as it was approached.179 
 For most of the eighteenth century, nonetheless, North Americans’ societies were strong enough to 
limit the English to a section of land on the Eastern cost of the continent. This way, the environmental 
and social impact of European colonists was territorially limited. Moreover, before the Industrial 
Revolution the environmental impact of settler colonialism on non-European ecosystems was also 
somewhat restricted. However, in the nineteenth century, the independence and expansion of the U.S. 
and its industrialization had an adverse effect on North American societies and their ecosystems, one that 
was forever going to transform the environmental and social configuration of the continent. A similar 
                                                 
177 Pagden, ‘The Struggle’, 37. Zuckerman talks about the settlers’ ‘genocidal rage’ in Zuckerman, ‘Identity’, 148.  
178 For Oberg, the consequence of the imposition of English civility was the erosion of North Americans’ religions and 
cultures. See Oberg, Dominion.  
179 Most North American societies were eventually divided between advocates of acculturation and resistance. See Ronald 
Wright, Stolen Continents: 500 Years of Conquest and Resistance in the Americas (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 
1992) 200-238. As in the case of the Creek Nation, at times animosity ‘between wealthy progressives and militant anti-
acculturation’ became so intense that it degenerated into open civil war. Ibid., 211. The imposition of the colonists’ culture in 
North America took several centuries. In fact, in the seventeenth centuries North Americans had ample space for manoeuvre. 
The fact that most of the land was bought, granting the possibility of alliances with certain European nations against other 
nations and rival groups, gave North Americans considerable bargaining power. So, at that time, there was neither 
accommodation nor resistance, but incorporation. See Kathleen DuVal, The Native Ground: Indians and Colonists in the 
Heart of the Continent (Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006). However, from the independence of the United 
States of America, control over most of what is today the U.S. drastically reduced North Americans’ capacity to prosper in 
the new colonial context. Even so, many North American groups bravely resisted assimilation for decades, and found a middle 
way that allowed them to retain their culture while apparently integrating into the new society, a struggle that continues even 
at present. See Mary Beth Norton et al., A Peoples and a Nation: A History of the United States (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 
2005) 123. Finally, some groups like the Comanche even progressed, creating a powerful empire in the eighteenth and early 
nineteenth century. See Hämäläinen, Comanche Empire.  
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pattern of social and environmental devastation took place in Australia, where the British pushed the pre-
colonial population of this huge land mass to territorial marginality and the brink of extinction. This is 
the story that will be the focus of our attention in Part IV. 
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Part IV 
 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SETTLER COLONIALISM: 
SAVAGES, STADIAL THEORY, AND OCCUPATION (1800-1850) 
 
 
When the history of nineteenth-century international law is narrated, the link is often emphasized between 
the Institut de droit international and the phenomenon of European imperialism, most clearly articulated 
in the context of the ‘Scramble for Africa’.1 This connection, important as it is, reveals only part of a 
larger story. Before imperial powers extended their sway over most of Africa and Asia during the last 
quarter of the nineteenth century, the British and the U.S. had already made enormous territorial 
acquisitions from 1800 to 1850.2 While the British Empire extended its sway to Australia, New Zealand, 
the Cape of Good Hope, and Colonial British North America, the U.S. expanded to the West of North 
America. So from the beginning of the century there was a compelling need to legitimize European 
colonialism. International law did precisely that, justifying the colonial acquisition and exploitation of 
these enormous extensions of territory and their myriad ecosystems.  
 The classical way in which the history of international law in the nineteenth century has been written 
is incomplete in yet another way. As the common narrative goes, during the nineteenth century the legal 
justification of empire was largely articulated through the vocabulary of civilization. The civilizing 
mission, the standard of civilization, and the distinction between civilized and uncivilized were all 
deployed in order to control, govern, and reshape non-Europeans. This account is actually true, even 
though the contours of the legal meaning and use of these concepts are still debated.3 But the project of 
civilization only reveals one side of the coin. Civilization was an ideological construct, an archetype to 
reform and refashion wanting individuals, groups, and nations. But when Western philosophers, policy 
makers, and legal commentators discussed the legitimacy of the acquisition of territory from 1800 to 
                                                 
1 See Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer, 98-178. 
2 The time, framework adopted in this chapter is highly artificial. Settler colonialism lasted longer than 50 years, and this 
chapter reflects this fact, including works and authors that spill over this period. However, I have decided to limit the inquiry 
temporarily in this sense, as this amount of time was fundamental in the formation of the legal phenomena that I analyze. It 
also offers a good perspective of the discourses and practices related to this colonial phenomenon.  
3 Arnulf Becker Lorca, for example, has emphasized the way in which semi-peripheral intellectuals internalized and 
exceptionally questioned the standard. See Arnulf Becker Lorca, ‘Universal International Law: Nineteenth-Century Histories 
of Imposition and Appropriation’ 51 Harvard International Law Journal (2010) 475-552, 495-503. 
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1850, they often made use of another equally compelling cosmopolitan vocabulary that gravitated around 
the idea of improvement.4 
 During the first half of the nineteenth century, the improvement of vacant, unexploited, and unoccupied 
lands was the main rationale for settling vast regions of the world. Settler colonialism was animated by 
the prospect of transforming wild areas into a replica—albeit not identical—of the metropolis. Through 
their legal craft, international lawyers resorted to a number of legal theories, namely discovery and 
occupation, in order to validate that progressive vision. This was not a novel course of action. After all, 
the British had already established settler colonies in North America during the seventeenth and 
eighteenth century, so there were a bunch of legal doctrines at hand that were applicable to the new 
colonial scenario. Besides, the British were well versed in the vocabulary of improvement. 
Civilization and improvement did not function as antagonist or alternative vocabularies. In fact, they 
coexisted and reinforced one another. In the eighteenth century there was already a long tradition of 
conceiving social change in progressive terms. During the Enlightenment, conjectural history explained 
the advancement of societies through a progressive philosophy of history based primarily on the 
amelioration of productive practices. As nations adopted agriculture and specialized in trade and 
manufactures, law and government appeared. Following these developments, all areas of human life 
improved. This progressive betterment of human capabilities and the standard of living found expression 
under the generic banner of civilization. 
In the nineteenth century, James Mill and John Stuart Mill mixed the conceptual worlds of 
improvement and civilization to explain how society was evolving. They retained the Enlightenment 
belief in historical progress through successive stages of economic growth linked mainly—though not 
exclusively—to a society’s ability to exploit their surroundings. But the transformations witnessed at the 
beginning of the nineteenth century were of a rather different nature. Social change had acquired an 
entirely new dimension when compared to previous epochs. Capital fostered science and technology, 
which in turn created new ways of altering nature to an extent that was unimaginable before. The path 
that human progress was following in the nineteenth century required a new conceptual framework, the 
explanatory character of which was applicable to the whole world. 
 When nineteenth-century intellectuals contemplated the world around them, they realized that the 
social gap that separated the most advanced European societies from the most backward ones had greatly 
increased and continued to expand. The progressive character of the avant-garde Western nations (as the 
                                                 
4 The importance of the idea of improvement in settler societies is underlined in Weaver, The Great Land Rush.  
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U.S. entered the selective European club) was never questioned, but the nature of that progress had clearly 
changed. While social progress was previously interpreted by reference to superior economic practices 
or better government, it now seemed to be all encompassing. Those European nations that had embraced 
the Industrial Revolution were advancing on every front. Government, laws, institutions, machines, 
knowledge, religion, morals, and all the other elements that distinguished their particular culture were 
indisputably superior to those of any other nation or community. What is more, that grandeur was 
considerably greater than ever before. The term ‘civilization’ conveyed the unique way in which Europe 
was changing and the corresponding superior plane from which European nations now related to other 
social formations.  
Industrialization and the social changes that it set in motion complicated classical stadial theory. But 
it did not make it completely obsolete. While losing some of its explanatory character, conjectural history 
retained part of its appeal. Several non-European nations, whose economy was based on trade and 
cultivation—the activities that corresponded to the higher social states of the stadial ladder of progress—
looked from the new prism of industrialized Europe as backward as those societies that hunted. Compared 
to Europe they were all uncivilized. This did not mean, however, that there was no difference among the 
general category of uncivilized non-European peoples. In territorial terms, for instance, it was not 
inconsequential whether nations or mere groups of savages held land.5 This is why most international 
lawyers retained the stadial terminology to designate societies of hunter-gatherers, and mixed it with the 
word ‘civilization’. Both could now function together.  
From 1800 to 1850, as in previous colonial periods, the rationale for settler colonialism derived in part 
from the idea of improving nature through what I have call a standard of environmental exploitation. In 
fact, one of the elements of the program to civilize non-Europeans consisted in transforming their 
productive activities. In other words, non-Europeans acquired civilization once they were taught how to 
improve the wilderness that encircled them. But, powerful as the idea of transforming wilderness into 
productive fields was in the abstract, it still faced a major practical challenge. How could the British or 
the U.S. justify the establishment of colonies and settlements in territories which were already inhabited 
by non-European peoples? In the nineteenth century, many commentators skipped answering this 
                                                 
5 For most international lawyers, savages did not constitute nations. So, they often referred to them as wandering tribes, 
savage tribes, hordes, or just savages. But there were exceptions. Ward and Polson talked about savage nations. For Ward’s 
remarks see infra Chapter 6, footnote 305. Polson uses the term ‘savage nations’ in Archer Polson, Principles of the Law of 
Nations, with Practical Notes and Supplementary Essays on the law of Blockade and on Contraband of War (Philadelphia, 
T. & J. W. Johnson, 1853) Sect. IV §VI 22. 
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question by merely denying that those territories were inhabited in the first place. But most scholars 
recognized that savages still roamed over vast unoccupied regions of the world. As the Industrial 
Revolution elevated the standard of living of Western masses, and particularly of wealthy colonial elites, 
the exploitation of the natural resources contained in those wild areas represented the tangible promise of 
unlimited human progress.  
The story of international law and European imperialism during the first half of the nineteenth century 
is then partly the story of the answer given to the question of what to do with the savages. It was in this 
context that stadial theory and the agricultural argument remained relevant. In the settler colonies 
particularly, they retained their explanatory character and provided a legal mechanism to open new 
avenues for progress. Concretely, they were extremely useful to justify the occupation of the land of 
savages, as well as the exploitation of the natural wealth that it contained. The U.S. expansion into the 
Western part of the continent and the British colonization of Australia were the perfect scenarios to test 
those doctrines and give a definite answer to the legal question of occupation. 
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6  Stadial Theory and Occupation (1800-1850): Theoretical 
Underpinnings and Legal Developments 
 
 
 
 
 
The scheme of Nature regarded in its whole extent, cannot have had, for its sole or even principal object, the good 
of human or other sentient beings. What good it brings to them, is mostly the result of their own exertions. 
Whatsoever, in nature, gives indication of beneficent design, proves this beneficence to be armed only with limited 
power; and the duty of man is to co-operate with the beneficent powers, not by imitating but by perpetually striving 
to amend the course of nature—and bringing that part of it over which we can exercise control, more nearly into 
conformity with a high standard of justice and goodness.1 
 
 
It has been recently claimed that there was a break between the way in which non-European societies 
were perceived in the eighteenth century and their characterization in nineteenth-century social theory.2 
James Mill and John Stuart Mill were paradigmatic of that change. Allegedly, they reduced the pluralistic 
account of non-European societies that was characteristic of the type of philosophy of history developed 
by the Scottish Enlightenment to a rough dichotomy between savage and civilized.3 In doing so, they 
purportedly parted ways with authors that wrote in the tradition of stadial theory. 
It is true that during the first half of the nineteenth century James and John Stuart Mill underlined the 
deficiencies of previous historical analyses of social development. They contended that the fact that some 
non-European societies had reached the stage that according to standard stadial theory characterized an 
agricultural or commercial society did not necessarily mean that they had attained a high degree of 
civilization. The merits and attainments of non-European societies needed to be re-evaluated. This 
reevaluation was vital for sound imperial administration. 
                                                 
1 John Stuart Mill, ‘Essays on Ethics Religion and Society’ in John Robson (ed.), The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill 
(Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1981) Vol X, Nature, 402. 
2 See Karuna Mantena, Alibis of Empire: Henry Maine and the Ends of Liberal Imperialism (Princeton, Princeton University 
Press, 2010) 58-59.  
3 See Jennifer Pitts, A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Imperial Liberalism in Britain and France (Princeton, Princeton 
University Press, 2005) 127-131, 133. Mantena does not go that far in her claim. She rightly observes that they used stadial 
categories more loosely than previous authors. Ibid., 59. 
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There were further reasons that called for a reassessment of stadial theory. The material gap between 
the world’s societies had grown to novel, wider proportions. Compared to industrial Europe even the 
most materially advanced non-European polity seemed lacking far behind. There was a clear-cut line that 
separated stationary non-European societies from the most progressive European nations. Through this 
prism, the world could be clearly divided in two. Besides, the civilizational level of a given society could 
not be derived from a mere analysis of its productive forces, as was the case with conjectural history, but 
instead demanded a thorough assessment of all aspects of that society.  
But despite differences between conjectural history and the philosophy of history of James Mill and 
his son John Stuart Mill, their theories resembled in important ways those of the Scottish Enlightenment. 
Like the latter, they subscribed to a vision of socio-economic advancement through four phases, defined 
by the productive forces and the degree of control over the environment of a particular society. But for 
the Mills a high stage of economic advancement did not necessarily coincide with the upper end of the 
scale of social progress. This was the point in which they parted ways with classical stadial theory. A 
certain degree of material complexity was necessary for attaining the superior end of moral progress, but 
the achievement of the former did not necessarily guarantee the attainment of the latter.4 In fact, as John 
Stuart continuously reminded his audience, without the right policies to correct the economic growth that 
resulted from industrialization, the avid pursuit of wealth could certainly turn into a stumbling block for 
human improvement. Sound legal and political prescriptions recommended by enlightened intellectuals 
were vital for harnessing the potential of industrial society.  
Outside Europe, there was no industrialization, so things were different. After assessing the world with 
their new civilizational lens, the judgment they passed was rather gloomy. Aside from a handful of 
European civilized societies that enjoyed continuous progress, all other human communities had either 
become stagnant or remained in a backward state of savagery/barbarism/primitivism (terms that they used 
interchangeably).  
The latter group inhabited a non-political space outside history. They lived in a mere physical realm 
integrated by vast territories and pristine ecosystems that had yet to be exploited, its population being 
incapable and/or unwilling (idleness often stood in the way of industriousness) to do so. In spite of this 
general state, non-European societies were not uniform. At the lowest end of the human social spectrum 
                                                 
4 In a description of Greece, Mill stated that this country was ‘strange and half-savage …, but advancing most rapidly in 
material prosperity, which in modern civilization is usually the first step towards moral progress’. See John Stuart Mill, ‘The 
Later Letters 1849-1873 Part II’ in John Robson (ed.), The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill (Toronto, University of 
Toronto Press, 1981) Vol XV, letter to Henry Fawcett, Athens, March 6 1862, 778. 
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were savages, who lived in ‘a condition very little above the highest of the beasts’.5 Civilization and 
savagery were the beginning and end of human progress. Accepting these premises, the Mills were 
convinced that by benevolent imperial rule and the exploitation of the territories populated by savages, 
European industrial societies disseminated the light of progress into the world. 
These ideas also found reflection in the legal doctrine of occupation. Through their reflections on 
occupation, the international legal jurists of the period continued developing the legal vocabulary that 
paved the way for settler societies’ displacement of non-European ‘savages’. In those theories, the 
material and the legal dimensions of the appropriation of non-European ecosystems were fused. Private 
property and trade were part of a progressive philosophy of history that justified the taking of supposedly 
vacant land and natural resources in order to fuel the growing capitalist global economy, which informed 
the legal doctrines of the period. The mixture between stadial theory and occupation (often as an 
agricultural argument) created a standard of environmental exploitation that, according to most legal 
commentators, savages and their backward forms of production were unable to meet.  
 
James Mill, stadial theory, and India 
James Mill (1773-1836) was born in the Parish of Logie Pert in Scotland on April 6 1773.6 His father 
(also named James Mill) was a shoemaker and his mother Isabel Fenton, daughter of a farmer, had worked 
as a servant in Edinburgh.7 James’ mother was optimistic for her son. She wanted him to reach the dignity 
and stature that she never got. In order to foster his education, she kept him apart from playing with other 
children and from work assignments either at his father’s shop or at home.8 
Mill showed an early academic talent at the parish school.9 In 1790, he moved to Edinburgh where he 
pursued university studies and study for the ministry.10 After finishing his studies and being ordained, he 
moved to London in 1802, with the need to make a living as ‘a man of letters’ and the ambition to 
participate in politics.11 Once in London, he did not follow his previous religious vocation, turning instead 
                                                 
5 The comparison with animals can be found in John Stuart Mill, ‘Essays on Politics and Society Part II’ in John Robson 
(ed.), The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1981) Vol XIX, Considerations on 
Representative Government, Ch II 394. 
6 George Spencer Bower, Hartley and James Mill (London, Sampson Low, Marston, Searle &Rivington, 1881) 8. 
7 Leslie Stephen, The English Utilitarians 3 Vols. (London, Duckworth and Co., 1900) 2. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Terence Ball (ed.), James Mill: Political Writings (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992) xiii. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Alexander Bain, James Mill: A Biography (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2011) 36-37.  
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toward a secular career. In 1808 he met Jeremy Bentham (an event that transformed his life), becoming 
his most devoted disciple and ‘converting’ to Utilitarianism. He occupied a prominent place in the circle 
of radical philosophical intellectuals gathered around Bentham. It was at this time that he definitively 
distanced himself from his religious affiliation and became openly critical of the religious establishment. 
In this, he was an example of the growing space for secular thinking within the English society.12 
During his first decade of life in London, necessity pushed Mill to write incessantly, producing scores 
of articles, reviews, and editorials. His prolific pen also produced various books. In 1818, the publication 
of his mammoth History of British India gave him notoriety and the possibility of being appointed 
Assistant Examiner of the East Indian Company (EIC).13 From this first position, he gradually advanced 
within the Indian House until becoming Chief Examiner in 1830.14 The last part of Mill’s life was largely 
devoted to one of his most important projects: the education of his son John Stuart. During the last years 
of his life his health rapidly deteriorated. He died in London on 23 June 1836. 
The History of British India and his service to the EIC has afforded Mill the reputation of being an 
advocate of British imperialism and influencing colonial administration.15 His History was compulsory 
reading for officials of the EIC and the top ranks of the Indian Civil Service.16 In addition to this direct 
influence, James Mill has been defined as a pivotal figure in the intellectual shift that, at the beginning of 
the nineteenth century, inaugurated a harsher view of and detrimental approach toward non-European 
peoples.17 
Notwithstanding Mill’s direct and indirect ideological contribution to the legitimation of British rule, 
it is worth underlying the ‘altruistic’ nature of his justification of Empire. He was convinced that British 
India was a burden rather than a gift. Its administration did not report any benefit to the mother country. 
                                                 
12 Bruce Mazlish, James & John Stuart Mill: Father and Son in the Nineteenth Century (New Brunswick, Transaction 
Publishers, 1998).59  
13 Ball, James Mill, xvi. 
14 Bower, Hartley and James Mill, 21. 
15 See, for instance, Uday Singh Mehta, Liberalism and Empire: A Study in Nineteenth-Century British Liberal Thought 
(Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1999) 77-97. See also Pitts, A Turn to Empire, 123-133. 
16 Duncan Forbes, ‘James Mill and India’ 5 Cambridge Journal (1951-1952) 19-33, 23. John Stuart Mill believed that the 
book and his father’s work for the East Indian Company had ‘effected a great amount of good, and laid the foundation of 
much more, to the many millions of Asiatics for whose bad or good government his country is responsible’. See James Mill, 
Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind, a new edition with notes illustrative and critical by Alexander Bain, Andrew 
Findlater and George Grote, edited with additional notes by John Stuart Mill, in two volumes (London, Logmans Green 
Readoer and Dyer, 1869) Preface, xiv. 
17 Duncan Bell, ‘Empire and International Relations in Victorian Political Thought’ 49 The Historical Journal (2006) 281-
298, 284. Notwithstanding this characterization, Bell, against Mehta, believes that Mill cannot be taken as representative of 
the whole spectrum of views (including anti-imperialist ideas) that formed within nineteenth-century British liberalism. Ibid., 
284-289. 
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His economic analysis proved that colonies drained necessary labor and resources from the metropolis.18 
Inter-colonial rivalry was also a recurrent reason to take arms against antagonist nations.19 Despite the 
obvious and multiple disadvantages of having colonies, Mill believed that governing India was still 
indispensable as part of the British universal task of spreading civilization worldwide. The duty of 
bringing progress to the world´s backward societies was a service to humanity. 
The cosmopolitan tone of Mill’s reflections on empire was noted by his son John Stuart Mill, who 
praised his father’s ‘ardour for the improvement of mankind and of human life’.20 The goal of 
transforming humanity entailed two distinctive tasks, namely ‘the direct improvement of their beliefs and 
sentiments’ and the removal ‘of the various influences which he regarded as obstacles to their progress’.21 
These intertwined goals guided his historical evaluation of Indian society. The herculean undertaking of 
enlightening humankind was entrusted to utilitarian reason. Human reason oriented toward utility and the 
maximization of happiness served as the lighthouse of humanity. 
The thought of James Mill was influenced by Scottish conjectural history. He showed great 
appreciation and even enthusiasm for the lectures he received in Glasgow from Dugald Steward.22 
Besides, he was well acquainted with the works of Scottish philosophical historians and their stadial 
conception of history. Actually, he used those works in his writings in The Literary Journal, The 
Edinburgh Review, The Monthly Review, and The Eclectic Review among others.23 In The History he cited 
Adam Ferguson’s An Essay on the History of Civil Society24 and The History of the Origin and 
Termination of the Roman Republic,25 John Millar’s The Origin of the Distinction of Ranks26 and An 
Historical View of the English Government,27 William Robertson's The History of America,28 The History 
of Scotland,29 and An Historical Disquisition Concerning the Knowledge the Ancients Had on India,30 
                                                 
18 Pitts, A Turn to Empire, 124. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Mill, Analysis of the Phenomena, xiii.  
21 Ibid. 
22 Knud Haakonssen, ‘James Mill and Scottish Moral Philosophy’ 23Political Studies (1985) 628-641, 629. 
23 Ibid., 630. 
24 James Mill, The History of British India, in six volumes (London, Baldwin, Cradock and Joy, 1826) Vol I, Bk II CH VII 
400 and Vol II Bk II Ch X 141. 
25 Ibid., Vol II Bk II Ch VIII 11. 
26 Ibid., Vol I, Bk II CH VII 383, 384, 390, 397. 
27 Ibid., Vol II Bk II Ch X 180. 
28 Ibid., Vol I Bk II Ch II 169; Vol I Bk II Ch V 280; Vol I Bk II Ch VI 293, 359; Vol II Bk II Ch VIII 25, 30, 37; Vol II Bk 
II Ch X 143-144. 
29 Ibid., Vol I Bk II Ch I 136. 
30 Ibid., Vol I Bk II CH I 145; Vol II Bk II Ch VIII 3; Vol II Bk II Ch X 165; Vol II Bk III Ch I 209. 
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and Adam Smith’s An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations31 and Essays on 
Philosophical Subjects.32 
In the second volume of the History Mill noted the importance of John Millar in the elucidation of the 
‘different stages of social progress’.33 According to Mill, his writings were ‘almost the only source from 
which even the sightless information on the subject can be drawn’.34 He also lamented that, in spite of 
the importance of philosophical history, ‘little had been attempted in this great department’.35 In his 
opinion, after the publication of Millar’s The Origin of the Distinction of Ranks, the writing of conjectural 
history had come to a halt.36 
James Mill regarded himself as an heir of the Scottish tradition and hoped to make a contribution to 
philosophical history. In 1818, after having finished The History, he envisaged a new work on the history 
of English law in which he planned to explore ‘the expedients of the several ages to the state of the human 
mind, and the circumstances of society on those ages, and to show their concord or discord with the 
standard of perfection’.37 He never completed such a project. But this does not mean that he failed to 
make any contribution to conjectural history. He had already written The History with an eye on the 
possibility of enriching the investigation into the laws of social progress.38 In fact, he claimed that by 
identifying the ‘state of society’ that corresponded to the leading nations of Asia he had accomplished 
something that nobody had done before.39 For the first time, the Hindus, the Persians, the Arabians, the 
Turks, and the Chinese could be accurately ranked in a scale of social progress. 
Did Mill continue the kind of conjectural history characteristic of the Scottish Enlightenment? His 
History clearly belonged to the historical genre cultivated by his admired Scottish predecessors. He 
similarly ranked non-European societies on a scale of social progress that crowned Europe as the apex of 
social sophistication. However, a difference of perspective and objective separates Mill’s theories from 
those of his precursors. Scottish authors like Adam Smith had attempted to identify the universal laws of 
economic and social advancement. They might have wished that their findings could influence the 
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economic policies of different nations—chiefly those of England—but that was not the sole or even the 
main orientation of their works. 
The classical four-stage theory of social development was also used as a lens to look at and reform the 
world outside Europe, in particular North America. But the recipe for the improvement of North America 
was casted in simple economic terms: introducing plantation agriculture and trade. Other social changes 
were naturally expected to follow from economic reform. Scottish conjectural history was not specifically 
conceived to serve as a guide for colonial administration. Mill’s inquiry into the state of society of Asian 
nations and particularly India had more direct imperial connotations, reaching widely and deeply into the 
texture of Indian society.  
At the time that Mill wrote The History, Great Britain was in charge of administrating and governing 
Hindu society. Consequently, ascertaining 'the true state of the Hindus in the scale of civilization’ had for 
Mill ‘the highest practical importance’.40 He contended that ‘[n]o scheme of government can happily 
conduce to the ends of government, unless it is adapted to the state of the people for whose use it is’.41 
Then he dispelled the implications of this hypothetical mismatch in the case of India. If the British had 
‘conceived the Hindus to be a people of high civilization, while they have in reality made but a few of 
the early steps in the progress to civilization, it is impossible that in many of the measures pursued for 
the government of that people, the mark aimed at should not have been wrong’.42 
Mill’s History consisted partly on an extensive analysis of all details of Hindu society and an 
evaluation of the place it occupied in the scale of human civilization. In this regard, he found that there 
was a mismatch between the high esteem in which most of his contemporaries held India and its actual 
backwardness. The same applied to other Asian nations like China. His History provided a derogatory 
reassessment of the Hindu nation and Asian societies in general, a re-characterization he believed was a 
precondition for the design of sound imperial government. 
Is has been contended that in addition to the explicit imperialist orientation of Mill’s conjectural 
history, his use of stadial theory differed also from the progressive philosophy of history of the Scottish 
Enlightenment in that he ‘reduced the comparatively subtle developmental gradations posited by the 
Scottish historians into a crude dichotomy between civilization and rudeness’.43 
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It is true that Mill's idiosyncratic version of the evolutionary social categories of his Scottish 
forerunners transformed the civilizational gap that separated Europe and the wider world into a deep 
chasm. It is also far from contentious that the fact that Mill, unlike previous Scottish philosophical 
historians, continuously referred to the mental deficiency of ‘rude’ peoples as a proof of their 
backwardness contributed to the deepening of that gap. But there is more complexity in the way he 
introduced these significant differences and reshaped conjectural history than has been recognized.  
Mill believed that his contemporaries’ admiration for Indian society was overrated.44 The ‘Scottish 
orientalists’ had no doubt in the superiority of the most advanced European nations over India, but they 
still praised several aspects of Chinese and Indian societies.45 They found exemplary traits in these 
societies that deserved consideration. For this reason, Mill took special issue with Sir William Jones, who 
despite his intellectual capacity and committed search for truth had misguidedly ascribed a high degree 
of civilization not only to the Hindu nation but also to other important Asian nations.46 This shortcoming 
was, in part, a consequence of erroneous observations and analysis. It was also the result of the straight-
forward application of a standard of civilization 'attached to no definite assemblage of ideas’.47 
Mill acknowledged the difficulty of correctly ascertaining the features that characterized the different 
phases of social evolution.48 It was not possible to reach a final conclusion on the civilization of any 
particular people by merely looking at one or two elements of their social fabric.49 This was precisely the 
shortcoming of the classical four stage theory of social development, according to which material factors 
and, particularly, a society’s way of production explained the transition from the lowest to the highest 
social forms. According to Mill, the evaluation of social advancement based on just one factor (no matter 
how important that factor was) was incomplete. Furthermore, it could lead to the misguided conclusion 
that two nations had the same level of civilization whereas in reality they belonged to very different stages 
of social progress.50 He believed that this kind of flawed and unreliable assessment had been made in the 
case of India. 
Despite the fact that Mill found the four-stage theory of social development to be somewhat lacking 
in explanatory character, he did not reject it entirely. In fact, in volume one of The History he presents a 
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pretty standard description of the stages of social change through which humanity had passed. In the 
‘origin of mankind’, he explained, the world was ‘inhabited by a very small number of people’.51 Life 
was precarious. There was no division of labor, no law, no government.52 Men were ‘ignorant and 
unrefined’, a consequence of a lack of time for the cultivation of knowledge.53 In the parts of the world 
where the first humans found thick forests they were ‘reduced to all the hardships of the hunter’s life’ and 
became ‘savages’.54 Contrastingly, in the regions where the first human groups found productive soils 
and mild climate they lived from the fruits of nature and ‘their flocks and herds’.55 It is evident that Mill 
did not get rid of the categories of hunter/savage and pastoralist/barbarian. However, for him they did not 
follow one another in temporal sequence. The first peoples of the world had become either savages or 
barbarians depending on the abundance of the natural habitats in which they lived.  
In several passages of the Elements of Political Economy Mill also referred to the ‘savage’ who 
climbed ‘a tree’ and ‘gathered the fruit’, and to the savage who captured and killed ‘a wild beast’.56 When 
he explained how capital first appeared, he also mentioned agriculture, situating it ‘at a subsequent stage 
in the progress of industry’ in comparison to hunting and gathering.57 He also distinguished between the 
‘savage’ who ‘kills a dear’ and the ‘man, who cultivates’.58 
Parallel to the material progress of different peoples, civil society developed through different stages. 
Various political and institutional arrangements were devised in order to satisfy the social needs created 
by the competition for natural resources that resulted from population growth. Once all the productive 
ground had been occupied disputes arose, and families joined together in order to better defend their 
interests.59 So, first tribes appeared. At a later stage, population growth gave rise to the first rudimentary 
forms of monarchy.60 
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After roughly outlining the origins of humanity and the first general stages of social evolution Mill 
examined the case of India. According to him, in their ‘way to civilization’ ‘the Hindus’ had ‘passed 
through the first’ rudimentary stage of society ‘very quickly’.61 There had left behind the ‘pastoral state’ 
characterized by the absence of a division of labor.62 Then they continued ascending through the 
agricultural stage and began to hold property.63 Once the cultivation of the land commenced, there was a 
compelling need to divide work tasks.64 The need for labor specialization became pervasive. As with Las 
Casas, he emphasized the importance of a superior man with the capacity to foster social progress. In the 
particular case of India, that man realized that, in order for society to advance, it was imperative to divide 
the population into different groups by occupation.65 That was the origin of the system of four castes. 
The division of society into castes, which originally sprang from the growing complexity of the Indian 
productive system, became in time the reason for its stagnation. Once the castes were fixed by regulation, 
the social system lost the flexibility required to adapt to the new requirements of production and reach 
further progress.66 The only variation to the otherwise rigid system of castes sprang from the fact that the 
classes, which were meant not to mix, became intermingled. The result was the creation of a subclass of 
inferior Hindus.67 But their lack of a concrete occupation and social function threatened the stability of 
the whole society. In order to overcome this difficulty a ‘virtuous king’ decided to ‘assigned them 
occupations’, and thus the ‘arts and manufactures’ were created.68 And then Mill concluded: ‘This is 
another important era in the history of Hindu society; and having reached this stage, it does not appear 
that it has made, or that it is capable of making, much further progress.’69 
Mill’s analysis of Hindu society showed that it had undoubtedly passed the savage and barbarous era. 
It was an agricultural society that had also developed trade and made some progress in the arts and 
manufactures.70 Mill remarked that the Hindu society had ‘passed but a small number of stages in the 
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career of civilization’,71 had ‘made a few of the first steps in civilization’,72 and even that it ‘had made 
considerable progress beyond the first and lowest stage of human society’.73 
Was this a great advance, one that had put India in a situation of parity or near parity vis-à-vis European 
nations? According to the four-stage stadial theory the Hindus, having agriculture and trade should have 
ranked them as an advanced nation. But Mill believed that this characterization was misleading. The high 
consideration of Indian society was actually the error in which Sir William Jones and other ‘orientalist’ 
and European missionaries and travelers had incurred.74 The case of North America illustrated his point: 
 
The nations of Europe became acquainted nearly about the same period, with the people of America, and the people 
of Hindustan. Having contemplated in the one, a people without fixed habitations, without political institutions, 
and with hardly any other arts than those indispensably necessary for the preservation of existence, they hastily 
concluded, upon the sight of another people, inhabiting great cities, cultivating the soil, connected together by an 
artificial system of subordination, exhibiting monuments of great antiquity, cultivating a species of literature, 
exercising arts and obeying a monarch whose sway was extensive, and his court magnificent, that they had suddenly 
passed from the one extreme of civilization to the other.75 
 
Because Mill did not want to commit the mistake he imputed to others, he deviated from the type of 
conclusions about India that would have been derived from a strict application of the doctrines of standard 
conjectural history. In doing so, he neither did away with stadial theory nor merely simplified it. In fact, 
he problematized it, thus complicating it. Paradoxically, the result was a simplification of the 
categorization of non-European peoples.  
Mill believed that the fact that a particular society had reached highest stages of social advancement 
described in classical stadial theory—that is, the agricultural and commercial phases—did not necessarily 
mean that the society had attained a high degree of civilization. This is why he complained that ‘with the 
exception of one of the lowest state of society’ the terms civilization ‘was applied to nations in all the 
stages of social advancement’.76 The old standard of measure for social evolution was flawed. The entry 
of a nation into the agricultural and commercial phase did not necessarily indicate social advancement 
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and sophistication. The old ladder of progress had to be reformulated, as there were obviously more steps 
than the four standard stages of stadial theory. Mill’s assessment of India’s state of social advancement 
was the best opportunity to make a contribution to historical speculation about human and social progress.  
Once Mill had concluded that from a material point of view India had become stagnant, he set himself 
the challenging task of examining in Book II of The History all aspects of Indian society. His conclusions 
about the various components of Hindu life were remarkably uniform and somber. He found them all 
wanting.77 The government was simple and rude, its military art deficient, and so were the system of 
justice, laws, tax system, religion, manners, arts, and literature. There was no aspect of Hindu society 
worth praising.78 The same harsh judgment was passed over Indian population. They exhibited some of 
the worst human vices, such as ‘ferocity’, ‘malignity’, ‘avarice’, ‘insensibility to the suffering of others’, 
and even ‘active cruelty’.79 
In his view, the Hindustan had made no progress since time immemorial. The English had found it in 
the same state as the ancient Greeks.80 In fact when measured up to the ‘people of Europe, during the 
feudal ages’, the Hindus were clearly inferior.81 The stationary condition of all their institutions, manners, 
and character was the result of the excessive influence of the priesthood over every realm of life. Religion 
and superstition had frozen the Hindu nation and the Hindu mind in a crude state. A despotic government 
and wretched system of castes further fixed the system, preventing any type of advancement. The state 
of India was rather unfavorable. Mill concluded that ‘despotism and priestcraft taken together, the Hindus, 
in mind and body, were the most enslaved portions of the human race’.82 
Mill identified education as the best tools for social improvement, but only if it was implemented in 
the way he conceived it. According to Mill, ‘the most efficient part of education is that which is derived 
from the tone and temper of the society: and the tone and temper of the society depend altogether upon 
the laws, and the government.’83 So, colonial reform had to be wide in scope. Sound legislation and good 
British government could reach and reform every aspect of Indian society. But Mill denounced that 
British administration had not yet implemented the ambitious program of reform that he envisaged. His 
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recommendations were meant to change this state of affairs. It was vital that British intervention in India 
was also extensive in time because ‘[t]he human race’ was 'not destined to make many steps in 
improvement at once’.84 The speed at which a backward mind could be awakened by reforms was limited; 
hasting too much could backfire. He gave as an example the introduction of the freedom of the press. Due 
to the ‘mental state of the people of India’, he argued, ‘the unrestrained use of the press’ might cause 
‘inconveniences of a serious nature’.85 Reform had to proceed gradually.86 
Mill had reworked stadial categories typical of the Scottish Enlightenment, applying his own standard 
of civilization to the assessment of India’s degree of social advancement. For Mill the classical stages of 
agriculture and commerce did not correspond to the highest threshold of civilization. The ladder of 
progress had more steps than was before assumed. He repeatedly reminded his audience that there were 
many steps on the path toward improvement and that the Hindus had just made but a few of the earliest 
steps in civilization.87 Mill's scale of progress seemed at first glance broader than that of previous Scottish 
authors. On closer scrutiny, however, despite the enlargement of the ladder of social evolution the 
civilizational categories that Mill used were rather simple and detrimental for non-European peoples. 
What is more, his idea of evolution of the mind in parallel to social evolution provided a further rationale 
for imperial control of alien societies. A society peopled by crude minds called for a stronger and more 
thorough external intervention than, for example, a society that just lacked trade or agriculture. 
Mill’s ladder of evolution was divided into three simple compartments: those of the uncivilized, the 
semi-civilized, and the civilized. First, there were the uncivilized peoples. In this first category, Mill 
placed both the savage and the barbarian. There were few nations in the world that fell under that category, 
but those that had remained in the lowest stages of society clearly lived a miserable and ignorant 
existence. Mill also referred to half-civilized88 peoples and half-civilized nations.89 Finally, there were 
the civilized nations. India stood ‘little removed from’ that condition of the ‘half-civilized nations’.90 
Most Asian nations were ‘in a state of civilization very nearly the same with’ the Hindus.91 
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Importantly, the scale of human civilization allowed cross-temporal comparisons. For example, the 
Portuguese people in the seventeenth century were considered ‘half civilized’.92 As Mill contemplated 
his contemporary Hindus, the life of ancient nations passed before his eyes. As he put it: 
 
As the manners, institutions, and attainments of the Hindus, have been stationary for many ages; in beholding the 
Hindus of the present day, we are beholding the Hindus of many ages past; and are carried back, as it were, into 
the deepest recesses of antiquity. Of some of the oldest nations, about which our curiosity is the most alive, and 
information the most defective we acquire a practical, and what may be almost denominated a personal knowledge, 
by our acquaintance with a living people, who have continued on the same soil from the very times of those ancient 
nations, partake largely of the same manners, and are placed at nearly the same stage in the progress of society. By 
conversing with the Hindus of the present day, we, in some measure, converse with the Chaldeans and Babylonians 
of the time of Cyrus; with the Persians and Egyptians of the time of Alexander.93 
 
The non-European world in the wide multiplicity of nations and the depths of historical time lay open to 
the scrutinizing eye of Mill. The world that resulted from Mill’s conceptualization of cross-social 
difference was a world of deep contrasts. In his scheme of social progress, backward and advanced nations 
were further from each other than ever before. And the distance kept growing, due to the static character 
of the former and the progressive nature of the latter.  
What were the implications of Mill’s ideas for the peoples of Australia who were regarded by British 
colonists as savages? In Mill’s scale of social progress that category represented the lowest type of human 
existence. Considering that for him Indian society displayed such a level of imperfection, it was easy to 
imagine what conclusions could be drawn about the savage peoples of Australia in terms of civilization. 
Moreover, his evaluation of savage North American peoples is telling. Even the more pluralistic John 
Millar had remarked that ‘when we survey the present state of the globe, we find that, in many parts of 
it, the inhabitants are so destitute of culture, as to appear little above the condition of brute animals’.94 
The British colonization of Australia had revealed the existence of precisely the kind of societies that for 
someone like Mill embodied the depravity of which Millar had talked. 
 According to Mill good colonial rule required a sound assessment of the degree of social evolution of 
a particular people. Otherwise, imperial policies risked delaying or even forestalling the amelioration of 
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a particular nation. Again, a comparison with the Indian case may illustrate the way in which a colonial 
administrator acquainted with Mill’s theories might have approached the government of Australia. If in 
the case of India the British had to guide the development of every branch of society, controlling, 
government, taxes, laws, land, education, etc., in the case of Australia the power in British hands had to 
be even larger, as Australians were far more distant than Hindus from the mental and social states suitable 
for self-government. This does not mean that Mill advocated the colonization of Australia. In fact, the 
contrary was true. For economic reasons he opposed the foundation of new colonies far from British 
territory. But in purely civilizational terms it was clear that savage life had to be brought in line with more 
sophisticated social standards.  
What was the role of nature in Mill’s doctrines of social advancement? He did not consider nature as 
pure matter devoted of inner forces. On the contrary, nature was animated matter. In order to produce, 
‘[a]ll that men can do is to place the objects of nature in a certain position’.95 Human power over nature 
was limited to performing a set of motions; it was actually matter that generated the productive result. 
For Mill, human production was the result of the combination of human labor and the laws of nature.  
Mill’s acknowledgment of the inner productive quality of ‘matter’ did not amount to recognizing 
nature’s sacredness or even the parity of humans and nature. In fact, in The History Mill, as Acosta before 
him, regarded the belief in the divinity of nature as a definite proof of the backwardness that prevailed 
‘among rude tribes’.96 The savage venerated the sun and found spirits everywhere around him. Even the 
Brahmans in India were fearful of the mysterious power of nature and, in consequence, tried to procure 
its favor through different religious rites.97 The deification and fear of nature were characteristics of 
rudimentary minds. So was the Indian belief that animals and plants had internal consciousness and were 
able to feel pain and pleasure.98 Mill even considered with a mixture of curiosity and disdain the Hindu’s 
‘superstitious care of the life of inferior animals’.99 There was no doubt that animals as with the rest of 
nature were inferior creatures. Thus, there was no external limit to the application of the human intellect 
to the elucidation of the laws of nature, a knowledge that enabled the manipulation of the environment 
for the attainment of material progress. Harnessing nature through science and technology were signs of 
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high civilization. Conversely, Indian unscientific explanations for the laws of nature was a proof of 
rudeness.100 
Mill retained from conjectural history the idea that the degree of mastery over the environment was a 
mark of social advancement. Two innovations in the way in which humans could affect their habitats 
were vital for the improvement of the human condition from the first stages of society to the peak of 
civilization. Once humans had become acquainted with the regularities of nature they could better devise 
instruments that amplified their power over it. Technological progress had created a gulf between the life 
of the savage and that of ‘the great capitalist, the owner of a manufactory’.101 Whereas the former applied 
his muscles directly to nature, the latter had created machines that increased the wealth that humans could 
squeeze out of their surroundings. Technological advance led to the improvement of human productive 
capabilities.102 In addition, the division of labor was indispensable for an efficient production of 
commodities.103 Specialization allowed the production of infinite commodities out of natural materials, 
exchanging them for monetary value. A society in which nature could be transformed, packed, and 
commercialized had undoubtedly reached the apex of material advancement.  
 
John Stuart Mill, stadial theory, and settler colonialism 
The famous first-born son of James Mill and his wife Harriet Burrow came into the world on 20 May 
1806.104 John Stuart Mill was born on Rodney Street, Pentonville, a suburb of London.105 The most 
noteworthy aspect of Mill’s early life was the outstanding informal education that he received. As 
mentioned earlier, the elder Mill tutored him and made John Stuart’s intellectual upbringing one of his 
life’s priorities. His efforts were not in vain. Despite never having attended school or university John 
Stuart Mill was a young prodigy.  
He learnt Greek at the age of three so he could read Plato in his mother tongue.106 By the age of six he 
started to create his first texts, writing a history of Rome.107 Only two years later he began learning 
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Latin.108 Mill absorbed knowledge at a remarkable pace. From an early age, his education comprised a 
vast number of readings of varied and eminent authors such as Homer, Plutarch, Cicero, Plato, Aristotle, 
Newton, Shakespeare, Cervantes, Milton, Spencer, Hume, Smith, and Ricardo, just to name a few.109 
There were also some dark clouds in John’s outstanding education. The sole emphasis on his rational 
development had the downside of a lack of attention to his emotional and social needs. The younger Mill 
would eventually pay a heavy toll for the absence of affection in his rearing and the loneliness that 
accompanied him in his early years.110 He experienced a full-blown mental crisis in the autumn of 1826 
at the age of 20, a type of episode that continued to happen on occasion, albeit mildly, later in his life. 
Several factors converged in the genesis of his melancholic state. The winter of 1826 was particularly 
gloomy. What is more, he felt lonely and tired out, rather unsettling factors on their own ground.111 On 
top of things, his intellectual foundations were strongly shakened, which provoked a sense of betrayal 
toward his father.112 All those contingent factors were exacerbated by a recurrent state of social isolation 
and a lack of emotional closeness. When Mill sank into depression, he had nobody close with whom to 
share the heavy load of his agitated mind. 
Fortunately, Mill recovered quickly once he was able to get in touch with his emotions. While reading 
Marmontel's Memoirs tears began to run down his cheeks. At that moment he realized that, fortunately, 
he was not like ‘a stock or a stone’ because he could finally feel something.113 From then on, Mill decided 
to redress the imbalance of his earlier education by paying attention to his emotional needs. Thus, he 
turned to poetry and the arts.114 The crisis had another important effect: he uncritically followed the 
intellectual footsteps of his father no longer. Mill opened his mind to different philosophical, cultural and 
                                                 
108 John Stuart Mill, ‘Autobiography [1873] and Literary Essays’ in John Robson (ed.), The Collected Works of John Stuart 
Mill (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1981) Vol I Ch I 13. [Hereafter CW]. 
109 Collini, J.S. Mill, 6-7. 
110 In his Autobiography Mill recounts the severity and lack of patience with which his father raised him, ‘constantly meriting 
reproof’. See Mill, CW,Vol I Ch I 39, Ch II 53. Moreover, he explained that his father ‘resembled almost all Englishmen in 
being ashamed of the sign of feeling’; Ibid., Ch II 53. And he added: ‘The element which was chiefly deficient in his moral 
relation to his children, was that of tenderness’; Ibid. In the same vain, Mill resented the lack of maternal closeness and love 
toward him, something he believed had also limited his father’s capacity for affection; CW, Vol I Ch II 53 (early draft) and 
CW, Vol I 612 (appendix G). 
111 Reeves, John, 62. See also Richard John Halliday, John Stuart Mill (London, George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1976) 13. 
112 For an interesting psychoanalytical explanation of Mill´s crisis, see Mazlish, James & John, 205-220. 
113 Mill, CW, Vol I Ch V 145. 
114 Ibid., 146. 
272 
 
political positions.115 He blended those influences with the empiricism and utilitarianism in which he had 
been raised, dedicating his life, time, and energy to reform and rethink the main tenets of liberal culture.116 
In the last years of his life, Mill focused his critical energy on the struggle for women’s rights and the 
improvement of the condition of the working class.117 He also reflected and wrote on the role of religion 
and the future of socialism.118 On May 7, 1873, at the age of 67, he died of eripypelas, a bacterial infection, 
in Avignon.119 
During his prolific career as a public servant, journalist, philosopher, politician, editor, and 
campaigner, John Stuart Mill was to achieve high intellectual stature. Ever since, his reputation has not 
decreased. If anything, the breadth and depth of his work has elevated his fame to the point of being 
commonly regarded as one of the most reputed thinkers of the XIX century. Mill directed his scholarly 
attention and reformative agenda to the complex social, political, economic, cultural, and religious 
changes that swept across English society in the aftermath of the Industrial Revolution. Still, he never 
lost sight of the broader project that imbued his intellectual career: the improvement of mankind, which 
according to him was one of the few pursuits that could make life a happy experience.120 Love was the 
quintessential force that animated this noble enterprise.121 In fact, the betterment of the human lot was 
tantamount to a faith without God: the religion of humanity.122 
As in the case of his father, Mill’s cosmopolitanism broadened his intellectual horizons so that his 
reflections encompassed the whole world. Reality outside Europe was an important object of inquiry. His 
writings frequently engaged with the question of Empire and the degree of social advancement of non-
European peoples. Due to his views on these matters, several authors have regarded Mill as an ardent 
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advocate of British imperialism.123 In contrast, others have claimed that his perspective on non-European 
people was more tolerant, complex, and flexible than the former camp of authors have acknowledged.124 
In this light, it has been argued, for example, that his theories contained both imperialist and anti-
imperialist tendencies. What is more, in his last years of his life a series of events made him more hesitant 
about the benefits that empire brought to non-Europeans, while still not completely renouncing the idea 
of empire per se.125 Ambiguity about imperialism was predominantly the result of Mill's disenchantment 
with the violence that pervaded the way in which the British ran their colonies. British greed and brute 
force in colonial societies were an instable and dangerous combination.  
Mill’s engagement with British imperialism was not only the result of detached abstract theorizing. 
Following his father’s footsteps, he started working for the EIC as a simple clerk at age seventeen, and 
remained at the service of the EIC for 35 years. He progressively ascended the ranks of the Indian House 
until becoming Chief Examiner of Indian Correspondence in 1956, which gave him a power similar to 
that of a Secretary of State.126 He served at the Political Department, where he dealt with the independent 
territories under the rule of an Indian chief and in which the British retained partial jurisdiction.127 Mill 
defended the continuation of the EIC’s administration of India against the idea of a direct involvement of 
the state. Adherence to this stance made him resign from his position once the government of India was 
transferred to British administration. In addition, he declined the State´s invitation to hold a new position 
in the recently created Indian Office. 
John Stuart Mill showed a vivid interest as well in the new British possessions in the Pacific. His views 
on the settler colonies of Australia and New Zealand were influenced by those of Edward Gibbon 
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Wakefield, a political economist that advocated state-sponsored systematic colonization.128 In 1830 
Wakefield created a Colonization Society, with the aim of promoting British settlement of the South 
Pacific. The following year, Jeremy Bentham, who had converted to Wakefield’s creed, drafted a charter 
for the proposed Colony of South Australia and suggested naming it Felicitania.129 In 1834, Mill joined 
the South Australian Association, which had been created the previous year, campaigning for the 
involvement of the British state in the creation of a new colony with that name.130 Mill also invested 
directly in the new colonial enterprise, buying land in New Zealand.131 
Mill’s philosophy of history had the imprint of the conjectural history of the Scottish Enlightenment. 
He loved reading history, and as a consequence of those readings he had his mind ‘full of details of the 
history of the obscurest ancient people’.132 As part of his early education, he had read the works of 
Robertson, Gibbon, Ferguson, Millar, and Smith.133 In addition, James Mill influenced John’s conception 
of philosophical history both directly and indirectly. A part of his intellectual formation his father 
transmitted to him ‘explanations and ideas respecting civilization’.134 His father´s History of British India 
also exercised particular influence over the younger Mill.135 As he stated in his autobiography: 
 
The number of new ideas which I received from this remarkable book, and the impulse and stimulus as well as 
guidance given to my thoughts by its criticisms and disquisitions on society and civilization in the Hindoo part, on 
institutions and the acts of government in the English part made my early familiarity with this book eminently 
useful to my subsequent progress. And though I can perceive deficiencies in it now as compared with a perfect 
standard, I still think it the most instructive history ever yet written.136 
 
                                                 
128 See Donald N. Winch, ‘Classical Economics and the Case for Colonization’ 30 Economica (1963) 387-399. 
129 Bernard Semmel, ‘The Philosophical Radicals and Colonialism’ 21 The Journal of Economic History (1961) 513-525, 
518-519. See also Bhikhu Parekh (ed.), Jeremy Bentham: Critical Assessments (New York, Routledge, 1993) 345. 
130 Bell, ‘John Stuart Mill’, 38-39. 
131 John Stuart Mill, ‘The Earlier Letters 1812-1848 Part II’ in John Robson (ed.), The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill 
(Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1981) Vol XIII, letter to Henry Chapman, November 12, 1845, 687. 
132 Mill, CW, Vol I, Autobiography, 16. 
133 Ibid., 11, 15 and 31. This notwithstanding, Capaldi considers that much of the Scottish Enlightenment was absent from 
Mill’s reading list during his formative period. See Capaldi, John Stuart Mill, 8. 
134 Ibid., 11. 
135  Javed Majeed, Ungoverned Imaginings: James Mill’s The Hisotry of British India and Orientalism (Oxford, Clarendon 
Press, 1992) 145. For Thomas, his father book sparked his ‘preoccupation with backward and progressive social states which 
marks all his political writing and much of his thinking’. See William Thomas, Mill (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1985) 
2.  
136 Mill, CW, Vol I, Autobiography, 27. 
275 
 
His father also encouraged Mill to read the works of Philip Beaver, an officer of the Royal Navy that 
participated in a failed attempt of settlement in Africa, and Captain-Lieutenant David Collins, one of the 
founders of the colony of New South Wales.137 These books contained adventures of adventurers and 
pioneers who participated in the exploration and colonization of Africa and New South Wales. They 
portrayed virtuous, energetic, and resourceful individuals facing insurmountable obstacles in their effort 
to tame wilderness. In his Africa Memoranda Beaver showed appreciation for the African people. His 
philanthropic leaning was exhibited in his desire to civilize and liberate Africans from slavery by 
introducing cultivation.138 The colonists of New South Wales were equally animated by the prospect of 
‘establishing civilization in the savage world’.139 
 Mill’s conception of civilization first appeared in his Essay on Civilization. In this work, he 
distinguished between two different senses of the term civilization. In the ‘narrow sense’ civilization 
denoted a particular kind of social improvement, namely, one characterized by material amelioration. In 
this sense, civilization was the antithesis of savagery and ‘rudeness or barbarism’.140 Civilization could 
also be understood, Mill held, as holistic human betterment. This was the kind of improvement that led 
individuals and societies on the road to perfection, toward a ‘happier, nobler and wiser’ existence.141 
In Mill’s philosophy of history savagery and civilization were antithetical. He explained the contrast 
between these opposite types of society by reference to a series of familiar standards characteristic of 
stadial theory. A savage community was composed of wandering individuals ‘scattered over a vast tract 
of country’ with ‘no commerce, no manufactures, no agriculture or next to none’.142 Conversely, a 
civilized society comprised of a ‘dense population … dwelling in fixed habitations … and rich in the 
fruits of agriculture, commerce and manufactures’.143 The productive capacity of a civilized society was 
complemented by the legal guarantee of personal security and private property, measures of protection 
that redounded in the increase of ‘wealth and population’.144 Europe and Great Britain in particular 
exhibited the typical features of a civilized and affluent area/society that was in constant progress.145 At 
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the other end of the spectrum, the absence of a system of law and administration of justice made savage 
societies vulnerable to the threat of continuous conflict, thus hindering the possibility of advancement.146 
In his reflections on civilization in the ‘narrow sense’, Mill used classical elements of conjectural 
history like material production and property, combining them with novel factors such as intelligence. 
While increases in intelligence and the apparition of the notion of property were surely hallmarks of 
civilization, they were still incomplete without another quintessential factor that Mill added to the 
equation: co-operation. Savages and slaves were ‘incapable of acting in concert’.147 They were not totally 
unintelligent, but their intelligence was not enough to form a superior common purpose and to adhere to 
it.148 Perfect co-operation and the capacity of organized combination were distinguished attributes of 
civilized life.149 
Mill provided numerous examples demonstrating that in the most advanced European nations 
intelligence, property, and the capacity to co-operate were expanding the horizons of human progress at 
a swift pace. The increase of the ‘physical and mental power' of the masses was in itself a remarkable 
achievement, and hence something to be celebrated.150 Civilization in the ‘narrow sense’ was clearly 
good.151 Material advancement was an indispensable constituent element of social progress. In 
consequence, those who remained outside the threshold of civilization had first to undertake the necessary 
changes in order to reach the economic level that prepared them for the next step on the ladder of progress. 
This twofold division of social advancement was reminiscent of the classifications used by the elder Mill.  
Despite its merits, the ‘narrow type’ of civilization was not a straightforward path to the supreme 
cosmopolitan goal of human happiness. Moreover, without proper guidance, ‘new rules and new courses 
of action’, it was likely that it would actually hinder ‘the road to perfection’.152 It was evident for Mill 
that this had actually happened in contemporary Europe. The clearest indication of this state of affairs 
was the absence of notable intellectual and moral works and achievements.153 In Europe the natural 
growth of the ‘narrow type’ of civilization had produced the biggest obstacle for further progress as the 
masses had swallowed the individual and his energy, and with it the ‘influence of superior minds over 
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the multitude’.154 That was a rather unwelcome development, one that needed urgent fixing through a 
panoply of new laws, policies, and practices. 
Did Mill’s diagnosis mean that advanced European societies had to renounce material progress and 
wealth in their quest for perfection? His answered was conclusive: ‘Assuredly not’.155 There was a cure 
for each of the symptoms that the illness of unrestrained material affluence had created. To counter the 
first evil—the evanescence and impotence of the individual absorbed by the crowd—Mill prescribed 
evermore co-operation.156 The second evil—the loss of individual energy, resourcefulness, and 
dynamism—could be remedied through national institutions and programs of education, combined with 
changes in policy and social practices.157 
In the Essay on Civilization John Stuart Mill had painted a crude picture of savage societies. This 
category was further developed in the Principles of Political Economy,158 published in 1848, where Mill 
elaborated the different stages of social development. In his exploration of the laws that explained the 
accumulation of wealth in different nations and times Mill put forward a rather typical account of stadial 
theory. The beginning of the social scale is by now familiar. The most backward type of society was 
inhabited by some of Mill’s contemporary tribes that still lived from hunting, fishing, and gathering.159 
They covered their bodies with animal skins and lived in rudimentary huts.160 This state of society, 
characterized by great poverty, was the lowest point of human existence, just above the condition of 
animality.161 The exertions of savages to procure subsistence were continuous, leaving little time for 
leisure and the cultivation of the mind. As a result, little of merit was ever produced at this early stage of 
social development. The conclusion was clear: savagery was a definite stumbling block in the road toward 
civilization. 
 The second state of society was pastoralism. The domestication of useful animals provided a 
‘constantly increasing stock of subsistence’.162 Raising flocks and herds was an enterprise that demanded 
far less human energy than hunting. As a result, leisure increased. Similarly, the wants and desires of the 
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members of pastoral communities expanded.163 In response to these transformations, social complexity 
increased. Domestic manufactures filled the new needs for ‘clothing, utensils, and implements’.164 Free 
time permitted exercising and expanding the mind, which fostered developments in the human capacity 
to penetrate the mysteries of reality, as the apparition of speculative science demonstrated.165 The growth 
of material wealth was accompanied by an increase in social inequality. Unlike the savage state, the 
shepherd state was characterized by unequal possessions.166 This notwithstanding, pastoralism 
represented a clear advancement in comparison to the stage of hunting-gathers. Furthermore, the shepherd 
period facilitated the transition to an even higher state of society.167 
 The inability of the old productive system to feed a growing population precipitated the changes that 
made it possible to further squeeze the earth’s natural wealth.168 The land was tilled for the first time and 
agricultural communities emerged around this activity. Under the new system of production food 
availability increased exponentially, and so did the population.169 But achieving a higher level of social 
improvement was no guarantee of automatic wealth. The beginnings of the new stage were far from rosy. 
In fact, rudimentary agriculture meant harder work and little leisure, except in the rare cases in which the 
land was rather fertile.170 Moreover, further progress took a long time.171 
After having arrived at the third stage of society Mill explained the historical divergent paths that 
Asiatic and European agricultural communities had taken thereon. They both had had rudimentary 
manufactures and a small commercial class. But whereas the former remained stagnant under a monarchic 
system, the latter continued progressing.172 Under the stimulus of a thriving bourgeois class, agricultural 
feudal Europe had moved into ‘commercial and manufacturing Europe’.173As a consequence of these 
changes in the productive structure, the most advanced European societies had reached a level of progress 
unmatched in the history of mankind.174 They were surely at the apex of human civilization. 
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As his statements about Europe and Asia clearly demonstrated, humanity had not moved uniformly 
through the four social stages that Mill had delineated. Rather, the world was a mosaic of polities that 
widely differed in terms of wealth and social sophistication. There were living examples of hunting, 
pastoralist, agricultural, and commercial-manufacturing communities.175 
What were the causes that accounted for the existence of such disparate social states? Like his father, 
John Stuart Mill did not single out any specific explanatory factor, but pointed instead to a variety of 
reasons. Some of them belonged to the moral and psychological spheres and depended on ‘institutions 
and social relations’.176 Importantly, others related to the knowledge of the ‘laws of nature’ and the 
capacity to use that knowledge to extract ‘the instruments of human subsistence and enjoyment from the 
materials of the globe’.177 
Mill’s conception of nature in Principles was similar to his father’s. Nature was not motionless matter. 
On the contrary, the powers of nature were of foremost importance for the production of wealth. 
Production was the result of mixing human labor and nature’s intrinsic powers.178 In fact, ‘all that man 
does, or can do’, Mill affirmed, was ‘putting things into fit places’ so that the internal powers of nature 
could act upon them.179 Did this mean that nature was more important than labor for the production of 
wealth? Did nature’s aliveness set limits on human acquisitiveness and the desire to consume its 
materials? 
For Mill, nature played two main roles in the production of wealth. In addition to its internal powers, 
it also furnished the raw materials to which human labor could be applied.180 Of these two functions, the 
provisioning of raw materials was the most important.181 So, the availability of raw materials and the 
application of labor onto them were the essential elements of human productiveness. But even between 
these two aspects the balance tipped in favor of human agency. Better natural endowments such as fertile 
soil, mild weather, abundance of mineral resources, and easy access to the sea offered a clear productive 
advantage.182 However, even a deficient natural habitat could be compensated by sustained and preserved 
human energy applied to its modification. Throughout history, poor but hard working communities had 
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often surpassed their richer counterparts in the pursuit of material affluence.183 Increase in wants and 
desires acted as a powerful incentive for labor. In light of these conclusions, it was natural that Mill 
believed that the indolence of the ‘North American Indian’ condemned him to a precarious life.184 In 
order to ‘civilize a savage’, he ought to 'be inspired with new wants and desires’ so that ‘their gratification’ 
could be ‘a motive to steady and regular bodily and mental exertion’.185 
Material acquisitiveness and the desire of riches was a powerful driver of behavior, encouraging 
humans to work and further transform their habitats in order to achieve a life of plenty. But as population 
grew and desires multiplied the extraction of natural resources intensified; a fact that could potentially 
exhaust them. Exhaustion of resources meant low productivity, and that in turn was equivalent to meager 
returns. This was, in a nutshell, the economic law of diminishing returns.  
Mill offered a simple way out of this conundrum: an increase of human power over nature. The 
extension of human ‘knowledge of the laws of nature’ resulted in innovation, technical advancements, 
and ‘new processes of industry’ which in turn permitted the surmounting of nature’s limits and the 
maintenance of high productivity.186 In the words of Mill, human knowledge and power over nature 
succeeded in ‘making for ourselves more space within the limits set by the constitution of things’.187 Mill 
gave concrete examples that illustrated how superior skills, techniques, and machines applied to 
agriculture and mining helped enhance productivity and overcome nature’s boundaries.188 The law of 
diminishing returns could be reversed by whatever added 'to the general power of mankind over nature; 
and especially by an extension of their knowledge, and their consequent command, of the properties and 
powers of natural agents’.189 
Mill’s conception of the human/nature relationship in the Principles is in line with ideas presented 
later in his life in Nature, an essay written between 1850 and 1858.190 In this work the term nature had 
two different meanings. On the one hand, it referred to ‘the entire system of things’ or, in other words, 
the sum of ‘all phenomena’ and ‘the power and properties of all things’.191 On the other hand, it denoted 
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the way in which the world was without human intervention.192 It was in this second sense that art and 
nature were opposites, and so were the adjectives ‘artificial’ and ‘natural’.  
The relationship between humans and nature was different depending on which of the two senses of 
the latter term one employed. As for the first meaning, it was logical that humans could just follow nature 
and not intervene in it because the term comprised everything that existed.193 In Principles, Mill affirmed 
that the limits of nature and the mind were not infinite and, thus, humans could not alter their ‘ultimate 
properties’.194 This did not mean, however, that humans could not carve for themselves a niche of freedom 
within the realm of existence. Human beings could not evade the ‘laws of nature’, but they could direct 
them toward a purpose that was desirable to them.195 This was the great insight of Bacon: humans could 
‘obey nature in such a manner as to command it’.196 
Nature could also be understood in a narrow sense: as opposed to craftsmanship. So conceived, Mill 
wondered whether it was good to let nature freely run its course or whether humans ought to intervene in 
it and amend it.197 Traditional religious beliefs presented nature as God’s work and creation.198 The fear 
of interfering with God’s designs had historically curtailed attempts to transform nature, thus hindering 
human improvement.199 But this did not need to be the case. The modification of nature was not inevitably 
opposed to religiosity; on the contrary, the essence of religion was defined as the duty of ‘man … to 
amend himself’ and to amend 'the world’.200 
Nature was not a realm of order and perfection. In fact, Mill sustained that nature contained an 
immense destructive power within it and had a great capacity to produce evil.201 Without a stern control 
over it, humans were certainly destined to suffer its ‘perfect and absolute recklessness’.202 Nature killed, 
caused terror, tortured, and destroyed sources of provision, which drove millions to starvation.203 What 
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is more, ‘she’204 did all that with ‘disregard both of mercy and of justice’.205 In the realm of animated 
creatures the prospect was no rosier. Unless ‘tamed and disciplined by men', 'the animal kingdom’ 
presented also an ‘odious scene of violence and tyranny’.206 What Mill called ‘lower animals’ could just 
be divided between ‘devourers and devoured’.207 Sensitive to abuses of power, Mill saw the animal world 
through human lenses and despised the fact that the stronger destroyed the weaker.208 
In consideration of the overwhelming evidence of nature’s destructiveness, it was logical that not only 
irreligious people but also religious ones ought to encourage ‘human rational creatures to rise up and 
struggle against’ it.209 Nature was a realm laden with deficiencies, dangers, and devastation. The same 
could be said about human nature. For the sake of the progress of mankind it was incumbent upon humans 
to intervene in the natural world in order to reform and reshape it by taming, directing, controlling, and 
commanding nature.210 
In Book IV of Principles Mill dealt again with the question of human power over nature. In spite of 
significant divergences between the four social stages of progress he identified an undercurrent of 
economic change that was common or was to eventually be common to all of them. Mill affirmed that 
the most advanced societies and ‘all others as they come within the influence of those leading countries’ 
were increasing in material prosperity.211 There were several reasons for this momentous expansion of 
the world’s wealth. The first was ‘the perpetual, and so far as human foresight can extend, the unlimited, 
growth of man’s power over nature’.212 According to Mill, human command over non-human nature, 
which was ‘still almost in its infancy’, stemmed from the combination of increased scientific knowledge 
of physical laws and the translation of that knowledge into physical power through technology.213 The 
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‘application of science to practical uses’ was changing the face of the Earth.214 It was also enabling 
humans (at least some of them) to enjoy a level of material affluence unparalleled in human history.  
The other two factors that accounted for the economic advancement of humanity were the institutional 
protection of the security of persons and property and the capacity to co-operate. Security of life and 
possessions provided a solid basis for production and accumulation.215 They also created the social 
conditions that fostered peace. As far as European nations were concerned, war was almost exclusively 
restricted to some of their overseas possessions—concretely, to the frontiers of civilization, those places 
in which there were still clashes with ‘savages’.216 The capacity of individuals to come together and join 
their energies for a common project was a third key element for the increasing creation of wealth.  
It is worth noticing that Mill considered the three elements that contributed to the increase of human 
wealth as also distinctive features of civilized societies. For example, he stated that ‘the peculiar 
characteristic of … civilized beings, is the capacity of co-operation’.217 But if only advanced societies 
were in possession of the traits that generated economic progress, how could backward societies achieve 
the same result? Mill believed that this challenge was being overcome, as most nations were brought 
within the sphere of influence of the most advanced countries.218 Even those that were not moving forward 
were eventually to progress: 
 
All the nations which we are accustomed to call civilized, increase gradually in production and population: and 
there is no reason to doubt, that not only these nations will for some time continue so to increase, but that most of 
the other nations of the world, including some not yet founded, will successively enter upon the same career.219 
 
Despite the positive effects of economic progress, Mill did not consider it a goal to be accomplished at 
all costs. Unlike most previous political economists such as Adam Smith, he believed that a stationary 
state, one without economic growth, was not necessarily negative.220 In fact, it could be a better state of 
affairs than his contemporary state of society, what he called ‘our present condition’.221 Mill defended 
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economic stagnation, which apparently contradicted the logic of progress, based on the underlying 
distinction that he had always made between the two senses of the word civilization and, hence, of 
progress.222 It was clear for Mill that there was a higher social goal than further material accumulation.  
In theory, the level of wealth enjoyed in affluent societies was enough to provide everyone a happy 
life. In practice, capital had accumulated in just a few hands, creating impoverishment, social inequality, 
and myriad social problems associated with them. This is why Mill believed that, as countries achieved 
a level of economic sophistication similar to that of England, the priority was redistribution rather than 
further growth.223 Whereas the latter contributed to civilization in a ‘narrow sense’, the former was in line 
with a higher conception of progress: human happiness. For Mill, ‘the best state of human nature’ was 
one in which ‘while no one is poor, no one desires to be richer’.224 
Unrestrained material advancement could potentially cause another major setback, one that is 
particularly important in evaluating the environmental implications of Mill’s thought. Unlimited human 
acquisitiveness could create an infinite incentive to modify nature to such degree as to strip it off its 
agreeable features.225 Mill did not think that economic growth in an advance society like England had 
already surpassed the limit of sustainability, but the risk was nevertheless real. In that hypothetical case, 
a stationary state in which nature was preserved from total degradation was preferable.226 
These remarks seem to be in tension with the ideas that Mill had expressed in his essay Nature, in 
which he had treated the human-nature relationship from a diametrically different perspective. In this 
work he had affirmed with conviction that ‘the ways of Nature are to be conquered, not obeyed’.227 Nature 
was composed of negative attributes, destructive qualities as much as pleasant ones. The different ‘faces 
of nature’ explains Mills ambivalence. Mill’s admonition against ‘environmental’ destruction stemmed 
from an aesthetic preoccupation mixed with Malthusian anxiety. Besides, economic growth and its 
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concomitant population growth threatened the possibility of experiencing solitude in the pleasant English 
landscape, something that Mill particularly cherished.228 The destruction of the landscape was tantamount 
to the destruction of the possibility of enjoying loneliness. Being alone, Mill affirmed, was necessary for 
‘meditation’ and the formation of a solid character.229 Only in solitude could humans perceive ‘the beauty 
and grandeur of nature’.230 This deep connection of humans with their surroundings reinvigorated the 
mind and redounded in the good of society.231 Industrialization threatened to destroy this possibility. 
Mill’s own life experience influenced his aesthetic and ‘environmental’ concerns. His long walks in 
solitude provided him a kind of mental gymnastics that refreshed his reason and energized his soul.232 He 
admired the orderly nature of the English countryside.233 It was this kind of landscape, which incarnated 
the beauty of an already humanized nature, that he did not want to lose. Moreover, Mill forewarned about 
the possibility of economic growth leaving nothing to the ‘spontaneous activity of nature’.234 It was this 
extreme and gloomy prospect that triggered Mill’s protective attitude. Reconciling economic progress 
and nature’s preservation before ‘every rood of land’, ‘every flowery waste or natural pasture’, ‘all 
quadrupeds or birds’, and every ‘wild shrub or flower’ were destroyed in the name of higher productivity 
still left ample space for a thorough use of natural resources. Only the total destruction of nature 
demanded halting economic growth.  
Mill’s defense of social equalitarianism and ‘environmental sustainability’ acted as a powerful 
counterbalance to his belief in the desirability of economic progress. But there was an important spatial 
exception that qualified his previous statements: economic growth was still desirable and utterly 
necessary in backward countries. Similarly, most of the world’s natural frontiers had not yet been 
conquered, and ample tracts of land were still vacant. Wilderness incarnated the kinds of imagery of 
African and Pacific regions that Mill’s childhood tails of discovery had imprinted in his mind. Non-
European societies were stagnant, and nature in those societies had yet to be squeezed sufficiently enough 
so as to create the material conditions that permitted reaching the threshold of civilization. For example, 
China—one of the most advanced non-European societies—was in a state of ‘permanent halt’.235 For that 
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reason, it was of outmost importance to instill economic motion into the dormant social structure of those 
countries.  
The simplest recipe for healing the economic malaise that pervaded backward societies was to increase 
production by exciting the desire for accumulation.236 This desire had to be implanted deeply into the 
consciousness of individuals. By infusing the need to have more possessions in peoples’ minds, their 
psychological structure could be affected and, hence, the wheel of progress could be moved from within 
backward societies. But in order to accomplish that change there were first a series of encompassing 
economic and political reforms that had to be undertaken. To start with, better government was needed, 
which for Mill meant one that protected private property, moderated taxes, and redistributed land.237 In 
addition, collective intelligence had to increase. The way to do so was by eliminating the superstitious 
beliefs that hindered productivity, and stimulating and driving mental activity toward ‘new objects of 
desire’.238 Finally, foreign technology and capital were required in order to foster productivity and propel 
the economy.239 
It is important to bear in mind that these economic and political prescriptions applied only to most 
Asian nations and to the ‘less civilized and industrious parts of Europe’.240 Mill inherited from his father 
the conviction that different social states had to be treated differently, in the sense that the degree of social 
development of a particular community was a crucial factor in order to determine the most suitable 
institutions and form of government.241 The best government was one adapted to the state of advancement 
of a particular society, which was also capable of carrying a people to the next stages of progress.242 
But how could a backward society produce individuals with the genius, skill, and competencies 
required to carry out such a dire and thorough transformation? Backward societies would naturally tend 
to produce backward individuals. Mill made clear the distinction between self-improving nations and un-
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improving ones.243 He even maintained that due to the despotism of custom ‘the greater part of the world’ 
had ‘properly speaking, no history’.244 How then to break this vicious cycle of backwardness that kept 
societies motionless and off the tracks of history? One possibility was the rise of a virtuous king. 
However, as Mill acknowledged, that was a rare occurrence.245 There was a short leap from the conviction 
of the almost impossibility of endogenous social change to the conclusion that the only alternative for the 
betterment of backward societies was the possibility of being governed by foreign more advanced polities. 
That was precisely what Mill recommended.246 Despotic rule had been historically important in bringing 
about social improvement.247 Thus, imperial rule was a necessary evil for the sake of human progress.  
The standard to judge whether foreign rule was positive or negative was its competence to adapt to the 
social state of the particular polity it administered. This is why Mill’s stadial theory remained important 
in the context of British imperialism. Savage societies could not be brought within the pale of civilization 
using the same economic and political recipes than those applied to semi-civilized countries. For instance, 
Mill recommended free trade for the civilization and economic development of semi-civilized 
countries,248 but in the unoccupied parts of the Earth, where savages like the peoples of Australia still 
lived, his prescriptions were rather different: migration and colonization.249 
The world of savages was also a world of wilderness. On some occasions Mill used that specific word 
to describe the habitats of hunting-gatherer communities.250 More often he employed terms such as 
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unoccupied lands,251 unoccupied parts of the earth,252 unoccupied continents,253 unpeopled continents,254 
uncultivated or ill-cultivated regions of the world, waste lands,255 etc., which conveyed the same idea of 
a vacuum to be filled. These empty spaces comprised an economic emptiness in the form of unutilized or 
underutilized natural resources waiting to be occupied and put into use, and a civilizational vacuum that 
required the construction of an advanced civil society.  
The reference to the lack of economic exploitation of the land and the lack of agriculture or its deficient 
nature is reminiscent of theoretical arguments used by Locke in North America during the seventeenth 
century. For Mill, virgin portions of the world and those that had not been intensively utilized had yet to 
be tamed, exploited, and civilized. He shared with Locke the belief that private property on land was 
related to labor and improvement. Explaining the origin of landed property, Mill affirmed that although 
‘no man made the land, men, by their industry, made the valuable qualities of it; they reclaimed it from 
the waste, they brought it under cultivation, they made it useful to man, and so acquired as just a title to 
it as men have to what they have themselves made’.256 According to Mill’s view, and carried by the 
British colonists, in the wilderness of Australia the improvement and privatization of the land went hand 
in hand.  
Mill’s economic and civilizing program for settler colonies fused in his plan to found the colony of 
South Australia. British surplus capital and population could find a suitable exit in faraway pristine 
lands.257 State sponsored colonization could alleviate social pressure at home while providing the best 
foundation for the construction of a new civilized society in a corner of the world which had been so far 
underutilized and thus held ‘vast productive resources’.258 Importantly, Mill conceived the exploitation 
of Australia´s natural resources as a cosmopolitan program connected with the promotion of ‘the 
economic interest of the human race’259 and designed to increase the ‘produce of the world’.260 
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British colonies provided a blank political and physical space in which to build an economically sound 
and polished society from the scratch, meaning one that avoided the several pitfalls that troubled British 
society, which prevented the full realization of human happiness. In Mill’s own words:  
 
Like the Grecian colonies, which flourished so rapidly and so wonderfully as soon to eclipse the mother cities, this 
settlement will be formed by transplanting an entire society, and not a mere fragment of one. English colonies have 
almost always remained in a half-savage state for many years from their establishment. This colony will be a 
civilized country from the very commencement.261 
 
The establishment of a colony in the ‘desert’ required thorough economic, social, and political 
engineering.262 There were several challenges to this utopian social dream.263 One of the perils was the 
possibility that the colonies reverted to a condition of savagery/barbarism if unsuitable economic policies 
were implemented. Having ‘a scattered population of settlers in the wilderness’ was something to be 
avoided at all costs.264 If colonists dispersed too rapidly and appropriated excessive land the new project 
was doomed to end up in fiasco.265 From the very outset the new society would suffer a loss of productive 
power and a delay in the attainment of ‘wealth and civilization’.266 The external wilderness of the natural 
world was an ever-present menace to human nature: either the colonists tamed it and imposed their 
civilization on the supposedly pristine landscapes of Australia, or those wild habitats could awake in them 
the savage traits that lay dormant under the civilized influence of their metropolitan upbringing. 
It is noteworthy that in Mill’s early writings about the Australian colonies there was almost no mention 
of the pre-colonial population of Australia or their societies.267All allusions to Australia referred to the 
new colonial society in formation. Mill’s ambitious vision of transplanting an entire society to South 
Australia presupposed the absence of an analogous social formation in Australia upon which the 
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experiment of founding a new colony would have impacted. There was no social space in South Australia 
prior to the arrival of British settlers, only a wild physical space that had to be physical conquered before 
it could be civilized.  
The violent clash between the new comers and the former population of Australia was totally absent 
from Mill’s early writings and his description of the possible challenges presented by colonization.268 The 
invisibility of the peoples of Australia was conspicuous. For instance, when Mill examined the different 
types of dependencies, he distinguished between overseas territories composed of people at a great 
distance from the degree of civilization of the metropolis such as India, and those like Australia in which 
the colonial population had the same degree of civilization than the ruling country.269 The peoples of 
Australia were not included within the population that counted as inhabitants of the lands that used to be 
their territory. 
Despite an early lack of attention to the plight of the peoples of Australasia, Mill became more attuned 
to colonial violence in the later part of his life. He denounced the excesses committed by British colonists 
and settlers. This change of attitude coincided with a general modification of his position in regards 
British rule over non-European peoples. Several violent incidents in the British Overseas Territories, such 
as the Indian Mutiny and the Governor Eyre controversy in Jamaica270 to which the British authorities 
had responded with stern force, had brought to light the violence that often accompanied British rule. The 
revolts against British power in India and New Zealand had also affected the perception of non-European 
peoples in Britain and, consequently, their place within the Empire.271 It was no longer clear that they 
could be peacefully brought into civilization.  
In spite of a certain shift, and in opposition to it, Mill remained loyal to his political prescriptions for 
indirect expert rule over colonial affairs. But reality of Empire proved recalcitrant, inflicting a big blow 
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on the feasibility of Mill’s imperial approach and the legitimacy of British rule overseas. Violent 
authoritarianism in the name of order was exactly the opposite of his vision of enlightened colonial 
administration in the name of progress. But order and progress were not incompatible—it was the means 
to attain order in the colonies that had gone ashtray. As always, the elder Mill firmly believed that law 
and justice remained the foremost appropriate foundations of ‘order & civilization’.272 
There was more than one reason for Mill´s disenchantment with certain aspects of the British 
Empire.273 First of all, there was the economic setback that colonies had become increasingly 
protectionist, against Mill recommendations.274 A second element of contention was the power of colonial 
governments to decide about the apportioning of unoccupied land, something that had hindered their 
potential for economic advancement.275 Had the lands remained in the hands of the Crown, as Mill had 
advised, the outcome would have been more favorable. Finally, there was the issue of harsh treatment of 
the subject populations. 
Even though Mill never presented his criticism in his printed work, in his private letters he complained 
about the attitude of colonists and settlers in respect of the colonized populations. Concretely, in a letter 
written to Henry Samuel Chapman he denounced that the colonists’ avidness for land created a potential 
irresolvable conflict with the Maoris.276 Settlers’ disregard for ‘the rights and feelings of inferiors’ usually 
ended in abuse.277 In the case of New Zealand, he was unsure whether, left to the sole power of the 
colonists, that scenario was bound to take place. Perhaps the wars of resistance against British occupation 
launched by the Maoris had contributed to increasing the esteem in which the British held them, 
something that could have prevented abuse and mistreatment.278 If that was the case, there was no need 
for metropolitan interference with the colonists’ self-government in New Zealand.279 And he went on to 
comment that if the colonists of New Zealand managed to protect the Maoris, they would prove to be 
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different to the ‘common English abroad’ who often resorted to tyranny and injustice ‘over what they call 
inferior races’.280 
In places like Australia, where the original inhabitants were barely more advanced in terms of 
civilization than wild beasts, a progressive society had to be created from scratch. In the habitats of 
Australia, nature and pre-colonial populations fused. Both had to be transformed and improved. 
Ecosystems were the point of entry for that program of progress. Colonists had to exploit them and 
transform the backward populations of the earth into efficient individuals equally capable of exploiting 
nature effectively.  
Mill believed that—instilled with negative qualities—wild nature had to be amended by human 
knowledge and technology. In the same way, human nature ought to be guided by education. As he put 
it:  
 
In the times when mankind were nearer to their natural state, cultivated observers regarded the natural man as a 
sort of wild animal, distinguished chiefly by being craftier that the other beasts of the field; and all worth of 
character was deemed the result of a sort of taming … The truth is that there is hardly a single point of excellence 
belonging to human character, which is not decidedly repugnant to the untutored feeling of human nature.281 
 
Savages incarnated the untamed wilderness of human nature. They had few virtues.282 Those traditionally 
attributed to them, like veracity, were a myth. ‘Savages are always liars’, Mill affirmed.283 And those 
qualities that they did possess, like courage,284 were the result of education rather than inherent merit. 
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John Stuart Mill´s approach to imperialism evolved over time. While he remained silent to the 
suffering and violence that accompanied British expansion in his early writings, his growing awareness 
of abuses of power over non-Europeans gave rise to a more critical approach to discussions concerning 
global and colonial affairs in the later part of his life. The rapacity of the colonists put into question the 
whole colonial edifice and its cosmopolitan goal of redeeming and bettering humanity, demanding a 
response from somebody like the elder Mill who still believed in the possibility of human progress. In 
the 1860s he maintained that his age was one ‘in which many great improvements in human affairs have 
really been made’.285 
The last period of his life was also one in which intellectuals like him witnessed the opening of ‘new 
paths’.286 As human power over nature increased, great transformations were modifying the face of the 
Earth. In a revealing passage Mill foreshadow the possibility that in a not so distant future human power 
over nature on a global scale may reach its limit:  
 
The very idea of anything impassable and impenetrable is almost too charming, now when every nook and corner 
of our planet has got or is getting opened to the full light of the day. One of the many causes which make the age 
we are living in so very important in the life of the human race—almost, indeed, the turning point of it—is that so 
many things combine to make it the era of a great change in the conceptions and feelings of mankind as to the 
world of which they form a part. There is now almost no place left on our own planet that is mysterious to us, and 
we are brought within sight of the practical questions which will have to be faced when the multiplied human race 
shall have taken full possession of the Earth (and exhausted its principal fuel).287 
 
This passage evidences an ambivalent tone in Mills’ views with regard to nature. On the one hand, the 
idea of pristine nature and virgin place of wilderness was charming. Here again one can perceive Mill´s 
aesthetic appreciation of nature.288 On the other hand, the fact that habitats that had been previously 
untouched by any people—or so he thought—had been finally humanized worldwide was described 
through a metaphor that conveyed the idea of wilderness as a dark, closed realm that had finally been 
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pierced and, hence, opened to the ‘full light’ of civilization—what he called ‘the day’. Finally, Mill 
pointed out the challenging balance between world population and the natural resources at its disposal. It 
is interesting that he characterized that question as a practical one, instead of an ethical one. Perhaps 
further management and technology could resolve the thorny question of the human relationship to nature 
in an age in which more than ever before the environmental limits of the world were a foreseeable reality. 
It seemed certain for Mill that, as the end of the nineteenth century approached, one age, in which the 
world was yet imbued with mystery, had passed, never to come again. Paradoxically, the opening of the 
interior of Africa was soon to reveal a novel wilderness, myriad mysteries, and further natural frontiers 
for imperial powers to control and exploit. 
 
International lawyers, vacant territory, and savages (1800-1850) 
At the end of the eighteenth century, and despite nuances in the formulation of conjectural history, most 
authors shared a cluster of ideas about how societies transitioned from a backward to an advanced social 
state. In the context of European imperialism, those ideas were used to legitimize the universalization of 
legal institutions that allowed the privatization and commodification of nature in non-European 
territories. Additionally, they provided the intellectual justification for the transfer of ecosystems and 
their constitutive natural elements—or as the colonists predominantly perceived them: natural 
resources—from non-European societies to the colonists.  
There was no systematic treatment of stadial theory in the international legal texts of the first half of 
the nineteenth century. Actually, several treatises on international law289 (a term that came progressively 
into wider use after Bentham’s first coined it) did not even refer to the four social stages of classical 
stadial theory. However, almost all of them analyzed the right of ‘civilized’ nations (a category that 
included European colonial powers and the U.S.) to occupy ‘vacant’ territory populated by backward 
communities, which they predominantly characterized as savages. So, there was a debate about the 
doctrine of occupation, its definition, and scope. 
Although most commentators on international law shared the idea that it was legitimate for civilized 
nations to acquire vacant land, and defined occupation in similar terms, each author offered a slightly 
different angle to that discussion. Scholars’ perspectives were influenced by diverse factors such as 
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nationality, religiosity, and ideology. In general, commentators who belonged to imperialist nations were 
more inclined to legitimize the occupation of non-European territories than scholars who belonged to 
states which had no colonial ventures.290 
So even as stadial theory receded from the fore of legal discussions on international law, it was evident 
that most commentators shared a framework through which they conceptualized non-European societies 
that was informed by a progressive understanding of history which resembled that of conjectural history. 
Assumptions about European and non-European societies derived from conjectural history were so 
embedded in the intellectual milieu of the time that the categories of savagery and civilization became 
naturalized. Even those authors that were not well versed in or subscribed to stadial theory used those 
categories. In particular, the category of savage gained its own traction and, even separated from the 
progressive philosophy of history from which it had come into life, it continued legitimizing European 
imperial sway over nature and non-European populations alike. 
Conjectural history still resonated in some of the legal international texts at the turn of the nineteenth 
century. One of the authors that referred more explicitly to progressive history was Robert Plumer Ward 
(1765-1846). Ward wrote An Enquiry into the Foundation and the History of the Law of Nations in 
Europe, which is regarded as a pioneer effort at writing a history of international law.291 From the outset 
of his work, Ward attempted to prove that the law of nations could not be conflated into the law of nature. 
The transformation of the law of nations throughout history already seemed to contradict the supposed 
immutability of natural law.292 Moreover, even the duties of mankind that the law of nature prescribed 
varied significantly. For Ward, the history of mankind showed that each society, whether savage or 
civilized, had different sets of beliefs and practices regarding moral obligations.293 
The heterogeneity of practices characteristic of civilized societies already constituted a solid proof of 
the lack of universal duties.294 But, for Ward, nothing could dispel the belief in the immutability of moral 
practices more than looking at ‘the frightful picture of deformed humanity’ that was savage life.295 
Looking at the temporal mirror of savage life, one could see the deformity of pristine and raw human 
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nature directly.296 For Ward, the savage state was the most unfortunate in which humans had ever lived, 
one in which even the most basic moral rules were generally disregarded.297 
Ward framed his analysis of universal moral obligations in a stadial mold, contrasting the savage and 
civilized or cultivated states.298 Even though he did not describe any of these states in-depth, he provided 
several hints of the backwardness of savages. For instance, he explained that the ‘naked and solitary 
Indian’ who lived in a savage nation such as the ‘North American Indians’ feared natural forces and 
praised the sun and the moon.299 The worship of nature was a recurrent point in the characterization of 
savages as backward. For Ward, as for Acosta and James Mill, among others, savage’s reverence for 
nature was a clear sign that they had not gained ascendancy over the natural realm. In modern Europe 
things were different: science had disclosed nature’s secrets, allowing humans to claim their superior 
place and ascendancy vis-à-vis non-human nature. Considering non-human nature as sacred revealed the 
inferiority of North Americans. Worshipping what was inferior was the most definite proof of inferiority.  
After having carried out an examination of the diverse practices of different human societies, Ward 
could reasonably conclude that the relations between commonwealths had been historically characterized 
by the same degree of variance. As there was no universal law of nations, the only way to know what 
really constituted the law of nations was to look into the practices that had regulated the intercourse of 
different commonwealths at different historical junctures. 
The first period of the law of nations in Europe that Ward delineated was that of the Greeks and the 
Romans. One of the aspects to which Ward referred in his discussion of that period was the more humane 
practices toward war prisoners that the Romans professed in comparison to the Greeks. He mentioned 
Dr. Falconer’s opinion that the disparity of behavior between both polities had to do with the larger need 
for land characteristic of the savage and the shepherd states (Greeks), in contrast to the agricultural stage 
(Romans).300 Ward disagreed with Falconer’s depiction of the Greeks as shepherds. The fact that they 
practiced agriculture and were skillful merchants demonstrated that they had advanced from the savage 
state.301 What is more, the stature and prestige of Greek’s arts and sciences were in stark contrast with 
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the absence of science in the savage and shepherd states.302 Arts and sciences could only flourish in a 
society in which sophisticated productive practices provided food with ease, leaving time for leisure.303 
Ward did not translate his adherence to a progressive philosophy of history based on a society’s mode 
of production into a legitimization of the territorial displacement of savages. Actually, he was critical of 
European colonialism, contrasting for example the fairness of the Pennsylvanian Quakers who signed 
treaties with ‘the Indians’ to the oppression and enslavement of South American peoples under the 
pretense of Spanish evangelization.304 Ward acknowledged that there were different kinds of nations that 
differed in their social advancement. In his opinion, savages even formed nations, that is, social and 
political bodies with their own laws and customs.305 He noted that the ‘Shepherds, Husbandmen and 
Merchants’ all had ‘a different law of nations’.306 
This pluralism was irreconcilable with the colonial practices of European powers such as Spain and 
England. They had taken possessions of lands in blunt disregard for the entitlements of the original 
inhabitants.307 ‘Who among us’, he complained, would not have felt ‘indignation where a fleet of ships 
from some part of the Globe, hitherto unknown, (if such there be) to arrive to Europe on discoveries, and 
pretend to spoil us of our goods, or take possession of our territory upon the authority of similar 
patents?’308 
Ward’s critique of European land acquisition in the colonies anticipated other nineteenth-century 
critical voices who pointed out the unethical basis of European colonialism. Still, his defense of European 
treaties with North Americans and his aversion to savage life may indicate the existence and possibility 
of other more palatable ways of founding colonies abroad.309 
Another author that gave some preeminence to stadial theory in his writings was William Oke Manning 
(1809-1878). Several decades after Ward, Manning authored the first general British book on 
international law, Commentaries on the Law of Nations.310 Published in 1839, Manning’s treatise dealt 
mainly with the question of war. 
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For Manning, the law of nations or international law (he mentioned both names but preferred to use 
the first) was the scientific discipline that regulated intercourse between different nations.311According to 
him, the law of nations had three different sources. One of them was the law of nature, which he equated 
to the will of God.312 The other two, customs and conventions, formed together the positive law of 
nations.313 Unlike natural law, these sources did not emanate from Divine law, but rather from tacit or 
expressed human compact.314 It was in his treatment of one of the ‘positive’ sources of the law of nations, 
namely customary law, that Manning used conjectural history. 
For Manning, customary law was by definition based on the usages and practices of nations in the 
past.315 Nations and societies were in constant improvement, advancing toward a ‘civilized state of 
society’.316 As nations advanced in civilization, they faced the dilemma of having to respect practices of 
a less advanced historical period.317 Manning dismissed this obstacle, explaining that as nations climbed 
the ladder of civilization they substituted the limited usages of an ‘imperfect state of society’ for better 
ones.318 Social and legal progress went hand in hand. This positive association not only affected 
customary law. The advance of civilization had, for example, also brought about more humane 
regulations of international warfare.319 For Manning, this later change had come about largely due to the 
benefits of Christianity. In fact, he believed that ‘law, and civilization, and religion’ had all progressed at 
the same pace.320 
Manning used his own nomenclature to refer to the social stages through which societies transitioned 
from backwardness toward civilization. His categories resembled those of John Stuart Mill. He 
distinguished between savagery, barbarism, and civilization.321 He also referred to a semi-civilized 
period. These periods were not necessarily linked to concrete social states and the productive activities 
that characterized them, and their generality allowed Manning to use them interchangeably.322 So 
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barbarism, for example, could mean at times a general absence of civilization rather than a historical 
period in which a society lived from pastoralism.323 
As with Ward, Manning’s use of categories characteristic of stadial theory did not translate into a 
straightforward defense of European imperialism. In fact, it is difficult to know whether he considered 
savage or barbarian nations to be part of international law. When he discussed the treatment of prisoners 
it seemed that barbarians and savage nations had their own usages.324 
This confusion stemmed from the fact that Manning used these terms to refer to different temporalities 
within the European context, as well as to the social state of non-European communities. In this sense, 
the Middle Ages were characterized as barbaric times in which there were few customary usages that 
belonged to the law of nations. He also used the term ‘savage tribes’ to refer to human communities 
contemporary to his own who still lived in a backward state.325 He explained that their practices of war 
violated the laws of nature and thus could not be considered as part of the customary law of nations.326 
What is more, Manning believed that there was no notion of a law of nations in Greek times. He compared 
the Greeks to the Iroquois of North America, noticing nonetheless that, according to Montesquieu, the 
latter had some resemblance of law when it came to the treatment of ambassadors of other tribes.327 But 
again, Manning’s conviction that savages did not have laws was not carried to its end point, and remained 
silence as to their rights over the territories they inhabited. 
In the middle of the nineteenth century, stadial theory reappeared (for the last time) in the work of the 
Scottish lawyer James Reddie (1775-1852). Reddie studied at the Universities of Edinburgh and Glasgow, 
where he attended law lessons with highly reputed intellectuals of the Scottish Enlightenment Dugald 
Stewart and John Millar.328 
 James Reddie wrote a general treatise on international law entitled Inquiries in International Law 
Public and Private, first published in 1842.329 Like Manning, he defended the status of international law 
as a science, the object of which was the regulation of the intercourse between autonomous entities called 
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states.330 This definition of international law did not mean that Reddie considered positive law the only 
constitutive part of the body of international legality. Again, as with Manning, who had also followed 
Wheaton in this point, Reddie maintained that international law was integrated by the natural law of 
nations and the positive law of nations.331 
For Reddie, one of the key elements for understanding the origin of the law of nations was the 
productive activities that each nation employed to procure subsistence.332 In other words, the natural law 
of nations adapted to different stages of social advancement.333 A progressive philosophy of history and 
its terminology permeated Reddie’s work. Terms such as ‘rude state’, ‘rude stages of society’, ‘civilized 
state’, ‘less civilized nations’, ‘barbarous times’, ‘all stages of society’, ‘progressive improvement’, 
‘progress of civilization’, etc., abounded in his writings.334 Despite his adherence to stadial theory, 
Reddie, like James Mill, maintained that a society that subsisted exclusively from agriculture was in a 
rude stage.335 A nation was progressive only when it combined agriculture with manufactures and trade.336 
 Reddie’s classification of nations according to their degree of civilization did not excluded the less 
advanced from the realm of law. In fact, he exhibited a certain pluralism, admitting that the international 
law of civilized nations was as natural as that of rude ones.337 But the parity of civilized and rude nations 
worked only with regard to the natural law of nations. It was clear that the modern and advanced nations 
of Europe excelled all others when it came to the development of a practical body of international 
regulations.338 It was then only natural that the body of positive international law adopted by the most 
civilized European nations was eventually adopted by the less civilized ones.339 
The progressive nature of James Reddie’s conception of international law, unlike that of Ward, had a 
direct influence on his views on European expansionism. For Reddie, the colonization of overseas 
territories and the acquisition of uninhabited territories was a natural corollary of nations’ inherent right 
of amelioration.340 One of the constitutive elements of a nation was its property over a defined territory. 
Bodies of people had historically grouped together into states with the purpose of occupying and 
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cultivating ‘a portion of the earth’.341 Property over land distinguished nations from wandering tribes and 
hordes.342 It also justified their dispossession. In consequence, Reddie maintained that unsettled tribes 
could not protect a right—that of private property—of which they had no notion.343 
Unlike Ward, Manning, and Reddie, other British writers of the first half of the nineteenth century, 
like Polson, Wildman, and Phillimore, did not feature conjectural theory prominently in their works. But 
all these later authors had something to say, however, about the legality of the acquisition of territories 
inhabited by ‘savages’. They all justified colonialism and placed the exploitation of nature at the center 
of their legal arguments. By mixing stadial theory and the agricultural argument they buttressed European 
occupation of non-European territory. In so doing, they routinely referred back to Vattel’s formulation of 
the agricultural argument. But while they unanimously declared the legality of European occupation 
overseas, most of them also criticized its immorality and/or set certain kinds of limits to treatment of non-
European populations and the territorial extent of occupation.  
One of the most critical authors was Arthur Polson, who in 1848 published The Principles of the Law 
of Nations, a book that unlike its precedents advanced a positivist conception of the law of nations.344 The 
positivist outlook of Polson’s conception of international law did not totally exclude natural law, 
however; in fact, he affirmed that the law of nations was predominantly based on natural law.345 The law 
of nations acted as a filter for natural law, modifying and enforcing the latter according to its own 
‘sanctions’.346 
Polson shared with contemporary international legal scholars a belief in progress and civilization. In 
the same manner as previous British jurists, he opened his book on the law of nations by delineating a 
history of the discipline. From the outset, he affirmed that the law of nations was ‘a result of a state of 
comparative civilization’.347 The law of nations was the result and the guarantee of the benefits that 
civilized nations derived from their intercourse, chiefly by commerce.348 The law of nations developed 
as civilization progressed.349Like Manning, Polson believed that the humanization of the laws of war was 
indebted to the ‘progress of civilization’ and a purer ‘spirit of religion’.350 
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Polson’s law of nations, as that of Ward, Manning, and Reddie, remained Eurocentric. For all these 
authors the history of the science coincided with the history of Europe and the Christian religion. For 
Polson, for example, the high consideration of the law of nations during the Middle Ages was the result 
of the Christian evangelization of Europe.351 Moreover, like Manning, Polson argued that the authority 
of the law of nations stemmed from its recognition by both Europe and the newly independent states of 
South and North America.352 The Turkish Empire was the only exception to the Western pedigree of the 
law of nations.353 
Polson’s Eurocentrism, however, did not mean that he unremittingly endorsed imperialism. When 
assessing the phenomenon of European expansion overseas, he made a distinction between what the law 
stipulated and what morality dictated. Polson recognized that historically the law of nations had 
sanctioned the legality of dispossessing savage nations of their territories.354 At first, European nations 
used papal grants as sources of legitimation.355 Later on, they invoked other legal principles such as 
discovery and ‘priority of occupation’.356 
So, Polson recognized that, as a matter of fact, the rights of savages had been superseded by those of 
the Christian and civilized colonists.357 The law of nations recognized the power of states to acquire the 
territories of savage populations.358 The basis of that power rested on the superior civilization of states 
vis-à-vis savages.359  
But despite the legality of European acquisitions overseas, Polson challenged its morality. He cited 
Vattel’s opinion that North Americans could not appropriate for themselves all the territory of North 
America because they neither used nor improved most of it. He questioned this reasoning, wondering 
how anybody could be an arbiter of the needs of North American ‘tribes’.360 Only they could be judges 
of their own necessities. He added that the productive activities of hunting and fishing demanded large 
areas.361 Finally, he made the interesting point that using Vattel’s logic one could justify as well the 
seizing of the vast and sparsely populated territories of the Russian Federation, or British Australia for 
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that matter.362 Interestingly, his example of British Australia evidenced the paradoxical fact that Polson 
ignored that the territory he was referring to had actually been formed by the application of the very logic 
he was criticizing. In his example Australian peoples remained invisible, being superseded by the settler 
nation. 
 A similar distinction between the legality and morality of European occupation can be found in the 
work of Robert Phillimore (1810-1850). Some years after Polson’s Principles, Phillimore published a 
series of four volumes under the title Commentaries upon International Law (1854-1861).363 Phillimore 
rejected the positivist outlook of international law advocated by Polson and more clearly by Wildman.364 
He defined international law as the laws that governed the rights and obligations of states in their mutual 
intercourse which emanated from the will of God.365 For Phillimore, states, like individuals, were moral 
agents that enjoyed rights and were liable to certain obligations.366 One of the main sources of 
international jurisprudence was Divine law, which obliged Christian and European nations as well as all 
civilized heathen ones.367 
Phillimore’s more pluralistic account of international law did not diminish the power of European 
nations over non-European territories. Phillimore defined dominium (the right of property) as the ‘fullest 
right’ that a person could have over a good.368 According to the jus gentium, occupation was one of the 
main forms of acquiring private property.369 Similarly to individuals, states could also acquire property 
through occupation. Original acquisition or acquisition by occupation gave states a title over unoccupied 
territory.370 
 Occupation was a process, the completion of which entailed several steps. The first one was the act 
discovery. Phillimore agreed with Wildman that discovery was the basis of the right to occupy and gave 
the discoverer an inchoate title to possession.371 Discovery produced this legal effect only under certain 
conditions. The discovery had to be made in the name of a state. The state could either give the explorer 
its authority before the discovery was made, or ratify it ex post facto.372 Discovery had to be followed by 
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an act of possession.373 But not all acts of possessions counted as occupation. Taking possession of a 
territory by merely erecting crosses or making external marks on the land to be acquired was not 
enough.374 Possession made the acquisition of unoccupied territory possible when discovery was followed 
by use of the land and settlement.375 In practical terms this meant that the territorial claims of European 
states in the New World were conditioned upon their founding colonies and using the ecosystems of the 
New World. 
After having set the terms in which occupation created a title over territory, Phillimore discussed the 
extent of territory that could be acquired. He stated that there ought to be a middle course between the 
extremes of restricting the territory to the spot where a settlement was created and extending it to the 
whole continent.376 The American continent illustrated the point that no single European power could 
hold it all—in the course of history a sound set of principles had developed to rationalize colonization.377 
How did the pre-colonial population of America feature in this colonial scheme? Did they have any 
entitlement to their territory? At first glance it seemed that for Phillimore the inhabitants of America 
before European arrival were secondary actors on the European chessboard. He stated, for instance, that 
once a European state had occupied a given territory, any purchases obtained ‘by grants or conquest of 
the native’ had no legal effect.378 This was a restatement of the doctrine of the U.S. Supreme Court that 
Marshall had declared in Johnson v. McIntosh.  
 What was the legal justification of European pre-eminence in the Americas? To answer that question, 
Phillimore, like previous authors, mixed stadial theory with the agricultural argument. He maintained that 
in general settlements were justified in terms of the economic activities carried out by colonists, such as 
fishing, mining, and agriculture.379 The exploitation of nature gave rights to the land. Phillimore explained 
that, according to this logic, Vattel was right in holding that a pastoralist society had an exclusive title 
over the territories that they inhabited.380 Moreover, Phillimore continued, it had been argued that 
according to that rule even the ‘North American Indians’ could have excluded the ‘British fur-traders 
from their hunting grounds’.381 
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But that claim, that even savage populations had a right to exclude Europeans of their lands, did not 
square well with Phillimore’s doctrine of occupation by discovery. Phillimore resolved that apparent 
contradiction by stating that: 
 
It may indeed be justly said, that the Earth was intended by God to supply the wants of the general family of 
mankind; and that the cultivation of the soil is an obligation imposed upon man: and it seems a fair conclusion 
from this premises, that when the population of a country exceeds the means of support which that country can 
afford, they have a right, not only to occupy uninhabited districts (which, indeed, they would be entitled to do 
irrespectively of this emergency), but also to make settlements in countries capable of supporting large numbers 
by cultivation, but at present wandered over by nomad or hunting tribes.382 
 
As was common in legal discussions about the acquisition of non-European territory, Phillimore 
buttressed his argument by citing Vattel’s view that lazy savages, who had more territory than they 
needed, could not prevent the occupation of those lands by hard working nations with little space to 
expand at home.383 Vattel was also of the opinion that the colonization of the territories of North American 
savages was legal.384 Phillimore referred to those portions inhabited by backward non-Europeans as 
‘uncivilized country’.385 
As with many of his contemporaries, Phillimore coupled his blunt justification of European acquisition 
of vacant territory with an admonition about possible abuses. He routinely criticized the treatment of the 
pre-colonial population of Spanish colonies.386 He also remarked that the British had dispossessed and 
annihilated innocent non-European populations as well.387 Not all types of occupation were good, and 
some were inadmissible. In that sense, he favored the purchase of savages’ land and its acquisition by 
treaty, while criticizing European neglect of the rights of non-Europeans.388 In line with Vitoria, he 
believed that savages ought not to be despoiled of their belongings. Of course, according to the stadial 
logic of Phillimore, the fact was that they just possessed very little. Accordingly, the legal taking of vast 
non-European territories could be done in a humane fashion without needing to terrorize non-Europeans 
or take the little they had. 
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Phillimore’s criticism of European colonialism was echoed in the Law of Nature and Nations by Leone 
Levi (1821-1888).389 Levi was a British jurist and political economist of Jewish origin and an adherent 
of progress and commerce.390 One of the main purposes of his treatise on the law of nature and nations 
was to criticize war and advocate for peaceful international relations. A believer in progress and 
Christianity, he thought that the spread of science and commerce, the consequent rise of wealth and 
comfort, and the increase of human knowledge were going to eliminate the need to resort to war.391 
Religion was also a crucial instrument for bringing about human improvement and the cessation of 
warfare.392 In fact, his religiosity informed his naturalist understanding of the law of nations. He conflated 
the law of nations with the ‘natural laws of states’ and, following Phillimore, considered Divine law as 
one of the main sources of the discipline.393 
As part of the denunciation of warfare, Levi censured the innumerable colonial wars that Britain had 
fought against non-European populations.394 What is more, he lamented the near extermination of the 
pre-colonial populations of Australia and North America.395 Aborigines, he reminded the reader, had been 
unjustly dispossessed of their lands.396 But how could Levi’s colonial critique be reconciled with his firm 
belief in progress? After all, he was sure that at the time he wrote just a small part of humanity, comprising 
Europe and the U.S., was able to reap the benefits of civilization and commerce.397 Africa, for example, 
was still a ‘vast desert’ awaiting the influence of the Western civilizing hand.398 Contrastingly, he 
celebrated the formation of an empire of wealth and prosperity in colonial Australia in which the pre-
colonial population did not feature at all.399 
Levi was convinced that ‘civilization, religion, commerce and science’ had contributed to make the 
world a better place.400 They had also transformed the worlds’ ecosystems. In the nineteenth century, 
Levi observed, the Earth was more ‘civilized and fruitful’ than ever before.401 Like other political 
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economists of the first half of the nineteenth century, he assumed the existence of different states of 
society.402 In this sense, making the vacant lands of savage peoples productive through European 
colonization was part of the gentle civilizing influence that he advocated.  
Levi positioned himself against war and violence but not necessarily colonialism. Following 
Phillimore and Vattel, he put forward a cosmopolitan argument that natural lawyers had often used in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to legitimize the colonial appropriation of unoccupied land. God, he 
asserted, had given the earth to mankind in general for their provision.403 The ever-growing increase of 
the human population had made the ‘discovery of new lands’ and the occupation of ‘uninhabited districts’ 
absolutely imperative.404 However, this necessity could not excuse the ‘expulsion of the original 
inhabitants’.405 Levi may have been thinking here about the U.S. policy of removing North American 
populations east of the Mississippi river from the territories they inhabited. 
Levi was clearly against violent imperialism, but he also believed that everyone was going to benefit 
from European expansionism enacted in a gentle fashion. This was so because, whereas Europe and the 
U.S. were swiftly advancing in civilization, ‘Asia and Africa’ had stagnated.406 But this need to engender 
progress overseas was not carte blanche. His humanitarianism, like most of his contemporaries, sought 
to balance European rights to acquire the territories of savage populations with the need to safeguard the 
wellbeing of those populations. The territories where savages lived were so vast that Europeans could 
appropriate enough natural resources to satisfy the needs of settlers while still leaving some territory for 
the locals to live in peace. Levi wrote at a time in which the extinction of ‘Aborigines’ and ‘Indians’ 
seemed inevitable. He thus lamented the fact that colonialism had caused their likely vanquishing from 
the face of the Earth.407 
Benign imperialism was the agent of human progress. Levi believed that with gentleness Europeans 
could carry out their mission to improve the earth and make it more productive. Humans, at least some 
of them, were now in possession of the means to do so. Agriculture, for instance, could transform all the 
ecosystems that remained in a ‘wild condition’ into gardens, crop fields, and pasture.408 Science, 
chemistry, and mechanics allowed humans to control the planet and manipulate natural forces to a degree 
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to which they had never before been capable.409 In the ‘early stages of civilization’, Levi affirmed, humans 
had only their own strength at their disposal.410 The power of steam had galvanized production and 
fostered industrialization. It had also made humans realize their power over matter.411 Transforming 
nature through human power was a cosmopolitan project that constantly pushed the horizon of human 
possibility. As he put it, new scientific and technological discoveries in the realm of the ‘physical world 
will contribute to render the whole world, the habitation of one universal family’.412 
The position adopted by Polson, Philimore, and Levi could also be found outside Great Britain. The 
Latin American Andres Bello (1781-1865) is a good example. Bello published the first book on 
international law of the Western Hemisphere. Written for a legal and diplomatic audience, Principios de 
Derecho de Gentes saw the light in 1832.413 Born in Caracas, Bello was one of the most prominent Latin 
American politicians and intellectuals of the nineteenth century.414 An eclectic author, he made 
contributions in the fields of law, history, philosophy, grammar, and literature.415 Soon after its 
publication, Principios de Derecho de Gentes became very influential in Latin America, especially in 
foreign Ministries and educational institutions.416 
Bello defined el derecho internacional as the collection of rules that ought to be observed among 
nations.417 He distinguished between the natural law of nations, founded in human reason, and the 
voluntary or positive law of nations that was integrated by express or tacit agreement.418 He recognized 
that Europe constituted a family of nations that had been united by the advances of Christianity, culture, 
civilization, and commerce.419 But he wrote Principios with the clear purpose of integrating Latin 
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America within the civilized family of nations.420 He did so by encouraging the cultivation of a science 
that was of utmost importance for the defense of the national rights of the newly independent nations.421 
 As a political economist, Bello believed in the beneficial effects of free trade and agriculture for the 
economy.422 An admirer of the European Enlightenment, he wanted to apply the philosophical ideas of 
this intellectual movement to Venezuelan and Latin American governments and economies. Good 
government and modern agriculture, he believed, were vital for Venezuela's modernization and the 
progress of the whole of Latin America.423 
In Principios, Bello provided an exhaustive account of the acquisition of property. As with several 
natural lawyers of the previous centuries he affirmed that the world was first in a state of primitive 
community, meaning that everything belonged to humanity as a whole.424 God had created the world in 
common for the provisioning of humanity. Then, gradually, things were appropriated. Movable things 
were privatized first, followed by immovables such as land, rivers, and lakes.425 
Not everything was suitable for appropriation and privatization. By their very nature certain things did 
not become private property, as they could render a service to humanity without deteriorating by 
everyone’s use.426 Bello did not include land in the list of common things for the reason that its products 
were limited.427 He explained that in the primitive state of community a vast area could only provide a 
meager sustenance to a limited number of families.428 Only the incentive to possess it and enjoy it with 
exclusiveness could motivate humans to undertake the hard exertions required to make the land 
productive through cultivation.429 Once cultivated, the land could feed large numbers of people.  
So for Bello, things were susceptible to privatization when they fulfilled three requirements. First, 
humans could appropriate what could not be used simultaneously by many people.430 Second, in order to 
be privatized things needed to exist in limited numbers or get deteriorated through use.431 Last but not 
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least, things could be privatized if human industry ‘improved them and adapted them to human use’.432 
Land, of course, fulfilled all three conditions, and hence could be enclosed and protected against 
intruders.433 In Bello’s scheme, the logic of efficiency and privatization informed human progress. Those 
were the lenses through which he looked at the ‘newly discovered’ regions.434 
Bello maintained that the discovery of islands and uninhabited territories gave the discoverer nation a 
right to occupy them, which was valid against the claims of any other nation.435 Like subsequent British 
commentators he placed certain conditions on that right. In a Lockean fashion, he made a correlation 
between the amount of territory appropriated and the capacity of a nation to populate and cultivate it.436 
Nations could not take more than they could use. Besides, the occupation of vacant lands ought to be 
followed by settlement and use.437 The erection of monuments in desert lands did not prevent the right of 
effective occupation of other nations.438 
Bello invoked both stadial theory and the agricultural argument to answer the question of whether 
savages could keep the territories that they inhabited. He was sure that reduced numbers of wandering 
tribes that made scant utilization of the land could not prevent discovering nations from appropriating 
their territories.439 Paraphrasing Vattel,440 he pointed out the legitimacy of European colonization. It was 
simply natural that Europe could ‘export’ its excessive population to the vast territories ‘discovered’, 
which the original inhabitants did not need and seldom used.441 Through an argument based on the 
efficient utilization of natural resources, he continued explaining why savages could be confined within 
narrower limits. He observed that ‘if, from the beginning of its existence, every nation would have wanted 
to claim an immense territory in order to live from hunting, fishing and wild fruits, the globe would have 
not been able of feeding a hundreds of the inhabitants that today inhabit it’.442 
For Bello, imperialism was not at odds with ethical behavior. Europeans could colonize the earth while 
leaving at the same time some territory for savage subsistence. Savages could be confined to certain areas 
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in which they could continue their backward life unharmed. This was a win-win situation that many 
international lawyers of later periods also found palatable. 
Bello established a further limit to European territorial acquisition. If the wondering tribes were 
pastoralists rather than hunters, barbarians rather than savages, they could not be deposed of their 
territories.443 Stadial theory was used in this case to limit colonialism. Still, Bello noticed that the case of 
barbarians had some parallels with that of savages and that it was difficult to fix the boundary that 
separated a ‘rational and just’ utilization of ecosystems from one that had a different character.444 But, at 
the end of the day, no matter where the boundary was fixed what was certain was that the capacity to 
exploit nature served as a standard to decide who the owners of the vacant areas of the earth ought to 
be—the civilized and advanced European and newly independent American nations. 
Another representative of this line of thinking was the French jurist Eugène Ortolan (1824-1891). He 
published the only manuscript of the era that dealt exclusively with the question of occupation.445 For 
Ortolan the human need for private property was a natural instinct. By appropriating things, humans used 
God’s creation to satisfy their own needs.446 Like Locke, Ortolan linked private property and labor.447 He 
affirmed that the first way to acquire property was through work, or the use of humans’ physical and 
intellectual capacity to procure things of utility.448 That utility was not restricted to the satisfaction of 
life’s necessities; things could also be privatized for general human ‘convenience’.449 
The rationale behind individual appropriation could be applied to nations. The international acquisition 
of territory derived from a nations’ effort to tame and dominate nature. As Ortolan put it, the act whereby 
a nation acquired a territory was the act of using it and applying over it ‘the works of cultivation and the 
works of exploitation’.450 Through this standard of environmental exploitation, nations, by occupying 
certain portions of the Earth, actualized the goal—human ‘service and utility’—to which Providence had 
destined the world.451 
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The only original way of acquiring property was what the jurists referred to as occupation.452 Ortolan 
made the—by then typical—point that, as the Roman law sanctioned, individuals could only occupy 
things that were res nullius.453 Similarly, nations could only acquire territory that was vacant.454 Ortolan 
acknowledged that the trips of discoveries by European nations had rendered in the past a great service 
to humanity.455 However, discovery per se was not enough to create occupation.456 The occupation of a 
country by a nation required the intention of occupying vacant land, the effective taking of possession of 
a territory, and works on the land that constituted settlement.457 Like Phillimore, Ortolan thought that the 
mere establishment of settlements into a part of an unoccupied territory did not give the settler nation a 
right over all of it.458 What a nation could not effectively occupy was open to acquisition.459 He illustrated 
this point by reference to the territorial dispute over Oregon.460 
Could European nations occupy the territory of savages? Ortolan answered affirmatively, resorting to 
a Vattelian reasoning. For Ortolan, traveling hordes and nomads did not thoroughly transform natural 
habitats through their work, and therefore were not really occupying all the vast extensions of territory 
that they misappropriated.461 The earth was appropriated through labor, and savages did not meet the 
standard of environmental exploitation. The extension of territory that a society occupied in the world 
amounted to the natural area that it could modify through the application of its productive forces. 
Sedentary non-Europeans practicing agriculture could have a legitimate claim over a large territory. But 
nomads could not prevent nations too tightly constrained in their continents from appropriating territories 
that their colonists were able to transform and make productive through agriculture.462 
Did this logic apply to the ‘Indians of America’? In practice, colonial history showed that in America 
the rights of the pre-colonial population had been largely ignored.463 But colonial practice was shifting. 
In North America, for example, English puritans had bought the land from the ‘Indians’.464 Similarly, at 
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the time of Ortolan, when the U.S. opened land by deforesting and pushed the ‘Indians back towards the 
forest’ they offered a price for the land.465 
Ortolan like most international legal commentators of the first half of the nineteenth century reconciled 
European colonialism with ethical considerations and the imposition of certain limitations to the 
occupation of territory overseas. It was clear that for Ortolan, as for Vattel, savages and nomads could 
not stop the wheels of progress, which, in practice, translated into a cosmopolitan program to civilize 
nature. But both authors agreed in favoring purchase of land rather than mere dispossession. But, for 
Ortolan, the savage receded into the forest—wilderness—as civilization advanced. And even if American 
Indians were not judged to be nomads, Ortolan nonetheless maintained that category was alive. This 
meant that when he wrote it was still possible to find other humans, like the peoples of Australia or 
perhaps communities in Africa, who could fall within that category. 
Other authors did not show the moral scruples that Polson, Philimore, or Bello exhibited. They 
similarly justified colonial occupation, but remained silent about the entitlements and fair treatment of 
pre-colonial populations. This second position could be found in the writings of a few Anglo-Saxon 
international lawyers of Great Britain and the U.S.  
In his Institutes of International Law, published in 1849, the British lawyer Richard Wildman (1802-
1881) explained that things that had not yet been appropriated by anyone could be acquired by occupation, 
as long as it was followed by continued possession.466 Likewise, when preceded by discovery, occupation 
legitimized European acquisitions of vacant territories overseas. 
Wildman affirmed that the right of discovery gave the state in whose name the discovery had been 
made an inchoate title over the territory.467 The right of discovery could be exercised over islands, 
deserted lands, and territories sparsely populated ‘by savages’.468 To create an inchoate title, discovery 
had to fulfill two conditions. On the one hand, there ought to be an external mark such as a flag to be 
recognizable;469 on the other hand, discovery had to be followed by continuous possession.470 If 
possession was interrupted the territory reverted to its original condition of vacancy.471 
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For Wildman, it was a self-evident truth that the occupation of vacant territory was legitimate, as it 
belonged to the historical practice of European nations. This belief was in line with his definition of 
international law as the custom of nations.472 He affirmed, following Polson, but in a more assertive way, 
that natural law was not part of international law.473 Nevertheless, reason played a role in the formation 
of custom. Wildman stated that ‘[h]e will not be wrong, who follows the old lawyers and holds’ the law 
of nations ‘to be, that which reason has induced, if not all nations, at least the most civilized, to observe 
in their intercourse with each other’.474 Savages and their practices were outside the scope of international 
law. Therefore, the way they used nature and the beliefs and practices that shaped that use were not 
recognized by international law. Those backward uses and conceptions could not thwart the projection, 
advance, and application of the European institution of private property over the underutilized territories 
of the Earth.  
At the other side of the Atlantic, and some years before British scholars started writing manuscripts 
on international law, Henry Wheaton (1785-1848) wrote the first ever English-language general book on 
international law.475 By the mid-nineteenth century, his Elements of International Law was one of the 
most read books on international law.476 It was soon translated to several languages, including Chinese, 
and became influential in Japan and Korea as well.477 In fact, Wheaton’s influence on the nineteenth 
century could be compared to that of Vattel and Grotius in previous centuries.478 
The impact of the book was felt immediately after its publication. In 1839, Oke Manning already 
praised Wheaton’s study as the best elementary inquiry into the discipline of international law.479 More 
importantly, for our analysis, is the fact that Elements was soon adopted by the governments of the U.S., 
Britain, France, and other European countries as a book of reference.480 This is not surprising, considering 
that Wheaton had intended his book precisely to assist policy makers.481 So, his views on colonization 
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had a larger influence on the policies of European colonial powers than those of his contemporary 
international lawyers.  
Wheaton divided international law into two branches: the natural law of nations, and the positive law 
of nations.482 Positive international law was, at the same time, subdivided into the voluntary, the 
conventional, and the customary law of nations.483 The law of nations was not a universal legal code but 
a set of international rules of conduct recognized by ‘civilized and Christian nations’.484 
Wheaton examined the legality of seizing the lands of savages, a thorny question in the legal practice 
of the U.S., but a vital one for the future expansion of the new nation. He maintained that discovery and 
compact laid the foundation for Europe’s overseas possessions.485 These were not the only forms for 
obtaining legal title over colonies. Wheaton explained that the ‘uninterrupted possession’ of a particular 
region created an exclusive claim against which no other nation could counteract.486 The legitimacy of 
continued possession stemmed from the tacit or explicit general agreement of humanity.487 Mankind’s 
consent to this specific form of colonization had a cosmopolitan motivation, as it tended to foster 
humanity’s wellbeing. Wheaton’s argument that the whole of humanity had consented to colonization 
bizarrely implied that non-European polities (whose territories were appropriated by Europeans) had 
accepted the taking of the territories in which they lived.  
After having established the legal doctrines that justified colonial acquisitions, Wheaton dealt with 
European colonial history, starting with ‘the splendid maritime discoveries’ of the fifteenth and sixteenth 
centuries.488 Independent of the legal practices of European colonial powers, he concluded, the one thing 
on which they all agreed was on ignoring almost completely the rights of the original inhabitants of the 
territories they visited and colonized.489 This statement was far from a critique; he was just describing a 
historical course of action with which he did not necessarily disagree.  
Reproducing Marshall’s reasoning in Johnson v. McIntosh, Wheaton concluded that the rights of non-
Europeans were subordinated to those of the discoverers.490 Upon discovery, the nation in whose name 
the discovery had been made acquired two kinds of legal entitlements. First, it acquired an exclusive right 
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to the territory, which could be exercised and made valid against rival claims of any other Christian 
nations.491 Second, it could extinguish the territorial rights of the ‘natives’.492 In America, the fate of ‘the 
natives’ was left to the decision of European powers and the nations that, like the U.S., had later encircled 
them.493 Wheaton explained that North American peoples had lost their lands largely through European 
conquest and ‘voluntary compact’.494 He justified this fate with an argument that mixed stadial theory 
and the agricultural argument, claiming that North American societies receded as ‘the progress of 
cultivation gradually compelled the savage tenant of the forest to yield to the superior power and skill of 
his civilized invader’.495 
German jurists were not as vocal as their American and British counterparts when elaborating the 
territorial rights of Europeans overseas. In fact, they were the only ones that provided a wider legal sphere 
of protection for pre-colonial populations. One of those jurists was Georg Friedrich von Martens (1756-
1821), Professor of the Law of Nature and Nations at the University of Göttingen from 1783 to 1808, and 
also a diplomat who became famous for his compilations of international treaties.496 In 1789 he published 
a book on the law of nations, Précis du droit des Gens Moderne de l’Europe, that, like Bello’s and 
Wheaton’s treatises, was mainly oriented to a diplomatic audience.497 
Occupation was one of the multiple issues that Martens dealt with in his work. As with previous natural 
lawyers, Martens believed that in their primitive state humans related to their surroundings through a 
primitive community of goods.498 In other words, there was no private property, and things were ‘res 
nullius’—they did not belong to anybody and so everyone could use them according to their needs.499 
But natural law allowed for the privatizing of things through occupation.500 
To what extent, Martens asked, could things be appropriated, and under what conditions did the right 
to occupy operate?501 He identified three requirements for privatization through occupation. In the first 
place, occupation applied only to those things that were, by their very nature, susceptible to possession 
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by a nation or individual.502 In the second place, privatization needed to offer a real utility to the person 
appropriating a thing from the common.503 Finally, only things without owner—res nullius—were open 
for occupation.504 After having established the conditions under which occupation operated, Martens 
remarked that the right to property belonged to every human being, independent of religion and mores.505 
Therefore, the law of nations did not authorize Christians to take over ‘districts that were already 
effectively occupied by savages against the will of the latter’.506 Martens noted that, in practice, colonial 
history was full of episodes that went against this rule.  
Occupation was effective when the intention to occupy was followed by the actual act of seizing what 
was vacant.507 Martens believed that acts such as declarations by nations, donations by the Pope, and even 
treaties were not enough to create a right to occupy.508 Discovery of territories later abandoned was also 
insufficient.509 The will to occupy had to be followed by concrete and permanent marks of occupation.510 
Martens acknowledged the existence of a discussion between nations and intellectuals about what marks 
of occupation were valid.511 Were crosses, inscriptions, and other marks enough to assure the occupation 
of a country that was not cultivated? Martens did not answer this question. He simply noted that natural 
law established stricter requirements than the positive law of nations regarding the occupation of vacant 
territories.512 
Cultivation was not a definite standard of occupation in the case of the territory of nations. A nation 
owned all the territory in which it had established itself, even if parts of it were uncultivated.513 However, 
in the cases of uncertainty about territorial borders a nation could not exclude foreign nations from 
disputed territories that it did not cultivate or occupy.514 Here cultivation seemed the most definite 
standard, although not the only one, to prove occupation. Even though Martens did not continue this line 
of inquiry, based on his statement one could suppose that savages could also lose disputed territories over 
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which they could not show effective occupation. After all, hunting did not leave a notorious mark over 
nature, and most commentators were convinced that ‘savages’ did not practice cultivation. 
Martens, like Wolff, affirmed that savages had a right over the districts that they effectively occupied. 
Their defense of the territorial rights of savages was undisputable. However, the relevant question for 
assessing the degree of this legal protection was the extent of savage territorial occupation. Importantly, 
due to European stereotypes about savages, all natural lawyers believed that savages did not occupy 
much. They hunted and gathered fruits only in certain areas of North America. This logically meant that 
most of the continent remained an unpopulated wilderness that was open to occupation. Savage 
communities were mere human islands in a sea of wild nature.  
Von Martens was ambiguous in his treatment of occupation. On the one hand, the fact that he discussed 
the legal requirements of the occupation of vacant lands in the context of European colonialism evidences 
that he was not totally against it. On the other hand, he clearly limited European occupation to the land 
that savages did not occupy. This ambivalence is evident in his discussion of European empire over non-
occupied territories. He introduced the topic with the affirmation: ‘if it is imaginable that a nation 
exercises empire on non-occupied countries…’.515 The exercise of empire in these cases implied the 
consent of all those affected by the act of acquiring sovereignty.516 
Another German jurist, Johann Ludwig Klüber (1762-1837), shared Martens perspective on 
occupation.517 But instead of presenting the right to property as an individual right that also applied to 
nations, he simply looked at it from a state’s perspective. A state’s right to property consisted of the 
faculty to exclude all other states and private foreign individuals from the ‘use and appropriation of the 
territory’ of the state and all things contained within it.518 
 Klüber observed that occupation only applied to things that were by their very nature susceptible to 
becoming private property and that were also ownerless.519 In addition, occupation demanded a state’s 
intention to acquire something, plus the actual act of placing it under its ‘physical power’.520As with 
Martens, Klüber limited the occupation of vacant lands in the case of states. He affirmed that vacant lands 
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within a state’s territory belonged to that state, so foreigners could not occupy them.521 Those things were 
vacant only within the state, but not with regard to other nations or foreigners.522 
For Klüber occupation was also extendable to vacant territories. In this regard, following Martens, he 
affirmed that the higher degree of culture that a nation had attained was not an excuse to steal the property 
of other nations, not even that of savages or nomads. This meant that, contrary to stadial accounts, the 
institution of ownership applied to savages and was used in this case to protect their territories and 
belongings.  
The fact that savages had rights over territory was not in conflict with the fact that there were still 
vacant spaces in the world. Klüber affirmed that the occupation of parts of the globe that were uninhabited 
and had no master could not extend further beyond what was effectively possessed with the intention of 
taking it as property.523 Occupation was consummated by continued possession.524 Klüber, like Martens, 
discarded external marks of occupation that had been frequently used during European colonial history 
such as discovery alone, Papal authorization, or the Papal division of the world.525 A state’s appropriation 
of things was linked to something deeper, to the actual transformation of the physical world. Once a state 
had operated a change onto a thing through the application of its physical power that thing became its 
property.526 That was so because separating the thing from the state impaired the fruits rendered by the 
state’s actions over it.527 
So, Klüber’s claim that the property of savages ought to be respected did not amount to morally 
condemning European colonialism or considering it illegal. As Klüber observed, and Martens hinted, 
there were certainly vast unoccupied spaces on the Earth—which certainly savages could not claim to 
have effectively exploited—where Europeans could legally extend their reach. As savages died by the 
millions the legal position that they could retain some territory was perfectly compatible with the legal 
justification of the appropriation of almost whole continents.  
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Concluding remarks 
James Mill and John Stuart Mill reformulated stadial theory in the nineteenth century. The intellectual 
lens of the kaleidoscope through which the Mills contemplated humanity revealed different civilizational 
categories as one turned its rotating conceptual tubes. Under the effect of these multifaceted prisms, the 
world was a canvas that could be divided into human compartments in various different ways. From a 
political economic perspective, for example, structuring societies into a four-layer developmental 
structure seemed appropriate. But four states of society could also be reduced to three: the uncivilized 
(savage hunting-gatherers and barbarian pastoral communities); the semi-civilized (countries with 
agriculture, some trade, and manufactures); and the civilized (manufacturing and trading European 
countries).  
This division was important for the purpose of colonial administration. In the settler colonies of 
Australia and North America the British found savage societies. The level of social advancement of 
savages was very different from agricultural and commercial non-European nations. The European 
entitlement to their territories and the way to govern them were also rather different. Thus Mill’s societal 
distinctions provided a sound framework and a simpler roadmap for governing the world. 
The ladder of progress could further shrink from a three-fold division into a rough opposition—
civilized and uncivilized—which corresponded to the opposites of progressive/stagnant. As the 
uncivilized moved up the ladder they reached the threshold of material advancement that characterized 
advanced societies. This is the sense in which John Stuart Mill distinguished civilization to rudeness or 
barbarism in his essay Civilization.528 However, mere economic progress did not guarantee human 
happiness; it only prepared societies to transcend civilization in the ‘narrow sense’ of economic progress 
and cross the threshold from which a higher type of progress was attainable. Climbing the first part of the 
ladder was a condition sine qua non for entering the second.529 The uncivilized had to be first civilized 
as materially advanced Europeans had been, before they could both be completely civilized in the broader 
sense in which Mill understood this concept, in the production of a ‘happier, nobler and wiser’ type of 
human.530 
James and John Stuart’s conceptual kaleidoscope showed reality both through a static lens (reality as 
it was, or as they perceived it) and a dynamic or progressive lens (reality as it ought to be, or as the Mills 
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thought it ought to be). Under the cosmopolitan ethos of human happiness and social progress, the latter 
had to be superimposed on the former, even if forcefully. And because, in theory, human happiness could 
be grasped in the abstract, the possibility that different communities could have conceived differently 
what constituted the good life for them was never an option. Interrogating backward individuals about 
what they thought made them happy seemed superfluous, even incongruent and absurd to the enlightened 
minds of James and John Stuart. 
In his writings, Mill moved freely between different ways of categorizing humanity. The ladder of 
progress had four, three, or two steps, depending on the topic under discussion and the angle from which 
he looked at it. So, for example, the term savage or barbarian stricto sensu denoted one of the four stages 
of conjectural history. Understood in this sense, savages and barbarians had to be treated differently than 
other uncivilized groups living in a higher state of society. But sometimes Mill used the word savage, 
barbarian, or barbarism to include all the uncivilized communities as a way of contrasting them with the 
civilized.531 There were economic, social, and political implications for uncivilized societies that 
depended on their specific place in the scale of social progress, but some of those implications affected 
all of them. For example, in Non-Intervention Mill held that the international customs and morality that 
applied between civilized nations did not apply to barbarians, using that term as a synonym of 
‘uncivilized’.532 Similarly, in On Liberty he recommended despotism as a way of dealing with barbarians. 
That was an exception to the rule of non-interference whereby the sphere of liberty for civilized 
individuals ought to be respected.533 
The category of savage was well alive in the nineteenth century and carried important legal and 
practical consequences. The capacity to transform nature, the standard of environmental exploitation, was 
a key factor in the legal determination of the type of human community that had a better entitlement over 
certain portions of the Earth. For natural and international lawyers alike, occupation had a cosmopolitan 
ring. As populations grew and industrialization built momentum, imperialism created the possibility that 
hard-working and efficient European settlers substituted the inefficient use of the lands inhabited by 
savages. By the efficient exploitation of particular ecosystems those lands could render plentiful resources 
to satisfy the demands of the growing capitalist international economy for natural products. 
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The belief in progress through environmental exploitation of vacant territories was widespread during 
the first half of the nineteenth century. But not every international legal commentator of the period 
justified the displacement of savages from their territories. Even if it is difficult to generalize from the 
varied array of attitudes of international lawyers regarding imperialism and the treatment of savages, it is 
safe to conclude that they were no uncompromising ideologues of Western imperialism. Most jurists, for 
instance, routinely underscored the immorality of Spanish conquest in America. Besides, some authors 
like Robert Phillimore and Eugène Ortolan advocated the purchase of land from savage peoples, and 
others like Leone Levi lamented their dispossession and annihilation. Of all nationalities, German jurists 
were the most ardent defenders of savages’ right to occupy (some) territory. 
But despite benevolent attitudes toward savages all international lawyers and jurists of the period, with 
the exception of German authors, believed that hunting savages inhabited much more territory than they 
could effectively use. For this reason, European colonial powers could occupy those surplus territories 
and their natural resources. In most international legal treatises of the period, Vattel was widely cited in 
order to justify the legal displacement of retrograde productive activities (and those who carried them 
out) and their substitution with more efficient economic practices (and those who incarnated them).534 
This may have sounded unethical at times, but most commentators agreed that it was certainly legal.535 It 
was also desirable, as a more intensive utilization of nature engendered human wealth and progress. This 
conviction sat comfortably with the ethical critic of the dispossession of savages. The vanishing savages 
could retain some hunting grounds and the little goods they possessed. An ethical standpoint was 
compatible with the colonial appropriation of the innumerable underutilized resources that savages did 
not use, the exploitation of which was the cornerstone of unending human progress. 
The theoretical strong stand of stadial theory, occupation, the agricultural argument, and their 
reinforcing intertwinement travelled with the colonists to North America and Australia. The U.S. and the 
British used these legal and philosophical ideas differently in order to extend their empires over the 
peoples and ecosystems of those great land masses. The result was the Anglo-Saxon world, one of the 
most powerful political and economic conglomerates the world has ever seen.536 Its capacity to annihilate 
peoples and to exploit their natural habitats is a vivid proof of the darkest dimensions of its power.  
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7  Imperialism, the Children of the Wilderness, and Occupation: The U.S. 
and Australia 
 
 
 
 
 
The earth is a laboratory in which, as a chemist, man has hardly begun to operate. And Mechanics will enable us 
to bring into review and make the most of every force, latent and manifest.1 
 
 
During the seventeenth and early eighteenth century, several intellectuals such as Grotius, Locke, and 
Vattel had combined descriptions of the low state of advancement of non-European societies with 
doctrines that granted either individuals or colonial states access to the supposedly unproductive natural 
resources that those backward societies could not put into efficient use. One of the legal devices that they 
often invoked was the agricultural argument, which gave European nations a right to occupy 
uncultivated—or not properly cultivated—land in overseas territories.  
By the end of the eighteenth century, dispersed but rather homogeneous descriptions of backward 
societies crystallized into a more elaborated theory of universal historical socio-economic development: 
conjectural history (also known as stadial theory). This theory provided further ideological validation to 
the legal doctrines that legitimized colonial acquisitions.  
During the first half of the nineteenth century, in the context of European imperialism, this strand of 
thought was redeployed—albeit in a somewhat theoretically modified fashion—to prove that there were 
still underutilized regions in the world inhabited by savages and barbarians. Those backward human 
beings had more than they needed or could use, so they ought to make room for Europeans or nations and 
individuals of European-descent who could efficiently exploit natural habitats worldwide. James Mill and 
John Stuart Mill revised the ideological framework within which stadial theory worked, adapting them to 
                                                 
1 Levi, The Law of Nature, Ch IV Sect. II 101. 
324 
 
the social and economic requirements of the nineteenth century as well as to the growing imperial needs 
of making sense of, ruling, and transforming non-European peoples and ecosystems.  
International lawyers of the first half of the nineteenth century also adopted this cluster of ideas based 
on the conviction that the Earth offered humans more than they were actually using. They translated those 
ideas into a legal vocabulary through the agricultural argument and the more general doctrine of 
occupation as enshrined in the law of nations. But the debates on the right to occupy during the nineteenth 
century were not constrained to the manuscripts of the law of nations and international law. In this chapter 
I will examine how stadial theory and occupation operated in concrete settings. 
The British and U.S. governments, for example, developed the legal doctrine of occupation during 
their dispute over the Oregon territory. This controversy became famous and the legal developments that 
the Oregon Question brought about were routinely mentioned in the international legal texts of the time. 
The debate about Oregon did not exhaust the practical context in which stadial theory and the doctrine 
of occupation was used. Under the auspices of the U.S.’ and New South Wales’ Supreme Courts, the 
theory and the doctrine were invoked—if differently—in settler societies in order to justify the expansion 
of the U.S. toward the Pacific Coast and its power over North American peoples and the British 
appropriation of Australia. Colonial nations and new nations, such as the U.S., arrogated a right to acquire 
territory and/or sovereignty in the territories supposedly inhabited by savages. The standard of 
environmental exploitation travelled from the chambers of jurists and intellectuals to colonial settings, 
justifying imperial rule and the appropriation of natural resources. North Americans and Australian tried 
to oppose the colonists, their alien legal tools, and exploitative worldviews regarding nature, and in so 
doing they fought a battle for their very survival. 
 
 
U.S. expansion and North American peoples  
The first instance in which the rights to sovereignty and private property over the land of ‘savage’ 
societies were tested in practice during the first half of the nineteenth century occurred in the context of 
the westward expansion of the newly born U.S. and the ensuing conflicts between North American 
peoples and settlers.  
Since the early years of the new Republic the peoples of North America had been characterized as 
savages living in the hunter stage. Stadial theory provided a key intellectual prism to conceptualize North 
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American peoples’ relationship to land and natural resources, one that was already used by the Founding 
Fathers of the U.S. Benjamin Franklin, for instance, wondered whether it was ‘the design of Providence 
to extirpate this savages in order to make room for cultivators of the earth’.2 Similarly, when Thomas 
Jefferson discussed the factors that were contributing to the decimation of North American societies in 
the State of Virginia, he mentioned the loss of territory.3 Losing their natural habitats was extremely 
costly for the savages, as Jefferson called the peoples of North America, as they subsisted ‘on the 
spontaneous productions of nature’.4 Their backwardness and closeness to nature was the reason why 
their societies lacked some of the main traits of civilization—namely, laws and government.5 
George Washington compared the expulsion of North American peoples from their lands by force with 
forcing wild beasts out of the forest.6 Furthermore, he maintained that the extension of white settlements 
will ‘cause the savage as the Wolf to retire’.7 And he went on, characterizing both as beasts of prey.8 The 
fusion between North American peoples and animals conveyed the idea of their lack of material culture. 
Savagery receded as settler agriculturalists occupied land and planted the seeds of civilization by 
improving North American wilderness through their labor.  
Neither Franklin nor Jefferson nor Washington for that matter had an especially negative view of North 
American peoples when compared to that of the majority of their contemporaries. Nonetheless, it was 
clear to all of them that North Americans constituted a stumbling block in the way of the progressive new 
nation. In the legal terrain, many questions related to the position of North American peoples vis-à-vis 
the U.S. had yet to be answered. What was their legal status? Could settlers purchase land directly from 
North Americans? Could States exercise legislative power and jurisdiction over them, or did these 
competences belong exclusively to the Federal government? 
These questions received different answers at different periods of U.S. history. In the early years of 
the Republic, the Federal policy crafted by President Washington and Secretary of War Henry Knox in 
regards North American peoples recognized them as sovereign nations.9 This treatment was not the result 
of ethical considerations, but practical ones. Washington and Knox where conscious that if the legal status 
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of North American peoples was downgraded so as to lose sovereignty and property over their lands, 
hungry states, settlers, and speculators would seize the opportunity to try to apprehend their territories by 
all means. This possibility was surely going to ignite conflict between the new nation and the North 
American peoples, a prospect that Washington and Knox wanted to avoid at all costs.10 
The Washington administration related to North Americans polities on an equal footing, treating them 
as independent nations and regulating their intercourse through treaties.11 Besides, Henry Knox and other 
members of the administration believed that North American peoples could be Christianized and that they 
would eventually adopt the sedentary ways of their white agriculturalist neighbors.12 Through a civilizing 
program based on agriculture and private property they could be assimilated, and eventually melt into the 
body of the new nation without recourse to the use of force.13 Moreover, settled farmers required much 
less land than wandering hunters. Washington policy-makers believed that a shift from hunting to 
cultivation was going to create surplus land that North Americans’ would be more inclined to cede or 
sell.14 
This line of thinking is evident in a report on Indian affairs written by the geographer Jedidiah Morse 
for the U.S. Secretary of Defense in 1820.15 Jedidiah claimed that North Americans had their own 
government and laws.16 Despite their capacity to manage their own affairs, they were legally within the 
jurisdiction of the U.S., and that jurisdictional power entailed the prerogative of disposing of their land.17 
North Americans had a right of occupancy over their territories, but the complete title was in the hands 
of the U.S. government.18 
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America within narrower limits and the legality of planting colonies in a vast territory inhabited by wandering tribes. He also 
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Jedidiah explained that the amount of land required in the hunter stage was far larger than what people 
living in the agricultural stage needed.19 The program of civilizing North Americans, to which Jedidiah’s 
report contributed, was going to help them making the leap from the lower to the higher state. Once that 
shift was accomplished, Jedidiah thought that ‘the advantages of the agricultural, over the hunter state’ 
were ‘presumed to be a just equivalent to the Indians for the lands they are constrained to resign to the 
civilized state’.20 Civilizing North Americans would create a win-win situation. While North Americans 
received the gift of civilization from the U.S., the latter would acquire the surplus land that hunters-
turned-peasants would no longer need.  
The policy considerations of the Washington administration with regard to the peoples of North 
America were translated into legal form through the Trade and Intercourse Acts of the 1790s. The Acts 
prohibited U.S. citizens to deal directly with the peoples of North America, reserving that competence to 
the Federal Government.21 In the eyes of Washington policy makers, trade was the best way to engage 
with North Americans as it was supposed to create a mutual interest in maintaining peaceful relations.22 
In addition, the new laws gave the President the power to promote the civilization of North American 
peoples.23 
This scenario radically changed in the following thirty years. By the second decade of the nineteenth 
century, the peoples of North America did not represent a military threat within the territory of the Union. 
Andrew Jackson’s militia had caused havoc among the North American communities of the South East 
and William Henry Harrison had defeated several other polities in the Northwest.24 In addition, the high 
mortality among North Americans peoples caused by smallpox, the social disruption provoked by 
alcohol, and the depletion of the natural habitats from which they obtained their food represented a great 
challenge for the survival of North Americans and their way of living.25 The belief that North American 
peoples east of the Mississippi were at the brink of extinction was widespread among U.S. 
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commentators.26 Nonetheless, those who survived the impact of their white neighbors still retained a good 
deal of territory.  
The presence of backward North American peoples was increasingly regarded as a hindrance for the 
new effervescent nation embarking on a project of growth and, hence, avid for natural resources that 
could keep its incipient economy booming. Economic expansion and population growth27 were 
particularly noticeable in the South, where the demands of the textile industry created an increasing need 
for new lands and hands (most of them slaves) for cotton plantations.28 At the same time that Americans 
felt that their destiny was to improve the territories in which they lived, many believed that the policies 
to civilize North Americans were not working.29 Therefore, the question of whether the territory of North 
American peoples should be put into the hands of those who could better exploit them—white 
Americans—or whether hunting-nomads North Americans could retain them as rightful owners became 
more pressing than ever before.30 
In no other place was this issue more contentious that in the state of Georgia. Since the beginning of 
the nineteenth century, the state of Georgia had tried to extend its sovereignty and jurisdiction over the 
Creek and Cherokee nations. The attempt to exercise power over different North American peoples also 
posed a challenge to the exclusive sovereignty of the Federal government over the territory of the U.S. It 
was in the midst of this intricate political situation that the Supreme Court intervened in order to resolve 
the thorny legal questions surrounding the relation between the new nation and the North American 
peoples.  
 
The Marshall Trilogy and North American vacant nature  
The Supreme Court had the first chance to have a say on this matter in 1810 in the case of Fletcher v. 
Peck. The conflict, which did not involve North Americans directly, originated as the legislature of the 
State of Georgia gave fee simple title to four development companies—the Georgian Company and the 
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New England Mississippi Land Company among others—over the Yazoo lands located in the western 
part of the territory claimed by Georgia (present day Alabama and Mississippi).31 A subsequent 
legislature declared the grants void and, in consequence, the grantees sued.32 
The Supreme Court unanimously decided that the legislative act that repelled the Yazoo grants was 
unconstitutional as it violated Article I, section 10 of the Constitution, which forbade states to pass 
legislation impairing contractual obligations.33 It also recognized that Georgia had the power to grant the 
lands, as they were within its territory.34 However, this affirmation created a conflict with the supposed 
rights that North Americans had over the same lands. The Court overcame that difficulty by affirming 
that ‘the nature of the Indian title, which is certainly to be respected by all courts, until it be legitimately 
extinguished, is not such as to be absolutely repugnant to seisin in fee on the part of the state’.35 The Court 
reached a Solomonic decision trying to reconcile the interests of Native Americans, States. and central 
government. It recognized the existence of North Americans’ title to the land at the same time that it 
preserved the power of the federal government to extinguish that title, while still acknowledging 
Georgia’s preeminent right to the lands.36 
Interestingly, one of the arguments presented for Peck, the defendant, directly addressed the question 
of the nature of North Americans’ title. Robert Goodloe Harper and Joseph Story, Peck’s representatives 
in front of the Court, invoked classical tenets of stadial theory in conjunction with the law of nations in 
order to prove that North Americans were not owners of their lands. They described North Americans 
according to their main productive activity: hunting.37 Harper and Story made the classical connection 
between the hunting stage (the one in which North American societies lived) and the lack of property 
rights.38 North Americans ‘overrun’ their territories rather than inhabit them.39 Harper and Story cited 
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Montesquieu, Adam Smith, and Vattel to back up their argument that societies which could not master 
their environment and make it productive had no property rights and, hence, according to the law of 
nations had no legal title over their territories. This conclusion was important as, according to Harper and 
Story, the status of North American peoples in the new republic had to be determined by reference to the 
law of nations.40 
In his judgment, Marshall tiptoed over the question of Indian title. Although he acknowledged that 
Indian title had to be respected by courts, he also affirmed that the title could be extinguished. Moreover, 
even though Marshall did not directly address the point raised by Peck’s defense, he still maintained that 
in the U.S. there were ‘vacant lands’, that is, territories whose natural resources were not productive and 
were thus open to occupation.41 
The question of Indian title came squarely to the fore of the Court’s legal analysis thirteen years later 
in Johnson v. McIntosh in 1823. The case involved competing claims to the property of the same land 
made by two individuals of Euro-American descent: Mr. Johnson and Mr. McIntosh. So, again, North 
American peoples were not directly part of the case. Mr. Johnson had obtained two land grants from 
North American peoples without the consent of the federal government in 1773 and 1775, before the first 
Trade and Intercourse Act (1790) gave the Union the monopoly to deal with the peoples of North 
America.42 Mr. McIntosh had got his title from the federal government, which had got the lands from 
North American peoples by cession.43 
Mr. Winder and Mr. Murray, McIntosh representatives, argued in front of the Court against the 
plaintiffs’ contention that the ‘Indians’ were the owners of the disputed land. According to them, North 
American peoples still lived in the state of nature and could not join the community of nations.44 
According to natural law, they claimed, the right of private property over a territory of a particular people 
was linked to that people’s capacity to utilize their territory to provide for their needs.45 Having described 
North Americas in such a derogative fashion, the logic of stadial theory combined with the agricultural 
argument played straight into their hands. They contended that wandering and hunting tribes who did not 
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form civil societies could not prevent agricultural people from seizing their lands.46 In order to add legal 
weight to their claims they cited passages from various renowned thinkers who had previously endorsed 
those ideas—namely Grotius, Montesquieu, and Locke.47 
In his judgment, Marshall identified two legal sources applicable to the case. On the one hand, he 
found it pertinent to study the principles adopted by the U.S.48 On the other, he affirmed that the law of 
nations, or what he called the ‘principles of abstract justice … admitted to regulate … the rights of 
civilized nations’, was also relevant to the case.49 
Based on those laws, Marshall was to determine whether North American people had legal title over 
their lands and could, therefore, cede them. In order to elucidate this question, he looked back at North 
American colonial history. During conquest colonial powers had sought to avoid inter-European 
confrontation. In order to do so, they found a legal principle according to which they could regulate their 
respective claims to North American territory. That principle was based on the doctrine of discovery.50 
For Marshall, discovery produced two different legal effects depending against whom it was exercised. 
Invoked against European powers, discovery secured the claims to legal title made by the European state 
in which name the discovery was made, provided that discovery was followed by actual possession. In 
other words, once a particular European country invoked it, all other European powers were prevented 
from arrogating a right over the land of North American peoples and from founding colonies in the 
territory so claimed to have been discovered and possessed.51 But discovery also had significant legal 
consequences concerning relations between European powers and North American peoples. In this case, 
it gave European nations a right to extinguish the title of occupancy of North Americans, either by 
purchase or conquest.52 In other words, North Americans were mere possessors of the soil and not its real 
owners.53 They still retained a right to dispose of the land and use it at their convenience, but they could 
not alienate it.54 
 After having established the doctrine of discovery as the legal ground to resolve the question of North 
Americans’ status within the territory of the U.S., Marshall buttressed his findings by reference to 
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colonial history.55 He presented several proofs of the historical relevance that discovery had had in 
colonial practice. The U.S. as the heir of the European colonial powers had inherited a right to extinguish 
North Americans’ ‘title of occupancy’.56 Thus, Marshall granted the U.S. ‘title of all the lands occupied 
by Indians’.57 This power to extinguish their right to occupancy also stemmed from the U.S.’ 
sovereignty—if limited—over them.58 
At this point in his reasoning, Marshall considered weather the agricultural argument was applicable 
to the case, or as he put it: ‘whether agriculturalists, merchants and manufacturers, have a right, on abstract 
principles, to expel hunters from the territory they possess, or to contract their limits’.59 He refrained from 
shedding light on this question.60 He just concluded that conquest was validated by practice because the 
courts of the conquering power so agreed, irrespective of the justice of the claim (that agricultural people 
had a legal right to the lands of hunters) in whose name they were made.61 
It is interesting that, referring to the agricultural argument, Marshall stated that he did not want ‘to 
engage in the defense of those principles’ but, after this affirmation, he did exactly that.62 According to 
him, European conquest found ‘some excuse, if not justification’ in the ‘character and habits’ of the 
peoples of North America.63 The English had found savage societies that merely subsisted from the 
products of the forest.64 To have left North America in the hands of those societies was tantamount to 
have left it as ‘a wilderness’.65 His words could not be more illustrative. Once North America was settled 
by agriculturalists, Marshall continued, game fled into thicker and pristine forest, and so did the Indian.66 
Game and North Americans were assimilated because they behaved alike when it came to the use of 
nature. Wilderness was not only North Americans’ natural habitat but also their internal condition. Both 
had to be reformed, by the hand of European colonists first, and U.S. settlers afterwards.  
By refraining to endorse the applicability of the agricultural argument to the territories of North 
American peoples, Marshall seemingly invested their possession with a certain degree of legal security. 
They could not be deposed of the natural resources from which they subsisted on grounds of their social 
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backwardness. However, his defense of conquest based on a rationale derived from stadial theory ended 
up producing the very same effect as a straight application of the agricultural argument.67 
 Marshall also believed that British colonists had found vacant land in North America, that is, land that 
was unoccupied and unused. So, even if the peoples of North America were recognized as owners of 
certain territories, there were vast tracts of land, which according to European colonists’ perception of 
the environment were not utilized. By appropriating and exploiting supposedly pristine natural habitats, 
worldwide European colonialism in North America and the U.S. government afterward contributed to the 
wider cosmopolitan goal of making the world productive. But at the end of the day, any difference 
between vacant territory and North Americans’ territory was eroded. As Marshall recognized: ‘So far as 
respected the authority of the Crown, no distinction was taken between vacant land and lands occupied 
by the Indians.’68 The Crown had the same power to dispose of all of them. 
Marshall recognized that according to the usages of civilized nations, as Vitoria and other authors had 
defended, North American peoples may have had a natural right to own their territories.69 But the 
conquerors could not respect those natural rights due to the aggressiveness and backwardness of North 
Americans.70 North American savages were fierce. Their main occupation was war. Therefore, conquest 
was necessary to secure the life and property of the settlers as well as their economic activities. Frontier 
violence against North American violence was a facilitator of economic progress. In fact, the task of 
ameliorating their surroundings and making the land productive was the new nation’s manifest destiny; 
a destiny that required pushing wilderness and one of its constitutive parts, North Americans, further 
away. 
Even though theoretically the law of nations would have protected the property rights of North 
American peoples, in practice conquest was indispensable to the way in which North America had to be 
colonized.71 Moreover, applying the logic of stadial theory, Marshall explained that conquest was adapted 
to the different state of society of the colonizer and the colonized, and hence was defensible in front of 
the former’s courts of Justice.72 
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 Johnson v. McIntosh shattered the aspiration of the peoples of North America to relate to the U.S. 
government in terms of equality. Soon after the case was decided, the judgment of the Supreme Court 
and the stadial logic contained in it were used by Campbell and Meriwether, U.S. treaty commissioners, 
to pressure the Cherokee to cede their territory.73 At the same time, the controversy surrounding the Creek 
and Cherokee’s territory in the state of Georgia escalated. Georgia’s Governor George Troup argued, 
following the logic used by Marshall in Johnson v. McIntosh, that the Creeks only had a right of temporary 
occupation for hunting in the territory of Georgia.74 In addition, he bitterly complained about U.S. 
attempts to civilize the Creeks and turn them into agriculturalists. This policy had enhanced their legal 
status, strengthening their legal claim to the property of their nations’ territory in Georgia.75 
Tension between the Union and the state of Georgia over the question of jurisdiction over Cherokee 
and Creek territory intensified during the 1830s. Emboldened by the election of Andrew Jackson as 
President of the U.S. and Congress’ adoption of the Indian Removal Act of 1830 (which allowed the 
President to negotiate for North American lands and to remove all North Americans east of the 
Mississippi river), the Georgian legislature took a series of assertive steps that enhanced Georgian power 
over the Cherokee.76 In June 1830 an Act of December 1827 came into force, enabling Georgia to 
unilaterally extend its jurisdiction over the Cherokee Nation and legalizing white settlers’ incursions in 
their lands in contravention of existing federal treaties.77 Soon after the application of this law a Cherokee 
individual, George Tassel, was captured and judged for a crime he had committed within Cherokee 
territory.78 Tassel was judged by a convention of judges from the county of Hall, which, according to 
Georgian legislation, exercised jurisdiction over the area of Cherokee territory where Tassel allegedly 
committed his crime.  
William Underwood, Tassel’s attorney, challenged the legitimacy of Georgia’s 1827 law, arguing that 
the U.S. government had treated the Cherokee Nation as a sovereign independent state on several 
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occasions. Therefore, a state of the federation could not exercise jurisdiction over members of the 
Cherokee Nation. By exercising jurisdiction over the Cherokee Nation, Georgia had contravened treaties 
between the U.S. and the Cherokee, which were according to the federal Constitution ‘supreme law of 
the land’.79 
The commission of judges responded to Underwood by restating what the Supreme Court had 
maintained in Johnson v. McIntosh, namely that the peoples of North America were mere possessors of 
the soil. Moreover, their power to dispose of their land was curtailed in favor of European colonial powers 
first and later to the U.S., which could unilaterally ‘extinguish Indian title to occupancy, either by 
purchase or by conquest’.80 The commission further referred to the Supreme Court to note that by virtue 
of its decision all the land of the Cherokee Nation had been ‘vested in fee in the State of Georgia’.81 
Tassel appealed the verdict of the commission to the Supreme Court. Marshall looked at the question 
in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia; or, rather, he refrained from looking at it. In fact, Marshall did not go 
into the merits as he found that the Court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate the case. In order to reach that 
conclusion Marshall explained that, according to the Constitution, cases between a state of the Union and 
foreign states fell within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Therefore, the decision on admissibility 
boiled down to the question of whether the Cherokee Nation, who had presented the motion before the 
Court, could be regarded as a foreign state according to the Constitution.82 In his response Marshall denied 
that the Cherokee Nation could be regarded as a foreign nation by famously characterizing the peoples of 
North America as domestic dependent nations.83 In consequence, the Cherokees could not file a case 
before the Supreme Court. 
In his separate opinion Justice Johnson concurred with Marshall’s conclusions, but for different 
motives. He claimed that the denomination of ‘State’ was not applicable to peoples who were as low in 
the state of society as ‘our Indian tribes’.84 They definitely had no part in the society of nations.85 When 
North America was discovered by European nations, they had found ‘a race of hunters’ living in a 
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backward social stage.86 Having found populations that did not have private property, the colonists 
acquired both private property rights and sovereignty over their territories.87 Johnson referred to the 
civilizing policies of the U.S. with regard to the Cherokees which aimed at elevating the Cherokee Nation 
from the hunter state of society to the agricultural stage.88 According to him, that policy had been a 
failure.89 So he concluded that North Americans were ‘an anomaly … which the law of nations would 
regard as nothing more than wandering hordes … and having neither laws nor government beyond what 
is required in a savage state’.90 
The Supreme Court had a new opportunity to resolve the controversial issue of Georgia’s power over 
North American peoples soon after the Court’s lack of jurisdiction had prevented it from doing so in 
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia. In 1832 a new case, Worcester v. Georgia, came before the Supreme Court, 
offering the possibility of settling once and for all the thorny question of the extent of federal and state 
power over the peoples of North America. Could Georgia dispose of Cherokee land or was that 
competence exclusively in the hands of the federal government? Did Georgia have jurisdiction over the 
Cherokee Nation? The Court had already shed some light on these questions, but for political reasons it 
had to refrain from giving a definite answer. The Court was well aware, as it noted in Fletcher v. Peck, 
that especially the land question ‘threatened to shake the American confederacy to its foundations’.91 
Moreover, to reach a definite conclusion on the matter, the Court had to evaluate North Americans’ rights 
to sovereignty and property over their lands, an assessment that required navigating the complex political 
waters of U.S.-North American relations.  
The new case in front of the Supreme Court involved a U.S. citizen, Samuel Worcester, who in 
defiance of Georgia’s laws (which offered white people the choice of departing from Cherokee lands or 
making a vow of allegiance to the State of Georgia) had refused to leave the Cherokee Nation. After 
having been convicted under Georgia’s laws Worcester appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the 
laws under which he was found guilty were unconstitutional. This time, the Supreme Court could not 
dismiss the appeal on jurisdictional grounds, and hence it was compelled to look into its merits of the 
case. 
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In order to ascertain the degree of ascendancy that the state and the federal government exercised over 
North American peoples, Marshall first evaluated the character of the polities in which the population of 
North America lived before conquest. From the outset, Marshall described North American polities by 
inserting them into a ‘stadial mold’. Referring to the colonial encounter he explained that Europeans 
found territories in North America in the hands of peoples who ‘had made small progress in agriculture 
or manufactures’.92 The peoples of North America, he continued, were warlike and lived from hunting 
and fishing.93 
 Marshall was conscious of how his previous judgment had been used by Georgia to back up exorbitant 
claims of power over North American peoples that not only challenged their survival but also threatened 
federal competencies. He was also aware that the low stage of social advancement of North American 
peoples had been used in the past by the Georgian government to substantiate rights of private property 
and sovereignty over all lands in possession of North American peoples within the limits of the state. So, 
Marshall went straight to the question of whether by nature agriculturalists and manufacturers had rights 
over societies of hunter-gatherers and fishermen.94 Could European colonial powers claim ownership of 
American territory from the Atlantic to the Pacific?95 This time his answer was unequivocally negative.  
 Marshals explained that, prima facie, claims of European dominion over North America—and vice 
versa—were bizarre and utterly unfounded. In his opinion there were independent nations in both 
continents. Those nations had their own government, laws, and institutions.96 After having set the stage 
for his later inquiry, Marshall proceeded to rework stadial theory so as to raise the threshold of protection 
granted to North American people. Even though he characterized North Americans as societies in the 
hunting stage (and hence as backward peoples), Marshall refrained from drawing the conclusion that they 
had no laws, government, or notion of property over land, assumptions that were typical among authors 
who wrote in the tradition of conjectural history. North Americans had all the traits usually associated 
with civilized societies. 
Although Marshall’s legal reasoning helped to somewhat secure North American peoples’ standing 
before the law, he still had to reconcile their social status with the colonial fact. In order to do so, he 
acknowledged that European prowess, war, and conquest had tipped the balance of power in favor of the 
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Europeans who ended up settling the continent.97 Colonialism was a fait accompli and had to be 
recognized as such. But that did not mean that North American peoples could be dispossessed of their 
territories or ruled at will. 
One of the legal doctrines that Marshall redefined in order to distance himself from his earlier 
conclusions was the right of discovery. In Johnson v. McIntosh that right was the cornerstone of all his 
legal reasoning about North Americans’ status. Discovery was the basis of European and later U.S. 
ascendancy over them. But in Worcester, Marshall restricted the scope of application of the doctrine of 
discovery. According to him, discovery was only applicable between European maritime empires, its 
purpose being the avoidance of inter-colonial conflict.98 In other words, discovery did not extinguish the 
rights of those who were in possession of the territories discovered,99 and Europeans could only acquire 
land from North American peoples by purchase.100 The first colonial charters did not even grant a power 
to make offensive warfare; only defensive war was within the scope of the power granted to the new 
settlements.101 
After having examined the land question during colonial times, Marshall dealt with the issue of North 
Americans’ capacity for self-government. He affirmed that the peoples of North America governed their 
own polities.102 This conclusion logically followed from his previous general statement that European 
‘discovery’ had neither extinguished North Americans’ dominium rerum nor their dominium 
jurisdictionis. Once Marshall had elucidated the questions of North American’s right to land and self-
government during European colonial times, it was easy to conclude that, as an heir of Great Britain, the 
U.S. had also recognized North American peoples as ‘distinct political communities’ with defined 
boundaries, jurisdiction, and rights over their lands.103 They were considered as nations and had 
accordingly the power to sign treaties, a capacity that for Marshall circularly proved their status as 
independent polities.104 This conclusion also applied to the Cherokee Nation.105 
The role of the U.S. with regard to North American peoples was that of a guarantor.106 The U.S. acted 
as a ‘big brother’ who protected the weaker but independent political communities that existed within its 
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territory. Citing Vattel, Marshall affirmed that the law of nations did not take away the right of self-
government and political independence from a weak nation just because it had decided to seek the 
protection of a stronger state.107 Even if the U.S. wanted to exercise its prerogative of extinguishing North 
Americans’ rights to land, the former needed the latter’s consent to do so.108 
The elucidation of U.S.-North American relations brought to the fore the controversial issue of State 
power vis-à-vis the federal government. Marshall was categorical in this regard. He first limited State 
power over North American territory, affirming that ‘Indian territory’ was ‘completely separated from 
that of the State’.109 In addition, he forbade States from ruling North American peoples; it was the 
exclusive competence of the federal government to directly deal or regulate intercourse with them.110 
The legal status of North American peoples in Worcester afforded them a great deal of protection 
against the acquisitiveness of U.S. settlers moving westward and States avid to acquire their lands. The 
obligation of the federal government to gain North Americans’ consent in order to dispose of their lands 
was the ultimate legal guarantee of an autonomous space within which they could live unharmed. 
Ultimately, however, the protective efforts of the Supreme Court were to not avail: President Andrew 
Jackson blocked the Supreme Court’s decision.111 Unluckily, the ultimate fate of the Cherokee Nation 
was in the hands of Jackson rather than Marshall. 
 
Occupation and the Oregon territorial dispute 
The Marshall Trilogy was not the only instance in which stadial theory was used to substantiate legal 
arguments related to the question of control of the land and the ecosystems of North America during the 
first half of the nineteenth century. The Oregon territory in the northwest presented a new contest, this 
time involving mainly the U.S. and Great Britain.  
By the beginning of the nineteenth century, Spain and Russia had also made claims to sovereignty in 
the region,112 but both countries eventually dropped their pretensions. Spain was the first to renounce its 
territorial claims in the Pacific Northwest.113 On February 22 1819, the Spanish minister in Washington, 
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Luis de Onís, signed the Adam-Onís treaty with the government of the U.S., committing his country to 
cede any rights in the Pacific coast north of the 42nd parallel.114 Soon afterwards, in 1824 and 1825, 
Russia signed treaties with the U.S. and Great Britain similarly relinquishing all territorial pretension 
south of the 54° 40’ parallel.115 
Great Britain and the U.S. had the more sustained claims to sovereignty in the region. In 1792, Captain 
George Vancouver and Captain Robert Gray on board of the Columbia had navigated the coast of the 
Pacific North West.116 While the former’s expedition reinforced British claims to the territory, Gray’s 
discovery of the Columbia River established the foundation of U.S. expansionism in the area. Interest in 
the fur trade elicited the initial claims of both nations to Oregon.117 The North West Company (later 
named the Hudson’s Bay Company) exercised great pressure on the British government to maintain its 
territorial pretensions in Oregon, especially after it received from the Parliament the monopoly of the fur 
trade in the region.118 In 1811-1812 John Astor, the leader of the Pacific Fur Company, founded the 
trading post of Astoria at the mouth of the Columbia, fostering the trade interest of the U.S. in the 
Pacific.119 
Tensions between Britain and the U.S. in the Oregon territory escalated after the War of 1812 leading 
both parties to negotiations in 1818, which were resolved through an agreement that stipulated the joint 
occupation of the territory.120 A new negotiation in 1826-1827 proved inconclusive, with the U.S. 
offering a line of demarcation of territorial interests at the 49th parallel and the British insistent on drawing 
that line from the 49th parallel to the Pacific Ocean following the channel of the Columbia River.121 The 
joint occupation of the territory continued after 1827, and there was a long stalemate in negotiations until 
the 1840s. 
With scores of settlers from the U.S. arriving to Oregon in the 1840s the dispute between Britain and 
the U.S. intensified once again. Land settlements for agriculture in the West provided an escape valve to 
population pressure in the east and the necessary raw materials to sustain the U.S. economic boom.122 
Access to the Pacific coast was also seen by U.S. policy makers as essential for U.S. trade with East Asia 
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and China in particular.123 For these reasons, the Oregon Question became one of the main issues of 
debate in the political campaign for the 1844 presidential election, which saw the appointment of James 
Polk, a devotee of Jackson, to the White House.124 The new administration resolutely supported U.S. 
expansionism in the West and advocated a 54° 40’ line of demarcation in the Pacific North West.  
Despite the firmness of the U.S. commitment to acquire Oregon, the British did not capitulate. The 
possibility of a military confrontation grew. But as the threat of war against Mexico also loomed large 
on the political horizon, the U.S. administration decreased its aggressive stance on the Oregon question. 
Besides, in the Congress Democrats from the South with investments in the cotton trade were concerned 
about the prospects of a war against Great Britain that could provoke a significant reduction of British 
textile imports, thus impairing the cotton industry.125 At the end, the Whigs (who also opposed war) 
aligned with the Southern Democrats in the Senate, and together they were able to reopen negotiations 
with London using a more conciliatory tone.126 
The British seized the opportunity to end the Oregon controversy once and for all and made a generous 
offer, one they believed could not be rejected by the U.S. They proposed to fix the line of demarcation 
of the territorial possession of each country following the 49th parallel from the Rocky Mountains to the 
Pacific Ocean, safeguarding Vancouver Island as a British possession.127 In addition, they also demanded 
a right of navigation for the Hudson’s Bay Company of the Columbian River south of the 49th parallel.128 
That was a palatable alternative for the U.S. as well. So, after the Senate accepted the offer, the U.S. 
Secretary of State, James Buchanan, and Richard Pakenham, British envoy to the U.S., negotiated a treaty 
that was ratified by the Senate on 15 June 1846.129 
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The Oregon question was a diplomatic conflict fought through legal trenches. During the negotiations 
different legal theories and rights such as discovery, exploration, and continuity were invoked to 
substantiate the territorial claims of the parties.130 While all these grounds played an important role in 
the legal debates on the Oregon territory dispute, the theory of occupation topped all other competing 
doctrines on the acquisition of territory.131 Already in 1822 the Duke of Wellington argued in his letter 
to Karl Nesselrode that the most reputed contributors to the law of nations agreed that occupation and 
use were the paramount legal grounds whereby nations could articulate their claims to territory.132 
The legal theory of occupation was often combined with arguments derived from conjectural history. 
In his book on the Oregon question, Albert Gallatin (a senior U.S. diplomat who had been in charge of 
negotiations with the British in 1818 and 1826) wrote that as farmers established permanent settlements 
in Oregon, hunters and animals disappeared.133 According to natural law, once an agricultural and 
industrious population had taken possession of the whole territory, those individuals became sovereigns 
by virtue of the ‘right of occupancy’.134 For Gatlin, the law of nations prescribed that the natural resources 
of Oregon ought to be in the hands of a progressive people, one dedicated to agriculture and industry. 
For Gatlin, the backwardness that characterized North Americans’ utilization of nature did not afford the 
legal protection of the law of nations. This claim not only affected the control of North Americans over 
their territory; it also strategically targeted the British fur trade, which was based on non-progressive 
productive activity performed by savages. 
Sir Traver Twiss, Professor of Political Economy at Oxford, disagreed with Gallatin’s account of the 
right to occupation. On the one hand, he believed that, according to the law of nations, only nations and 
not individuals could acquire empire and domain (sovereignty and property) when they seized 
unoccupied territory.135 To substantiate his position, he cited Vattel extensively, arguing that individuals 
could acquire property in an unoccupied country, but never sovereignty over it.136 It was ridiculous to 
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suppose, he argued, that individual occupation of vacant lands could trump the rights of nations over the 
same territory.137 
At first sight, Twiss account of occupation seemed to differ from that of Gallatin in a second aspect. 
Gallatin believed that occupation was valid once an agricultural population displaced a hunting society. 
For Twiss the right of occupation was limited to the acquisition of a vacant territory or ‘res nullius’, that 
is, a territory which had ‘always been unoccupied’ or after having been occupied was then deserted.138 
The question that remained to be answered was whether the law of nations recognized North American 
peoples’ possession and use of their territories as occupation. Twiss also affirmed that the lack of 
population was a strong indicator of the vacancy of a given territory.139 This seemed to suggest that, 
notwithstanding the degree of social advancement of a particular society, any population present in a 
territory presumed its occupation. In other words, North Americans’ supposed backwardness could not 
foreclose the enjoyment of the ecosystems they inhabited. 
However, later in his book Twiss used the same argumentative line that Marshall had used in Johnson 
v. McIntosh. He claimed that according to European colonial practice, the first European nation that 
occupied the lands of ‘savage tribes’—that is, communities that lived ‘by hunting, fishing and roaming 
habits’—possessed the exclusive right to acquire ‘the soil from the natives by purchase, or cession, or 
conquest, for the purpose of establishing settlements’.140 Twiss also underlined that the modern law of 
nations was imbued with a more humanitarian spirit. Accordingly, he continued, the exclusive right of 
European nations against rival colonial powers was weakened into a right of pre-emption.141 
Twiss’ account of occupation legitimized the displacement of North American people’s use of nature 
by European colonial nations. Colonial powers could extinguish their right to the soil. That displacement 
was not only the displacement of one people by another, but also the displacement of a ‘savage’ use of 
nature by a civilized one. An unproductive utilization of natural resources—epitomized by backward 
productive practices such as hunting and fishing—had to be substituted by the efficiency of white 
agricultural settlements. It is striking that a century and a half after Locke, Twiss described the peoples 
of North America in the same fashion, to wit, as non-agricultural communities.142 
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For Twiss, the contest over Oregon was a territorial dispute between two civilized nations; the 
presence of North Americans was inconsequential to its resolution. Phillimore, Wheaton, and Ortolan 
presented the Oregon question in the same fashion as a dispute between Great Britain and the U.S.143 In 
these legal texts North American peoples were utterly invisible. Occupation applied to territory that was 
described by all these authors as vacant, unoccupied, and open to appropriation. 
Twiss and Phillimore had shared views in regard to the Oregon question. As Twiss noted, British 
acquisitions in the North West were validated by international law because the territory under dispute 
had not yet been occupied ‘by any other civilized nation’.144 In the same vein, Phillimore emphasized the 
British argument that nations had rights to occupy vacant portions of the Earth, independent of where 
they were located.145 
Similar arguments were aired from the competing camp. On 7 February 1846 Garett Davis, U.S. 
Senator and chairman of the Committee on Territories, intervened in front of the U.S. House of 
Representatives. In his speech he went further than Twiss, asserting that:  
 
The earth is the common heritage of mankind, the universal gift of a bounteous God. It is alike the law of reason 
and of nations, that such portions of it as are not occupied may be appropriated by any people; and Oregon, in 
1790, when this Nootka treaty was made, having no people, no government, no laws, no political authority of any 
kind, but being in a state of unbroken, unsubjugated, primeval solitude, except the occasional landing of traders 
upon the coast to traffic with the savages, and having so continued for more than two centuries since it was first 
visited by civilized man from Europe, was open to any race who might seek it for a home and subsistence, to 
establish their hearths and their altars.146 
 
Davis described Oregon using standards of social advancement characteristic of conjectural history, 
namely, government, laws, and political authority. In addition, his conclusion that the primeval condition 
of Oregon legitimized its occupation by any civilized race was strengthened by a religious interpretation 
of God’s creation. In the same manner as Grotius, Pufendorf, Locke, and Vattel, Davis believed that the 
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Earth belonged to humanity as a whole. The only difference with these previous thinkers was the racial 
undertone of Davis’ pronouncement. But, like them, he believed that the world was given to humans by 
a generous creator in order to privatize, populate, and improve it. Oregon was a wilderness in which wild 
savages surely existed, but had not yet created a civil society. Furthermore, they had not left any trace on 
the surface of that part of the Earth that was worthy of recognition.  
Davis went even further, paradoxically suggesting that North American peoples did not even count as 
inhabitants. On the one hand, he acknowledged their presence, recognizing European trade with them. 
On the other, he clearly affirmed that Oregon had no people.147 The fact that North Americans fused with 
their surrounding wild environment implied that the land they inhabited was not really populated, in the 
sense of having been improved and marked by civilization. Only economically progressive individuals 
counted as human beings in the full sense of the term. In North America they belonged to the nation upon 
which God had bestowed the Manifest Destiny of subduing all of North American nature.148 
 The Oregon territory was not empty. Before Europeans set foot on it, it had been inhabited since the 
Holocene for thousands of years by successive generations.149 At the time of European arrival the 
territory was peopled by fifteen different language groups, comprising a population of between 100,000 
to 200,000 inhabitants.150 They modified the landscapes of the northwest coast of North America through 
hunting, fishing, cultivation, and the use of fire.151 They used and managed more than 300 plants, 
increasing their productivity and using them for food and ceremonial purposes, as well as medicines.152 
Their productive activities and lifestyles had an impact on the natural habitats that surrounded them, but 
generally maintained the fertility of the land.153 The belief of the Northwest North Americans that they 
were part of the grand cycle of life and their love for their land were conducive to a respectful—though 
not protective—attitude toward nature.154 Moreover, their impact on nature paled in comparison with 
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that of U.S. settlers. Mining, grazing, logging, farming, and uncontrolled fires had an impact on the 
Northwest ecosystems, larger than any other previously recorded in history.155 
 Despite all the activities through which North American communities in the Northwest skillfully 
modified nature, they were generally perceived by European colonists and their descendants as savages 
that wandered over the land.156 This claim—namely, that they could not utilize the natural resources of 
the Northwest—paved the way for their dispossession. In 1850 the U.S. Congress passed the Oregon 
Land Donation Act, whereby every white settler who would work the land in the Oregon territory would 
receive 320 acres of land.157 The Act did not recognize North Americans’ pre-existing presence. Five 
years after the Act, 2.5 million acres of North American territory became the private property of white 
settlers.158 
With the discovery of gold in Oregon even more settlers avid of land and wealth made inroads into 
North Americans territory in the North West, using violence if necessary. North Americans retaliated.159 
Disease and wars with the Confederation debilitated North American societies in the Pacific North West. 
In this context, the U.S. Congress created the Willamette Valley Treaty Commission in 1850 with the 
objective of negotiating agreements that would grant colonists access to North American land in 
Oregon.160 Despite fierce resistance, most groups ended up signing unfavorable treaties in which they 
ceded more and more territory, and transferred to the U.S. innumerable natural resources which had 
previously been at their disposal.161 
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The alleged backwardness of North Americans before the law condemned their practices and 
understandings of nature to invisibility. The other side of the coin was the strong connection in the minds 
of U.S. intellectuals and legal scholars between the improvement of nature, social advancement, and U.S. 
manifest destiny. The law of nations provided the strategic link between Western visions of social 
progress and the institutions of private property and trade that propelled the kind of exploitative economy 
that incarnated progress. As North Americans and the wilderness that encircled them rapidly shrank a 
handful of commentators melancholically lamented the eventual vanishing of their once strong savage 
neighbors.162 
 
Savages rediscovered: Australians and colonists’ perceptions 
When on the 28th of April 1770 the Endeavour, captained by James Cook, landed at a site they named 
Botany Bay, he could not imagine the enormity of the 7.78 million square kilometer island-continent on 
which he had arrived. Cook and his crew were not the first Europeans to ever visit those lands. Since the 
sixteenth century, European explorers had navigated the seas around Australia. In 1567 the Spanish 
searched for gold in the Solomon Island with little success.163 They tried again unsuccessfully in 1595 
and 1605, this time landing in the island archipelago of Vanuatu.164 The Portuguese might have been the 
first to actually arrive to Terra Australis.165 But their presence in the area ended soon with the arrival of 
the Dutch, who operated in the western and northern coasts of the continent, which they called Nova 
Hollandia (New Holland).166 In the mid eighteenth century the French had also started to show interest 
in the region, sending several scientific expeditions to chart the unknown expanse of the Pacific.167 
Despite those early contacts, Australia had remained largely untouched by Europeans before Captain 
James Cook chartered more than 8,000 kilometers of the eastern seaboard and laid claim to the entire 
coast in 1770.168 Eighteen years after Cook’s arrival, Captain Arthur Philip commanded a fleet of 11 ships 
and 1,350 passengers comprising 759 convicts and their guards to Port Jackson. The English claimed and 
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named the vast area around this first settlement as New South Wales. It was the first permanent English 
colony in the continent.169 
Australia was a penal colony. More than 150,000 convicts were transported during the years that the 
system operated.170 Convicts were valuable in the new British territory because they provided a free labor 
force, first for the government and later for private masters.171 In addition to offering the possibility to 
get rid of a social burden, Australia was a valuable colonial acquisition for the British because it provided 
an advantageous geographical location to operate in the Pacific and Indian oceans, far from the Dutch 
sphere of influence in the East Indies.  
As with other overseas territories, Australia also offered the possibility of furnishing new commodities 
of economic value for the Empire. On the first voyage, James Cook was accompanied by Joseph Banks 
(1743-1820), a young scientist that was to become the most important figure in British colonial botany 
during his lifetime, and Swedish botanist Daniel Solander (1733-1782), a disciple of the Swedish 
naturalist Carl Linnaeus (1707-1778) who had famously coined a system of botanical nomenclature.172 
Banks and Solander collected hundreds of new species for study.173 
Commercial exploitation of valuable species began in the early years of British colonization. At first, 
it focused on the products obtained from whales (highly prized in European and North American markets) 
and on the furs from seals.174 Hundreds of thousands of whales were killed. The intensity of the hunt 
provoked a population crash that negatively impacted the new-born industry.175 In addition to whales, 
approximately 250,000 seals were slaughtered.176 The extinction of some minor species and the 
decimation of others resulted in the swift collapse of the fur industry.177 
The first decades of the new colony were a time of hardship. In contrast, from the 1830s the Australian 
colonies received millions of pounds of British investment.178 In fact, they were the second biggest 
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recipient of capital in the British Empire after India.179 That supply of money transformed life in the 
colonies and soon Australian settlers achieved one of the highest standards of living in the world at the 
time. But abundance was achieved at the expense of natural resources: Australian nature suffered the 
vigorous impact of the colonists’ acquisitiveness.  
British colonists not only found an alien environment in Australia, but also an unknown and large 
population. They were part of an even larger group of people that had been using that environment to 
their convenience for thousands of years. The peoples of Australia180 had first arrived to the continent 
between 40,000 BP and 60,000 BP.181 The size of the pre-contact population in 1788 remains disputed, 
but most authors agree on figure between 300,000 and 1.5 million.182 This population manipulated the 
environment, adapting it to its needs.  
Despite Australians sustainable adaptation of the natural habitats they inhabited, they had also a clear 
impact on the natural environment.183 How is it then possible that the idea that Australians fussed with 
their wild habitats has persisted until so very recently?184 When did this idea originate and how did it take 
form? What were its legal and political effects in the context of British imperialism? 
The idea of Australia as an empty land waiting to be settled, with a crude and backward pre-contact 
population that lived in a kind of ‘state of nature’, has deep colonial roots. In spite of this fact, during the 
nineteenth century several settlers and explorers recognized that Australians pertinently managed their 
lands and modified the environment. Convict painter Joseph Lulcett, for instance, portrayed a group of 
Awakabal people using fire to hunt kangaroos.185 Similarly, other paintings of the time represented 
Australian as ‘people in possession and full enjoyment of their lands’.186 Explorer and geologist Paul 
Edmund de Strzelecki, ethnologists James Cowles Prichard, Albert Cort Haddon, and polymath John 
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Lubbock recognized that the Australian peoples had a distinctive system of land ownership and a special 
connection to the lands they inhabited.187 Haddon also noted that Australians cultivated certain plants like 
purslane, though not the soil.188 
Important as they were, these testimonies constituted mere islands of recognition in a sea of denial. 
Moreover, the fact that early colonial account of Australia recognized the pre-colonial population as 
proprietors did not mean that they regarded them as a socially advanced population. Lubbock, for 
example, noted the paradoxical situation that Australians unlike North Americans had individual property 
rights over land, despite the fact that they were much lower on the scale of social evolution.189 
But soon after the early benevolent testimonies of Australians, the imposition of the ideological label 
of ‘savages’ erased whatever entitlement to possess and use their ecosystems that Europeans may have 
recognized. Already Captain Cook had described Australian peoples as a timorous, naked, and non-
agricultural race.190 But Cook’s picture of the Australians was not somber. Their simplicity had a positive 
corollary. They had not experienced the extremes of opulence and social inequality that, according to him 
and several Enlightenment intellectuals, characterized the European society of his time.191 Hence, they 
were considerably happier than contemporary Europeans;192 aborigines were content with what nature 
had furnished them with. Their lack of greed protected them against the social suffering caused by the 
craving for riches and material affluence characteristic of advanced nations. 
By the beginning of the nineteenth century accounts of the Australian population were far less rosy. 
Evangelical missionary work in the Pacific negatively affected the perception of Australians.193 
Missionaries had travelled to the new British possessions in order to bring civilization and salvation to a 
fallen race rather than to learn from a dignified ‘Other’. The attitude of missionaries was based on the 
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certitude of Australians’ inferiority. Fortunately, their mission of converting and enlightening the pre-
colonial populations prevented them from turning this difference into an excuse for harsh treatment.  
So it was still possible to find during the first decades of British settlement influential individuals such 
as Governor Macquarie who believed that with gentleness and persuasion the peoples of Australia could 
be assimilated into the new colonial society.194 Once civilized, the peoples of Australia could become 
useful for the new British colonies in Australia.195 Learning industriousness and the arts from the British 
settlers would, for instance, allow them to find a place within the labor structure of the new colonial 
economy.196 
Not everybody believed that civilizing the Australians was feasible. In the view of Barron Field, Judge 
of the Supreme Court of New South Wales, the peoples of Australia were irredeemable. They could not 
be civilized because of their deficient rationality and natural savage instincts.197 Peter Miller 
Cunningham, pioneer and commentator, went further than Field, speculating that the animal state of the 
peoples of Australia and their deficiency in the mechanical arts in comparison to other savages suggested 
that they could well be the missing link between man and monkey.198 That was visible in ‘some of the 
old women’ who ‘only seem to require a tail to complete the identity’.199 
The fluid social identity of Australians was superseded following the voyages of Cook by a 
depoliticized and ahistorical colonial identity within the British Empire, built on the perceptions of the 
pioneers, explorers, officers, and scientists who came in contact with them. At the same time, the various 
individuals that studied and described the peoples of Australia were influenced by the intellectual ideas 
that circulated in metropolitan circles about non-European peoples and the function, place, and treatment 
they should be afforded in the British Empire. One of these sets of ideas, based on Enlightenment stadial 
theory, was used to justify their dispossession.  
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The children of the wilderness: the fate of the Cherokee and North Americans 
Jackson’s grand scheme of removing all North American peoples east of the Mississippi had been hunting 
the Cherokee for decades.200 Fearing that they were going to eventually be forced to abandon the territory 
where they lived, the Cherokee had been ceding land for decades in an attempt to appease land hungry 
settlers. But their efforts were in vain: both settlers and the Georgia state continued to demand more and 
more land. Unluckily for the Cherokee, the discovery of gold in their territory only exacerbated the 
growing appetite for land.201 
On December 28, 1835, an unauthorized minority faction of the Cherokee Nation signed the treaty of 
New Echota with the U.S., committing to leave their territory within a period of two years.202 Eventually, 
in 1837 and 1838, under the office of President Martin Van Burden (Vice-President under Andrew 
Jackson), the Cherokee were forced to migrate in an exodus famously—or rather, infamously—known 
as the Trail of Tears.203 This forced migration provoked a high mortality rate. It is estimated that of the 
15,000 Cherokee that left their land (accompanied by 1,600 slaves), between 2,000 and 8,000 died as 
direct consequence of walking the Trail of Tears.204 
None other than John Stuart Mill defended the forced migration of ‘Indian tribes’. Replying to articles 
in the Times and the Standard which criticized removal and alternatively proposed a policy of civilization, 
James endorsed the policies of the federal government. He first described the belief of the Union that the 
lands in possessions of the ‘Indians’ needed to be allocated to civilized settlers for agriculture.205 In 
exchange, ‘Indians’ were going to obtain new lands and keep them forever. Mill argued that removal was 
legitimate. Mill had always believed in the cosmopolitan need for an efficient utilization of unproductive 
land. Accordingly, he did not criticize the rationale of removal defended by the federal government. In 
addition, he believed that the government of the Union had treated North American peoples in an 
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honorable manner and had invested a lot of resources in their civilization.206 North American peoples 
would be better off after removal had separated them from the jurisdiction of the State and placed them 
under the protecting umbrella of the Federation.207 
Even Marshall, despite his legal defense of North Americans’ right to property, was far from 
advocating the parity of North American polities and the U.S. In Worcester v. Georgia, Marshall’s 
characterization of both nations evidenced an understanding of social formations informed by a 
progressive philosophy of history. In his account, North American polities figured as weak nations that 
needed the protection of the strong U.S. from external incursions ‘into their country’.208 Moreover, 
because of their savage condition, they also needed the U.S. to furnish them with the necessities of life.209 
This situation was the same at the time of European colonialism.210 Due to North Americans’ backward 
productive activities they could not enjoy the basic comforts of a civilized life.  
For this reason, Congress launched a program to civilize North Americans.211 The way to do so was 
by turning them from wandering hunters into settled agriculturalists.212 That policy was also implemented 
in the Cherokee Nation. According to Marshall, that scheme of cultural, economic, and social 
transformation had started to bear fruit: the Cherokee ‘had already made considerable progress in this 
improvement … Their advance in the "habits and arts of civilization," rather encouraged perseverance in 
the laudable exertions still farther to meliorate their condition.’213 Marshall’s stereotypes about North 
American peoples, similar to those of the executive, neglected the fact that the Cherokees had permanent 
settlements and practiced agriculture long before the first Europeans ever set foot in North America.214 
Those stereotypes neglected who North Americans really were, while encouraging the imposition of the 
‘progressive’ model over their identities. 
Justice McLean also commended the laudable attempt of the Federal Government to civilize North 
American peoples by helping them advance from ‘the hunter state’ in which they lived toward that of ‘the 
agriculturalist and herdsman’.215 North Americans, or ‘the children of the wilderness’ as he referred to 
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them, would be uplifted by abandoning nomadic life and embracing civilization, private property, and 
productive activities that helped in managing and trading natural resources.216 
McLean's views about North American peoples, although more extreme than Marshall’s, evidenced a 
similar adherence to the main tenets of stadial theory. But McLean went further than Marshall, also 
defending the legal validity of the agricultural argument. According to McLean, it was an indisputable 
principle of natural law, which he regarded as the highest source of normativity, that peoples or 
communities that lived in the hunter stage ought to be confined within narrow territorial limits in the case 
that others who were in a more pressing need of their vast territories (and the natural resources those 
territories contained) attempted to acquire them.217 McLean was here paraphrasing Vattel’s conclusions 
about the applicability of the agricultural argument in North America.  
In practice, McLean noticed, the settlement of North America had not been carried out according to 
this legal principle. European states and colonists chose a more ‘conciliatory’ course of action, acquiring 
North American’s territories by contract and purchase.218 Land was also taken in the aftermath of warfare 
by application of the laws of war.219 To be sure, McLean explained that the use of these legal mechanisms 
for the settlement of North America did not mean that the agricultural argument was not a legitimate 
method of acquiring territory. It only meant that it may have not been the most expedient way for colonists 
who were not powerful enough to impose their prerogative.220 
Marshall, as Vitoria had done several centuries before him, recognized the possibility that non-
Europeans had pre-colonial natural rights of private property. This undoubtedly prevented greedy 
individuals from acquiring their property and disposing them of their natural resources. Both Vitoria and 
Marshall were conscious of the threat that an unruly taking of lands from the peoples of Latin America 
and North America could pose to their respective states. For Vitoria and the Dominicans, aligning with 
the Spanish Crown and limiting the power of the conquistadores in Latin America was essential in order 
to promote a more benign colonization, one in tune with the imperative of Catholic evangelization, the 
worldview that informed the Dominican vision of Spanish Empire. Marshall, for his part, was well aware 
that an increase of State power over North American affairs could end up fracturing the Confederacy.  
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Again similar to Vitoria, Marshall’s conclusion that the peoples of North America were the proprietors 
of the soil retrospectively projected the institution of private property over land and other natural 
resources to describe the way in which the peoples of North America had traditionally related to the 
ecosystems they used. Once the relationship between North American peoples and their natural habitats 
was re-conceptualized as one of proprietorship, the natural habitats of North America became either 
private or privatizable. In other words, North American nature became commoditized, and therefore all 
natural elements entered the realm of goods that could be object of trade. In the context of U.S. expansion, 
the legal redefinition of nature as a commodity allowed the federal government to purchase as much land 
as possible from North American peoples, something that became easier and easier as the balance of 
military power tipped in favor of the U.S.  
The legal fiction of North Americans’ ownership of nature allowed the change of hands from North 
American polities to the colonists or the U.S. to be presented as occurring in a continuum. This fact hid 
the great divergences that existed between the way nature and the relationship between humans and nature 
was understood and conceptualized in North American (with all the nuances and variations that existed 
within this vast and heterogeneous group) and European societies—or societies of European descent like 
the U.S.221 The Cherokee, for example, considered that they were part of and belonged to the natural 
world that surrounded them.222 Even though they had rights of use of the land, there was not clear 
separation between the natural and social realm, and, hence, no conception of human superiority over 
nature.223 Despite a cosmology rife with conflict, Perdue and Green affirmed that ‘the creation stories of 
the Cherokees emphasized the importance of respect for other living things, not dominion over them’.224 
The Cherokee, as with many other communities, had a sense of territoriality linked to the natural spaces 
from which they sought sustenance.225 Eventually they adopted many of the ways of the Europeans and 
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their descendants in order to safeguard their groups and improve their standard of living.226 One of the 
notions that they acquired was the conception of landed property. But even after adopting the idea of 
ownership of their lands, they still retained a collective approach. For the Cherokee, their territory 
belonged to the whole group.227 In other words, land could not be owned by particular members of the 
community. This is why the private division of their land and other civilizing measures in reservations 
and Indian Territory represented the ultimate attack on North Americans’ way of life, constituting a 
violent attempt to erase their singularity.228 
From Vitoria’s De indis to the ‘Marshall Trilogy’, the law of nations remained blind to the different 
worldviews and understandings of nature in non-European societies. At the same time, the more 
exploitative relationship to nature that the growing U.S. economy demanded, anchored on the right to 
privatize and trade whole ecosystems and their constitutive natural elements, received international 
validation. The law of nations conferred legal protection to those institutions and the nations that 
embraced them, projecting them on a global scale through the self-arrogated mission of exploiting nature 
to create civilization. 
It would be disingenuous to claim that either Vitoria or Marshall were consciously attempting to 
privatize the territory of North America. Within the worldview that made sense to them, the only way in 
which they could protect the peoples of America and their territories from encroachment (however 
secondary this protection was to other interests at play) was by conceptualizing—and, hence, by 
inadvertently transforming—North Americans’ relation to nature into a private relationship of 
ownership, an institution with an old pedigree that was sacrosanct in the European as well as the U.S. 
legal imagination. All in all, it was their conviction that Latin and North American polities were inferior 
to Europeans that prevented them from understanding the former’s use of nature as socially advanced or 
progressive. The backwardness of their practices and their understanding of nature was taken for granted. 
This disadvantageous position foreclosed the inclusion of their views and practices into a universal legal 
vocabulary that ultimately remained utterly Eurocentric.  
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The uncontrolled freedom of nature: stadial theory and occupation in Australia  
Upon their arrival to Australia, the British claimed sovereignty over half of the continent and handed 
jurisdiction to the governor of New South Wales and its courts. Unlike any of their other colonies, in 
Australia the British never signed treaties with its inhabitants. Britain arrogated and claimed the rights to 
settle, govern, and own the territories of which they took possession. 
British colonization had a traumatic impact on the Australian peoples who first came in contact with 
the colonists. The extension of British power sent reverberating waves throughout the continent. The most 
severe effect of the colonial encounter was the extremely high mortality rate among Australians. Mortality 
figures vary depending on authors, but the general consensus is that the pre-colonial population of 
Australia was reduced from a figure of 300,000-1.5 million people in 1788 to 58,000 and 19,000229 by 
1920, before slowly starting to recover.230 Independent of the historical data one relies on, the glaring fact 
of the disappearance of between 80 and 96 percent of the pre-colonial population amounts to the almost 
total destruction of a whole—if very varied—group of peoples.231 
The main causes of death were contagious diseases, sexual abuse of women and girls, and direct 
violence.232 Tens of thousands died at the hands of English colonists. Only in Queensland, British settlers 
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killed 10,000 Australians between 1850 and 1900.233 Many women and young girls perished as victims 
of venereal diseases (which were uncommon among Australian peoples before European arrival) and 
sexual violence. Social and cultural dislocation in the aftermath of colonization exacerbated the impact 
of germs and colonist violence.234 The rupture of the social fabric in which the lives of Australian peoples 
were knitted continued well into the twentieth century when thousands of their children were forcibly 
removed from their families and allocated to British families in an effort to assimilate them into British 
culture.235 
A further factor that aggravated the impact of the English was the dispossession of land. Displacement 
from their habitats affected Australian peoples in various ways. To start with, much of the violence 
perpetrated against Australian peoples came about in reply to their resistance against the takeover of their 
territories.236 Besides, the impossibility of accessing fertile land to satisfy their food requirements 
provoked undernourishment and, in some cases, even led to starvation.237 In this sense, Lisa Ford has 
argued that ‘for indigenous people, conflict revolved around life-or-death access to resources, access 
hampered by settlers’ occupation of land, their monopolization of water, and their relentless destruction 
of animal habitats’.238 
For Australian peoples nature was much more than a mere source of provision: it had intertwined 
social, cultural, and spiritual meanings and values that contributed to the formation of their identity. 
Losing this was tantamount to being deprived of a limb or losing one of the pillars that held the social 
edifice together. Alcohol addiction became the most conspicuous symptom of the acute collective and 
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individual suffering that resulted from Australians’ loss of lives, space, and self, and their segregation 
from the new white colonial society. 
Dispossession was not a planned course of action specifically designed by the British for the 
colonization of Australia. In fact, throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries British imperial 
authority over non-European peoples was to a large degree based on mutual consent. Treaties, protocols, 
and similar instruments gave legal validity to reciprocal if uneven relationships.239 In North America, 
colonists generally acquired the land through purchase rather than first taking (original occupation). But 
more often than not, non-European peoples entered into unjust agreements and took part in one-sided 
sales. North American peoples, for instance, gave away more land and natural resources than they would 
have wanted to. European diseases debilitated their societies, placing them from the outset in a 
disadvantageous bargaining position vis-á-vis the British and eventually the U.S. In this sense, Banner 
has observed that most treaties in North America were characterized by coercion rather than informed 
and free agreement.240 
The policy of considering non-European peoples as owners of the territories they used and occupied 
influenced the instructions given to Captain Cook before his voyages to the Pacific by James Douglas, 
14th Earl of Morton and the President of the Royal Society (which sponsored Cook’s first voyage to the 
Pacific), to treat the ‘Native’ that he may find with care and to ‘exercise the utmost patience and 
forbearance’ with them.241 He was also instructed to do his utmost to avoid any act of violence against 
them.242 Moreover, the ‘Natives’ were, in the words of Douglas, the natural and ‘legal possessors of the 
several Regions they inhabited’.243 Consequently, Europeans could not exercise any right of free 
occupancy. In other words, settlements could only be established based on free consent.244 In the same 
vein, the dispatches of Governor Philips to London show a peaceful and gentle approach toward the 
peoples of Australia. He often asserted that he tried to refrain from using violence against a population 
that, according to his own words, he had always considered ‘friendly’.245 
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 However, the initial approach of the British soon changed for a number of reasons. First, Cook and 
other explorers reported that Australia was sparsely populated. Second, the first accounts from Australia 
described the social state of the pre-colonial population as lower than that of any other people encountered 
before. Additionally, the British also noted that pre-colonial Australian polities were not large enough to 
present a military threat to Europeans. Finally, the well-armed expedition that the British sent to colonize 
New South Wales had the power to impose its terms on the ground.246 Due to all these factors, the British 
did not need to buy the land.247 That approach contrasted to the one taken in colonial North America. 
There, colonists proceeded often ahead of government, making deals and frequently operating outside the 
colonial government’s control and protection. The ad-hoc way in which colonization proceeded built its 
own momentum. Once colonists acquired land from non-Europeans or alternatively directly purchased it 
from the Crown, reversing the initial course of action proved difficult in the volatile social context that 
often characterized the first decades of colonial settlements.248 
So when in 1787 Arthur Philips travelled with the first settlers to Australia, they immediately began 
to land grab. The British stuck to the legal fiction that the Crown was the proprietor of the continent. The 
growth of the new colony during the first decades of settlement was conditioned to find commodities that 
could be exportable to international markets.249 From the 1820s, the textile industry in England started 
booming. This development was crucial for Australia. International demand for animal textiles, cheap 
land, and forced labor provided a suitable basis for the profitability of large-scale wool production.250 The 
demand for wool soon skyrocketed, and with the drop in the duty of wool coming from Australia in 1822, 
millions of sheep started to fill Australian landscapes.251 Plantation agriculture and mining were also 
important in the initial development of a colonial economy largely dependent on Australian natural 
resources.252 
British settlers seized the land upon their arrival to Australia. How did they justify it? What legal 
grounds did they invoke? Until recently, historians commonly assumed that British authorities had labeled 
Australia terra nullius—that is, a territory belonging to no one—at the time of first contact.253 Allegedly, 
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the British knew that Australia was inhabited but they used the doctrine of terra nullius to claim that the 
peoples of Australia had never been in possession of the land.254 Even though this way of thinking was 
widespread among the colonists, it is now clear that the British did not really use the notion of terra 
nullius as a legal ground to dispossess the peoples of Australia.255 The term was only applied much later 
by the Privy Council in 1889 (Cooper v. Stuart) to Australian lands considered ‘practically 
unoccupied’.256 In academic circles, the question of whether Australia had been terra nullius at the time 
of British occupation was debated as late as 1939.257 
 The English did not regard Australians as owners of their territories. This attitude was not the result of 
the direct application of any specific legal concept, but was derived from the use of a particular 
conceptual framework to understand non-European societies. Those ideas were later translated into legal 
terms. The practical application of this ideological apparatus entailed a general appraisal of the degree of 
sophistication of pre-colonial Australian societies. The information assembled about Australians was 
inserted within a progressive social scale informed by a particular philosophy of history that ranked 
societies according to their level of material advancement. In Australasia, that evaluation took place from 
the very outset of British exploration and settlement. This is attested by the hints given to Cook by Lord 
Morton,258 which formed part of a larger corpus of instructions whereby the Royal Society detailed the 
features of non-European peoples that English expeditions were expected to record and report back on 
during their ‘trips of discovery’ around the world.259 
Morton mentioned a vast array of elements that Cook ought to observe and register, the analysis of 
which could provide juicy information about the level of civilization of non-European populations. These 
elements included dress, food, habitation, weapons, religion, morals, order, government and distinctions 
of power, police, mechanics, tools, arts, and science.260 The number of inhabitants was also a relevant 
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factor due to the assumed correlation between population density and civilization. The more populous a 
territory was, the more civilized it was supposed to be. Only a refined economy could feed large numbers 
of people. Conversely, a sparse population was almost always indicative of the existence of a savage 
nation. 
The journals of Captain Cook contained several descriptions of the peoples of Australia that presented 
them as a tiny population. They wore very simple clothes, had rudimentary weapons, and lived in 
primitive huts.261 The metaphor of the state of nature, the hypothetical condition in which humans lived 
before coming together to form a civil society, was often used to describe them. It is interesting that Cook 
and Phillips applied this concept to the land rather than to its population. His conclusion was that 
Australia was ‘in the pure state of nature’.262 Its population fused with the wild ecosystems in which they 
lived and did not leave any trace on the landscapes. Governor Philips used the same expression when 
talking about the state of the new British territory.263 James Grant, an official of the British Royal Navy 
and explorer, explained in the account of his voyage of discovery that Australians, like other savages, 
lived in ‘the state of nature’.264 David Collins, one of the founders of New South Wales and Secretary, 
Lieutenant Governor, and first Judge of the Colony, concurred. The British had found the pre-colonial 
population of Botany Bay, Port Jackson and Broken Bay (the terms with which the British renamed those 
territories) in the pure ‘state of nature’.265 
Like Cook, all the early accounts of colonization described the pre-colonial population of Australia as 
a very crude and savage people. Phillips noted that they were amicable, naked, and had simple huts and 
instruments.266 But in contrast to Cook he pointed out that they were far more numerous than had been 
predicted. He presumed that the interior of the continent was equally as inhabited as the coast.267 
Notwithstanding the relevance of all the social aspects contained in the long list provided by Morton, 
as well as the importance of population size, the existence of currency and commerce were of foremost 
importance when evaluating the kind of societies that existed in Australia.268 These social institutions 
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were significant because in the European intellectual tradition the existence of an exchange economy 
implied relations of private property, which in turn evidenced the existence of laws that regulated 
ownership and a system of government that could enforce proprietary rights.269 
In addition, commerce was not only a mode of subsistence. In the European imagination it was also a 
social category related to historical progress, a stage characterized by social complexity and progress. 
Stadial theory influenced the perception that British metropolitan political elites, colonial administrators, 
and settlers alike had of the inhabitants of New Holland. The belief that societies progressed through 
different stages of production did not fade away at the end of the eighteenth century, but was recast—
albeit in a slightly different form—by nineteenth-century intellectuals of the first half of the century such 
as James and John Stuart Mill. It also figured prominently in the legal texts of British lawyers at the turn 
of the nineteenth century. Even religious people such as the Archbishop of Canterbury John Bird Sumner 
used a stadial theoretical framework to explain the story of Adam, and others like Thomas Clamers 
combined philosophical history and political economy with Christianity.270 
The centrality of commerce in conjectural history explains, for example, why in Cooks’ voyages the 
possibility of establishing trade with the inhabitants of Tahiti and New Zealand but not of New Holland 
was a decisive factor in considering the latter lower in the scale of social advancement.271 Moreover, 
Cook even believed that the ‘Country’ as such did not offered tradable commodities that could be of 
interest to the Crown.272 Having no commodities with which to bargain with the newcomers, the 
importance of the peoples of Australia as possible trading partners diminished considerably. For this 
reason, direct access to the land was crucial.273 
Once it was evident that the peoples of Australia were not a commercial society, it remained to be 
seen whether they had advanced as far as the agricultural stage of civilization, owning land and 
cultivating it. Again, in this respect they lost in comparison with the Māoris, who the English always 
regarded as cultivators of the soil.274 In the journals of his trip on the Endeavour Captain Cook described 
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Australians as fishing, hunting, and gathering communities.275 For Cook they were ‘like wild beasts’ 
moving constantly in search for food and depending solely on their daily catch for subsistence.276 It was 
also obvious from the descriptions of Governor Philips that they had no knowledge of agriculture.  
The state of nature in which Cook found Australia opened the possibility for the exploitation of 
Australian natural habitats. In the Australian state of nature, Cook remarked, there was ample space for 
the planting and cultivation of ‘Grain, Fruits, and Roots’.277 Australia was wild but abundant at the same 
time. The grasslands offered good prospects for the introduction of cattle.278 All in all, applying the ‘hand 
of industry’,279 to use Cook’s words, to the vacant lands and ecosystems of Australia could provide 
succulent dividends to the British Empire, hence fostering its economic prosperity.  
Living in the state of nature, in backward communities, with a rudimentary material culture and no 
knowledge of trade or agriculture, the peoples of Australia appeared to British eyes as creatures of nature 
in need of civilization. A humanitarian sentiment toward the peoples of Australia appeared in the 
dispatches of the first British governors of New South Wales. Governor Macquarie’s sympathy toward 
the pre-colonial population crystallized into a program of civilization destined to lift them from the abject 
condition in which they lived. He claimed that: 
 
Scarcely Emerged from the remotest State of rude and Uncultivated Nature, these People appear to possess some 
Qualities, which, if properly Cultivated and Encouraged Might render them not only less Wretched and destitute 
by Reason of their Wild Wandering and Unsettle Habits, but progressively Useful to the Country According to 
their Capabilities either as Laborers in Agricultural Employ or among the lower class of Mechanics.280 
 
Turning Australians from a society of savage hunter-gatherers to an agriculture and industrial people was 
a vital component of the program of civilizing the ‘Uncultivated Race’.281 For Macquarie, the indolence 
of the savage Australians translated into a careless attitude toward future provision.282 Therefore, the 
hard working British ought to mentor them, and teaching economic planning and industriousness.283 
Macquarie firmly believed in their capacity to improve, and thus he proposed to the British government 
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an experiment in civilization, part of which consisted of allocating some land in which Australians could 
settle and cultivate the ground.284 
A specific philosophy of history provided the matrix in which the interplay between European notions 
of agriculture, savagery, improvement, and civilization were used to make sense of and manage the pre-
colonial Australian population. According to Macquarie, many Australians were keen on civilization, 
and with patience and gentleness those repugnant to it could be convinced otherwise.285 The conceptual 
vocabulary of stadialism was not privative of the colonial government.  
In New South Wales the judicial system also perceived the peoples of Australia through the lens of 
conjectural history, depicting them as wild savages. The Supreme Court of New South Wales described 
them as ‘harmless inoffensive savages’ who wandered ‘about the country’ and lived in the ‘uncontrolled 
freedom of nature’.286 Australians’ savage state was contrasted to the civilized state of the British.287 
The repertoire of conjectural history also inspired the British metropolitan elites who held influence 
over colonial affairs. This was the case of John Russell, Secretary of State for War and Colonies between 
1839 and 1841, who had become familiar with conjectural history at the time of his studies with Dugald 
Stewart in Scotland from 1809 to 1812.288 Henry Temple, 3rd Viscount Palmerston who served terms 
both as Foreign Secretary and Prime Minister, had also been a pupil of Stewart.289 William Lamb, second 
Viscount of Melbourne who served twice as Prime Minister, had learned stadial theory from John Millar 
at Glasgow from 1799 to 1801.290 Viscount Howick, who was first Under-Secretary of State for War and 
Colonies for four years and then occupied the highest cabinet position in the same Department from 1846 
to 1854, shared the same philosophy of history.291 As Hickford has eloquently noted: ‘Whiggish 
attachment to stadialism proved particularly resonant in the way it appraised indigenous populations and 
their normative relations with landscapes or natural resources, such as land.’292 
In the early nineteenth century, stadial theory remained a robust conceptual framework for 
understanding non-European backward populations.293 Ideas formulated by European intellectuals thus 
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travelled to the colonies while ethnographic data on Australian peoples collected by travelers and 
explorers made the return voyage, buttressing preconceived theories about non-Europeans. Abstract ideas 
and colonial stereotypes reinforced one another, creating an ideological chain between metropolis and 
colony that was particularly difficult to break. After all, British explorers could only understand reality 
through the conceptual lens with which they looked at it. Besides, stadial theory suited British interests 
in exploiting Australian natural resources as it legitimated the displacement of the peoples who had 
enjoyed them before European colonialism. 
 The alleged backward condition of Australian peoples influenced how colonists understood their 
relationship to their land. According to conjectural theory, private ownership of land appeared only in an 
advanced state of society: the agricultural stage. Australians, who roamed over their territories, had not 
yet reached such a level of material progress. Accordingly, they had no notion of proprietorship and their 
lands were therefore supposed to be unoccupied and underutilized. Australian ecosystems awaited the 
arrival of the civilized hand that could improve them. The external and internal wilderness fused in the 
category of savagery. Civilizing the wild uncivilized mind and habits of the savage and improving the 
wild territory she/he inhabited became two threads of a common imperial cord.  
In New Holland, the British had found territories that they perceived as pristine, unutilized, open, and 
unfenced. And even though throughout the period of settlement several books, newspaper articles. and 
individuals maintained that the peoples of Australia were proprietors of their territories, the majority of 
the settlers supported the contrary view, also held by the British State, that the Australians were savages, 
incapable of improvement.294 Due to the deficient nature of Australians, the newcomers had a right to 
improve the wasted continent as part of the British general imperial mission to control, govern, and 
civilize the world.  
 The British were well provided with a legal vocabulary within which they could translate their superior 
mastery over nature as an entitlement to appropriate the land and natural resources and to exclusively 
enjoy the fruits of their exploitation. According to the Roman law ferae bestiae things that lay unoccupied 
could be made the property of the first who seized them. That law was limited to immovable things, but 
European natural lawyers such as Grotius had expanded the scope of the right so as to include also 
immovable goods such as land. Through the works of natural lawyers, the law ferae bestiae became part 
of the law of nations. Eventually, the law ferae bestiae expanded into what has been called the 
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agricultural argument. The latter doctrine expanded the scope of occupation, defining unoccupied land 
as that which was not cultivated. Other uses of the land, like hunting or gathering, did not count as 
occupation.  
Locke developed this argument, mixing labor, improvement, and land in order to create a legal 
justification for the British acquisition of land in the North America colonies. Lockean principles and the 
ideas they validated were in vogue when the British extended their Empire to Australasia, and did not 
completely lose their persuasiveness in the following century.295 In 1833, George Poulett Scrope, a 
British Parliamentarian, wrote in his book Principles of Political Economy that ‘every fraction of the 
human family’ had from ancient times accepted the idea that ‘what a man obtains from nature by his own 
exertions becomes his property’.296 The French jurist Ortolan had also adopted a Lockean framework in 
his treatise on the modes of acquiring international dominium.297 
 Apart from Locke’s ideas, Joseph Chitty the elder’s English translation of Vattel’s treatise The Law of 
Nations was often quoted in Australian settlements.298 Most of the international legal commentators of 
the first half of the nineteenth century also echoed Vattel’s ideas about savages and occupation. 
Translating stadial thinking into the law of nations, Vattel had claimed that both dominium rerum (private 
property) and dominium jurisdictionis (sovereignty) emerged when the first human communities of 
wandering tribes appropriated land, tilling the soil and creating a political community.299 But in the case 
of communities that had remained in the savage state without cultivating the land, their territories were 
open to the appropriation of more industrious nations.300 
The combination of Lockean improvement and sovereignty became a tool for Empire. Public law gave 
state support to the property interests guaranteed by private law. Sovereignty in Australia gave the British 
the possibility of defining and enforcing property rights as well as issuing decrees, ordinances, and 
statutes that prevented Australians from using their territories and the natural resources they contained 
as they had traditionally done.301 
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Since the beginning of settlement, under the conviction that the territory of Australia was owned by 
the Crown, colonists acquired land through Crown land grants. During the first decades of settlement the 
sovereign power of the Crown to grant land rested on the Governor.302 The first land grant was given by 
Governor Phillips to James Ruse, an emancipated convict, in 1792.303 Initially, grants were limited to 
100 acres and were conditional on having enough capital to invest in the land.304 But individuals were 
not the only beneficiaries of land grants. For example, in 1824 the British Parliament passed an Act 
creating the Australian Agricultural company, allocating 1 million acres of land for the cultivation and 
improvement of Australian waste lands.305 
The limits of the initial individual land grants were almost always surpassed by sheep owners. They 
encroached on Crown land, generally known as waste lands.306 The widespread repetition of this act, 
known as squatting, gave rise to a powerful proprietor class of squatters. In 1831, under the influence of 
Wakefield, the Ripon Regulations issued by the Colonial Office established that all Crown lands were to 
be sold by public auction.307 These regulations, followed by the Burke’s Act of 1836 and the Imperial 
Acts of Parliament of 1842 and 1846 regulating ‘the Sale of waste land’, tried—to no avail—to restrain 
the occupation of Crown land and prevent the extension of the pastoralist economy.308 Their goal was to 
encourage the development of agricultural communities around settlements.309 
None of these pieces of legislation dealt directly with the legality of the acquisition of Australia in the 
first place. However, other official documents and legislation of the era referred to the British acquisition 
of territory. In 1819, a dispute occurred between Governor Lachlan Macquarie and Barron Field, Judge 
of the Supreme Court of New South Wales, about the power of the Governor to tax settlers. The English 
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Attorney General Samuel Shepherd and the Solicitor General Robert Gifford resolved the question in 
Field’s favor. They explained that the Crown and its representatives had the power to tax colonies that 
had been acquired through conquest.310 But that was not the case of New South Wales. The part of New 
South Wales that the Crown possessed, they affirmed, was not acquired by conquest, but taken possession 
of ‘as desert and uninhabited’ lands.311 
A similar legal opinion was given in 1822 by James Stephen, a mere law clerk at the time who later 
became Undersecretary for the Colonies.312 Again, as in 1819, the issue under consideration did not 
involve Australians or the issue of property over the land. The question under contention was the 
competence of the Governor to issue laws by proclamation. Stephen, following the logic of Shepherd 
and Gifford regarding taxes, maintained that the direct legislative power of the Crown and its 
representatives was limited to colonies acquired by conquest or cession.313 In other types of colonies the 
King needed the consent of the Parliament to make laws.314 Paraphrasing his colleagues, Stephen 
affirmed that New South Wales had not been acquired by conquest or cession but by the occupation of a 
‘desert or uninhabited land’.315 Under those circumstances, if His Majesty decided to grant legislative 
power to the Governor, that power ought to be validated by a local Assembly.316 
The vacant character of Australia according to British legal opinions was further confirmed by the 
British Parliament. The South Australian Colonization Act of Parliament of 1834 declared that the South 
Australian territory prior to colonization consisted of ‘waste and unoccupied lands’.317 This opinion was 
echoed in 1834 by Chief Justice Francis Forbes of the Supreme Court of New South Wales, who repeated 
the distinction made by British lawyers between colonies acquired by conquest and cession and those 
like New South Wales which had been settled as ‘uninhabited country’.318 Consequently, the King was 
entitled to ‘all the waste lands of the colony’.319 
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But, as noted earlier, not everybody in the new colony believed that Australians were not the owners 
of their territories. Some individuals even acted on this belief. This was the case of John Batman, who in 
1835 signed a treaty with the Kulin people of the south-west coast of Australia, hoping to acquire fertile 
land for pasture.320 This was the only attempt in Australia of ever negotiating the cession of land with 
Australian peoples. The reason why that practice was discontinued was simple. On 26 August 1835 the 
Governor of New South Wales Richard Bourke made clear that the acquisition of land from the 
‘Aboriginal Natives’ had no legal validity.321 Bourke’s Proclamation deterred other colonists from 
dealing directly with Australians. The Crown, not Australian peoples, was the owner of Australia. 
Lieutenant Colonel George Arthur concurred with Bourke’s opinion that ‘a migratory savage tribe … 
roaming over an almost unlimited extent of country’ could not be the owners of the land.322 
 
Savages and the New South Wales Supreme Court  
Despite all these statements and the conceptual and legal apparatus that the British deployed in order to 
fashion their relationship with the peoples of Australia, the latter were not under the legal authority of 
the former for the first fifty years of settlement. There was a significant gap between British expectations 
of governing and owning Australia from the outset and events on the ground. In time, expectations and 
reality converged. However, for a long time legal pluralism was the norm in Australian colonies. The 
courts of New South Wales generally acknowledged the jurisdiction of the peoples of Australia over their 
own affairs.323 This recognition did not translate into an automatic benevolent attitude toward 
Australians, and there was no lack of violence. But Australians still maintained their own jurisdiction 
both within and outside the colony. 
 The situation changed from 1824 to 1835 in a period of fast economic and geographical expansion of 
the colony of New South Wales. As wool from Australia fed the growing and lucrative textile industry 
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at home, and dreams of acquiring the resources of a whole continent seemed within reach, the British 
started to shift toward an inclination for exercising jurisdiction over the people of Australia.324 
The real blow to Australians’ jurisdiction and territorial claims in the new colonial scenario came in 
1835 in the trial of Jack Kongo Murrell and George Bummaree, who had killed two of their fellow 
compatriots.325 This was one of the first times that the Supreme Court of New South Wales agreed to 
adjudicate a case involving only Australian peoples. The case became the landmark of the extent of 
British sovereignty and property in New South Wales.  
In defense of Jack Murrell, his counsel John Stephen argued that British law did not apply to the case, 
because the peoples of Australia had their own societies, customs, and regulations to solve the matter.326 
In other words, they had their own jurisdiction. This line of argumentation was in consonance with the 
general practice of the courts of New South Wales up to that time.327 
The views of the Supreme Court changed with the arrival of William Westbrooke Burton (1794-1888), 
who firmly believed that the rights of non-European populations within the Empire were better protected 
under British jurisdiction.328 Chief Justice Francis Forbes believed that the definition of the legal status 
of Australian peoples as well as the extent of British sovereignty were questions to be decided by the 
legislative and not the judicial branch of the colonial state.329 However, Burton’s views found their way 
into the Court, setting a precedent from which to resolve the thorny question of the legal status of the 
peoples of Australia vis-à-vis imperial power.330 
The legal case was actually resolved in favor of Murrell and Bumaree, whom the jury acquitted based 
on the ground that they were too ignorant and savage to understand the legal system under which they 
were being judged.331 Nevertheless, it was Burton’s legal opinion and not the jury’s decision which set a 
legal precedent regarding the status of Australians’ sovereignty, property, and jurisdiction within the 
colonial legal system.  
In his judgment Burton made first an evaluation of the degree of complexity of the communities that 
the British ‘found’ in Australia. Despite considering that the freedom and independence of the peoples 
of Australia ought to be safeguarded by the British, they had not yet, at the time of settlement, reached a 
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position in ‘point of numbers and civilization’ as well as ‘Government and laws’ so as to be recognized 
in parity with more civilized states.332 And hence, ‘the king of England’ took possession of ‘a tract of 
country before unappropriated by anyone’.333 He further declared that the English nation had acquired 
the rights of dominium and imperium over Australia, thus extending British jurisdiction over its new 
colony.334 
Burton employed stadial language in service of the British Empire. The degree of social advancement 
and civilization of the people of Australia was so low that it prevented the recognition of its political and 
legal existence. Savages had no civilized institutions, lacking both government and laws. Moreover, they 
had no notion of private property and, henceforth, they could not have been in possession of Australia 
before English arrival. Australia was vacant and open for appropriation through occupation. In his 
reasoning, Burton mixed stadial theory with the law of nations, citing Vattel as the legal source from 
which to base his statements.335 From Burton’s perspective British colonization was not only legitimate, 
but also a service to humanity as civilization was extended over wilderness.  
Burton agreed with Vattel’s view that the Earth belonged to humanity in general and that its cultivation 
was an obligation imposed upon humans.336 He also paraphrased his opinion that if indolent savages did 
not cultivate their territories industrious nations in need of land could occupy them.337 The British 
acquired dominion and empire by cultivating the wilderness.338 Decades before Burton’s findings, Chief 
Justice Forbes had already observed that Australia was ‘generally speaking … a wilderness’.339 
Colonization was necessary for the improvement of ‘desert wastes’.340 
Burton was not the first to declare Australian land vacant. Piles of official documents before him had 
declared Australia a desert, uninhabited and unoccupied space open for first taking. But Burton’s 
conclusion carried the authority of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. This decision had special 
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legal weight and therefore decisively eroded Australians’ political independence and their use of 
Australia’s ecosystems. Paradoxically, it was the very placement of the peoples of Australia under the 
protection of British law that left them unprotected against foreign encroachment of their territories. 
While the legal light of civilization opened Australia’s natural resources to the industriousness of those 
who profited from their exploitation, it darkened the prospects of those whose close—albeit far from 
always harmonious—bond with nature was deemed an obsolete and backward anomaly to be overcome. 
Years after R. v. Murrell and Bummaree, in the case of Attorney-General v. Brown in 1847, Chief 
Justice Stephen restated that all of Australia’s land belonged to the British Crown since the beginning of 
the settlement. This statement was based on the translation of English feudal law to Australia. According 
to English feudal law, all land belonged to the Crown.341 The Crown was the pinnacle of a feudal tenure 
system inherited by the British Empire.  
In Attorney-General v. Brown the Crown brought a case against James Brown, a settler who was 
accused of intrusion on Crown lands.342 Brown had leased the land from Arthur Dumaresq who, in turn, 
had a right derived from a land grant.343 Coal had been found in the land and Brown was resolved to 
exploit it.344 The Crown argued that the establishment of a coal mine violated the terms of the original 
grant.345 The case was decided against Brown, who appealed to the Supreme Court of New South Wales. 
In the Supreme Court, Richard Windeyer, Brown’s legal counsel, did not doubt that the land in 
contention belonged to the Crown. But he argued that the power of the Crown to impose limitations on 
the free use of the land had been restricted by English legislation.346 The Crown was the main divider of 
the land, but could not reserve any other power over it.347 The three judges deciding the case disagreed. 
Chief Justice Stephan maintained that Australia had been discovered and settled by the British.348 This 
meant that, upon discovery, all the land and natural resources belonged immediately to the Crown.349 
The exploitation of those resources could only be done through a legal title emanating from the Crown. 
After the decisions R. v. Murrell and Bummaree and Attorney-General v. Brown, Australian land 
continued to be given to colonists. In the 1860s legislation regulating land was introduced in Vitoria, 
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New South Wales, South Australia, and Queensland. These pieces of legislation consisted of the Crown 
Land Alienation Act of 1860 in Queensland, the Nicholson Land Act of 1860 in Victoria, the Crown 
Lands Act of 1861 in New South Wales (also known as the Robertson Land Acts), and the Strangways 
Land Act of 1869 in South Australia.350 All these laws regulated how the land was sold in each of the 
Australian states. They responded to the economic boom of Australia and the capitalist redefinition of 
property as a tradable commodity that took place during the second part of the nineteenth century within 
the British Empire.351 
 The fiction that Australia was vacant, unoccupied, and unexploited was maintained by the Australian 
courts throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.352 Almost a century and a half after R. v. 
Murrell and Bummaree, the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory made the same claim in the case 
of Milirrpum v. Nabalco Pty Ltd.353 This was the first time that Australian peoples (in this case the Yolngu 
people) went to court with the purpose of defending their land rights, this time against Nabalco, a mining 
corporation. In his decision Judge Blackburn, as British jurists had done before, distinguished between 
settled colonies in which the land was ‘desert and uncultivated’ and colonies acquired through conquest 
or cession.354 He concluded that the former, populated ‘by uncivilized inhabitants in a primitive state of 
society’, were acquired through occupation.355 
Only in 1992 was the legal fiction that the British had occupied Australia, acquiring dominion over 
all of it, dispelled in Mabo v. Queensland. British sovereignty, the High Court of Australia argued, did 
not extinguish ‘native title’ over Australia.356 This was a welcome change of doctrine. But after two 
centuries of British settlement, violence, and the continued encroachment on and exploitation of the 
ecosystems from which Australians nurtured, there was little, in practice, to celebrate. Both the pre-
colonial population of Australia and its natural habitats had suffered immensely from the price of 
philosophical ideas, legal doctrines, and economic interests and practices aimed at improving and 
civilizing both wild people and wild nature.  
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Concluding remarks 
In 1850 the world was more privatized than ever before. In little more than 50 years, and under the ‘settler 
revolution’, millions of hectares had fallen prey to an economic-legal rationale of private appropriation. 
As Warren reminds us, private rights are an ‘expression of how natural goods can be conceptually 
separated from the earth and tied to people’.357 In some sense, this process is always an illusion (the 
illusion that the Earth belongs to humans). But the delusion of owning nature is a powerful one, and 
during the first part of the nineteenth century industrialization pushed humans to acquire natural products 
that were demanded by expanding and predominantly urban global markets.  
The prospect of converting the untapped natural resources of supposed vacant areas of the biosphere 
into wealth and progress stimulated Western expansion and global capitalism. European colonialism 
placed millions of hectares in the hands of private owners.358 An innumerable amount of natural products 
were similarly privatized. Myriad parts of ecosystems were transformed into commodities that traveled 
far and fast around the world. In places like Beijing, Sydney, London, New York, Chicago, Manchester, 
Paris, Vienna, a privileged few and an underprivileged many required growing amounts of selective 
luxuries for enjoyment and an array of indispensable goods to subsist. But before Anglo-Saxon colonists 
founded Neo-Europes in North America, the Pacific, and South Africa, those territories were inhabited 
by numerous non-European polities. If the cosmopolitan need for separating even more natural products 
from the Earth and allocating them to proprietors, merchants, and avid markets was to be fulfilled, there 
was an imperative urge to legalize this gigantic land grab.  
During the nineteenth century European and American thinkers, international lawyers, policy makers, 
explorers, and judges used stadial theory—or at least its category of savagery—to make sense of and 
interpret the world outside Europe. Through the prism of this particular interpretation of human social 
development they assumed that extensive areas of the Earth were inhabited by the most backward 
category of humans to be found in the globe: savages. Eventually, this category became naturalized, and 
legal commentators used it independent of the theoretical framework in which it had traditionally 
operated. Even when stadial theory was not directly used, speculation about savages was common.  
                                                 
357 See introduction, pages 3-4. 
358 Ibid.  
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One point of general intellectual agreement around the condition of savagery was that the crude 
character of savages predetermined the state of the land in which they lived. Savages were assumed to 
exist in the wilderness. They were referred to as ‘the children of wilderness’359 or as savages living in the 
‘uncontrolled freedom of nature’360. Therefore, settler colonialism encompassed the double mission of 
redeeming backward populations and transforming unutilized lands and natural resources into fertile 
engines of economic progress.  
This does not mean that the white man’s burden of spreading civilization and improving the Earth was 
accepted and preached uncritically. Marshall was perhaps the most reputed legal figure who attempted to 
safeguard a legal sphere of protection within which savage societies could survive. But even his bold 
attempt to limit state power and circumscribe federal rule over North Americans had its own conundrum. 
His judgment was adopted in the court of the victor and under its rules. The federal government had a 
right to extinguish native title, but only if North American consented. But Marshall made reference to a 
number of treaties between the U.S. and North American peoples without paying enough attention to the 
fact that in the colonial context being part of a legal agreement was not always synonymous with 
exercising free will. North Americans could negotiate and had a certain space for maneuvering, but as 
the settler frontier advanced that space was swiftly reduced.  
The dream of a sphere of independence—if vague and small—derived from Marshall’s 
pronouncement soon vanished in the air. Andrew Jackson flexed the muscles of the executive to shutter 
any dreams of emancipation and autonomy. North American nations were forced to migrate west and to 
settle in alien territories in which they were further and further weakened, constrained, and 
disenfranchised. As long as they did not have the military power to confront the advance of settlers and 
the Union, their presence on the land did not count in a legal sense. This fact was evident in the legal 
dispute over the Oregon territory, a debate in which their presence was conspicuously ignored. 
In the Supreme Court of New South Wales things were even more somber for Australian peoples. 
Vattel was widely cited in order to justify the legal displacement of their retrograde productive activities 
(and those who carried them out) and their substitution by more efficient economic practices (and those 
who incarnated them). Stadial theory and the agricultural argument were applied in Australia in disregard 
of the pre-colonial population and their uses of nature. 
                                                 
359 See supra footnote 128. 
360 See supra footnote 287. 
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Freed from the troublesome legal presence of the leftovers of backward humanity, settler colonialism 
proceeded unabated. Most of the Earth had finally been opened for occupation by the industrious and 
progressive nations. The destiny of non-Europeans who died and suffered as a consequence of this 
process was also the fate of non-European nature. As ‘savages’ perished and shrank, so did their habitats, 
the biodiversity of ecosystems, and non-European’ ideas of how humans ought to relate to non-human 
nature. Under a more exploitative approach to the use of ecosystems in the U.S. and Australia, animals 
disappeared forever or died by the millions, countless forests were reduced to a fraction of their previous 
size or completely cut down, soils were eroded and degraded as commercial agriculture insatiably fed 
from their fertility, the air around cities and mines became plagued with smoke and chemical pollutants, 
and the overuse of water and its pollution destroyed countless riverine ecosystems and aquifers.  
As extensive as this was, the destruction of humans and nature that resulted from settler colonialism 
was only part of a larger picture. During the second half of the nineteenth century, as industrialization 
accelerated and the demand of markets boomed, the imperial penetration of the world reached its apex. 
Western science and technology showed for the first time its capacity to unveil all of nature’s secrets. 
Imperial powers pressed hard to obtain even more territory in continents not yet under the rule of Western 
powers. Colonial powers sought to govern nature and squeeze the natural wealth that it contained for 
national aggrandizement and individual wealth. Under a new wave of imperialism, Westerners pressed 
hard to open the world’s unexploited natural frontiers to the hectic activity of the—predominantly 
Western—homo economicus.  
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Part V 
 
GOVERNING NATURE: 
 INTERNATIONAL LAW AT THE TURN OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1851-1922) 
 
 
In 1851 the Crystal Palace housed an extraordinary event. For a few months, the world’s technical 
wonders and scientific achievements were on display in London. Built for the occasion in just nine 
months, and visited by six million people during the course of the Exhibition, the Crystal Palace was the 
incarnation of the very creative powers and prowess of industrialization. The Great Exhibition did not 
only reveal to the world the latest inventions and productive systems, it also celebrated and encouraged 
a particular economic understanding of what was the best present and the desirable future of humankind.  
If industrial capitalism was to be celebrated at the Great Exhibition, no other nation was in a better 
position to host the event than Great Britain. After all, it was the nation that had first adopted it and, in 
so doing, had almost singlehandedly changed the economic and social course of humanity, inspiring 
other Western nations to follow its progressive path. In this sense, the official catalogue of the conference 
noted that worldwide respect for British economic policies and institutions as well as its technological 
capacity, namely ‘the perfect security for property; the commercial freedom and the facility of transport’, 
were the chief reasons to locate the Exhibition at the heart of the British metropolis.1 
The British epitomized the power of industrialization and a liberalized market economy. But the 
Exhibition was also a demonstration of a wider power: that of modern man over nature. The latest 
technological advances were testimony to the growing dominion of humans over nature, a power that 
constituted the springboard for economic progress.2 Prince Albert, who had taken the lead in the 
organization of the Exhibition, eloquently captured this sentiment in a speech given to the municipal 
authorities of Great Britain. At the occasion of a banquet celebrated to publicize and advertise the 
Exhibition he declared: 
 
                                                 
1 Official Descriptive and Illustrated Catalogue of the Great Exhibition of the Works of Industry of All Nations, 1851, Vol 
I (London, W. Cloves and Sons Printers, 1851) 1. 
2 Paul Yong, Globalization and the Great Exhibition: The Victorian New World Order (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 
2009) 5.  
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So man is approaching a more complete fulfillment of that great and sacred mission which he has to perform in 
this world. His reason being created after the image of God, he has to use it to discover the laws by which the 
Almighty governs his creation, and, by making this laws his standard of action to conquer Nature to his use—
himself a divine instrument … THE EXHIBITION of 1851 is to give us a true test and a living picture of the point of 
development at which the whole of mankind has arrived in this great task, and a new starting point from which all 
nations will be able to direct their further exertions.3 
 
Through technological innovation, Prince Albert observed, the world was now a manageable entity that 
was progressively moving toward homogenization.4 People, ideas, and goods travelled at an 
unprecedented speed. The old progressive and cosmopolitan yearning to conquer nature and govern the 
Earth was, for the first time in history, within human reach. 
 But despite significant steps forward in the path to progress, there was still a long way to go. The 
human to which Albert referred was none other than the modern individual, still a rare creature in a world 
of heterogeneous peoples. And, outside a handful of Western nations, the British believed that most 
humans still lived in pre-historic conditions. Non-European territories housed myriad retrograde societies 
surrounded by wilderness. In this respect, as Albert noticed, the Exhibition was also a point of departure. 
It represented a renewed call for the progressive transformation of the unused or underutilized natural 
resources of the world.5 The cosmopolitan mandate to control and transform nature in a planetary scale 
provided British imperialism with a robust legitimating rationale, one that presented the British Empire 
as the transformative force of modernity. 
Importantly for Great Britain, the mission of feeding industrial capitalism with raw materials was also 
extremely profitable. As Albert recognized, ‘the products of all quarters of the globe are placed at our 
disposal, and we have only to choose which is the best and cheapest for our purposes, and the powers of 
production are intrusted to the stimulus of competition and capital’.6 
 By the mid-nineteenth century, the idea of governing, transforming, and exploiting nature had not lost 
any of its appeal. But the change of colonial scenario from North America and Australia to Africa and 
Asia represented a challenge to the way colonialism was justified in settler societies. At the time of the 
Berlin Conference (1884-1885), the days of savages were forever gone. Yet, paradoxically, as savages 
                                                 
3 Official Descriptive and Illustrated Catalogue, 4. 
4 Ibid., 3. 
5 Yong, Globalization and the Great Exhibition, 10. 
6 Official Descriptive and Illustrated Catalogue, 4. 
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receded from central stage in international legal debates about occupation, they were at the forefront of 
theoretical debates about evolution, featuring especially prominently in the work of socio-cultural 
anthropologists. In 1871, for example, Darwin reflected about savages in the book in which he attempted 
to translate his findings on natural evolution to the human sphere, The Descent of Man.7 In one of the 
books that most importantly contributed to adumbrating a novel understanding of human life on Earth, 
one could still find a reformulation of ideas that had been put forward centuries before by international 
legal commentators. Darwin affirmed that:  
 
When we see in many parts of the world enormous areas of the most fertile land peopled by a few wandering 
savages, but which are capable of supporting numerous happy homes, it might be argued that the struggle for 
existence had not been sufficiently severe to force man upwards to his highest standard.8 
 
Darwin placed savages in an evolutionary mold that mixed the old idea of savagery and occupation with 
the novel and modern idea of evolution. Even more than Darwin, sociocultural anthropologists such as 
Lubbock, Tylor, and McLennan put the savage at the center of their scientific investigations.9 
Contemporary savages were the living vestiges of primitiveness. Thus, their study was vital to elucidating 
how primitive societies had transmuted so as to reach the sophistication characteristic of modern 
societies. Against creationists who opposed evolution and degenerationists who believed that savages 
degenerated from a superior human specimen, sociocultural evolutionists defended the incremental 
development of societies from a primitive to a modern condition.10 
 Something common to all theories of social evolution was the idea that humans were more enmeshed 
in nature than Western intellectuals had previously been willing to acknowledge. The traditional 
conviction about the radical difference and superiority between human and non-human nature—be it 
because of human reason, soul, or resemblance with God—had to be discarded. The difference between 
human and non-human nature was not one of kind but rather degree. Evolution had demonstrated that 
one of the most ingrained truths in the Western intellectual imagination was nothing more than a belief. 
Evolution faced an enormous resistance as it turned the intellectual world of nineteenth-century Britain 
upside down. It was humbling to wake up and discover that humans were only evolved apes after all.  
                                                 
7 Charles Darwin, The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex, Vol. I (London, John Murray, 1871). 
8 Ibid., Ch V 180 
9  George W. Stocking, Jr., Victorian Anthropology (New York, Macmillan, 1987) 144-185. 
10  Ibid.  
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 But it was precisely humanity’s natural origin the put the struggle for existence, the slow creation of a 
civilizational niche out of wilderness, at the center of theories of evolutionary progress.11 Humans, who 
had started evolving from a continuum with nature, had slowly ascended over it. Therefore, the degree 
of human control over non-human nature marked the success of their evolution.  
Marxism, one of the most influential end-of-the-century ideologies, also emphasized the importance 
of material factors of production (the ways in which humans modified nature to satisfy their needs) and 
struggle—class struggle in this case—as motors of world history. At the other end of the spectrum, 
liberalists could point to the supremacy that capitalist industrialism had given humans over nature as the 
definite proof of human progress. As Prince Albert had explained, the movement from primitiveness to 
modernity run parallel to the process of conquering nature. Humans had evolved from being subjected 
to the laws of nature to being able to control and bend those laws to their advantage.  
But not all humans had managed to control nature and ascend over it. Primitive societies had remained 
trapped in the natural realm, fused with their surroundings. Therefore, the social and natural spheres had 
not yet been disentangled in non-European territories. Because non-European peoples lived in a 
continuum with nature there was no civilizational niche that could serve as the definite home to an 
evolved humanity. This was then the task of the civilizing mission. In Africa and Asia, nature had still 
to be exploited before civilization could advance. This state of affairs made evident the urgency of 
Western imperialism as an agent of progress.  
 The theoretical purpose of sociocultural anthropologists was to defend the possibility of progress. As 
with many Victorians, they believed that the Industrial Revolution had transformed humanity’s relation 
to nature by giving the former the possibility of governing the latter.12 That was a fundamental element 
in the path toward progress. It was also a belief shared by the discipline of international law. International 
lawyers celebrated without reservation the progress that Western nations had achieved.  
The international legal profession was an enthusiastic adherent to Western civilization. International 
lawyers firmly believed that their discipline was one of the most progressive forces of modernity. For 
that reason, they too celebrated the Great Exhibition as the materialization of cosmopolitan aspirations 
                                                 
11 Ibid., 170. 
12 Stocking, Victorian Anthropology, 220. 
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to international peace13 and prosperity.14 In their opinion, international law could provide universal 
standards of good governance applicable worldwide. It could also help in spreading institutional 
mechanisms to guide the natural evolution of humanity. In so doing, the novel profession could carry the 
torch of progress, fulfilling its role as the guardian of civilization. Finally, it could continue providing 
guidelines to reform and govern non-European territories and ecosystems. But how exactly could that 
mission be carried out in practice? 
 Fifteen years after the publication of the Descent of Man, from the Berlin Conference onwards, as the 
terminology of savagery began to disappear from legal texts, there was a compelling need to explain why 
the densely populated territories of Africa and Asia should be placed under European rule. While in 
Africa and Asia the standard of environmental exploitation was, in general, no longer applicable, the 
urge to exploit untapped natural resources was stronger than ever before. Africans and Asians were no 
savages, and their territories could therefore not be easily occupied. But as the global economy expanded, 
profitable raw materials, especially from the tropics, incarnated the promise of constant production and 
unfettered consumption. The profession of international law responded to that challenge in a variety of 
ways. Chapters 8 and 9 will explore the novel legal theories that international lawyers developed in their 
attempt to respond to the theoretical demands of a new historical context in which non-European 
ecosystems became, perhaps more than ever before, tied and subservient to the modern exigencies of 
progress.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13  Henry Sumner Maine, International Law: A Series of Lectures Delivered Before the University of Cambridge 1887 
(London, John Murray, Albemarle Street, W., 1915) Lecture I 3. 
14 Leone Levi believed that the bright future that the Exhibition promised was yet to be realized. It was precisely the role of 
the law of nations to tame the darker features of the international arena and guide mankind toward peace and prosperity. See 
Levi, The Law of Nature, Ch I 18-20. 
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8  International Lawyers and Occupation (1850-1926): From Savage to 
Barbarian 
 
 
 
 
 
Countries which are not in the legal possession of any civilized state, but which are inhabited by savage tribes may 
be acquired by occupation; limiting it however, to the portions of territory unused by the natives and in which, by 
reason of the disproportion between the area and their needs, they cannot apply the ordinary means of exploitation 
to render them productive.1 
 
 
The first land rush of the nineteenth century had paid great dividends to the British Empire and the U.S. 
By the last decades of the nineteenth century, both empires had occupied Oceania and the region of North 
America situated between what is today Mexico and Canada. As far as savages were concerned, the 
general view among the jurists of the second half of the nineteenth century was even more protective of 
their territorial entitlements than those of the first half. Most international jurists of the first half of the 
century had legitimized the taking of savages’ territories while emphasizing the need of reserving some 
land to assure savages’ subsistence. Additionally, many advocated the good treatment of non-European 
populations.  
International lawyers of the second half of the century were also in favor of the humane treatment of 
savages. But, in contrast with their predecessors, they generally agreed that North American savages were 
in possession of certain territories from where they could not be expelled. Western powers could extend 
their sovereignty over those territories, but in case they wanted to occupy the lands used by savages, they 
had to obtain their consent and offer some kind of economic compensation in return for the land. The 
case of Australia was different. Most commentators made a differentiation between North American and 
Australian savages. The latter had neither agriculture, nor civilization, and hence no notion of private 
                                                 
1 Pasquale Fiore, International Law Codified and its Legal Sanctions or The Legal Organization of the Society of States (New 
York, Baker, Voorhis and Company, 1918) Book III Title III §1061 423. 
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property. Having a legal carte blanche to occupy Australian territory, the British displaced Australians 
from the lands they had inhabited for millennia.  
But even the most humanitarian international legal commentators—those sensitive to the fate of 
savages, recognizing certain entitlements that those communities had vis-á-vis colonial powers—believed 
that even if savages could not be expelled from their lands (those that they were using), there were still 
immense tracts of wild vacant land in North America and Australia open for acquisition. Humanitarianism 
toward the vanishing savage was easily reconcilable with colonialism, particularly at a historical time in 
which savage populations were rapidly shrinking and most of the continents in which they lived had been 
entirely occupied. Therefore, the recognizing of savages’ right to occupy their territories had little 
practical implication. 
Wilderness was the dividing line between civilization and savagery. Its pervasiveness in non-European 
territories called for the reforming and improving hand of Western progressive nations. Significantly, as 
savages perished, the extension of the uncivilized natural frontier steadily grew. The havoc that U.S. and 
British imperialism caused among North American and Australian peoples greatly reduced their numbers 
and the space they occupied. In North America and Australia, they were confined to a minimal fraction 
of the continental mass. Conversely, under less human pressure, non-European ecosystems blossomed. 
So whole continents, excluding the fraction where savages lived, were legally opened to legitimate 
occupation. In this sense, defending the right of savages to occupy territory did not pose a challenge to 
European colonization.  
The conceptual framework that had been applied to savages in North America and Australia for over a 
century entered crisis toward the end of the century. In Africa, it was no longer applicable. Despite the 
loss of millions of lives, Africans did not suffer the population collapse that non-European peoples 
experienced in America and Oceania. To a certain extent the trend actually reversed. Most Westerners 
who ventured into the interior of Africa perished as a result. Settler colonialism was not an option, at least 
not in most of the continent. So, as Western nations started to penetrate Africa, they needed to find new 
legal tools with which to justify their actions. African populations could not just be dismissed. 
Accordingly, the doctrine of occupation shifted to accommodate the change of colonial scenario.  
International commentators recognized that ‘African tribes’ were socially more evolved than ‘savage 
communities’. African human communities were in general agricultural and had a certain kind of political 
organization. Unluckily for Africans, at the end of the nineteenth century those traits were not per se 
enough to deserve political recognition and legal status as international actors. The consolidation of states 
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as sole agents of the law in the international plane meant that African political communities which failed 
to organize as nations did not meet the new standard of progress.  
Africans may have been more civilized than Australians or North Americans, but the threshold of 
civility was now raised to new heights. In addition, industrialization made Africans’ productive systems 
look rather primitive in comparison with the more evolved Western systems. At the very least, Africans 
seemed to be unable to undertake the cosmopolitan exploitation of vacant resources, a trait that was 
interpreted as a lack of progressive civilization. Being outside the pale of civilization and having no 
international legal agency meant that Africans could not have a say on the standards that were now used 
to measure their civilizational status. Once they were judged to be wanting in civilization, colonial powers 
could occupy Africans’ sovereignty in order to guide them toward statehood and social progress. 
In this chapter I will describe the changing nature of the doctrine of occupation. This change is important 
for our analysis, because the shifting of occupation from the acquisition of property to sovereignty 
challenged the way in which the exploitation of non-European nature had been legitimized in previous 
centuries. 
 
The receding savage: occupation before the Berlin Conference 
Since Columbus’ arrival to America, European commentators had tried to come to terms with the 
relationship that non-European populations had with their surrounding ecosystems and natural habitats. 
Based on their assessment of the extent to which those populations could make nature productive and 
utilize the natural resources at their disposal, they recognized that colonists had certain rights to use the 
environment and profit from its exploitation. This assessment changed according to place and time. In 
Latin America, Vitoria recognized a right to apprehend and use natural elements that were vacant—that 
is, unoccupied. In North America, Locke used the so-called agricultural argument to amplify the scope 
of this right. According to this doctrine, English colonists could appropriate land that was uncultivated 
or not properly cultivated according to European standards.  
Those rights put in jeopardy the capacity of non-Europeans to keep territories that had sustained their 
lives and informed their worldviews for millennia. After a series of debates in the British colonies of 
North America during the seventeenth century, it was generally agreed that land had to be bought from 
the pre-colonial population who were considered as owners. Still, the agricultural argument applied to 
the vast spaces of the continent that the Europeans thought were not used and occupied by North 
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Americans. In Australia, stadial theory and the agricultural argument buttressed the legal myth that the 
whole continent was unoccupied, and hence the British Crown could claim its ownership. Based on this 
assumption, colonists obtained the land directly from the Crown.  
During the first half of the nineteenth century, international legal commentators, judges, politicians, 
explorers, and intellectuals at large continued debating the question of whether backward populations of 
savages could keep territories which they supposedly could not make productive. European intellectuals 
believed that as industrial European nations rapidly advanced and expanded their economic activities, 
there was a compelling need to exploit all the underutilized ecosystems of the world to keep up the pace 
of human progress. Material improvement resulted in the betterment of all aspects of human life. So, the 
progress of humanity hinged on the capacity to continue and even accelerate the transformation of wild 
landscapes and idle natural resources into active engines of civilization. This cosmopolitan mission was 
also extremely lucrative for the privileged few who owned and traded the commodities (produced or 
extracted in various world’s natural frontiers) that became the lynchpin of dreams of unlimited wealth. 
 From the mid-nineteenth century European commentators and their American counterparts continued 
debating the legitimacy of the occupation of territories of backward non-European populations. As in the 
first half of the nineteenth century, there was a certain degree of variation within the general homogeneity 
with which jurists approached the matter. The theory of occupation was delineated differently by 
different scholars depending on their nationality, ideology, and political agenda. Of all factors, the 
‘scramble for Africa’2 was without doubt the historical event that most significantly shaped the doctrine 
of occupation at the end of the century. Besides, international lawyers struggled to accommodate the 
immorality of Western imperialism and the subjugation of non-Europeans with the colonial fact. While 
they generally criticized the ill-treatment that non-Europeans had suffered during the colonial period 
preceding the nineteenth century, they also underscored the benefits that colonization brought to the 
colonized and the world at large.  
There were two main positions among authors who debated the doctrine of occupation before the 
Berlin Conference. On the one hand, there were those who claimed that savages were owners of the land 
they used for their subsistence. These authors also criticized the ill treatment of non-European 
populations. On the other hand, some commentators claimed that the taking of savages’ territories was 
legal. At first sight, this seems to be a clear difference between both groups. However, on closer scrutiny 
                                                 
2 This term can be found in one the leading British international legal text of the period. See Thomas Joseph Lawrence, The 
Principles of International Law (Boston, D.C Heath & Co., Publishers, 1900) Part II Ch II §92 144. 
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there was not such a large gap. Those who were more protective of the rights of savages ultimately 
recognized some scope of application for the right to occupy. Conversely, it is also possible to observe a 
humanitarian tone in some of the international lawyers who justified European occupation. Both groups 
also remained utterly Eurocentric in that they took European superiority over savages for granted. 
The group of lawyers who defended savages’ territorial entitlements (at least to a certain extent) was 
composed of British international lawyers such as Edward Shepherd Creasy (1812-1878), Professor of 
Jurisprudence at the Inns of the Court and emeritus Professor of History at University College London. 
His views on the matter evidence the combination between a moral and a legal assessment of occupation 
that characterized the legal texts of the time. Based on moral standards of conduct, he denounced the 
injustice of the European treatment of non-European populations.3After having scrutinized the historical 
process of European territorial aggrandizement, he concluded that it gave little ‘credit’ to European 
‘culture’.4 He was even critical of the British Empire. Australia and New Zealand were examples of the 
excesses that had also taken place in other parts of the Empire.  
For Creasy, occupation applied sensu stricto to territories that were uninhabited or deserted.5 But the 
strict application of that rule would have prevented most European territorial acquisitions.6 Creasy 
explained that European colonial powers had overcome that obstacle by entirely disregarding the 
proprietary rights of non-Europeans. Using a lucid comparison with animals he illustrated how non-
Europeans’ rights had been ignored. Non-Europeans had been made invisible and given as much 
importance as the natural habitats that surrounded them. As far as the ownership of their territories was 
concerned, they were treated like ‘herds of elks’ and ‘families of black beavers’.7 Creasy captured better 
than any other contemporary commentator the fact that non-Europeans had been placed in a continuum 
with nature. Civilizing humans and civilizing nature were part of the same imperial mission of socializing 
non-European spaces. In addition to this critique, Creasy even challenged the Eurocentrism that 
underpinned European expansion, affirming that the countries where ‘native tribes’ lived were ‘new to 
Europeans, but not new to human beings’.8 
Not endorsing the way in which European imperialism had generally proceeded did not amount to 
rejecting colonialism as such, however. In fact, Creasy directly participated in the administration of the 
                                                 
3 See John Van Voorst, ‘Review of New Books’ 2 The Law and Magazine Review (1877) 246-250, 246. 
4 Edward Creasy, First Platform of International Law (London, John Van Voorst, Paternoster Row, 1876) Ch IX §219 211.  
5 Ibid., §216 207. 
6 Ibid., 208.  
7 Ibid., §217 210. 
8 Ibid., §216 208. 
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British Empire. He was Chief Justice of Ceylon, and in 1872 he published a book on the Imperial and 
Colonial Institutions of the British Empire.9 The book was intended to provide knowledge about the 
constitutional situation of the colonies and other dependencies, information that was of utmost 
importance for the political awareness of English voters in Parliamentary elections.10 That knowledge 
could also contribute to strengthening the professional and commercial links that united the metropolis 
with British settlers.11 
Returning to the question of occupation, Creasy believed that not all Europeans had acted unethically 
when acquiring land in the colonies. He mentioned the classical examples of the fairness of the New 
England Puritans and William Penn, who had purchased the land from North American ‘chiefs’.12 
Moreover, he gave Justice Marshall’s judgment in Johnson v. McIntosh as an example to illustrate the 
reversal of the legal policy followed with regard to North American peoples. According to Creasy, the 
case illustrated how the dispossession of North Americans had turned in the U.S. into a policy to protect 
their property.13 Europeans had no moral right to criticize the U.S., as most of the wrongs against North 
Americans had also been perpetrated by British colonists.14 But things were changing for better, and even 
within the British Empire non-Europeans had begun to receive better treatment.15 
Creasy limited the sphere of application of the right to occupy to vacant land. In order to do so, he used 
a standard based on stadial theory. He affirmed that in many of the territories visited by Europeans 
‘natives were in considerable numbers’ and practiced agriculture to some extent.16 In Creasy’s own 
words: ‘they had attained a high degree of peculiar civilization’.17 The recognition of agricultural systems 
among non-Europeans was a welcome corrective to the general opinion of European intellectuals with 
regard to the non-European populations in America and Oceania. Creasy added that advanced non-
European communities were not present everywhere Europeans travelled. In certain cases, he 
acknowledged, vast tracts of wild land were ‘roved over’ by a scarce number of wandering ‘savages’ 
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who could not be considered to occupy them.18 In these cases, ‘it could be fairly thought’ that European 
colonists could obtain a legitimate title by occupancy.19  
Who were those savages to whom Creasy referred? Edward Creasy viewed the world through the lens 
of a humanitarian colonial administrator. His treatment of the right to occupy reflected the legal position 
of the British Crown concerning its various overseas possessions. Accordingly, in North America he 
envisioned a policy of purchase of land from North American peoples. That policy was based in the 
presumption that North Americans were ‘often more or less agriculturalist’,20 to use Creasy’s words. 
They were the owners of the territories in which they lived.  
But there were other kinds of savages. In the Pacific, British explorers had discovered new groups who 
they generally referred to as aborigines.21 Creasy placed them ‘among the most degraded specimens of 
the human race that have ever been discovered’;22 the pre-colonial population of Australia had ‘little or 
no civilization of their own’.23 In other words, they did not fit the category of advanced non-Europeans 
(‘more or less agriculturalist’ with some sort of ‘civilization’) to whom the occupation of territories did 
not apply. In the case of Australians, backwardness created the theoretical possibility for a land grab of 
continental proportions, an opportunity that, in practice, the British happily used to their advantage.24 
 Australian peoples occupied one of the lowest places in Creasy’s hierarchical order of societies. But 
they were not the only non-Europeans who were downgraded in relation to the superior Europeans. Even 
those ‘natives’ with a ‘peculiar civilization’ did not withstand the comparison with the societies of 
progressive nations. This differentiation is evident in Creasy’s definition of international law as the set 
of rules that were operative between ‘all, or nearly all, civilized nations’.25 Non-Europeans’ lack of 
participation in the creation of the very law that legitimized inroads into their territories was not the only 
legal outcome of their assumed backwardness. For Creasy, ‘a very large proportion’ of the heterogeneous 
non-European peoples that were part of the human collage integrated into the British Empire were ‘unfit’ 
for enfranchisement.26 Among this large group of people whose limited capacity curtailed their right to 
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cast a vote for the Imperial Parliament he mentioned the ‘Asiatics of India and the adjacent districts, the 
Hottentots and Kaffirs of the Cape, the Aborigines of Australia, the Esquimaux, and the Red Indians of 
the Hudson Bay territories’.27 
 A similar analysis of occupation is visible in one of the first treatises on international law of the second 
half of the nineteenth century. In 1860 the U.S. international lawyer Theodore Dwight Woolsey (1801-
1889) published an Introduction to the Study of International Law.28 The subtitle of the first edition 
reveals that the book was intended to help students get acquainted with the discipline of international 
law. In fact, it was used as a textbook in Yale, where Woolsey taught history, political economy, and 
international law.29 Woolsey dedicated only a page and a half of his treatise dealing with the acquisition 
of territory. One of the modes in which states could acquire property was the occupation of vacant land.30 
Traditionally other claims had been invoked in colonial times, but those claims were in his words ‘more 
doubtful or less generally acknowledged’.31 Here, he was referring to the papal bulls and the evangelizing 
mission with which the Spanish justified the conquest of the Americas. As he navigated historical waters 
Woolsey, as with the majority of nineteenth-century international lawyers, routinely referred to Spanish 
colonialism in order to track back the legal justification of European overseas expansion and the 
evolution of the doctrine of occupation.32 
 Woolsey explained that European powers had traditionally claimed a title to occupy land in the 
territories that North Americans were not using for hunting.33 Still, he praised the more humane manner 
in which the English and the U.S. had acquired territories from North American peoples: the English 
colonies, for example, had purchased North Americans’ land.34 While most international legal treatises 
of the nineteenth century celebrated the fact that William Penn and the New England Puritans had bought 
the land from North American peoples, Woolsey generalized that story and the humanitarianism of the 
colonists, claiming that all English colonies had followed their example. He also affirmed that the U.S 
had extinguished North Americans’ titles to their territories by treaty and by always paying economic 
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compensation for the taking of their lands.35 Woolsey was right that this was a more just and humane 
course of action—albeit one that paved the way for the eventual disenfranchisement of North American 
peoples. It was also a way of proceeding based on Marshall’s conclusion that the U.S. federal government 
had the ultimate power and prerogative of extinguishing whatever right North Americans’ had to the 
enjoyment of the territories in which they lived. Woolsey’s humanitarian tone concealed the fact that the 
ultimate legal power over the territories of savages was in the hands of Western nations. 
 Other points on which Woolsey converged with Creasy was the opinion that ‘savage or half-civilized 
tribes’ were not part of international law.36 A man of deep religious convictions, he defined international 
law as the norms that Christian nations used in their mutual intercourse.37 That religiosity also explains 
why Woolsey advocated that European colonialism and U.S. expansionism follow a humane course of 
action.38 But he never doubted that certain courses of action could be simultaneously unethical and legal. 
This explains why he referred to the Spanish legal justification for conquest as doubtful, a 
characterization that would be surprising to say the least from an ethical standpoint and one that most of 
his contemporaries also rejected emphatically from a legal perspective. 
 Criticism of imperialism and advocacy for the good treatment of non-European populations was not 
limited to Anglo-Saxon jurists. In Germany, Auguste-Wilhem Heffter (1796-1889) shared the 
humanitarian tone of Creasy and Woolsey. In 1873, coinciding with the founding of the Institut de droit 
international, his book Das Europäische Völkerrecht,39 first published in Berlin in 1844, was republished 
in French with the tile Le droit international public de l’Europe.40 For Heffter, the right to occupy was 
applicable to ‘countries or island’ that were not populated or not entirely occupied.41 But no one, he 
continued, had the power to impose its rule on ‘wandering and even savage peoples’.42 
These two affirmations have to be read together. On the one hand, there was the possibility that 
European colonial powers could appropriate territories in countries that were not entirely occupied. That 
meant that in certain continents non-Europeans occupied some areas but not others. This belief reflected 
Vattel’s conviction that the territories where savages lived comprised more land than they could use. On 
the other hand, the lands that savages were actually using, and hence occupying, could not be taken from 
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them. Moreover, Heffter affirmed that colonizing nations could not impose their jurisdiction, namely 
their government and laws, upon them.  
Heffter’s position did not deviate from the general line of argument followed by international lawyers 
during the nineteenth century. Savages ought to keep their lands and could not be treated violently. To 
his credit, Heffter—unlike most of his contemporaries—also defended savages’ sovereignty, which 
meant that they could not be placed under the laws of the colonizing power. But in North America and 
Oceania, there were huge tracts of land that, according to European views, savages neither controlled nor 
used. Moreover, scholars like Heffter wrote at a time when it was generally believed that savages were 
becoming extinct. The impact of civilized societies had been fatal, and most savages were doomed for 
extinction.43 As their numbers plummeted, the territories where they lived seemed to European eyes even 
more uninhabited and unoccupied.  
In principle, Heffter was not opposed to colonialism. In previous pages of his book he had discussed 
the possibilities for European nations to have colonies. They had a natural right to do so: ‘Nature’, he 
affirmed, did not ‘forbid nations to extend their empire on earth’.44 But that empire did not confer a right 
to subjugate non-Europeans.45 His criticism was mainly directed toward Great Britain. Referring again 
to nature, he claimed that it had not given a right to only one nation ‘to establish its domination anywhere’ 
it suited, even if occupation was made in the name of civilization, commerce, industry, or the exploitation 
of underutilized resources.46 
The Argentinean Carlos Calvo (1822-1906) was another jurist who set a high bar for the protection of 
savages. Like Heffter, he rejected civilization as a ground for dispossessing savages.47 He applied to 
savages Marshall’s conclusions in Worcester v. Georgia about the juridical relationship between the 
federal government and North Americans, namely that states had no right to expel savages from their 
lands.48 In an inversion of the general scholarly trend of the period, he cited Vattel to demonstrate that 
they were possessors of the territories they inhabited.49 The territories of the savages could only be 
occupied with their authorization.50 The occupying state could then use the territory in common with 
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savages or separately.51 In the last case, savages should be allowed to migrate in peace and offered 
equitable reimbursement.52 Colonizing states ought to follow the good example set by the New England 
Puritans and Quakers who had bought the land from North American savages.53 
Calvo did not entirely restrict the doctrine occupation. He used a standard of environmental 
exploitation to delimit its scope. Like all jurists of the period he acknowledged that colonizing nations 
had the right to acquire unoccupied land in ‘wild countries’.54 The application of that standard meant 
that, in the continents in which Europeans had settled, savages could not prevent Europeans from seizing 
the ecosystems and vast tracts of land that the former could not exploit. Latin American nations and the 
U.S. had inherited the right to those areas.55 
A second group of legal commentators did not recognize savages’ territorial rights. One such author 
was William Edward Hall (1835-1894). He dedicated much more space in his famous treatise on 
international law than Creasy, Woolsey, or Heffter on the elucidation of the doctrine of occupation.56 
Although he explained in detail the rules that applied to occupation, he made only one mention of savages 
or barbarians. Most of his disquisition was dedicated to framing the scope of the right to occupy territory. 
As with most of his contemporaries, Hall believed that discovery could not per se create a title to acquire 
territory.57 Occupation was a valid title that needed the twin elements of intention (to occupy) and the 
actual seizing of unoccupied lands. But in order to be valid occupation had also to be followed by 
effective control.58 Control was assured either by establishing settlements or by exploiting the ecosystems 
of the acquired territory.59 Hall was here merely stating what constituted the generally accepted doctrine 
of the time.  
Hall continued his exposition on occupation by referring to a set of questions that appeared in almost 
every contemporary manuscript on international law. These questions related to the extent of territory to 
which occupation applied, the amount of time that states had in order to make their acquisitions 
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permanent, the authority of the individuals who appropriated territory, the need for a state ratification of 
individual acts, etc.60 
Hall did not refer to the situation of savages. Nevertheless, his position on this matter can be read 
between the lines. Hall clearly stated that occupation entailed a state’s appropriation of an area that was 
‘unappropriated by a civilized or semi-civilized state’.61 Later in the book Hall made reference to another 
two categories: savages and un-civilized nations.62 For Hall there were three types of nations, according 
to their degree of civilization. In addition to these three groups, there was the non-state category of 
savagery. Savages did not constitute political communities. What is more, neither they nor un-civilized 
nations passed the threshold of civilization required to defend one’s territory. Only civilized and semi-
civilized nations were protected against expansionism and imperialism.  
This conclusion might be supported by Hall’s discussion of the abandonment of territory. One of the 
instances in which states abandoned an occupied territory was when they were expelled by savages or 
by other states.63 The only way in which the territory could return to a vacant condition was if the state 
that expelled the original occupant did ‘not attempt to set up a title for itself by conquest’.64 For Hall it 
was inconceivable that savages could establish a title by conquest or claim a title by prior occupation. 
There were more evidences in Hall’s text that the territories in which savages lived were considered 
vacant. Describing the way in which powerful nations usually colonized new territories, he affirmed that 
in general settlements were first establish on the coast.65 Beyond the coast there were vast stretches of 
‘unoccupied country’.66 This, of course, was the case in North America, and Hall like other jurists of the 
period referred to the disputes between European powers and the U.S. over the territories of Louisiana 
and Oregon.67 The North American nations of these territories were totally absent from those discussions, 
and hence legally invisible.  
Hall greatly amplified the power that occupation gave to colonial powers over non-European territories. 
The German Johann Caspar Bluntschli (1808-1881) shared Hall’s lenient views on the occupation of 
territories overseas. A founder of the Institut de droit international, Bluntschli has been regarded as a 
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‘liberal apologist for empire’.68 On closer scrutiny, however, his ideas do not seem to be too distant from 
the apparently more ethical and humanitarian views of Anglo-Saxon authors such as Creasy and 
Woolsey. 
For Bluntchli, occupation did not apply to property over territory but to territorial sovereignty.69 His 
position anticipated the general agreement of the jurists of the last decades of the nineteenth century. He 
explained the kind of occupation that he had in mind by reference to the British colonists in North 
America.70 They had acquired the sovereignty of wild territories in order to improve them through 
agriculture.71 Bluntschli legitimized occupation by reference to a Vattelian rationale.72 States could 
extend their imperium over the lands of savages in order to stimulate ‘civilization and cultivation’.73 ‘The 
surface of the earth’, he continued, was ‘destined to be cultivated by man and humanity is destined to 
extend civilization over the earth’.74 The logic of progressive exploitation of ecosystems fell upon 
savages with full force. Bluntschli, like most of his contemporaries, assumed that savages did not till the 
ground.75 Moreover, he also maintained that they had no notion of territorial property.76 
Because civilization was a cosmopolitan goal, Bluntschli explained that civilized nations ought to 
extend their sovereignty over the maximum possible number of savage peoples. This is what the British 
had done in North America and Oceania, the Spanish and Portuguese in South America, and the Dutch 
in the islands of South East Asia. The savages of these lands could neither administer nor exploit them 
through the introduction of agriculture.  
Although Bluntschli’s position was clearly imperialistic, he did not celebrate European colonial 
acquisitions in all cases. Based on the same cosmopolitan logic of exploitation of underutilized natural 
habitats he criticized the fact that colonial powers often appropriated territories that were too large for 
them to properly cultivate or govern.77 In doing so, they were preventing other nations from sharing the 
burden of colonization, thus hindering the progress of humanity.78 Without naming it explicitly, 
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Bluntschli—like Heffter and other German jurists—resented that it was Great Britain who profited most 
from colonialism.  
The cosmopolitan goal of exploiting nature, and the need to do so to guarantee a nations’ control over 
vast tracts of land, looked rather different from the other side of the Atlantic. Carlos Calvo defended that 
the U.S., Mexico, and South American nations could extend their grasp over wild areas. Reversing 
Bluntschli’s logic, Calvo maintained that in those large areas not inhabited by savages, colonization and 
administration could proceed gradually.79 
In spite of Bluntschli’s enthusiastic endorsement of European expansion, he was far from embracing 
imperialism wholeheartedly. He neither advocated the ill-treatment of non-Europeans nor the disregard 
of all their rights. Actually, he claimed that savages could not be expelled from their territories;80 they 
could migrate in peace and ought to receive economic compensation.81 That was not a very different 
language from that which Creasy and Woolsey had used. Of course, as the story of U.S.-North 
Americans’ relationship attested, the line that separated expulsion from ‘peaceful migration’ was a thin 
one.82 Bluntschli added that civilized nations ought to strive for the improvement of savages by 
instructing and leading them to higher civilization.83 But they also had the duty to respect savages’ modes 
of production and avoid at all cost their mistreatment.84 Savages could choose the way of life that suited 
them the best. Accordingly, they could not be prevented from cultivating or hunting.85 Based on this 
ethical position he followed Creasy in criticizing the Spanish conquest and advocating the conduct 
followed in North America by William Penn and the Puritans of New England.86 
 
Towards Berlin: Henry Maine and the changing nature of occupation 
Writing at the end of the 1880s, Henry James Summer Maine (1822-1888) defined the occupation of 
vacant land in the same way as Hall, as one of the three rights that a sovereign state possessed.87 He also 
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followed Hall in emphasizing the two elements needed for occupation: the material element, concretized 
in ‘physical contact’; and the intention to apprehend vacant territories.88 But, unlike Hall, he directly 
looked at the question of whether the territory of savages and barbarous tribes could be occupied.  
Colonial history provided a good standpoint from which to conduct that inquiry. At the time of the 
Spanish conquest in Latin America the general practice was to consider the title of pre-colonial 
populations as void due to their infidel condition.89 The problem with the evangelizing mission in Spanish 
America was that Spanish rule imposed a system of forced labor and great cruelty.90 Without excusing 
it, Maine noted that Queen Isabella’s sincere desire to tackle this question was weakened by the 
missionaries’ conviction that Latin American peoples would retreat ‘into the wilds’ if relieved of their 
work obligations.91 Despite criticizing Spanish colonial policies, Maine noticed with approbation that 
they had managed to assimilate ‘white and colored races’.92 
 The colonization of North America was the final test for the right of occupation in contemporary 
history. The notable European communities and individuals who, according to Maine, courageously 
changed the unethical course of European colonization are by now familiar. In contradistinction to the 
rudeness of Spanish and most English colonists, Maine praised the humanitarianism of William Penn 
and other Quakers.93 Maine then looked at the contemporary ‘legal doctrine’ on occupation, citing 
Marshall’s conclusions in Johnson v. McIntosh.94 According to Marshall, the British title over American 
territory which was inherited by the U.S. had extinguished all rights of pre-colonial peoples, save for 
their right to occupy land.95 The federal government had the authority to extinguish that title by ‘conquest 
or purchase’.96 
Savages were possessors, but not owners of territory. Progressive nations could therefore acquire their 
territories. But this right was accompanied by the humanitarian duty of reserving and not taking away 
the land that savages required for subsistence.97 Considering the deadly impact that Great Britain had 
historically had on the ‘savages’, it is save to affirm that this duty was far from a serious limitation of the 
scope of occupation. Moreover, this limitation could be circumvented if ‘sufficient provision’ was ‘made 
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for their subsistence by agriculture or by hunting’.98 This behavior, Maine explained, had become general 
practice as all imperial powers now allocated some land for the subsistence of all ‘savage natives’.99 
 Maine wrote at the end of the 1880s when an epoch in the history of European expansion and overseas 
occupation was coming to an end and a new period was about to start. As Maine noted, the times in 
which Europeans found new territories inhabited by savages were passing away. The non-Europeans 
which Europeans had to deal with now had passed the stage of civilization characteristic of savage life.100 
In a manuscript republished in French in the same year as Maine’s lectures Carlos Calvo agreed that at 
the end of the nineteenth century there was little land to be discovered, a conclusion shared by the British 
jurist Thomas Joseph Lawrence (1849-1920).101 Exploration had substituted discovery in unearthing the 
secrets of all corners of the world.102 As Hall noted in the 1895 edition of his treatise on international 
law, only a few regions in the interior of Africa had evaded the colonizing influence of the West.103 Due 
to the change of colonial scenario, the doctrine of occupation, as it had been generally understood for 
most of the nineteenth century, was becoming obsolete. Occupation, Lawrence argued, seemed to be at 
the time a question of mere ‘historic interest’.104 
 In 1868, writing about territorial aggrandizement, Farrar Mountague Bernard (1802-1882) rhetorically 
asked whether there was ‘a square yard of soil on the whole surface of the world that any sensible 
Englishman wished to see annexed to the British Empire’.105 Bernard answered in the negative.106 He 
criticized previous European intestine wars and conversely celebrated the ‘pacific decorous diplomacy’ 
of his time.107 He did not live long enough to see that ‘decorous’ Western ‘diplomacy’ being once again 
deployed in service of European imperialism to the great detriment of African peoples and their 
ecosystems. 
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Enter barbarian tribes: the Berlin Conference and the occupation of Africa 
In the nineteenth century, the British Empire was the indisputable hegemonic maritime power. At its 
apex, the Empire encompassed a territory that amounted to a quarter of the globe and comprised over a 
quarter of the world’s population. But for a long time the British were reluctant to undertake the direct 
administration of their colonies.108 Thus, for instance, the British EIC ruled the Indian Subcontinent for 
a century, from 1757 until the Mutiny in 1858. Similarly, British economic hegemony in Latin America 
was maintained without challenging the formal sovereignty of Latin American nations.109 
As Jeremy Bentham, James Mill, and Mountague Bernard among others observed, conquest and 
imperial administration were indeed burdensome.110 The Scottish international lawyer James Lorimer 
(1818-1890), Professor of Public Law at Edinburgh, was of the same opinion. The white man’s burden 
of civilizing inferior races had a limit. Giving as example, the high costs incurred by Great Britain during 
the ‘Zulu war’, Lorimer argued that colonialism should never compromise the material resources needed 
for continued progress in the metropolis.111 That was too costly a price to pay. Similarly, Western policy 
makers were convinced of the inconvenience of carrying the burden of ruling non-European territories 
and peoples. Informal rule through trading companies was a convenient intermediate between direct rule 
and non-intervention. It allowed Western nations to reap the benefits of colonization without having to 
bear all the costs.112 It was enough to sign treaties with nations or chiefs that assured imperial powers 
access to lands and ports or granted special protection to their missionaries and traders.113 Private 
interests rather than public power ran the colonial world during most of the nineteenth century. 
This state of affairs changed in the last quarter of the century. From 1879 to 1882 European states 
entered a frantic race to acquire portions of the African continent. Whereas by the 1870s only a fraction 
of Africa—limited to its coasts—was occupied by European nations, from the mid-1880s the interior of 
the continent came under increasing European influence.  
The reasons for the scramble for Africa are disputed. The economic benefit of African colonization is 
far from obvious. Acquiring and keeping an empire was a very costly enterprise, and Africa offered little 
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in return. Few capitalists were interested in investing in Africa.114 Trade in the continent was also 
negligible. For instance, the Belgian Congo, one of the economic jewels of Africa, contributed only one 
percent of Belgian trade.115 Moreover, African trade with Europe had reached its maximum level in the 
second half of the eighteenth century due to the trade in human beings, the slave trade, declining 
thereafter.116 
None of these meant, however, that economic reasons did not play an important role. The discovery of 
diamonds in Kimberley in 1866 and gold in the Transalvaal in 1885 allowed a few British individuals to 
amass immense fortunes.117 It is likely that other European powers were attracted by the same possibility 
of finding new sources of natural wealth and carrying on trade in the interior of the continent. This hope 
was reinforced by the stories of influential explorers such as Henry M. Stanley or Heinrich Barth who 
spoke authoritatively about African riches and the potential for trade in the continent.118 Livingston too 
helped in consolidating a view of British imperialism ‘that fused moral purpose with the civilizing 
functions and values of commerce’.119 Besides, particular business groups—like the commercial 
companies of Marseille—and individuals like King Leopold and Cecil Rhodes, who became extremely 
rich through their economic ventures in Africa, were able to adopt or influence state policies of territorial 
acquisition that favored their economic interests.120 
Be that as it may, Western powers gathered in Berlin during 1884 and 1885 with the intention of fixing 
the rules whereby Africa was to be colonized and partitioned between colonial powers. Those rules 
included the question of how to legally occupy territory. Articles 34 and 35 of the General Act of the 
Berlin Conference were devoted to this question. With the change of colonial scenario it became evident 
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to colonial powers that, for a number of reasons, the occupation of African could not be identical to the 
appropriation of Australia and northern North America by the British and the U.S. 
Africans, unlike Australians and North Americans, did not experience a population collapse due to 
contagious diseases. The fact that Africans had had contact with Europeans since time immemorial made 
them more resistant to European germs. Despite millions of victims of brutal conquest and slave trade, 
African polities were often highly populated. Actually, the tendency reversed in the sense that it was now 
European colonists who were dying in great numbers in the African tropics. For Europeans, Africa had 
become the white’s man grave.121 
Although European mortality in tropical Africa only started to decrease during the last quarter of the 
century, it still remained high compared to non-tropical areas.122 Based on his geographical knowledge 
Ernst Georg Ravenstein (1834-1913), a German geographer and cartographer who worked most of his 
life in England, declared in front of the British Royal Geographical Society that the tropics were 
unsuitable for European settlement.123 Nature imposed a series of limits upon humans that according to 
Ravenstein were impossible to change. As he put it: ‘To render tropical countries fit places of residence 
for European colonists it will be necessary either to change the constitution of Europeans or to bring about 
a change in the climate.’124 
For Europeans it was also difficult to replicate in the tropics the economic approach to colonization 
followed in the temperate regions of Australia and North America. Mild weather or at least a climate 
similar to that of Great Britain made it easier to adopt modes of production suitable for landscapes that 
resembled those of the metropolis. Pastoralist and agricultural communities fared much better in the coast 
and prairies of North America and the southern coasts of Australia than in the African tropics. The 
possibility of creating ‘Neo-Europes’ in Africa following North American and Pacific models was out of 
the question.  
For nineteenth century international lawyers, the population of Africa also differed from the savages of 
Oceania and North America. As Maine hinted, that distinction was based on their different level of social 
progress, determined in accordance with the social categories of stadial theory.125 While Australians and 
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North Americans were almost invariably regarded by Europeans as savage hunter-gatherers, Africans in 
turn were considered agriculturalists. They were also deemed to have political communities. And, of 
course, these two facts affected their status in international law. As Maine recognized, Africans were 
‘assumed’ to live in ‘organised community’, and importantly to be ‘in possession of the land’.126 
Apart from these factual changes that affected the context in which the doctrine of occupation operated, 
there were also relevant conceptual variations derived from the new outlook of the discipline of 
international law after the creation of the Institut de droit international. The ascendancy of positivism 
and the emergence of states as centerpieces of international life and international law influenced the way 
in which the doctrine of occupation was understood.127 Sovereignty rather than private property became 
the focus of attention. While previously state’s sovereign power (imperium) and private property 
(dominium) had been considered as separate elements, at the end of the century the latter was subsumed 
within the former. The way in which a state related to its territory was not comparable to individual 
proprietorship, a question that pertained to the sphere of private law. International law and public law 
dealt solely with states’ territorial sovereignty.  
For the international lawyers of the end of the nineteenth century the world was a conglomerate of 
states. Statehood also had a normative dimension. International lawyers believed that the surface of the 
Earth ought to be parceled between states because these modern political entities were the harbingers of 
progress. In consequence, they maintained that only states were international actors, a status that gave 
them legal agency in the grand scheme of the world. Any other political formation or human community 
that did not share the characteristics of European states and European civilization were considered legally 
irrelevant or, at least, not politically mature enough to have their own voice. Anghie has demonstrated 
how sovereignty acquired its specific legal contours in the imperialistic process of being projected over 
a supposed inferior Other.128 Only when European sovereignty was consolidated as the measuring stick 
of political status and international agency could the world be recreated as a political emptiness that had 
to be filled anew.  
The sovereign power associated with Western statehood and the imperial mission of its dissemination 
acquired such an importance and pull only by contrast to what they were destined to remedy: the existence 
of inferior non-European political formations with no endogenous capacity for progress. European 
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imperialism created its own purpose by defining most non-European peoples in opposition to the 
progressive standard they believed they incarnated. In Africa, supposedly void of states and civilization, 
European colonialism was naturally presented as a progressive instrument for the creation of modern 
political communities that could be agents of transition toward progressive and civilized economic and 
political life. 
As Lawrence and Hall noted, with the scramble for Africa the doctrine of occupation was again at the 
forefront of international legal discussion.129 This revival was caused by the ‘earth hunger of the Old 
World’.130 But the doctrine of occupation now had a novel outlook. When international lawyers debated 
occupation at the end of the nineteenth century, they often referred to the African territory as territorium 
nullius.131 John Westlake (1828-1913) properly described this change in his treatise on international 
law:132 territorial sovereignty, he argued, was not the same as property.133 Neither the government, nor 
the King or Queen, nor even the people as a whole, Lassa Oppenheim explained, were owners of the 
territory of a state.134 Accordingly, the question with regard to occupation to which international law 
turned its eyes from the Berlin Conference onward was whether ‘an uncivilized region may be 
internationally recognized as appropriated in sovereignty to a particular state’.135 Oppenheim firmly 
believed that occupation entailed ‘the acquisition of sovereignty’ over a territory.136 
Just when it seemed to be losing its historical importance, the scramble for Africa elevated occupation 
to the central stage in international legal textbooks. The French jurists Salomon and Jezé dedicated a 
whole manuscript to studying the question of territories without master. In contrast with the few pages 
that earlier commentators devoted to the legal treatment of the doctrine of occupation, John Westlake 
dedicated a whole chapter of his treatise to the topic. He paid particular attention to the question of what 
to do with the ‘natives’. Westlake was an apologist of empire, and his tone throughout the discussion 
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remained bluntly paternalistic, if not downright racist. According to him, ‘uncivilized populations’ had 
moral but not legal rights.137 Therefore, their relationship with colonial administrators was like that of the 
‘ignorant and helpless’ to the ‘enlightened and strong’.138 The treatment of the ‘natives’ was a question 
purely related to the conscience of the state that administered them.139 
For Westlake the ultimate criterion for the occupation of territory was civilization. But the standard of 
civilization was not predicated on a cultural distinction between the ‘mental or moral characteristics’ of 
civilized and uncivilized populations.140 For him, no social or cultural aspect was a decisive element for 
judging social progress; what counted was when Europeans came ‘into contact with American or African 
tribes’ was ‘government’.141 Government allowed ‘people of European race’ to enjoy the ‘complex life’ 
that they could have in their home countries.142 
Considering the ideas of Westlake, the standard of occupation seemed to be shifting after Berlin from 
the improvement and exploitation of ecosystems to the political organization of populations. Before 
Berlin, Creasy had defended the rights of non-European advanced peoples because they were ‘more or 
less agriculturalists’. Similarly, Bluntschli linked civilization and the improvement of nature through 
agriculture. Even Heffter’s anti-imperialist critique of Great Britain’s imperialism included justification 
based on the exploitation of idle natural resources. Besides, most jurists agreed that wild territories could 
be occupied by nations that could exploit them by introducing agriculture and trade. 
Despite the references to government, stadial theory and the standard of environmental exploitation 
remained central to Westlake’s understanding of non-European peoples and territories. When he 
discussed whether treaties with ‘natives’ had any validity in international law he defended the idea that 
the only thing that ‘uncivilized’ populations could transfer was the property of their land. This conclusion 
was drawn by reference to stadial theory. Savages and nomads had little notion of landed property.143 
That was not the case for the settled agricultural populations of Africa, who had a clear understanding of 
private property over land, an institution indispensable for the cultivation of the soil.144 Both savages and 
agriculturalists practiced trade, even if that practice was sometimes restricted to barter.145 But uncivilized 
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peoples could not cede what they did not have any notion of. That limitation was applicable to 
sovereignty.146 
Did the fact that African ‘tribes’ were agriculturalists and hence ‘in a stage of advancement higher than 
that of the redskins’ mean that Europeans could not seize African natural resources?147 Was the standard 
based on the progressive exploitation of ecosystems no longer valid? Westlake’s position on this matter 
was unequivocal. He still believed that, due to their superior mastery over nature, Westerners ought to 
have preeminent access to the unexploited natural wealth of Africa. In the racial jargon of the era he 
expressed his conviction that: ‘The inflow of the white race cannot be stopped where there is land to 
cultivate, ore to be mined, commerce to be developed … If any fanatical admirer of savage life argued 
that the whites ought to be kept out, he would only be driven to the same conclusion by another route 
…’148 
 Westlake clearly understood the economic interests that the British Empire, or at least some of its most 
influential subjects, had in occupying Africa. But the effective occupation of land and the administration 
of uncivilized peoples did not only signify gains. It also imposed the duty of civilizing non-Europeans 
and guaranteeing their wellbeing.149 In fact, one of the requirements of occupation was the administration 
of the occupied territories and the establishment of an authority that was able to guarantee the protection 
of the pre-colonial population.150 In the international legality of the end of the century this condition was 
something more than a simple wish stemming from the humanitarian impulse of international legal 
scholarship: it was now part of the positive body of international regulations. Westlake underscored the 
fact that it had been agreed by all European powers at Berlin. Article 35 of the General Act of the Berlin 
conference read as follows: ‘The Signatory Powers of the present Act recognize the obligation to insure 
the establishment of authority in the regions occupied by them on the coasts of the African continent 
sufficient to protect existing rights.’151 It seemed that European profit could not now be made at the 
expense of the populations under European rule. 
Westlake continued his disquisition on the doctrine of occupation, examining several questions to 
which jurists of previous periods had given a great deal of attention. Among them were the questions of 
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an inchoate title based on discovery or occupation, the requirement of notifying other powers of 
occupations made in Africa, the extent of occupation, and the authority of those making land 
acquisitions.152 
In contrast to Westlake, other British international lawyers such as Thomas Joseph Lawrence (1849-
1919) seemed to have a more pluralistic conception of international law. Westlake had defined the society 
of states as that which had European civilization. Similarly, Lawrence defined international law as the set 
of rules applicable between civilized states.153 But, for him, there was not only one international law. In 
fact, he believed that different peoples had different systems of international law.154 This legal pluralism 
did not, however, entail equality. International law was the most important of these systems as it had been 
adopted by all civilized states.155 Moreover, according to Lawrence, the modern definition of international 
law as a system between states made it entirely impossible for ‘nomadic tribes’ to be part of it.156 
In international law, Lawrence explained, title to territory may be acquired originally through 
occupation. States and their sovereign power were the defining standard for occupation. Therefore, the 
right to occupy could be exercised over all territories that were ‘res nullius’, that is, places that were not 
part of any ‘civilized state’.157 For Lawrence the label vacant land or ‘res nullius’ was not limited to 
uninhabited territories.158 ‘Savage tribes’, who ‘roamed over’ large expanses of land could not retain their 
territories.159 Even non-European polities with a higher level of civilization and political organization 
could not prevent Europeans from legally seizing their lands.160 Only the highest international legal 
standard—the achievement of full sovereignty and statehood—could prevent the application of the right 
to occupy.161 
Non-Europeans did not fare well in Lawrence’s scheme. Following Westlake, he affirmed that 
‘natives’ had moral rights but did not enjoy legal status.162 That characterization, of course, hindered their 
international legal personality. Lawrence noted the contradiction between the fact that, on the one hand, 
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‘natives’ were not even noticed in international documents and their rights were ignored and, on the other 
hand, that European powers regularly made treaties with them for the purpose of occupying their lands.163 
Lawrence resolved this conundrum in a similar way to Westlake by distinguishing between private 
property and sovereignty. Non-Europeans could not cede what they did not have—sovereignty—so 
treaties with them were not valid under international law. Occupation was effective only between the 
civilized communities that were subjects of international law.164 
But, for Lawrence, treaties with non-Europeans were not inconsequential. They pertained to the ethical 
conduct of European colonialism. Non-Europeans had to be ‘treated with fairness’ and ‘justice’;165 they 
could not be legally dispossessed. Accordingly, Vattel’s argument that savages had too much land, which 
legitimized Europeans’ taking of their lands, was strongly criticized by Lawrence.166 Did this mean that 
the standard of exploitation of natural habitats was no longer valid? How could the duty of treating ‘native 
races’ with ‘justice and humanity’ be reconciled with Europeans’ occupation of non-European territories 
in order to undertake their superior economic practices?167 The answer, Lawrence believed, was not as 
straight forward as one may think at first sight.  
Lawrence hesitated on the question of whether Europeans could exercise their superior economic 
activities of trading, farming, and mining in the colonies based on concessions made by non-Europeans.168 
For him, the definite measuring stick was the way in which the civilizing mission was carried out. 
Sometimes, civilization had proceeded in a humanitarian way and had resulted in the improvement and 
general benefit of non-Europeans.169 But, at times, civilized rule had been lethal. Under the impact of the 
colonizer several tribes had disappeared like ‘grass before a prairie fire’.170 As a result of the disparity of 
historical experiences no general rule could be easily laid down. But, self-pressed to take a stand on the 
question, Lawrence bent toward civilization. He was sure that in the cases when ‘the representatives of 
superior and inferior races come into contact, the former must prevail’.171 But even if that was the case, 
it is important to remember that, for Lawrence, European rule and the civilizing mission ought to be 
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carried out for the benefit of non-Europeans and not for personal profit.172 Economic progress ought to 
be inspired by and reflect a cosmopolitan impulse. 
Lassa Oppenheim shared with his British colleagues the idea that the world was only composed of 
states. This meant that the geographical space of any political formation that was not a state could be 
occupied by any member of the ‘Family of Nations’.173 For example, wandering tribes with a system of 
government were not regarded as states so long as they had an unsettled existence.174 Similarly, a territory 
in which there were ‘natives’ with some kind of ‘tribal organization’ did not need to be deemed a state.175 
In his treatise, Oppenheim summarized the general theory on occupation. In order to be effective, 
occupation needed to be preceded by possession of the object of occupation, which in practice amounted 
to settlement of the territory.176 Possession, in turn, had two elements: ‘corpus’, or the actual taking of 
the object; and ‘animus’, the intention of taking it with the purpose of acquiring sovereignty over it.177 
But possession was not enough. Following Article 35 of the Final Act of the Berlin Conference, 
Oppenheim argued that occupation was only effective when possession was followed by the actual 
administration of the territory.178 
 Non-European territories were the object of European acquisition of sovereignty. The inhabitants of 
those territories did not form states. They had political systems, but their superiors were the heads of 
‘tribal communities’ rather than states.179 Oppenheim, like Westlake and Lawrence, differentiated 
between non-Europeans’ sovereignty and their rights to private property. Lack of sovereignty limited 
non-Europeans’ agency: this is why treaties in which ‘natives’ agreed to submit to the occupying power 
were invalid.180 They could not cede something they did not have and normally did not understand.181 
Agreements made with the chiefs of ‘natives’ had only moral value,182 and non-Europeans had no 
international legal status. Nevertheless, a lack of sovereignty did not preclude the recognition of pre-
existing rights of private property.183 In other words, non-Europeans could keep the private property they 
possessed before European arrival. 
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The distinction between sovereignty and private property marked a definite turning point between the 
traditional conception of occupation and the modern one. As Oppenheim explained, traditionally it was 
considered that occupation conferred a title to private property over the whole territorial space 
occupied.184 The colonizer acquired both sovereignty and private property over the land. That was no 
longer the case. Occupation was limited to sovereignty. For non-sovereign non-European populations 
things had changed for the better—or so international commentators believed. 
Did respect for the private property of colonized populations impede the European progressive and 
cosmopolitan mission of exploiting underutilized ecosystems? For Westlake the answer was a definite 
no. As mentioned above, he declared that in Africa whites could not be prevented from cultivating the 
available land, extracting its mineral wealth, and carrying on commerce.185 Similarly Lawrence, despite 
criticizing Vattel, thought that Western farming, mining, and trading could be and often had been 
reconciled with the interests of the pre-colonial population.186 
So, the standard of exploitation of ecosystems did not entirely go away by the end of the nineteenth 
century. In fact, it was consecrated in some of the legal international texts of the period. This was the 
case, for example, of the English translation of Il diritto internazionale codificato e la sua sanzione 
giuridica, first published by the Italian jurist Pasquale Fiore (1837-1914) in 1890. Of all authors it was 
Fiore who most firmly invoked a standard of environmental exploitation.187 He maintained that 
colonization and imperial expansion were legitimate,188 but the legitimacy of the extension of Western 
rule over non-European populations, he acknowledged, was a complex matter. The final criterion to judge 
the soundness of Western imperialism was the protection of the rights of non-European peoples in the 
same way as those of ‘civilized nations’.189 Nonetheless, legal humanitarianism did not mean that the 
rights of Europeans and non-Europeans were the same. 
According to Fiore, one of the reasons that justified the expansion of Western nations was the existence 
of underutilized areas of the Earth that were of no use to uncivilized populations.190 Following this 
Vattelian rationale he claimed that: 
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The earth is in general designed to serve the needs of everyone and that it is not permissible that savages who are 
unable to derive any profit from natural products should be allowed to leave sources of wealth unproductive, 
leaving the ground uncultivated191 
 
This statement did not amount to a complete denial of the rights of pre-colonial populations. In fact every 
human being, a category that included savages and wondering tribes, had a number of natural rights that 
were inherent to his or her person.192 These rights integrated what Fiore called the laws of humanity, a 
set of rights that belonged to humans, which could not be derogated from, and ought to be respected by 
colonial powers in their dealings with ‘barbarous tribes’.193 Among those rights were private property, 
trade, and freedom of movement.194 Uncivilized and independent tribes had not only personal rights: they 
were also entitled to international rights and international legal personality.195 
Fiore defined ‘independent tribes’ as those who were settled in a particular territory, who had their 
own legal norms, and integrated a political community, having ‘a government capable of commanding 
the respect of the fundamental principles of international law’.196 In case ‘uncivilized’ non-European 
peoples fulfilled those requirements, their first right was the application of international law to ‘de facto 
relations … with civilized states’.197 This entitlement basically came down to the right of ‘barbarous 
tribes’ to keep the lands which they occupied and the subsequent obligation of the colonizers to obtain 
the tribe’s consent to the occupation of those lands.198 The second international right applicable to tribes, 
connected with the first, was the prohibition of conquest.199 These two limits imposed on ‘civilized’ states 
in their colonial ventures were supplemented by a series of duties. It was incumbent upon civilized powers 
to promote the spreading of civilization and the cultivation of international law among the uncivilized200 
The application of international law to ‘independent tribes’ did not translate into automatic legal 
equality.201 International law was applied differently to its various legal subjects—‘civilized, uncivilized 
and barbarian nations’.202 Moreover, international law was applied to uncivilized tribes in a flexible way, 
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as it was always subject to ‘historical and moral exigencies’.203 This provided civilized states a certain 
space for maneuver in their dealings with uncivilized peoples. Moreover, despite having a certain status, 
tribes were always found wanting when compared to civilized nations. Only the latter were full 
members—in the sense of having all the rights—of the international community, or as Fiore called it, the 
‘Magnas civitas’.204 When confronted with the superior mirror of the civilized state, Fiore defined a tribe 
as a body of people that lacked ‘political organization’ and had no rules and mores comparable to those 
of civilized states.205 
Non-European societies had a political and legal status which allowed them to be at the same time inside 
and outside the international legal system. As for Vitoria, they were advanced enough to deserve the 
enjoyment of natural rights and humanitarian treatment, but their status was always lacking when 
compared with the full members of that system. This logic of inclusion/exclusion allowed their societies 
to be placed within the power of superior political formations. Progress was created out of that contact, 
as more advanced societies drove the less progressive toward higher human achievements. 
What were the effects of occupation over non-Europeans? First, there were protectorates, colonial 
possessions over which the occupying state acquired imperium or sovereignty.206 In cases where there 
were tribes in the zone under colonization, states ought to respect their rights. Did this mean that they 
needed the consent of the uncivilized tribes in order to establish a protectorate? Were the treaties signed 
with tribes a valid title for occupation? Like his British counterparts, Fiore answered this question in the 
negative. He believed that agreements signed with local chiefs did not constitute a valid legal ground for 
occupation due to the ignorance of those leaders.207 As Fiore put it, treatises had no legal effect because 
natives could not cede ‘what they are not conscious of possessing’.208 
Regarding property, Fiore distinguished two cases. On the one hand, if non-European territories were 
inhabited and occupied by barbarous nations, if these ‘savage tribes’ had chiefs who were invested with 
sovereign power, imperial powers ought to reach an agreement with them and pay compensation before 
acquiring their lands.209 In the territories which were not exploited by savage tribes—that is, vacant or 
unoccupied lands—the agricultural argument applied with full force. The rationale of this argument is by 
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now familiar: savages could not retain the excess of underutilized land because Western nations could 
better exploit them.210 But even in this second case the legitimacy of the occupation was conditioned by 
the obligation to conduct colonization in a peaceful and just manner.211 
Western imperialism could fill the blank spaces of the world—in other words, the land areas that did 
not constitute a state and did not belong to a state.212 The African continent was now ripe to be 
administered by the establishment of protectorates.213 If carried out peacefully, colonialism and 
civilization were a blessing for humanity. Progressive nations could exploit idle natural resources, 
promoting the improvement of global material conditions. The expansion of industrial capitalism was the 
engine of human affluence. This is why, as Fiore noted, Western imperial powers ‘could extend the field 
of their activity and production, so as to satisfy their ever increasing needs through an increase of 
wealth’.214 It was the force of this cosmopolitan goal that imperialism incarnated that led Fiore to affirm 
that even in cases where negotiation with ‘natives’ was necessary to secure the cession of land, and 
outside the use of force, ‘the indirect and passive means for inducing them to yield their territory to 
colonization must be regarded as lawful’.215 
  
Concluding remarks 
The territory at the disposal of U.S. and Great Britain at the end of the nineteenth century comprised an 
expanse of land of twenty-eight million square kilometers—a territory almost the size of Africa. The 
supposedly unexploited ecosystems that these lands included fed the growing industries of both countries 
and stimulated the development of international capitalism. As pre-colonial populations were pushed 
away, those territories and their natural resources were now either privatized or susceptible to private 
appropriation. The exploitation of these continental masses and the economic fluxes created between 
colony and metropolis were the cornerstone of two of the most powerful empires the world has ever seen. 
The other side of the coin was tremendous human suffering and ecological destruction. 
Around the mid-nineteenth century, the massive process of settlement of vast natural frontiers in North 
America and Australia had no historical precedent. The speed and breadth of that process seemed 
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impossible to replicate, and the times of big land acquisitions were coming to an end. As the jurists of 
the period recognized, there were few lands in the world unknown to the Europeans. Where else could 
Western imperialism extend its tentacles? Where could it gain easy access to natural resources that the 
increasing process of industrialization in Western countries demanded?  
Against all odds, Western imperialism had yet to deliver its final blow. At the close of the century, a 
land grab of equally gigantic proportions took place. Another thirty million square kilometers fell into 
European hands in the final decades of the nineteenth century. According to European perceptions, a 
whole new unoccupied continent awaited to be efficient and beneficial exploitation. But the occupation 
of Africa posed a completely different set of legal challenges to that of continents inhabited by savages: 
the barbarian African could not be treated the same way as the savage. Besides, its tropical lands were 
not suitable for the kind of economic ventures that were typical of settler societies. How could Africa be 
legally appropriated? Was the standard of environmental exploitation useful for African colonization? 
Could Africans and the tropics be civilized?  
International jurists at the end of the century tried to provide an answer to these questions. The 
rationale of African colonization was not the exploitation of vacant natural resources, but the creation of 
sovereign states in a political vacuum—or, rather, a backward political space. But the cosmopolitan 
impulse to transform nature did not completely fade away. As industrialization demanded more and more 
raw materials, most international lawyers recognized that Western nations, as they had done in other 
continents, ought to improve African natural habitats. Industrious activity was inherently associated with 
the white race. But how could this mission be reconciled with the fact that Africans were acknowledged 
as owners of their lands?  
Despite the fact that the importance of exploiting African natural wealth was recognized in 
international legal texts, there were conceptual obstacles to the materialization of this idea. Because 
Africans were not savages, stadial theory and the agricultural argument no longer served as legitimizing 
rationales of colonization. How, then, could Europeans reap the benefits of exploiting the tropics without 
violating the property rights of Africans to the territories they occupied? How was the exploitation of 
Africa organized in practice and legalized in theory? As stadial theory receded, losing its explanatory 
character, the idea of civilization was in need of a new vernacular that could better capture how progress 
operated at the end of the century, and explain how colonial nature ought to be civilized. The following 
chapter will explain the way in which the idea of evolution, and particularly legal evolution, provided a 
response to these various challenges.  
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9  Civilizing Nature: Evolution and the Homo Economicus (1850-1924) 
 
 
 
 
 
Nature and mankind interact on one another. Nations and races derive their characteristics largely from their 
surroundings, but, on the other hand, man reclaims, disciplines and trains Nature. The surface of Europe, Asia and 
North America has submitted to this influence and discipline, but it still has to be applied to large parts of South 
America and Africa. Marches must be drained, forests skillfully thinned, rivers be taught to run in ordered courses 
and not to afflict the land with draught and flood at their caprice; a way must be made across deserts and jungles, 
war must be waged against fevers and other diseases whose physical causes are now mostly known. A good 
beginning had been made and the future is full of hope.1 
 
During the last decades of the nineteenth century most international lawyers concluded that the period in 
which Europeans had ‘discovered’ new appropriable territories inhabited by savages was over. A new 
epoch in Western expansion was inaugurated with the march of European adventurers, companies, and 
nations from coastal areas into the interior of African. The colonization and partition of Africa took place 
under a rather different set of circumstances than settler colonialism. In this context, stadial theory and 
the standard of environmental exploitation lost a great deal of its power. It was generally agreed that, 
even though African methods to till the land were rudimentary, Africans were mainly agriculturalists. 
They definitely had a notion of private property. Besides, Africa was densely populated, especially West 
Africa. For all these reasons, Europeans could not easily displace Africans and seize their natural 
resources. 
 In response to the change of colonial scenario, occupation shifted in Africa from the appropriation of 
land to the occupation of sovereignty. For Europeans, African political communities did not meet the 
standard that gave them the status of sovereign nations. They did not exercise full sovereignty, at least 
not in the way that international law demanded for full recognition as international independent actors. 
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Consequently, Africans needed European intervention to help them gain the capacity to govern 
themselves. 
 The demise of stadial theory, the shift of occupation from property to sovereignty, the importance of 
sovereignty and statehood as the standard that gave access to the civilized community of nations: all these 
factors seemed to indicate that the exploitation of nature was no longer a valid rationale for colonization. 
However, international lawyers still clung to the cosmopolitan conviction that modern nations had a 
mandate to develop the world’s unexploited resources. As we shall see in this chapter, even as late as the 
second decade of the twentieth century Lord Lugard, writing about the British motivation for the 
colonization of Africa, declared the tropics the heritage of mankind.2 Their exploitation was the 
progressive mission of modern nations. At the same time, and perhaps more than ever, the great 
international expansion of the capitalist economy demanded the continuing flow of raw materials from 
the colonies for the production of all kinds of consumable items. 
 Parallel to this development, international law also suffered a crisis. This is paradoxical, taking into 
account that, as Koskenniemi has demonstrated, international law was actually born as a specific project, 
through the efforts of the Institut de droit international, during the last decades of the nineteenth century. 
Factors such as the expansion of trade, the threat of war, and colonial competition pointed toward the 
need for a science that could regulate and make manageable all the activities that states had started to 
undertake with increasing vigor and frequency on the international plane. The world was increasingly 
knitted together, and international law seemed to be the right language to articulate that union. But 
precisely at the time that its guidance was most needed, international law lost two of its most powerful 
sources of normative power: Christianity and natural law. So, international law was in need of an extra 
juridical yardstick in which to anchor its transformative capacity.  
 In this chapter, I will explain how the idea of evolution filled the need for a new model of colonization 
while at the same time helping international law gain stature, force, and respectability. I will specially 
focus on the writings of Henry Maine for a number of reasons. First, Maine popularized the idea of legal 
evolution. In so doing, he found a new and modern vernacular that gave flesh to the old idea of 
civilization, reestablishing a solid intellectual foundation for progress and Western superiority. 
Importantly, in so doing, he did not move completely away from the importance of material factors as 
drivers of historical development and social change. In fact, for Maine, evolution took place when the 
law was able to accommodate technological, productive, and material innovations. Second, Maine 
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defined the state as power over a specific portion of the Earth. Statehood was related to government. But 
in turn government meant, among other thing, the establishment of a space for private relations over 
matter. In other words, states regulated how a collectivity could use and exploit the ecosystems within a 
particular geographical area. Finally, the writings of Maine informed the way in which the British 
organized the administration of their colonies. As we will see, in 1922 Lord Lugard adopted and adapted 
Maine’s guidelines to the imperial government of Africa. In so doing, both Lugard and Maine provided 
an answer to the question of how to exploit resources that in principle belonged exclusively to African 
peoples. Even though not the main focus of Maine’s theories, the exploitation of nature indirectly 
informed his theories. 
 But perhaps more important than all these aspects was Maine’s contribution to recreating in a modern 
fashion the narrative of progressive social development, an idea with old pedigree in Western intellectual 
history. The move from primitiveness toward modernity was for Maine the process of individual 
disaggregation from the collectivity, which he aptly captured in his famous maxim ‘from status to 
contract’. The progressiveness that according to Maine was inherent to individualism, and particularly 
economic individualism, reified anew Western private rights. So Maine’s theories provided theoretical 
ammunition to continue the exploitation of non-European nature. 
For Maine and contemporary legal commentators, the rights that allowed the appropriation of nature 
were the ideal institutional apparatus to engender progress. As in stadial theory, individual property rights 
and the marketization of social relations were proclaimed as the means to hit the highest point that 
societies could reach. Reassured at the top of the social pyramid sat the Western homo economicus, an 
individual that could reap the fruits of the modern materialization of an old Western aspiration: human 
reign over nature. 
 
Henry Maine and legal evolution 
Henry Maine was born in 1822. His early years were not particularly happy, a circumstance to which the 
separation of his parents certainly did not help.3 His tendency toward illness and a delicate nature 
contributed to his introverted character.4 At age 18 he went to Cambridge, as an Exhibitioner of Pembroke 
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College, to follow his studies.5 He was a distinguished student with a sharp mind. His intellectual merits 
won him a Chancellor’s medal for English verse and membership in an elite secrete society at Cambridge 
called the Apostles.6 After studying law for a few years, he was appointed to the Regius Professorship of 
Civil Law at the early age of twenty-five.7 After some years he became Reader in Roman Law and 
Jurisprudence at the Inns of Court in 1852.8 The knowledge of classic legal systems that he acquired 
during his academic career was to have great importance for his later theories on law and society. 
 Maine was also interested in journalism. He wrote several pieces for the Monday Chronicle and was 
one of the founders of the periodical The Saturday Review.9 A convinced conservative, Maine favored 
aristocratic government and distrusted democracy, advocating against the extension of suffrage. In 1861 
he published Ancient Law, a book that became popular soon after its publication and which eventually 
acquired the status as a classic text. A year later, in 1862, he moved to India, where he acted as a legal 
member of the Governor-General’s council, where he advised on legal and political matters. Back in 
England in 1869 he became Corpus Professor of Jurisprudence at Oxford, and almost two decades later 
he took up the Whewell Professorship of International Law at Cambridge. During those years he 
published the bulk of his work. In 1871 came Village Communities of East and West; soon followed The 
Early History of Institutions published in 1875. His next book, Dissertation on Early Law and Customs, 
which focused on the early Irish Brehon laws, was published in 1883. These were the books in which 
Maine deepened and extended some of the main views contained in Ancient Law, which, despite 
criticism, remained almost unaltered until the end of his life. The lectures he imparted as Professor of 
International Law were published postmortem under the title International Law. He died in 1888, leaving 
behind his wife and cousin Jane Maine and two sons. 
Maine had an interest in jurisprudence and legal history. His historical approach to the study of legal 
and social change was an important contribution to the development of sociology, creating a bond 
between law, history, and anthropology.10 Maine presented his work as a scientific endeavor:11 he 
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wrapped in a scientific guise his object of study, famously drawing a comparison between the function 
that rudimentary early forms of legal ideas had for the jurist and that which the ‘primary crusts of the 
earth’ played in the inquiry of a geologist.12 The movement from ancient to modern society could be 
study with rigor, precision, and objectivity. This scientific outlook, together with Maine’s confident tone 
in Ancient Law, explains the authoritative force of his work.  
Maine was particularly influenced by comparative philology and the German historical method.13 The 
greatest discovery within the discipline of comparative philology was the existence of an Indo-European 
or Aryan language family. The revolutionary restructuring of the ethnic affiliation of the peoples of the 
world that followed the emergence of an Aryan group influenced Maine’s research agenda, placing India 
squarely at the center of it.14 
Like other intellectuals interested in the laws of social change, he believed in a timeline that linked 
humanity’s primitive past with its modern present. Following former theories of social change, namely 
stadial theory, he was able to identify traditional communities contemporary to his own society that 
reproduced many of the ancient traits of modern nations. Contemporary backwardness was a mirror of 
the past of progress. As he put it: ‘the primitive condition of the progressive societies is best ascertained 
from the observable condition of those who are non-progressive.’15 India was one of the examples where 
one could contemplate the past of civilized nations. India had a double temporality, being simultaneously 
past and present. As Maine noted, ‘the British rulers of India are like men bound to make their watches 
keep true time in two longitudes at once’.16 Due to India’s particularity, its scientific observation could 
provide invaluable data for reconstructing the general and progressive movement of human 
communities.17 
 Despite Maine’s conviction about the neutrality and objectivity that the scientific method conferred to 
his theories, it is possible to identify a specific political agenda running through his work. Maine was a 
conservative, and hence he praised order and was averse to change. He especially feared and distrusted 
transformations of a revolutionary nature. So, for example, he characterized the French Revolution, 
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which attempted to attain equality, as full of gross ‘disappointments’.18 Maine believed that ‘human 
nature’ was stable: traits of older generations were passed to the new ones, assuring continuity.19 Stability 
rather than change was the predominant condition of human beings. Life had a good degree of repetition, 
harmony, and continuity. 
It was the general lack of variance that created the possibility for scientific inquiry into the laws of 
change. Constant change presented a great challenge to the predictability of human conduct. Conversely, 
a good degree of permanence allowed an unbiased scientific observer (this is how Maine saw himself) 
to discern, spot, and analyze social phenomena and social change. He was convinced that ‘… the stable 
part of our mental, moral and physical constitution is the largest part of it, and the resistance it opposes 
to change is such that … the variations of human society … are neither so rapid nor so extensive that 
their amount, character, and general direction cannot be ascertained.’20 
Maine’s conservatism did not translate into immobilism. To a certain extent, he was a progressive 
thinker. He valued Bentham’s principle of happiness for the greatest number of people as a guide to 
police and institutional reform.21 At the same time, he thought that the pace of conscious social change 
through legislation that Bentham recommended was too hasty. One of the main goals of Maine’s 
historical analysis was to demonstrate the steady and gradual evolution of human institutions. In this 
sense, his analysis contributed to a shift in imperial administration as it demonstrated that societies 
carried within themselves the seeds of their own change. This meant that any attempt to speed up the 
process of social transformation at a rate faster than the institutions of ancient societies could absorb it 
ran the risk of creating the contrary effect. Revolutionary change shocked the very foundations of 
primitive societies, leading straightforwardly toward disorder and anarchy.22 This was a conclusion of 
great relevance for those worried about the stability of the British Empire. It was also an assumption that 
guided imperial administration at the end of the nineteenth century.23 
 In his various works Maine provided an account of the development of laws related to their historical 
context. In doing so, he distanced himself from analytical jurists such as Bentham and Austin. He 
recognized and appreciated the scientific character of their systems of jurisprudence, but criticized the 
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abstraction of their deductive approach.24 Asserting that law was a command of the law-giver followed 
by the threat of a sanction left more questions unanswered than answered.25 The shortcoming that vitiated 
both Bentham and Austin’s speculations on law was that neither of them had taken stock of law as it 
existed in ancient periods of human history.26 They based their conclusions on an appraisal of the laws 
and institutions of their own time and older periods that they were fond of.27 But they failed to go further 
back in time and broaden their horizons. Maine was convinced that, when trying to understand the 
interrelationship of law and society, one ought to start with the ‘simplest social forms’ in as ‘rudimentary’ 
a ‘condition’ as possible.28 Instead of deductive theorizing, Maine advocated an inductive analysis of 
historic and ethnographic evidences. 
 A second group of authors with whom Maine parted ways, and one he was more critical of, comprised 
scholars from different generations who had explained the origin of civil society by reference to a 
hypothetical natural state in which humanity dwelt. This set of authors encompassed renowned thinkers 
such as Grotius, Burlamaqui, Blackstone, Locke, and—perhaps its more representative advocate—
Hobbes.29 The great mistake of this tradition had been to adopt as a point of departure for their 
speculations a ‘non-historic’ and, thus, ‘natural’ human condition.30 By imagining a conjectural vacuum 
or state of nature from which humans had moved into political communities through compact, those 
authors had managed to create a self-fulfilling prophecy.31 Due to the rationalist and deductive nature of 
their speculations, they were able to project into the original state of humanity the very circumstances 
that justified the transformation of that condition. 
 Instead of starting his analysis from his own society or from an abstract hypothetical human condition, 
Maine set upon his shoulders the intellectual task of producing a theory and explanation of social change 
based on the concrete first historical vestiges of human law and society. In his enquiry, he painted an 
image of primitive societies rather different from that of stadial theory. Without explicitly referring to 
authors that wrote within that tradition, he lamented that previous historians had often projected onto 
primitive humans the very features of their own contemporaries.32 There were fundamental differences 
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between Maine’s ideas and previous accounts of social advancement. Mill, for instance, had given an 
individualist account of savagery: for him, one of the main traits that set savages apart from civilized 
individuals was their incapacity to cooperate and come together with their fellow beings for the good of 
the whole society. Maine inverted Mill’s logic, arguing that primitive humans lived constrained in tightly 
communal patriarchal groups.  
He explained the ‘primeval condition of the human race’ by reference to what he termed the 
Patriarchal Theory.33 Accordingly, humans lived as part of family groups, in which they were under the 
absolute authority of a common father—as Maine vividly put it, ‘law is the parent’s world’.34 For Maine, 
the progressive move toward civilization did not stem from an individual’s ability to cooperate and 
integrate into wider social groups but actually from the contrary movement of individual liberation from 
the bonds of communal obligation under which humanity had spent most of its primitive history. Far 
from idealizing the original human condition, Maine believed that in remote ages humans lived most of 
their life subjected to ‘patriarchal despotism’ and, as a result, their actions were controlled by a regime 
of ‘caprice’ instead of law.35 This was a suffocating world, one that precluded individual enterprise, 
hindered creativity, and limited individual achievement. 
Ancient society was not an aggregation of individuals but a collection of families. This was the single 
most important trait, one from which ancient law derived most of its other characteristics.36 Law in 
primitive societies was minimal in quantity, ritualistic in form, and stationary.37 As the evolutionary logic 
of history engendered social progress, the individual eventually emerged as the source of rights and 
obligations. Modern society was characterized by the dissolution of the reciprocal rights and duties of 
families and their substitution with legal relations that stemmed from ‘the free agreement of 
individuals’.38 Maine used the term ‘status’ to refer to these ancient customs based on personal ties. In a 
legal sense, he described the progressive move from traditional to modern society through his famous 
maxim ‘from Status to Contract’.39 
Maine considered codification as a central process for understanding the relationship between legal 
evolution and social progress. The opening sentence of Ancient Law is revealing. Referring to Roman 
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law as ‘the most celebrated system of jurisprudence known to the world’, Maine contended that it ‘begins, 
as it ends, with a Code’.40 Civilized nations had similar codes.41 For Maine, codes were of utmost 
importance. They were the type of law that created the possibility of social progress. But before 
codification was even possible in a given society, that society had to undertake a series of prior steps in 
its legal evolution, steps that were tied to political change. 
Maine affirmed that in the ‘infancy of mankind’ law was first mere habit; then supernatural judgments 
or ‘Themistes’ (the Greek expression for what Maine considered as awards divinely dictated to the 
judge), which were closer to commands than to law; and finally custom.42 Habits and ‘Themistes’ issued 
by a powerful King constituted the beginning of the history of jurisprudence. A second phase started with 
the weakening of the connection between the monarch and the divinity.43 The decay of monarchical 
power left the door open for the emergence of powerful aristocracies.44 Aristocracies took power in both 
the West and the East at different historical times but at the same stage of civilization.45 But despite this 
similarity, events unfolded differently in those regions. Whereas in the East a religious aristocracy 
directly placed under the King managed to displace political and military aristocracies, in the West it was 
the latter that prevailed.46 
 The epoch of aristocracies was also the time of customs. Aristocracies were the ‘depositaries and 
administrators of law’.47 Even though the divine origin of rules persisted, concrete disputes between 
members of the community were not resolved by reference to a sacred command. Instead, the juridical 
aristocracy started to claim authority as interpreters of the laws.48 In time, this knowledge became custom. 
As a result, before the invention of writing the aristocratic judicial class was the guardian and living 
repository of the customs of the tribe or race.49 This was the era of customary law, and from it the history 
of jurisprudence moved to the next stage: the ‘era of Codes’.50 
 The discovery of writing allowed the inscription of usages in codes. The abuse of power by 
aristocracies may have played a role in bolstering popular demands for codes, but the invention of writing 
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was the definite springboard for reform.51 In general, codes were of great value for ancient societies. But 
the fundamental question—one that was crucial for social advance—was the stage of social progress at 
which the laws of a particular society were registered.52 In the case of Rome, laws were codified at the 
right moment.53 By contrast, in India, they were written too late, after irrational superstition had already 
found a way into the legal system.54 
In the early times of human societies, legal evolution was the result of archaic feelings and backward 
intellectual ideas rather than explicit will.55 However, in the era of codes legal change was guided by a 
conscious effort to attain social improvement.56 For Maine, there were two types of codification that 
corresponded to two different kinds of societies: ‘stationary’ and ‘progressive’.57 Whereas in the East 
once social usages had been recorded in codes societies became stagnant, in the West there was a 
continuous improvement of the legal system in order to bring it into conformity with advances in the 
social sphere.58 
This was the crux of the relationship between social evolution and legal change. The improvement of 
material civilization everywhere in the world demanded new rules that, in turn, created the conditions 
for further improvement. Codification was not only vital for legal progress, but also for material and 
social amelioration. The incapacity to bring about a complementary positive interconnection between 
improving social activities and suitable laws was the cause of all the evils that afflicted primitive 
societies. India was again the perfect example of a stagnant society in which instead of material 
civilization ‘expanding the law, the law’ had limited ‘civilization’.59 The main problem in India was the 
fusion between law and religious ideas. Here Maine came close to James Mill, who had previously 
identified and denounced India’s main social drawback. Religious superstition and the power of priests 
were stumbling blocks toward civilization and the main reasons for the enslavement of Hindu society.60 
Maine explained the stagnation of the greater part of humanity in a similar vein. Even though he did not 
mention India explicitly, it was clear that it was included in that part of humanity:  
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The rigidity of primitive law, arising chiefly from its early association and identification with religion, has chained 
down the mass of the human race to those views of life and conduct which they entertained at the time when their 
usages were first consolidated into a systematic form.61 
 
Maine conferred an important role in the social evolution of what he called ‘progressive societies’62 to 
the material aspect of those societies. He affirmed without hesitation that in an advanced stage of progress 
social wants as well as social sentiments preceded rather than followed the law.63 Law, he stated, was 
‘stable’, but the societies he was referring to were ‘progressive’.64 In those types of societies, new social 
needs created a tension with old legal codes. As they progressed, a gap between the two was created. 
And, he continued, in an illuminating passage in which he identified the basic law of social progress: 
‘The greater or less happiness of a people depends on the degree of promptitude with which the gulf is 
narrowed.’65 The correlation between material improvement and legal change as the underlying logic of 
human progress applied to primitive communities as well. The customs of primitive communities were 
normally in tune with their social needs. Therefore, they tended to procure the welfare of the whole 
society.66 Those rules, Maine contended, ought to be preserved until new ‘social wants’ created new 
material conditions.67 
It is in light of this conclusion that the history of Roman law was of particular relevance for the 
explanatory character of Maine’s theory. Rome was the best historical example of a society in which 
social development and legal change had proceeded hand in hand, producing as a result a civilization 
that had, ever since its fall, received nothing but the highest admiration from European intellectuals. The 
progressive modification of Roman law enabled a virtuous cycle of improvement at a historical time in 
which the rest of humanity had stagnated.68 
 But the simple scheme in which legislation was a mere positive ally of social improvement was 
complicated by the fact that it could also be the worst instrument in the destabilization and disintegration 
of the social order. How was that possible? Maine believed that there was a contrary problem of 
legislation coming too late to help effect social change: it coming too soon.69 When law developed more 
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rapidly than the pace at which the social institutions of a particular society evolved and when the rule of 
law was relaxed for the sake of justice, as was the case with ‘the more progressive Greek communities’, 
the authority of the rule of law was undermined, as was the institutional stability that steady and continued 
progress required.70 Here again Maine trod the delicate line between the necessity of legal change as an 
instrument of progress and the dangers of its prematurity. All in all, the contribution of legal change to 
social progress both highlighted and testified to the evolutionary logic of history.  
Another major piece in the historical puzzle that Maine attempted to elucidate in Ancient Law was the 
emergence of private property. As in other areas of analysis, Maine started his exposition on the subject 
by exposing the pitfalls of a conjectural theory of the origin of property based on occupation as a natural 
mode of acquisition. According to the Roman law ferae bestiae, things that were vacant or ‘res nullius’71 
became the property of the first who took possession of them with the intention of making them her or 
his own.72 The merit of this institution was beyond question. It was adopted, for instance, as part of the 
law of nations, becoming the source of regulation for the original acquisition of territory in the continents 
colonized by Europeans.73 
 In addition to its service to European world expansion, occupation had also served speculative 
jurisprudence in explaining how private property had historically originated. According to natural 
lawyers, at the dawn of humankind the Earth belonged to the whole human family. Humanity enjoyed 
nature and its fruits as a whole without individualizing any part of it. Everyone used natural products at 
their convenience, and that use created a temporary right of possession that ended as soon as utilization 
finished.74 As Blackstone had declared, when humans first trod the Earth everything was res nullius.75 
According to Blackstone, as the world population grew, the need of subsistence made it expedient to 
appropriate not only the use of things but also their very substance.76 For Maine, this hypothesis left 
unexplained the reason why the somebody’s new property automatically enjoyed the respect of all other 
members of society.77 
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As with other theories that started with a priori ideas from which they derived the emergence of 
political or legal institutions (private property in this case), the main shortcoming of the theory of 
occupation was its lack of historical context. By presupposing a primitive state of humanity where 
everything was unappropriated, authors like Blackstone had painted a picture of the past that was in stark 
contrast to what for Maine was the real scenario. Maine actually argued that the right to occupy vacant 
things characterized advanced societies rather than traditional ones.78 Only in those states of society in 
which everything was supposed to have an owner did mere possession of unoccupied things create a 
legal entitlement to ownership.79 It was logical that only a good deal of familiarity with the institution of 
private property together with the belief that everything was someone’s property could account for the 
fact that occupation automatically created individual property rights. 
Maine mobilized his ethnographic knowledge of ancient societies to buttress his critique of the way 
in which intellectuals had traditionally understood the operation of occupation in primitive societies. As 
he had previously stated in his book, ancient society was composed of families rather than individuals. 
Therefore, the law of persons and the law of things were intertwined in early times.80 In other words, the 
family held everything in common. The first human societies were not familiar with the institution of 
private property. The best way to demonstrate this hypothesis was to look at the foremost living example 
of an archaic society: India. In India, the Village Community was a patriarchal organization and, at the 
same time, an ‘assemblage of co-proprietors’.81 This model was so important because of its endurance 
despite the revolutions and upheavals experienced by the whole society.82 Finally, it was also a society 
in miniature, with its own system of government, justice, and police.83 
Maine believed that finding the detailed reasons for the evolution from common to private ownership 
was a hard task because the conditions in which that capital transformation had occurred remained utterly 
obscure.84 He was sure, nonetheless, that the process of alteration of the nature of ownership was linked 
to the process of the family expanding into tribes, then the dissolution of the tribe or group of kinsmen 
into separate households, and finally those households being replaced by the individual.85 In ancient 
times in the Aryan and Semitic groups the family, the house, the tribe, and the state were linked by a 
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relationship of consanguinity.86 This relationship was often a fiction as people outside the blood-group 
were admitted as insiders.87 Still, the presumption was that these outsiders eventually became assimilated 
and hence were part of the common lineage.88 Landed property, situated at the top of the pyramid of 
privatization, appeared when this system of consanguinity crumbled and was substituted by a direct 
attachment to the land.  
When tribal communities settled down in particular territories, sovereignty started to shift slowly from 
an ancient personal character to a modern territorial one.89 Only a few societies had completed that vital 
transfiguration, namely those ‘portions of mankind destined to civilization’.90 This process took a long 
time, but soon land rather than kingship consolidated as the center of social and political organization. 
Even ancient great empires had consisted of an aggregation of smaller units glued together by relations 
of consanguinity.91 
Significantly, this political process affected not only commonwealths but also the smaller social units 
of the Aryan group: village-communities.92 Whereas commonwealths previously united by 
consanguinity evolved into countries with territorial sovereignty, village-communities gave rise to 
modern notions of landed-property.93 Village communities in India were first united by blood relations. 
Land, being a mere source of provision, was accessory to political power. But two important changes 
altered this state of affairs. There was, first, an endogenous progressive movement of dissolution of 
family ties whereby the village-community was assembled solely by its members’ relationship to the 
land.94 At this stage, there was still a perfect regime of communal ownership, but this regime did not 
foreclose the enjoyment of private property over movable goods and cattle.95 Later on, there was a slow 
dissolution of the Village-Community from a common stock to an aggregation of separate families living 
in separate dwellings. The land was no longer hold in common by the whole village. While arable lands 
were divided between the various households, wasteland remained common.96 From that stage there were 
only a few steps to the ‘disentanglement of the separate rights of individuals from the blended rights of 
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a community’ and the apparition of private property over land.97 Maine left the reasons for this last 
change unexplained, conceding that they were unclear.98 
The emergence of landed property in Indian village-communities and European societies did not 
follow the same path. After the dissolution of the Roman Empire, barbarian invasions brought with them 
many of the features of organization that were typical of ancient communities. But once settled in 
Western Europe, the tribe’s ties started to disintegrate in a process later called feudalization. This process 
was bolstered by the extension and concentration of power and authority in the figure of the chief.99 From 
the study of India and Ireland, Maine theorized an autochthonous—albeit different—process of 
decomposition of the village-community in the East and the West.100 The reasons for the dissolution of 
tribe’s ties in Ireland were, in general, applicable to the whole Europe.101 What were those reasons? 
It is surprising to say the least that it was an animal, the ox, that was the central figure in the narrative 
of change. In ancient societies oxen were highly valuable as objects of exchange102 but, more importantly 
in an agricultural era, as instruments of tillage.103 Chiefs were the biggest owners of cattle, probably due 
to their superior military status.104 Whereas the chiefs needed lands in which their cattle could feed, the 
tribesmen needed oxen to till their lands.105 The need of the tribesmen gave the chief an advantage that 
eventually allowed him to amass a kind of feudalistic power over his subjects, but also over free 
tribesmen to whom he formerly was a mere ‘primus inter pares’ (first among equals).106 It was through 
this practice of receiving stock from the chief and performing in exchange a service in the form of manual 
labor that tribesmen became vassals of the chief.107 Importantly, this feudal system contributed to the 
dismantling of the ancient tribal and family group.108 This was so because the persons from whom 
tribesmen took stock were often not the chiefs of their own tribe.109 Due to this novel association the 
groups formed by lords and vassals superseded the old unit of chief and tribesmen.  
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When blood ties were completely severed, the conditions were ripe for further changes toward a 
society of individuals linked by territorial sovereignty. The dissolution of the feudal group was the final 
step leading to the advanced European societies that were contemporary for Maine.110 Maine refrained 
from trying to explain this final change, arguing—not without reason—that this task amounted to re-
writing the modern political, economic, and social history of Europe.111 This notwithstanding, Maine 
enumerated the greatest achievements engendered by the transition from feudal to modern society: 
modern state sovereignty over the population of a particular territory, an understanding of land as an 
exchangeable commodity, and the growth of legislation oriented toward human happiness.112 
This political process of the individualization of property was concomitant to a legal process of 
alienability whereby social goods were transformed into merchantable commodities. In ancient societies 
it was not rare for the group to exchange certain things with one another. In consequence, they separated 
a part of the common patrimony and gave it away in return for a useful item.113 Importantly, Maine noted 
that this phenomenon was not universal. Among Sclavonians, for instance, it was forbidden to alienate 
the belongings of the family.114 But as soon as the material conditions of life started to improve and there 
was an increase in ‘activity’, the need to exchange items became pressing.115 The satisfaction of this need 
found the obstacle that in ancient societies the transmission of goods was riddled with innumerable 
formalities and burdensome solemnity.116 
The universal idea of distinguishing between different types of goods emerged as a solution to this 
conundrum.117 Early societies differentiated lower things that could be objects of transaction without the 
intricateness required for things imbued with special dignity and importance.118 Here again Maine used 
Roman law as an example, invoking the Roman division between res mancipi (things that needed a 
formal act of mancipatio to be exchanged) and res nec mancipi (things the transmission of which did not 
require the full ceremony of mancipatio) to substantiate his point. This way of dividing goods sometimes 
coincided—but often did not—with the division between movables and immovables. The differentiation 
between movable and immovable goods did not necessarily correspond to one between inferior and 
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superior things. However, the latter distinction applied respectively to res nec mancipi and res nec 
mancipi.119 The Romans categorized as res mancipi items that had a great value for the community, 
mixing together movables and immovables such as land, slaves, horses, and oxen.120 
As economic life became more complex, or, as Maine put it, when ‘the wheels of society had begun 
to move quickly’, societies felt the convenience of simplifying the requirements to sell and buy 
property.121 In progressive societies, new material goods constantly appeared thanks to the development 
of the arts and science. Everything that was newly produced was then classified as res nec mancipi.122 
These new articles of trade were valuable things, so in time the old difference between superior and 
inferior items and their way of transfer became diluted. Eventually land was also commercialized, 
integrating the ranks of commodities whose value was derived from the market.  
Maine’s theory of property provided an explanation of the origin of private property. Unlike previous 
doctrines, Maine’s findings were based on a scientific reconstruction of ethnographic data. One of the 
main conclusions of this investigation was that in traditional societies property was common. From a 
methodological stand point, the historicist explanation of the transition from common to private property 
provided a well-grounded and scientifically authoritative narrative. The supposed objectivity of his 
research also had a political effect. His theory of private property resonated with debates that were 
contemporary to Maine’s society. There were rival interpretations of the origins and nature of property, 
as well as of its social and political ramifications. The opening lines of the Communist Manifesto made 
clear that the specter of communism was a force to be reckoned with.123 In addition, the function of 
communal property in traditional cultivating communities was also associated with popular democratic 
theories.124 
Maine’s conclusions about the origin and development of private property scientifically shielded it 
from ideological attack. He linked private property with progressive societies on the one hand and 
communal property with non-progressive ones on the other.125 By doing so, he managed to move the 
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debate away from the ideological battleground to a scientific terrain in which his authoritative use of the 
past strengthened his position and political agenda. What is more, Maine’s scientific scrutiny of history 
proved that private property and social progress were interwoven, and hence the substitution of private 
by communal property could inhibit social improvement in Great Britain and other advanced European 
societies. As a result, his theories cemented the high reputation of private property as a vehicle for 
progress. 
 
The new face of civilization: A shifting progressive narrative?  
Maine’s theory of legal evolution was a watershed in attempts to provide a historical explanation of 
progress. The attention to detail with which Maine reconstructed ancient society and his innovative 
theories made him a pioneer of and an inspiration for the new sciences of sociology and anthropology. 
Many of his postulations were attacked and discredited by later anthropologists.126 Still, part of Maine’s 
impact stemmed from the fact that he created an original account of progress that broke with standard 
explanations of this phenomenon based on material forces, which were characteristic of the progressive 
philosophy of history cultivated by the Scottish Enlightenment.127 Conjectural historians postulated that 
the engine of social advancement was the improvement of the mode of production that a society used to 
procure its subsistence. The intensification of the productive forces whereby societies used their natural 
resources and transformed their surroundings was also factored as an explanation for political and legal 
changes within those societies. Accordingly, for instance, the origin of the institution of private property 
was deemed to have sprung from the change from pastoralism to agriculture.  
For Maine, legal change was not epiphenomenal to economic or social transformations. Likewise, 
legal institutions were neither the mere façade of particular economic arrangements nor, as Marx 
famously put it, part of the superstructure of society. In moving away from a material explanation of 
history, Maine conceived the development of jurisprudence as governed by its own laws of change. But 
those laws could not be grasped in the abstract. In order to flesh out their implications, one ought to look 
at the regularities of the past registered in ethnographic data, or to contemporary primitive societies that 
reproduced the features of ancient ones. 
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 Another crucial point that demarcated Maine’s theories from those of conjectural scholars was that 
Maine reduced the four states of society advocated by stadialism to a binary opposition between modern 
and traditional societies.128 Moreover, even if he used terms such as ‘savage’ and ‘barbarian’ that were 
commonly associated with stadial theory, they were often devoid of the ‘historical and sociological 
specificity’ that those terms had in the former model.129 However, in spite of the obvious divergences 
that existed between the philosophy of history characteristic of the Scottish Enlightenment and that of 
Henry Maine, I believed that Maine’s ideas were closer to authors such as James and John Stuart Mill, 
who adopted and reworked many of the theoretical underpinnings of conjectural theory.  
On the surface, it seems that in their speculations about social progress James and John Stuart Mill 
had postulated a stark binary contrast between civilized and uncivilized communities. Maine’s opposition 
between primitive/traditional and modern provided a new vocabulary to articulate this deep-rooted social 
division. But, this being true, I believed that the Mills retained many elements of stadial theory and 
deployed them in their argumentations about empire, albeit in a modified way. It is possible to find a 
similar undercurrent in the way that Maine conceived social progress and imperial rule. 
 Maine used many of the terms typical of stadial theory, such as savage or barbarian. Mostly, he did so 
without linking the terms explicitly with any vision of social progress. This was the case with the way in 
which he used the term savages in Ancient Law. The ‘customs of savages’ were here synonymous to 
those of backward peoples in general.130 In the same book it is possible to find the term barbarian more 
often, but when he used it, it was mostly applied to refer to Germanic peoples that migrated and settled 
in the Roman Empire.131 In Village-Communities there is a further reference to savages. Lubbok and 
McLennan, two of Maine’s contemporaries and reputed precursors of anthropology, contended that there 
were two stages of social advancement in which humans lived before grouping in families.132 Maine 
denied their claims by pointing out that ‘wild tribes’ in India had adopted usages from outsiders that 
scientists had later recorded as their own.133 In his lectures on the Early History of Institutions Maine 
talked about ‘our savage forefathers’, again as a general reference to ancient peoples.134 In a more 
revealing fragment of the same book, he referred to ‘societies, just emerging from the savage state’.135 
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Here Maine acknowledged the existence of a stage of social development distinctly characterized by 
savagery.  
 Notwithstanding the hints that these references offer, they are too scant and unsystematic to draw solid 
conclusions. The general lack of treatment of savages and barbarians in most of Maine’s books is 
understandable considering that Maine’s main and almost exclusive focus of Ancient Law, Village 
Communities, and Lectures on the History of Institutions was the Aryan family, comprised of settled 
societies that already practiced agriculture.136 The village-community, his main unit of analysis, was an 
agricultural society in miniature. For that reason, the lack of treatment of savagery and barbarism cannot 
be automatically read as evidence that Maine completely disregarded those social categories. In fact, he 
implicitly acknowledged the possibility of earlier states of society than that in which Aryan communities 
lived when he noted in the History of Institutions that the Roman and Hindoo systems (part of the Aryan 
race) covered a vast part of antiquity (but not all).137 Significantly, he added that the institution that was 
at the base of the social organization of those agrarian communities, the family, was not universal among 
savages.138 
The questions to which Maine turned his attention in his lectures on international law were somewhat 
different from those contained in his earlier works. The very nature of international law demanded a 
widened range of societies under consideration. In a passage discussing the warlike original condition of 
mankind and the cruelty associated with it, Maine mentioned the North American Indians and the 
Australian aboriginals as examples of savage races that exemplified humanity’s original practices and 
conditions.139 It is not a coincidence that he exactly referred to the two communities that from the 
seventeenth to the nineteenth century had been most often associated by Western thinkers with the stadial 
hunter-gather stage. He even added that Australians exhibited the animal instinct of torturing prey.140 
This identification of savages with wild nature and wild animals was a classical way of underscoring 
their low social state. 
Soon after this reference, Maine mentioned the Mexicans as a branch of the Indian ‘race’, remarking 
that they had attained ‘a certain degree of civilization’.141 This observation was in line with a vision of 
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historical evolution and social improvement based on the material condition of non-European societies 
that had historically informed European intellectual imagination. The urban, agriculturalist Mexica were 
separated by most commentators from almost all other Latin American and North American peoples that 
did not cultivate the land.  
Finally, Maine discussed the appropriation of unoccupied territory in the context of colonial 
expansion. He referred to the doubts of the American Secretary of State about ‘how far the discovery of 
a territory which is either unsettled or settled only by savages’ gave a right to the discovering power.142 
Without mentioning it explicitly, the doubts about whether savages were true owners of their territories 
seemed to be linked to the common assumption that savages were hunter-gatherers who lacked 
government and the notion of private property.  
 Maine accepted the existence of a savage state. Moreover, he used it as an analytical category, at least 
with regard to norms of international law. In the History of Institutions, while discussing the importance 
of horned cattle, Maine also mentioned the ‘pastoral stage of society’.143 He noted that there had been a 
lot of fruitless debates around the issue of whether cattle had only been of ultimate importance in that 
stage of society.144 He contended that evidence proved that the biggest service of cattle came at a later 
stage, when human populations settled over expanses of land and started to cultivate the land.145 
These series of passages suggest that Maine did not reject an explanation of history based on stadial 
theory. Still, it would be far-fetched to claim that recognizing the existence of different stages of social 
advancement amounted to placing them squarely at the center of the theory of social evolution. Maine 
never conceived of societies as holistic blocks on account of their forms of production. Nor did he explain 
the origin of political and legal institutions by reference to them. Still, for him material forces played a 
role in social change and the legal developments associated with it. When he discussed codification, 
Maine assumed that social and legal progress went hand in hand. The fulfillment of social wants was the 
engine that propelled the march of societies.146 Material civilization was the animating stimulus of legal 
change. Therefore, in those cases in which the rigidity of law limited material civilization, stagnation 
followed.147 Social necessities were always in advance of the law, and even though it was the function 
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of the law to close that gap between social needs and the institutional capacity of a society to respond to 
them, because of the continuous nature of progress the gap tended to reopen again and again.148 
It was clear from these statements that material change preceded legal evolution. But the latter enabled 
and further stimulated the former. Both created a dialectical move and a virtuous circle of social 
improvement that lay behind the logic of progress. The formula for success in generating further progress 
thus resided in the capacity of the law to accommodate the progressive and productive forces of social 
evolution, and the difficulty in recreating those conditions accounted for the extremely limited number 
of societies that had become progressive throughout history.149 
Importantly, material amelioration was also related to the human/nature relationship, to the capacity 
of humans to control and dominate nature and natural processes. In a section of Ancient Law dedicated 
to the discussion of the progressive commodification of goods that corresponded with their transfer from 
the category of res mancipi to that of res nec mancipi, Maine affirmed that the transfer started when ‘a 
society had reached a certain degree of activity’.150 Put differently, when the economic life that accounted 
for the material conditions of a particular society had expanded, ‘every fresh conquest of man over 
material nature’ was integrated into the category of res nec mancipi.151 
Without a doubt modern society was a society in which material conditions were steadily and swiftly 
improving. Actually, the problem of legislation in progressive societies was that, more often than not, it 
could not keep up with the pace of discoveries, inventions, and the ‘manipulation of accumulated 
wealth’.152 This wealth was largely derived from the discovery of new laws and ‘facts of nature’ and the 
application of technology to the transformation of the environment that resulted in the improvement of 
humanity’s well-being.153 Maine conceived the human relationship with nature as a continuous battle. 
He believed that:  
 
It is the urgency of the struggle for existence—a struggle in the West both with man and with nature—in the East 
a struggle less with savage enemies than with nature, not indeed unkindly, but extraordinarily capricious, and 
difficult to subdue for her very exuberance. The utmost available supply of human labor at first merely extracts 
from the soil what is sufficient for the subsistence…154 
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There is a clear influence of natural evolution and social Darwinism in Maine’s conception of life as an 
urgent struggle.155 This struggle had a social dimension that drew humans against their kind, but also a 
biological one in which humans constantly fought to dominate nature and elevate themselves above it. 
The feminine personification which Maine conceived of Indian nature is also interesting. India was like 
an exuberant woman that precisely because of her plenteousness could not be easily tamed.  
 The East and the West, primitive and modern societies, struggled to gain control over nature. However, 
whereas the latter had succeeded, the former were not able to do the same, stagnating at some point in 
their historical social evolution. One of the reasons that best explained this fact was the general belief in 
natural deities characteristic of traditional societies. In ‘the infancy of the race’ humans personified and 
deified natural phenomena.156 How could humans elevate themselves over nature when the latter had a 
sacred status? Like Acosta and other European intellectuals, Maine considered superstitious beliefs one 
of the reasons why ancient societies were non-progressive.  
 In a way characteristic of James and John Stuart Mill, Maine complemented the social gap that 
separated progressive and non-progressive societies with reference to differences in mental evolution. 
Maine gave a very important role to ideas in the history of progress. As he put it: ‘progress is, in fact, the 
same thing as the continued production of new ideas.’157 He further believed that the condition of thought 
of primitive societies such as India resembled the human mind in its infancy.158 It is interesting that he 
used a natural metaphor to describe primitive opinion, comparing it with ‘dense and dark vegetation.159 
Still, Maine, as had John Stuart Mill, conceded that the superiority of European intellect vis-à-vis the 
Indian mind was a question of degree rather than kind.160 The primitive mind was wild and uneducated, 
but amenable to improvement.161 Humans were comparatively intelligent in all states of society.162 
 Notwithstanding various parallels in the progressive histories produced by James and John Stuart Mill 
and Henry Maine, the most remarkable similarity was that they all placed European economic life and 
the institutions that facilitated it at the apex of their scales of social progress. James and John Stuart Mill 
as well as Maine recognized various stages of social advancement. In numerous passages of his works 
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Maine talked about ‘early stages of society’, ‘first ages of the world’, ‘stage of development’, ‘early 
societies’, ‘relatively different stages of society’, ‘sates of society’, ‘stage of society’, etc.163 Still, they 
all identified a stark contrast between the level of economic advancement characteristic of British 
industrial society and a few other European nations and that of the rest of the world. Their theories of 
social advancement rested on a binary opposition that opened up various different degrees of progress at 
its lower end, but always placed the European industrial economy at its apex.  
 
The idea of evolution in international law and the evolution of international law  
As the nineteenth century progressed in Europe, it was evident that the ideological space for religious 
interpretation of social, political, and economic phenomena was reducing rapidly. Evolutionary theories 
challenged some of the main dogmas of the Christian creed, particularly those related to the time of the 
Earth and humanity, the origin of humans, and the human relationship with nature. The scientific 
challenge of religious doctrines meant neither that the Christian church lost its prominence and social 
influence nor that, from one day to the other, European society became secularized. Actually, the contrary 
seemed to be the case outside Europe: while the influence of Christianity certainly diminished in Europe 
by the end of the century, missionary work, especially in Africa, disseminated the Christian faith among 
an unprecedented number of people.164 By the end of the nineteenth century, Christianity was spread 
farther over the world than ever before. 
 While evolutionary thinking in Europe created further doubts about the veracity of religious beliefs, it 
also made many people cling even more fervently to their spiritual convictions. And even if Darwin’s 
theories posed a fundamental challenge to the assumed tenets of the Christian faith, theologians and 
scientists alike tried to reconcile scientific truth with God’s design.165 The Christian doctrine was flexible 
enough to accommodate or co-opt (according to one’s interpretation) new scientific discoveries. 
Evolution, for example, could be conceived as God’s design all along. 
 Despite efforts to reconcile the new scientific findings about the age of the Earth, humanity’s presence 
on it, and the evolutionary nature of life with old religious dogma, it was increasingly difficult to base 
scientific knowledge on religious principles. Academic and intellectual respectability was increasingly 
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at odds with theories informed by particular religious creeds. One of the new nineteenth-century social 
sciences that most strongly felt the divorce between objective knowledge and belief was international 
law. A newly born discipline, international law had claimed for most of the nineteenth century a specific 
European pedigree, one closely linked to the Christianity of European nations and the Christian origin of 
the law of nations.  
In the first history of the discipline, written in 1795, Robert Ward traced back the history of the law of 
nations to its Christian European roots. He had claimed that, in Europe, morality was comprehended 
within Christianity.166 A common spiritual and moral heritage had provided European nations with a 
solid foundation and a good degree of affinity which in turn created the possibility of sharing the same 
stock of laws.167 Christian religion was the cornerstone of the law of nations, a body of laws exclusively 
European.168 
Most commentators after Ward opened their treatises on the law of nations and international law 
referring to the same European history and the same religious origin.169 William Oke Manning is a good 
example. From the Greeks and Romans to Klüber and Martens the law of nations was squarely situated 
within Europe. It had historically evolved through the writing of a series of canon of lawyers (names like 
Suarez, Grotius, Pufendorf, Leibnitz, Selden, Zouch, Wolf, Bynkershoek, and Vattel, among others, were 
thrown into the mix) that for most of international law’s history (until U.S. lawyers acceded to the 
selected club) were exclusively European.170 Almost fifty years after Manning published his 
Commentaries, Henry Sumner Maine made a brief reference to the writers that had contributed to the 
development of international law. Remarkably, all the names he mentioned—Grotius, Pufendorf, 
Leibnitz, Zouch, Selden, Wolff, Bynkershoek, and Vattel—were included on Manning’s list.171 These 
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authors were not only important for historical reasons: in the absence of a general code containing the 
rules applicable between states, their writings were one of the main sources of international law.172 
Christianity was part of international law in two other senses. Many nineteenth-century authors, 
especially those at the beginning and middle of the century, defined international law as the body of 
norms that existed among Christian nations, or what German jurists called Droit des Gens Moderne de 
l’Europe.173 In one of the most influential books on international law of the period, Wheaton defined 
international law as the group of norms shared and followed by civilized Christian nations.174 At the same 
time, the Christian faith was part of international law indirectly. During most of the nineteenth century 
several jurists had identified natural law as the spiritual underpinning or at least one of the founding 
blocks of international law. For many commentators, such as Manning, Phillimore, Levi, Bello, and 
Woolsey, natural law was totally based on or at least partly inspired by the will and dictates of God.175 
 Not all authors shared the conviction that Christianity was a constitutive element of the selective club 
that composed the international society—some of them were ready to widen the application of 
international law to non-Christian nations. Phillimore, for example, was sure that international law was 
applicable between Christian and heathen nations and also among heathen nations.176 Creasy was of the 
same opinion, justifying his ideas on the basis of expediency.177 The British Empire was formed of 
countless territories that encompassed multiple political communities, religiously heterogeneous, with 
which the empire needed to establish some sort of international legal relations.178 But even these more 
plural interpretations of the scope of international legality acknowledged that Christianity was the 
lighthouse of international law, or, as Creasy put it, ‘the surest and holiest of all guides’.179 Christianity 
assured a more precise, distinct, and accurate application of international law among the states that 
professed that religion.180 The Christian faith was also praised for its service as a cosmopolitan instrument 
for peace. Several international lawyers underscored its contribution to the humanization of the practices 
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of war.181 And some like Leone Levi were convinced that Christianity, if genuinely followed, was the 
best tool to prevent war, due to its unparalleled ‘power to check passions’.182 
 By the end of the nineteenth century, the influence of Christianity on international law weakened, but 
it did not completely subside. The first step toward its decline was the dissolution of the association of 
Christianity with Europe. With the entry of American states into the family of nations the ambit of the 
Christian faith expanded to encompass non-European Western and even non-Western nations.183 In 
addition, the admission of Turkey and Japan into the family of nations made it impossible to characterize 
the international community as exclusively Christian.184 At the turn of the twentieth century the definition 
of international law by reference to a Christian family had become obsolete.  
 In addition to these factors, the demise of natural law at the end of the century further contributed to 
lessening the influence of Christianity on international law. Divine will was no longer a valid source of 
international law. Secularism was gaining ascendancy in Western society, and the use of old religious 
categories as the foundation of international law during the last decades of the century was increasingly 
at odds with the new scientific spirit of the period and the impartial outlook of the discipline.185 But again 
this did not mean that the historical Christian roots of international law or the positive influence of 
Christianity on the family of states were ignored. In fact, similar to Creasy and Phillimore, it was 
precisely the British international lawyers at the turn of the century—Westlake, Lawrence, and 
Oppenheim—who emphasized that influence. They argued that the existence of a common faith, namely 
Christianity, was one of the factors that had most contributed to the development of a social bond between 
the states of the international community.186 
The steady demise of Christianity as an interpretative tool of social reality coincided with a great 
upgrading of living conditions in Western nations, at least among the most privileged social strata of the 
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population. Standards of life raised in a large extent thanks to material improvements engendered by the 
fusion of scientific inquiry and technological innovation. These improvements provoked a quasi-religious 
scientific fervor.187 A confident scientific approach was applied to various spheres of human knowledge, 
converting those areas into scientific disciplines.  
International law was one of the novel disciplines labeled scientific that soon acquired academic status 
and respectability. Jurists were part of the legion of engineers, inventors, investors, and social planners 
that were sketching the contours of a new society allegedly oriented toward the improvement of the 
human lot.188 As Pasquale Fiore affirmed, international lawyers formed part of the larger ‘intellectual and 
political movement of our time aiming at the organization of international society’.189 Once international 
law was defined in this fashion it became rather difficult to accommodate natural law as part of the new 
discipline. But, as in the case of Christianity, the move away from natural law was a long process, and 
was far from completed until the turn of the twentieth century. 
 Natural law was at the core of international law for most of the nineteenth century. This does not mean 
that there was either uniformity in the treatment of the subject, nor that natural law was the exclusive 
source to which authors looked in their attempts to establish a solid foundation for international law. 
Already mid-century authors such as Polson and Wildman put forward a positivist conceptions of 
international law, albeit far from identical. Whereas Wildman assertively stated that natural law had no 
part in international law, Polson still maintained that the law of nations was chiefly founded upon natural 
law.190 But, for Polson, that influence was only indirect. The direct basis of the law of nations was the 
will of states.191 So, natural law became part of the law of nations only when it was transformed into a 
positive rule through usage and convention.192 Moreover, positive law was not a mere reflection of the 
law of nature; it actually modified it.193 
Throughout the nineteenth century, the meaning of natural law and its influence on international law 
was delineated differently by commentators. This was a consequence of the fact that, as Lawrence noted, 
‘each writer’s definition’ of international law was ‘coloured, to a certain extent, by his own views’.194 
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During the last years of the eighteenth century Robert Ward had already endeavored to disentangle the 
law of nations from the law of nature.195 This differentiation was helped by the fact that, from the 
beginning of the nineteenth century, almost every commentator on international law made a two-part 
division of the science. Already, in 1832 and 1836 respectively, authors such as Bello and Wheaton 
distinguished between a natural and a positive law of nations.196 This binary division was later adopted 
by Manning, Reddie, Phillimore, Woolsey, and Creasy, among others.197 
Despite the unanimity in identifying two sources (natural and positive) of international law, there was 
still a plural understanding of what the law of nature was and its role in international law. Fervent 
Christian authors such as Phillimore and Manning related divine law with natural law. For Phillimore, 
natural law was just one of the branches of divine law.198 It amounted to the laws ‘written by the finger 
of God on the heart of man’.199 So the natural law of nations meant nothing else than Divine law. 
Similarly, Manning fused natural law with the will of God.200 Leone Levi shared this religious approach 
to international law but, in contrast with the predominant view that divided international in two branches 
according to its sources, he mentioned three such sources: natural law, divine or revealed law, and positive 
law.201 
A second group of authors distanced themselves from religious categories when trying to identify solid 
underpinnings for the discipline other than positive law. Some of these authors derived natural law from 
concrete and tangible—albeit general—elements. This was the case of James Reddie, for whom natural 
law stemmed from factors as diverse as the modes of production of nations, their mutual intercourse, and 
the ‘corporeal and mental constitution of mankind’.202 Wheaton defined natural law as the rules of justice 
observable among nations.203 Creasy and Woolsey founded the justice of international law and its natural 
character on moral and ethical principles.204 Humans were rational creatures that could understand 
abstract and ethical principles of conduct. In a similar fashion, states were defined as moral persons who 
had natural rights and obligations.205 
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The presence of natural law in international law began to fade in the last two decades of the century, 
but did so very gradually. Well into the 1880s there was still ample room to accommodate natural law as 
part of international law. In the Whewell lectures of 1887 Maine already noted that ‘the most useful and 
practical part’ of international law was positive law.206 Despite this promising statement, he immediately 
conceded that natural law was still the main source from which the discipline derived ‘its force and 
dignity’.207 And there were still authors like James Lorimer who upheld an extreme position concerning 
natural law, totally identifying the law of nations with the law of nature.208 
 By contrast, Hall mounted the first serious attack on natural law. He identified two general views on 
the rules of international law. On the one hand, there were authors that distinguished between international 
positive laws and international rights.209 Others like him thought that the only valid rules of international 
law were the existing ones, that is, the rules that had been transformed into positive law.210 Hall admitted 
that his position was less predominant among his fellow international legal scholars.211 One of the main 
reasons why Hall was against abstract absolute rights was that the ultimate source from where they 
emanated was impossible to identify with a good degree of scientific certainty.212 Was it the will of God, 
natural law, or some other metaphysical principle?213 
Hall was the first to hint that the scientific outlook of the academic discipline of international law could 
no longer be easily reconciled with a conception of international law based on unscientific standards, 
natural law among them. Still, he fell short of completely divorcing international law from extra-legal 
sources that conferred normative force to the discipline. Some international usages, for example, 
incarnated ‘certain moral obligations’.214 
Despite Hall’s concessions to morality, the tide of opinion regarding natural law and natural morality 
was definitely changing. This was visible in the assertiveness with which international commentators 
tried to get rid of the last vestiges of the influence of natural law on the discipline at the end of the century. 
This trend was evident in the writings of Lawrence, who judged it inappropriate to base international law 
on transcendental rules that obliged states as ‘moral beings’.215 International law was not an abstract 
                                                 
206 Ibid., 32.  
207 Ibid.  
208 Lorimer, The Institutes, Introduction Ch I 1, Book I Ch I 19.  
209 Hall, International Law, Introduction 1.  
210 Ibid.  
211 Ibid., 1-2.  
212 Ibid., 2.  
213 Ibid.  
214 Ibid., 5.  
215 Lawrence, The Principles, Part I Ch I §1 2. 
444 
 
instrument but instead a concrete science, the purpose of which was to ascertain ‘by observation the rules 
actually followed by states in their mutual intercourse, and to classify and arrange these rules by referring 
them to certain fundamental principles on which they are based’.216 For Oppenheim, the only source of 
international law was the consent of the members of the international community.217 
Lawrence and Oppenheim more than any commentator before them drew a clear-cut line between 
international law and international morality.218 The latter was still important as a mirror in which the 
former could look in order to find a contrasting reflection, once based not on legal but on ethical standards. 
Once the split between these two modes of judging international phenomena was complete, morality was 
no longer an in-built mechanism of international law. The same international action had two dimensions 
that did not necessarily match: an action could be legal but immoral, and the other way around.  
At the end of a lengthy process, international law had, to a large extent, changed its outlook. Much had 
apparently changed from previous times. The science of international law was now imbued with features 
such as objectivity, impartiality, rigor, consistency, and precision. It aspired to neutrality by distancing 
itself from the tumultuous and subjective realm of politics.219 The nation-state, sovereign over its territory, 
was the fundamental unit of analysis. The free will of those entities created law—a voluntary, discernible, 
and factual law. And still, even at the peak of affirmation of the positivist nature of international law, 
someone like Lawrence still affirmed that international law was related, if only historically, with ‘a few 
great ethical principles’.220 
The loss of religious and moral inspiration deprived international law of a notorious part of its normative 
force. These were not the only cosmopolitan vocabularies to recede. Utilitarianism had provided for most 
of the nineteenth century an intellectual stimulus for social improvement and legal change. And none 
other than Jeremy Bentham had coined the very term ‘international law’ by which the discipline was 
increasingly known as the century progressed.221 Utilitarianism also had a certain influence on 
international law. Edward Creasy, for instance, dedicated a whole chapter of his book Platform of 
International Law to demonstrate that utilitarianism was the best ‘standard of international law’.222 
Nevertheless, at the end of the nineteenth century utilitarianism had lost much of its former appeal and 
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was clearly in retreat as an ideological influence in British society.223 In Ancient Law, Henry Maine 
highlighted the predominant discontent toward Bentham’s theory of jurisprudence.224 
Despite the weakening of natural law, the receding influence of Christianity, and the demise of 
utilitarianism, international lawyers were not ready to renounce either the moral orientation that these 
universal vocabularies had provided to their discipline or the ethical force behind the transformative 
cosmopolitan project of uplifting mankind and uniting it under a common—albeit ‘Westerncentric’—
legal order. If international law was merely law as it was and not as it ought to be, how could it retain its 
transformative purpose?  
Considering all these factors, international law was in need of an extra-legal yardstick that allowed it to 
retain its scientific respectability without compromising its transformative and normative force. This was 
a pressing task, considering the liberal agenda of reforms envisaged by the international lawyers of the 
Institut de droit international and the political nature of the issues they dealt with. The cosmopolitan pull 
of empire added to this need. Remaining strictly technical would have limited the influence and power of 
a profession that considered itself ‘the conscience of the civilized world’.225 But how exactly could an 
extra-legal criterion inform international law without being open to the criticism of being subjective and 
unscientific? 
 The application of the idea of evolution to the field of international law resolved this puzzling 
question.226 At the end of the nineteenth century, evolutionary theories were in fashion. Not without 
controversy and contest, they had acquired an immense scientific reputation since the publication of 
Charles Darwin’s Origin of Species.227 But evolution was such an open-ended term that almost anything 
that was progressive could be accommodated within its conceptual umbrella. Precisely for this reason, it 
conferred the possibility of making a broad set of claims, those that reflected the particular worldviews 
of its exponents. According to Casper Sylvest, ‘the idea of evolution—despite, or perhaps because of, its 
indeterminable meaning and wide range of reference encompassing biological, social and legal forms—
took over some of the functions formerly fulfilled by the idea of a natural law.’228 Evolution was easily 
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applicable to international law because it was based on science and, hence, it fitted nicely within the new 
boundaries of a novel discipline that aspired to scientific status and was thus eager to consolidate an aura 
of truth and certitude required to regulate and guide international life.  
International lawyers used the idea of evolution for two purposes. First, evolution allowed them to 
overcome the ‘Austinian challenge’, which denied the legal character of international law, characterizing 
it as mere positive morality.229 Not all international lawyers used the idea of evolution to defend the fact 
that international law was law. One reason was that for most of the nineteenth century that idea was not 
there to start with. So, international lawyers adopted different strategies in order to confront Austin’s 
conception of law as the command of a superior sovereign whose authority derived from the threat of 
sanction. Some like Manning and Lawrence contested Austin’s conception of what law really was by 
broadening its definition.230 Lawrence charged Austin with having adopted one of the various elements 
of the notion of law as the only valid one.231 Creasy agreed with Lawrence on the existence of various 
contrasting definitions of the term law, and gave the example of the definition given by Richard 
Hooker,232 also cited by Manning and Lawrence. Hooker had several centuries before already provided 
intellectual ammunition to challenge Austin’s conception of law in his book On the Laws of Ecclesiastical 
Polity.233 Hooker had postulated that law could be used in a wider sense than the mere enactment of the 
command of a superior.234 Another possibility was to define law as ‘any kind of rule or canon, whereby 
actions are framed’.235 According to Manning that was the sense in which the law of nations had 
historically been understood.236 
It is curious that while Maine built one of the most solid arguments against analytical jurisprudence he 
did not use his own conclusions to defend the legal character of international law. The main question that 
Maine took issue with regarding Austin’s challenge to international law was the lack of sanction. For 
Maine, Austin made a mistaken assumption regarding the nature of the human being.237 Against Austin, 
Maine suggested that obedience of rules did not stem from fear of punishment, but rather from mere 
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routine, or the unconscious repetition of a habit.238 Maine conceded that international law had no 
sanctions, but there were other reasons apart from sanction that explained why norms were followed. 
Maine maintained that within international society there was an expectation of compliance that derived 
from a general ‘law-abiding sentiment’.239 International law was socially necessary and had the general 
approval of the members of that system: states.240 
 A similar line of argumentation was followed by Westlake and Oppenheim who, like most end-of-
century international lawyers, put forward a sociological explanation of international law.241 Science, 
technology, Christianity, civilization, and progress had created a bond between states. Modern life was 
in flux, following the progressive nature of the times. There was a need for a legal system that glued the 
heterogeneous elements of modern life together. International law was the necessary product of the 
growing internationalization of modern life and the creation of a community of states that needed to 
regulate their interactions.242 Precisely because of this necessity there was a compelling need to obey 
international law. International regulations, Westlake maintained, were more often than not followed.243 
This regularity and the fact that force could be used in cases of breach of the law to convince a non-
compliant state to abide by the rules was enough to assure the legal character of international law.244 
Westlake agreed with Maine that due to the social need for international law there was a general feeling 
of obedience among the international community.245 And even in cases where that feeling was not enough, 
Oppenheim argued, the international community could impose sanction to discipline law breakers.246 
Henry Maine not only defended international law against Austin’s characterization of it as international 
morality. In addition, he directly attacked the core of Austin’s assumption about what law really meant. 
The problem with Austin, and Bentham for that matter, was that they had applied to completely different 
historical scenarios the conclusions that they derived from the circumstances of their own times.247 It was 
only in Rome and the most progressive nations of Europe and America that a conscious attempt at 
legislation was made. Similarly, only in those societies was law equivalent to the command of a sovereign. 
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The more one looked back in history and immersed oneself into primitive times, the more one found a 
conception of law completely alien to Austin’s definition.248 
In primitive times most people followed the customary rules of the village communities.249 There was 
no legislation in those communities, but instead the constant repetition of ancient practices whereby life 
was regulated.250 Maine claimed that throughout the history of the Aryan communities there had been 
two different kinds of political organization that in turn had given rise to two different kinds of law. On 
the one hand, there were primitive communities in which life was regulated through custom and only 
sporadically by the commands of a superior ruler;251 on the other, there were the progressive nations. In 
these political communities, now in the form of territorial states, while local customs slowly disintegrated 
legislation was ever increasing.252 Primitive and modern societies had a different kind of law.  
While custom was the predominant legal form in ancient times, the commands of a sovereign legislative 
authority were only the product of modern civilization. According to Maine, law as Austin had conceived 
it was only the result of a lengthy historical process in which States extended over a large territory, 
families and tribes dissolved into a more uniform body of citizens, and European nations adopted many 
of the legal rules of the Roman Empire.253 The force of the legislature due to the existence of a sovereign 
and sanctions was a specific product of modern life. The error of Austin had been to adopt those specific 
categories as universal legal standards. 
The implications of Maine’s argument were important for rescuing international law. Law was a 
historical product. It evolved according to the social evolution of different branches of the Aryan family. 
As societies changed, the form of the norms changed accordingly. In consequence, international law did 
not need to be exactly as Austin demanded in order to be considered law. International lawyers conceded 
that Austin was partly right in affirming that international law was not as perfect—in the sense of perfectly 
legal—as other branches of law. Maine was the first to recognize that international law suffered ‘some 
real defects’.254 However, they also believed that Austin had wrongly disregarded the possibility that the 
new science would one day evolve, gaining the maturity that it still lacked. Nineteenth century 
international lawyers placed their discipline in a temporal framework. Looked from that perspective, the 
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potential of international law to become as sound a legal discipline as any other legal branch placed it in 
a position of parity vis-à-vis domestic law.255 
Following Maine, Oppenheim stated that in primitive communities law was custom.256 There was thus 
no need for a legislative or judicial body.257 Law existed there, where there was a community that needed 
to be regulated.258 Social reality was the basis of law. As Lorimer explained, international law ought to 
have existed since the first time in the history of humanity that two separate political units emerged.259 In 
the same way in which primitive law was customary, the law of nations had been for many centuries the 
result of the conduct that states followed in their mutual relations.260 But customary international law was 
complemented by ‘more and more’ written international regulations that were ‘daily created’ in modern 
times.261 For Westlake, if international law was deemed mere morality, as Austin had proposed, if its 
evolution was negated, there was a real risk of hindering ‘the progress of mankind by depreciating the 
less ripened claims’.262 
 Like Oppenheim, T. H. Lawrence followed Maine (something he explicitly recognized) in his critique 
of Austin and his defense of an evolutionary conception of international law.263 Law in general was the 
fruit of historical developments, a fact that Austin, as Maine demonstrated, had overlooked.264 
International law as with other types of law followed an evolutionary logic.265 As humans progressed, the 
notion of force became gradually obsolete.266 The same process affected states. As they reached maturity, 
they needed less and less forcible compulsion to obey international regulations. International law had 
paid a great service to humanity, ‘and on stricter observance and further development’, Lawrence 
proclaimed, ‘rest some of the fairest hopes for the future of our race’.267 
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Even Lorimer, who accepted that international law was the ‘least developed’ of all legal disciplines, 
upheld the modern—if incomplete—character of international law.268 And the good news for 
international lawyers is that their discipline was ever evolving. As Lorimer explained with regard to the 
law of nations: 
 
In historical times it is continually growing, not only as a science, or thing known, but as a fact or thing to be 
known. Human activity is a factor in its growth as well as human reason. As the lives of individuals or nations 
progress, as they increase in refinement, wealth, and power, new relations are developed, and new sources of 
positive law spring up. There was always, as we have seen, a natural law of the relations of separate communities, 
and this was more or less consciously recognized, as the tide of reason, and consequent civilization flowed or 
ebbed.269 
 
Lorimer, like Maine, Lawrence, Oppenheim, and Westlake, was sure that the march of progress and 
civilization in the Western world went hand in hand with the development of the science of international 
law. This precisely was the ‘trade mark’ of the discipline. But the idea of evolution was not only used in 
an inter-European or Western context. It was also applied to the wider world. In the context of European 
expansion there was an imperative need to classify societies according to their level of social advancement 
in consonance with the new scientific dictates of modern anthropology. In that regards, the evolution of 
international law was animated by the necessity of applying it to guide the evolution of inferior races.  
International legal regulation became a progressive instrument for spreading and applying European 
superior ideas of administration, economics, and law to the rest of the world. The mission of imperial 
government oriented to human improvement fitted nicely with the liberal internationalist ideology of the 
late nineteenth century and its double task of bringing progress and order to the international sphere.270 
This international program of action could be encompassed within the idea of social evolution. Legal and 
social evolution intertwined, allowing international lawyers to look at the non-Europeans as the perfect 
scenario in which to test various—even, at times, opposing—progressive visions.  
The fact that the same concept—evolution—was used to substantiate contrary claims reveals the 
instrumental use of this idea. When applied in relation to international law, evolution served to defend its 
equality vis-à-vis other legal branches. Its potential to become a complete scientific discipline was enough 
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to buttress that claim and guarantee international law’s high status. However, the idea of social evolution 
applied to non-European communities underlined the disparity between those societies and European 
industrial nations. Instead of underscoring non-Europeans’ potential for change, the idea of social 
evolution emphasized the gap that separated progressive and primitive nations. It was precisely the 
closure of that gap that justified progressive—albeit in practice often violent if not genocidal271—
international standards and imperial rule. Whereas the evolution of international law underscored its 
maturity, the idea of social evolution applied to non-European primitive societies was based on the 
immaturity of the latter and their need for guidance. It was precisely the civilizing mission that called for 
a deployment of international law in Western colonies. Paradoxically, this need became one of the 
ultimate proofs of its growing importance and maturation. 
Evolution was not the only element that conferred on international law a certain status and traction. The 
scientific character of the discipline permitted a new claim to universality.272 Having a radically different 
outlook than natural law, international law was still universally applicable. Besides, it remained linked to 
the cosmopolitan project of providing a legal basis for the articulation of legal relationships both within 
the sphere of civilized nations and outside it. In fact, the main aspiration of science was precisely the 
achievement of indisputable truth. Arguments fashioned in a scientific style carried an authority that the 
new legal elites gladly welcomed. In this sense, the two aspects of the idea of evolution combined. 
Once international law was proved to be a science, the introduction of the idea of social evolution as a 
measuring stick to uplift primitive societies as part and parcel of the new discipline became scientifically 
validated. This allowed the reconciliation of a façade of objectivity with the introduction of a claim of 
superiority that oscillated between two different versions of the same civilizing project. Colonial powers 
evidenced at times an interventionist pull that materialized in an attempt to thoroughly transform the 
uncivilized and their surroundings. Other times, they had a more lenient approach that consisted of 
demarcating two spheres of action within colonial societies: one in which the backward non-Europeans 
lived their traditional lives, and another in which advanced Europeans could carry on their modern 
economic life.  
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At the end of the nineteenth century the British Empire generally adopted the second alternative in its 
dealings with colonial populations. The postulates of Maine regarding legal evolution and imperial rule 
were of utmost importance in shaping this administrative line of action, traditionally known as indirect 
rule. As he noted, evolution was a slow process that assured order and avoided revolts.  
 
Maine, Lugard, and the government of the British Colonies: Indirect rule  
During the second half of the nineteenth century several rebellions and wars of resistance shook the 
British Empire. The Indian mutiny, the governor Eire controversy, and the Maori wars, which took place 
within a small amount of time, forced the British to rethink what was the best way to manage their empire. 
The British came to realize that non-European communities under their rule were less amenable to their 
will and their dictates than they had assumed. In the aftermath of tumultuous waves that destabilized the 
Empire, the liberal goal of civilizing the uncivilized seemed less urgent than the need for maintaining 
order within an Empire of myriad heterogenic peoples. This was the context in which Maine presented 
his novel understanding of social progress, one that was to have an effect on the way British imperialism 
proceeded at the end of the nineteenth century.  
 Apart from his contribution to the intellectual consolidation of the idea of legal evolution, Maine’s 
theories played a large role in shaping new conceptions of administration in the British Empire. India was 
the main laboratory where Maine, like previous British thinkers, tested his hypothesis. For James Mill, 
John Stuart Mill, and Maine the main problem with India was its stagnation. But whereas the former 
assumed that benign despotic rule through the EIC and enlightened legislation could put Indian society 
back onto a progressive path track, Maine inverted this idea. For him, mere British presence radically 
affected traditional Indian society, threatening disintegration. For this reason, he was convinced that, 
under British influence, India as he knew it ‘was passing away’.273 Spontaneously, just by mere contact 
with a superior ‘civilization’ (the British), India was steadily losing all its ancient features.274 
Maine was aware that British experts thought that the population of India was too attached to their 
traditions and customs.275 There was a good degree of truth in that characterization. India was, indeed, 
an ignorant and superstitious society. This state of affairs largely explained its immobility.276 At the same 
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time, precisely because of the general ignorance of the masses, the ideas and influences of the upper 
intellectual classes had an impact on the other strata of the population that had no historical parallel.277 
Contact with British superior ideas had already set in motion a process of assimilation and modernization 
of the upper classes that, in time, was to transform the whole country. The change that the presence of 
the British had elicited was not the result of the use of force.278 It was actually the British’s superior level 
of social progress that accounted for the alterations that were sweeping Indian society. 
In this light, the main challenge of imperial rule was not the intentional modification of Indian society 
in order to bring it to an improved condition, as mere contact with the English was enough to shake the 
foundations of that society and trigger modernization. The question was rather how to help India’s 
transition toward modernity with the minimum degree of turbulence and turmoil. Maine’s theoretical 
conclusions and Non-Europeans’ violent resistance against British rule had convinced British 
administrators that Indian institutions, ideas, and customs had to be protected from the quick 
disintegration that was certainly to follow from Western imperialism.279 
Theoretically, governing a non-European traditional society according to the most progressive ideas 
of the modern occupying power seemed a sensible approach to imperial rule. But that required thorough 
knowledge of the society that was going to be changed. A good understanding of primitive societies 
provided colonial administrators with know-how as to the better course of progressive reform. This was 
an ideal that was often not realized in practice. In the case of India, British administration had failed to 
understand local institutions and practices. They had interpreted Indian reality through distorted lenses. 
For instance, English administrators had not recognized that the Indian village community was both an 
organized patriarchal society and a union of co-proprietors.280 This mistake had produced some of the 
gravest errors in the administration of the subcontinent.281 
According to Maine, the case of India was not exceptional. The English tended to make mistakes 
when appraising foreign social forms whenever they were brought in contact with communities whose 
institutions were in an earlier stage of development than those of their own civilization.282 They could 
not remove the modern lenses with which they contemplated the world, and hence they projected their 
specific social, political, economic, and cultural categories on societies that functioned under a 
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completely different logic.283 In light of this difficulty, Maine believed that any attempt to rule Indians 
according to the British interpretation of their ideas and institutions was in vain. Moreover, as resistance 
to British rule in different imperial locations had shown, the old way of administrating colonies and 
dependencies exposed the Empire to violent reactions. 
Criticism of imperial rule did not amount to the conviction that the British ought to abandon their 
responsibility to transform Indian society according to their own superior image. It only underscored the 
fact that any quick attempt to radically shape India based on deficient knowledge was doomed to fail. 
Maine believed that the superiority of modernity vis-à-vis tradition/primitiveness, once two societies that 
represented these two models came into contact with each other, unleashed an automatic process of 
osmosis or absorption of the higher by the lower.284 Steady codification was a sound tool for 
improvement. Importantly, it also guaranteed stability. Maine was convinced that once a society was 
touched by progress, improvement spontaneously followed. Progress, he claimed, spread ‘like a 
contagion’.285 It was then the responsibility of the British to rebuild in its image the naturally shattered 
fragments of primitive society.286 In order to do so, British rule had to find the right tempo. If the pace 
of change was too slow, improvement was compromised. But too rapid modification undermined 
security.287 
It was the last of these two values—the security of Empire—that got the upper hand in imperial 
debates about the right course of action in the colonies during the late nineteenth century. The followers 
of Maine emphasized the need to protect and preserve local institutions within the Empire. The practice 
of indirect rule through non-European institutions was sensitive to Maine’s insights and, at the same 
time, appeased British fears. 
 For Maine, even a non-assimilationist and non-interventionist imperial approach to the colonies still 
guaranteed the transformation of primitive societies. Once progress touched primitiveness, the former 
started slowly to alter the latter until backwardness dissolved and the colonized society started moving 
toward modernity. He admitted that it was ‘by its indirect and for the most part unintended influence that 
the British power metamorphoses and dissolves the ideas and social forms underneath it’.288 This was 
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the historical progressive force of imperial rule; a necessary force, it seemed, because, as Maine noticed, 
no other nation in the history of humankind with the exception of the Ancient Greeks had been able to 
engender progress spontaneously. Such was the English mission in India: transforming without 
consciously assimilating, re-shaping without force, without creating tension or turmoil. Furthermore, the 
English were a mere piece of the impersonal engine of progress. In their imperial dependencies they were 
just passing the torch of enlightenment that they had previously received: 
 
It is this principle of progress which we Englishmen are communicating to India. We did not create it. We deserve 
no special credit for it. It came to us filtered through many different media. But we have received it; and, as we 
have received it, so we pass it on. There is no reason why, if it has time to work, it should not develop in India 
effects as wonderful as in any other of the societies of mankind.289 
 
It is worth noticing that whereas John Stuart Mill was critical of his contemporary society, Maine did not 
utter a complaint other than that directed against democracy. Modernity, if managed according to his 
conservative/progressive creed, was no doubt a blessing for humanity. Still, he qualified his binary 
distinction between modern and traditional/primitive by noting that the traditional and the modern were 
often more enmeshed that one would think at first sight.290 There was an element of civilization in ancient 
societies, as well as ancient traces in modern ones. India, for instance, was a barbarian region that 
contained a considerable part of European civilization.291 
 Maine’s concerns about the stability of the British Empire travelled to Africa. The Indian mutiny and 
its civilian rebellions in 1857 demonstrated, to British eyes, the difficulties of imposing a rational model 
of life over irrational societies. In fact, the fear of entropy permeated European bourgeois societies at the 
end of the nineteenth century. Social unrest and turmoil at home which threatened the social order and 
status quo showed just how fragile civilization was.292 Even though British rule in Africa was an ad-hoc 
experiment for decades, the publication of Lord Lugard’s The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa 
in 1922 elevated the administrative system known as indirect rule to the status of a religious dogma.293 
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Since the date of its publication, no other book like The Dual Mandate exercised such a great influence 
on imperial administration in the British African colonies.294 Lugard’s theoretical framework for British 
rule resolved some of the challenges that British rule often encountered in Africa. On the one hand, it 
tipped the balance of administration in favor of stability rather than reform. In a vast empire of myriad 
peoples and extensive territories, peace was a cherished value. On the other hand, indirect rule helped in 
addressing a practical problem of colonial administration. The British Empire struggled to have an 
efficient administration due to the scarcity of human resources and the difficulty of transportation in 
Africa. Lugard himself had at his disposal only 231 officers in Northern Nigeria to rule a population of 
seven million.295 Finally, by aligning with supposed tribal traditional chiefs, the British shifted the 
balance of power of African societies to the rural world. Once that world had been militarily conquered, 
and tribalism no longer represented a locus of resistance, having chiefs as allies allowed the British to 
disempower dynamic urban elites who could be a destabilizing progressive force in the colonies.296 
Lugard started The Dual Mandate by examining the state of Africa before European rule. In contrast 
to coastal Africa, which had been part of commercial routes for centuries and thus part of the larger 
history of mankind, the interior of Africa had remained a blank space in European maps.297 Therefore, 
its penetration by imperial powers could be compared to the discovery of America.298 But unlike America 
and several other regions that housed great civilization, the lack of monuments and cities in the interior 
of Africa revealed that no remarkable civilization had existed in pre-colonial Africa. In fact, Lugard 
affirmed without hesitation that the general state of Africa before colonization was ‘deplorable’.299 
This negative conclusion about the continent foregrounded his examination of the civilizational status 
reached by Africans. As was common among Western intellectuals, he ordered Africans in different 
classes according to their level of social sophistication. In order to do so, he followed the stages of social 
evolution outlined by Henry Maine. He distinguished mainly between three groups: the primitive, the 
advanced, and the Europeanized Africans. The primitive Africans could also be classified in two sub-
groups. First, there were those who were still in the patriarchal stage, whose political organization was 
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mainly based on family groups.300 Lugard described this human compartment in the worst terms possible. 
They were prey to ‘cruel superstitions’ and ‘degrading practices’, such as cannibalism and the sacrifice 
of innocents.301 In between the most primitive and advanced Africans were communities that recognized 
a chief and had tribal organization.302 This group had managed to move away from patriarchal power 
relations, arriving to the tribal stage. But despite being able to consolidate more advanced political 
structures, these groups reproduced some of the most negative practices of patriarchal societies.303 
 It was only when the ‘negro aborigines’ were conquered by a superior Aryan race and converted to 
Islam that advanced communities flourished in Africa.304 One step forward in this direction was the 
introduction of a monotheistic religion, which dispelled many of the myths and superstitions of the 
populace. Besides, the introduction of a written language and the superior political and material culture 
of the Arabs helped those Africans under Muslim influence to advance.305Advanced Africans practiced 
trade and agriculture and had centralized states. They also built cities and had industrial arts.306 They 
were in an intermediate condition between primitive Africans and the progressive Europeanized classes. 
 Those Africans who had been brought up under European influence were just an exiguous part of the 
whole African population. But despite their reduced numbers they had great political influence on 
African affairs.307 They were a kind of African bourgeois class, mentally superior to the other groups, 
and in proportion to their few numbers far more powerful than them.308 Because of their social progress 
one could think that the educated Africans would be able to govern their own people. However, Lugard 
disagreed. Living in cities, they were removed from and out of touch with the common rural African that 
they ought to rule. Furthermore, despite their merits, they lacked the capacity and skills to rule their 
backward fellow Africans.309 
 Lugard believed that of all the different social types, the primitive Africans in the ‘early tribal stages’ 
constituted the majority in British Tropical Africa.310 The abject condition of Africans was the strongest 
call for alien rule. As Lugard reminded his audience, the Treaty of Versailles recognized the fact that ‘the 
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subject races of Africa are not yet able to stand alone’.311 European imperialism was to guide them in 
this noble pursuit.  
 After justifying the humanitarian character of empire, Lugard proceeded to explain what he thought 
was the most suitable system for imperial rule in Africa. Like Henry Maine, Lugard was convinced that 
British rule had a disintegrating effect on African traditional structures, particularly among the most 
primitive communities.312 This was a natural outcome, considering that in confronting British rule the 
primitive African had to come to terms with ‘ideas a thousand years in advance of his mental and social 
equipment’.313 Under this circumstances it was impossible to maintain African ancient structures exactly 
as they had been traditionally. Lugard, like Maine, was convinced that ancient societies such as those 
found in Africa were already changing upon contact with modern ones.314 So, preserving them exactly 
as they were in pre-colonial times was impossible. By the same token, reinforcing traditional structures 
of government that were responsible for the immobility and stagnation that pervaded African societies 
was not an option.315 
What was needed was a system that allowed a course of action between these two either impossible or 
unwanted alternatives. That basically meant helping old structures adapt to new circumstances (modern 
British ways) without generating social disintegration and chaos. In other words, the final goal of indirect 
rule was to safeguard the cohesiveness of a government that sought to reconcile two seemingly 
incompatible worlds: one that was progressing toward a modern future, and another that had remained 
in the primitive past. That system was indirect rule, and the two main policies of the system were 
decentralization and continuity.316 
 This in practice meant that Africans should be left to manage their own affairs to the largest degree 
possible, always according to their level of social development.317 Throughout his treatise Lugard 
emphasized the need to interfere as little as possible with ‘native customs and modes of thought’.318 He 
affirmed, using a terminology that resembled the postulates of Maine, that administration ought to be 
fashioned as ‘evolution’ rather than ‘revolution’.319 In the same vein, he maintained that trying to promote 
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too quick a progress among backward Africans was far more dangerous than going too slowly.320 
Keeping ancient tradition and political structures while at the same time introducing modern principles 
of administration that guided African chiefs made it possible to have it both ways. 
The British and the ‘native’ spheres of influence ought to communicate with one another. To that end, 
Lugard recommended cooperation between the whole chain of administration, especially between 
provincial officers and local African authorities. That would keep in check the inherent tendency of 
backward African societies to stagnate. British supervision and education of the African chiefs was to 
guide the slow progression and adaptation of traditional structures to modernity without compromising 
their very existence and role. Through the administrative chain of colonial rule, British progressive 
impetus would also be partly diluted, so as to alter archaic structures without compromising their very 
existence and, hence, antagonizing the local population. In that way, progressive colonial rule would 
always ‘keep in touch with native thought and feeling’.321 
Respecting local circumstances would guarantee, at the same time, another principle of administration 
cherished in the British Empire, one that was already postulated by James and John Stuart Mill: colonial 
rule ought to adapt to the level of social development of those governed.322 Not all African societies had 
reached a similar level of social development. Through the collaboration of local chiefs in colonial 
administration, Africans’ level of ‘natural evolution’ would be respected.323 And, of course, their 
submission would be secured too. At the end of the day, Africans were to obey British command as if 
they were obeying themselves. Through indirect rule, the aims of civilizing and controlling Africans 
could be fulfilled simultaneously. 
Indirect rule did not entail only a distinction between two interconnected political spheres. It also 
institutionalized a system of two economic spheres that, as with the former, were intertwined. Africans, 
Lugard recognized, were mostly agriculturalists.324 The majority of the African population oriented their 
work toward subsistence agriculture. Primitive man had no desire for profits or wealth.325 Here resided 
the deep roots of the economic stagnation of Africa. However, Lugard believed that once nomadic and 
savage Africans settled they felt a desire for consumption and capital accumulation.326 That desire after 
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all, he explained, was intrinsic to human nature. Africans could definitely be moved along a progressive 
material path. 
Land tenure was the most vital institution for the economic advancement of Africa. Maine influenced 
Lugard’s conception of the emergence of private property over land.327 For Lugard as for Maine, the 
development of land tenure ran parallel to the natural evolution of a society. As societies progressed, 
they recognized private property rights.328 According to Lugard, land tenure passed through different 
stages. First, it was possessed in common and belonged to the whole community.329 At a later stage, land 
was the property of the family, and the head of the family decided how to allocate it.330 In the tribal stage, 
it was the chief who acquired control over land and distributed it according to the needs of the 
collectivity.331 Finally, the needs derived from population growth forced societies to treat land as any 
other tradable commodity.332 
British rule ought to respect and preserve the various functioning systems of land tenure. As in the 
political sphere, land would be regulated according to local laws and customary rights under the control 
of ‘natives’.333 At the same time, when land started to be owned individually, colonial rule ought to 
promote a system of small peasant proprietors.334 Only the latter system, Lugard believed, encouraged 
those working the land to make improvements in their systems of production.335 For Lugard, the recipe 
was the same as the one applied in the political sphere: ‘teach the native to manage his own affairs and 
better his own methods’.336 
Besides the primitive economic sphere in which Africans tilled the land and traded according to the 
slow rhythm of a backward past, another vibrant economic sphere was controlled and administered by 
the British. The administrative power was, for Lugard, the custodian of the tropics. As such, one of the 
tasks incumbent upon the British in Africa was the material development of those regions.337 He was 
convinced that in the tropics, ‘the surplus population of the white races’ could settle and ‘create new 
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wealth’.338 The colonial government ought to foster economic development through scientific 
improvement and private enterprise.339 As he recognized, the logic that had animated British interest in 
Africa was precisely the search for new sources of raw materials: 
 
The tropics produced in abundance a class of raw materials and of foodstuffs which cannot be grown in the 
temperate zones, and are so vital to the needs of civilized man that they have in very truth become essential to 
civilization. It was the realization of this fact (as I have said) which led the nations of Europe to compete for the 
control of the African tropics.340 
 
Apart from being a reservoir of raw materials, Africa also offered markets for British manufactured 
goods.341 
 Because of its economic importance for the world, Africa had to be opened to free trade and the activity 
of the modern homo economicus (‘the merchant, the miner and the manufacturer’342), an economic 
operator who was entitled to participate in the exploitation of African natural wealth independent of their 
country of origin.343 Even the Europeanized African, who for Lugard represented just a fraction of the 
total population, could turn into homo economicus and operate on an equal footing to the Europeans.344 
According to Lugard, the colonial state ought to intervene as little as possible in the promotion of 
economic growth. Foreign commercial banks could assist African agricultural proprietors, and 
transnational corporations were ready to step into West Africa in order to explore ‘every avenue of trade 
and development’.345 
Lugard was always careful to present the British mandate to develop the tropics and their population 
in humanitarian terms. This demanded, among other things, that the appropriation of natural resources 
by the British did not result in the dispossession of Africa. Lugard believed that Africa was big enough 
to accommodate the interests of all actors. Even in the more densely populated regions of West Africa, 
there was enough land for the locals and even for plantations owned by Europeans which could serve as 
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an example of improved agriculture.346 The situation was different in the more sparsely populated East 
Africa. In those ample territories, British citizens could settle at will.  
The same principle guided the concession of mining licenses. Foreigners could gain access to the 
minerals that were not used by the locals.347 In principle, locals could keep their mineral customary rights 
and participate in the profits derived from the exploitation of the mineral wealth of Africa.348 But in 
practice, only European private enterprises had enough capital for the investment required for the 
prospection and machineries needed to exploit minerals.349 So, as in the case of land, the fact that Africans 
were not disposed did not mean that they had equal opportunities. In the advanced economic sphere only 
Europeans and a few Europeanized Africans had the capital needed for industrial mining and industrial 
agriculture, activities conducive to the accumulation of wealth. 
The alleged economic inequality that the colonial system produced was most manifest in terms of 
trade. Africa exported raw materials and imported industrial articles from Europe. Lugard was aware of 
the allegation that, because of unbalanced terms of trade, British rule in Africa was impoverishing 
Africans.350 In response to this accusation, Lugard defended that British rule ought not to deter the 
industrial capacity of Africans; on the contrary, it ought to encourage it. Lugard believed that the eventual 
industrialization of Africa was not detrimental to Britain. Once African industry was able to produce 
basic and cheap articles, Great Britain could concentrate on more refined products and the very 
technology required by industrialization.351 That way, the terms of trade would still work in favor of the 
metropolis. For Lugard the real problem was not the British predisposition to underdevelop Africa but, 
actually, the fact that Africa was not yet ripe for industrialization.352 
Lack of efficient transport and the retrograde condition of its populations were inimical to economic 
progress.353 Because the African population could not take upon itself the burdensome task of exploiting 
the natural wealth of the continent, Europeans ought to assist in this collective endeavor, reaping in return 
generous profits for their generous assistance.  
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International law and imperialism in the late nineteenth century: creating a global space for the homo 
economicus  
Despite important contextual differences with previous periods, the idea of Western pre-eminence in 
mastering nature and its cosmopolitan duty to transform wilderness into civilization survived as one of 
the main rationales for Western imperialism in late nineteenth century. Authors such as Westlake, Fiore, 
and Lawrence directly or indirectly acknowledged the importance of extending Western economic 
activities to the non-European world as an instrument to exploit vacant natural resources, with the purpose 
of bolstering universal progress and civilization. As late as the second decade of the twentieth century 
Lord Lugard clearly upheld this cosmopolitan vision. What is more, he argued that the whole civilized 
community had consensually endorsed the mission to improve the world’s unproductive resources. In his 
own words: ‘the civilized nations have at least recognized that … the abounding wealth of the tropical 
regions of the earth must be developed and use for the benefit of mankind.’354 Africa was the new 
geographical scenario of world history that housed the old battle between the natural and the social 
spheres. Through empire and civilization all kinds of benefits could be obtained by taming and exploiting 
African wilderness.  
For Lugard, that mission rested on the shoulders of Western industrial and civilized nations. But how 
could that mandate be reconciled with the fact that underproductive regions were populated by human 
communities to whom those resources in theory belonged? How could external actors decide where, why, 
and how to exploit nature without the consent of the locals? At the turn of the century the old answer to 
these questions had not entirely changed. As had historically happened, the importance of the mission to 
exploit wild nature was such that it trumped the interest of the human communities that populated the 
tropics. Lugard legitimized that displacement using an argument with clear Vattelian undertones. He first 
described the tropics as ‘the heritage of mankind’.355 Then he declared that the ‘races’ who lived in the 
tropical world could not place restrictions on the use of their natural wealth in regard to ‘those who need 
them’.356 Those in need were, of course, the colonial powers, or as Lugard called them the ‘custodians of 
civilization’.357 Africans, Lugard believed, were not yet ready to entirely conquer nature and ascend over 
it. In order to do so, they needed the guidance of imperial powers.  
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 But the need for foreign intervention did not mean that Africans ought to be dispossessed, of course. 
There was enough wealth for everyone. Indirect rule gave a practical answer to the need for 
accommodating the interests of African peoples and Western economic actors. In Africa, indirect rule 
helped create a two-fold political and legal sphere: one in which African peoples—under the tutelage of 
the administering power—managed their own affairs and applied their ancient customs, and another 
entirely regulated by the Western government administering the area. Yet this separation also entailed a 
division of economic spheres. On the one hand, there was a sphere reserved for the backward local 
population who could carry out their productive activities for subsistence. On the other hand, there was a 
sphere of advanced economic activity that allowed the homo economicus to exploit the abundant wealth 
of the tropics and, for that matter, of any wild natural frontier in order to foster global economic growth. 
The product of the tropics enriched global markets and contributed to keep global commerce and 
capitalism running. 
This economic division of two spheres that somehow followed the boundaries between civilized and 
uncivilized human communities, as conceptually demarcated by the Mills, found new ideological 
ammunition in the idea of evolution and the writings of Henry Maine. Reassured by Maine’s divide 
between primitive or ancient and modern or progressive societies, at the top sat the homo economicus, an 
individual disaggregated from the mass of the group who had contracts—the most progressive legal 
instruments—at his or her disposal. From primitive and tyrannical familial and communal units operating 
under collective institutional arrangements and systems of production emerged the Western economic 
man, armed with legal equipment and a set of legal institutions of a private nature that allowed him to 
amass and enjoy unlimited wealth with exclusivity. That was the progressive movement that Maine had 
aptly captured in the opposition of status and contract. 
But this line of action faced a major obstacle. Naturally, as a particular group of individuals—an 
international capitalist elite—appropriated the Earth’s natural resources, a large numbers of people would 
lose those recourses and the material benefits that they reported. But social inequality was invisible to 
theories of evolution such as Maine’s. For him, while group and communal property represented 
backwardness, individualism and modern economic life opened a window of opportunity for continued 
social amelioration. Contracts provided a legal instrument to articulate a particular vocabulary that 
guaranteed the improvement of the homo economicus’ boundless life. Importantly, they created the legal 
basis for the privatization of natural resources and of all that humans produced out of them, together with 
the possibility of transforming private goods into commodities and exchanging them in the market. 
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Transforming nature into capital was the ultimate source of material wealth. The fantasy that humans 
‘ultimately’ owned nature helped in building simultaneous empires of wealth and misery. It also provided 
an incentive to blindly destroy the ecological systems that supported human life. 
The individual enjoyment of a private sphere of merchandisable natural and artificial goods was 
cemented by the fact that, for Maine and other jurists such as Lawrence, political authority in its 
progressive form consisted in the exercise of power over a ‘limited portion of the Earth’.358 Importantly, 
Maine provided a historically grounded scientific explanation of the origin of the modern conception of 
sovereignty. The primitive conception of sovereignty based on personal ties, Maine argued, was 
transfigured in modern societies into a territorial one. As ancient families and larger patriarchal groups 
disintegrated into the individuals that composed modern states, sovereignty shifted from power over 
people to power over a definite portion of the Earth.359 
This modern idea of a state’s territorial sovereignty was no neutral umbrella with the capacity to 
accommodate different understandings of political authority, different kinds of normativity, and varied 
worldviews. Its progressive nature came from the fact that sovereigns in modern societies were 
continuously legislating in order to promote social progress. Because of this teleological validation, the 
production of positive norms to regulate society was considered a benchmark of modernity, a vehicle for 
progress. This activity in turn was associated with the continuous improvement of standards of living in 
modern Western economies. Territorial sovereignty assured that within a specific portion of land the 
sovereign could enact legislation that stimulated material production.  
The Earth was no longer the one that imposed limits to and conditions on the progressive lifestyles of 
the modern citizens of nation-states. The individual became the unit of a political system that had the 
prerogative of enacting rules that allowed him, in conjunction with many other units operating under the 
same lucrative principles, to claim an absolute power over different parts of ecosystems. The existence 
of a market system that rewarded this process of exploitation of natural habitats stimulated and reinforced 
the very private institutions that enabled ‘modern life’ and progress.  
One of the progressive instruments at the disposal of the homo economicus was the right to privatize 
nature and transform it into an individual article of property. It was a right with an old pedigree in Western 
legal thinking. It had been associated by European intellectuals during the sixteenth and seventeenth 
century with God’s mandate to people the Earth and tame it. At the end of the eighteenth century, 
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conjectural history situated it as part of the progressive movement from backward productive activities 
such as hunting and pastoralism to activities conducive to social amelioration such as agriculture and 
commerce. In order to create affluence, trade and agriculture had to be carried out under a regime of 
private property. 
The association of private property with social progress and Western civilization carried its day during 
the nineteenth century. Maine, for example, linked the advancement in civilization to the 
individualization of property in land.360 The cultivation of North America, he insisted, was the result of 
the English introduction of the right to private property over land.361 For Maine, trade and private 
property were not only conductive to civilization: they were the distinguishable legal benchmarks of 
modernity.362 In Maine’s legal jargon, they assured the possibility of societies moving from status to 
contract. Significantly, they also allowed the commodification and marketization of nature. A possibility, 
to which philosophical ideas of progress linked to human mastery over nature operated on a global scale 
through a cosmopolitan imperial mission, conferred irresistible force.  
At the end of the nineteenth century, the civilizational benefits of private property had been firmly 
established as unquestionable truth. In one of the most important legal treatises of the century, The 
Elements of Jurisprudence, the British jurist Thomas Erskine Holland (1835-1926) still associated the 
right to private property with an ‘advanced state of society’.363 Similarly, the capacity of individuals to 
enjoy an absolute power over ‘a wide circle of matter’ constituted for Holland a ‘great advance in 
civilization’.364 For the Italian jurist Fiore, private property was one of the universal rights of human 
beings.365 That claim had enormous implications. As Fiore explained, every human being could ‘claim 
such a right all over the world, demand respect for them and enjoy them in every country’.366 As Fiore 
formulated it, the legal sphere of protection of the private property of the homo economicus had acquired 
planetary dimensions.  
 In the extension of the homo economicus’ global economic sphere of influence, trade nicely 
complemented private property. Once privately owned, different natural elements of ecosystems could 
be transformed into commodities and exchanged for a monetary value. Trade, as much as private property, 
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had had a positive ring since its inclusion in the law of nations. Already Vitoria enshrined commerce as 
a cosmopolitan instrument for the natural partnership and communication of humanity. The cosmopolitan 
allure of trade came partly from the widespread idea that as different regions of the world had different 
natural endowments, commerce had the potential to benefit everybody. In theory, trade was the rising 
tide that lifted all boats. Its contribution to the creation of wealth and prosperity was not the only appeal 
of trade. For centuries, it had also been related to the promotion of peaceful international relations. 
Commonwealths that engaged in beneficial trading relations would naturally have less reasons to fight 
one another. 
 In the nineteenth century the positive aspects of trade were conspicuously emphasized. International 
lawyers were some of those that ascribed to the defense of trade. Again, a figure of the stature of Maine 
believed in the existence of a solid bond between civilization and commerce, characterizing both as part 
and parcel of the law of nations.367 The views of these authors were a reflection of the British 
cosmopolitan aspiration to universal peace and progress through free trade.368 When weighing the 
relevance of trade, all British international lawyers emphasized its cosmopolitan dimension. For Levi, for 
example, trade was together with religion the best vehicle to achieve justice and peace in the international 
realm. As material progress disseminated in the world so did commerce, ‘spreading its wings and 
extending the blessings of plenty and of peace’.369 
At the end of the century international lawyers often resorted to a sociological explanation of 
international law.370 This particular branch of law was the result of a need to regulate the factual existence 
of a community: the international community of nations. This community was found to be the result of 
growing interdependence between nations. Modern states were knitted with one another for several 
reasons. For authors such as Westlake, Lawrence, and Oppenheim, one of the utmost important factors 
that encouraged bonding between modern states was the increase in commercial relations.371 
Commerce was one of the most progressive forces of Western civilization and the modern world. 
Lawrence was a vocal exponent for the cosmopolitan blend of commerce and civilization. He referred to 
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commerce, democracy, and Christianity (in that order) as the three main drivers of modernity.372 This was 
a short version of Levi’s slightly larger list, which included ‘Civilization, Religion, Commerce and 
Science’.373 Trade was like a flower that carried within it the seeds of a better international order. It had 
the potential to alleviate all evils and bringing the good life for all of mankind. As Levi explained: ‘It is 
commerce which brings nations into mutual contacts, which enlarges their resources, administers to 
individual comfort, promotes the prosperity, and softens the manners of peoples.’374 
Importantly, civilization, commerce, international law, and the international community were all tied 
together. For Maine, one of the elements that formed part of international law was the ‘growth of 
civilization and commerce’.375 Polson had also defined the law of nature as the outgrowth of civilization, 
that is, a state in which nations recognized the positive effects of trade.376 For Woolsey trade, civilization, 
and the law of nations were equally connected, but in a different sense. Commerce helped the law of 
nations take its first steps, until the advance of civilization strengthened the moral ideas of the time and 
international regulations became more robust.377 And Phillimore remarked that the principles of 
international law applied with greater precision in the regulation of trade between Christian nations.378 
Fiore included international trade together with private property as one of the basic human rights that 
could be exercised by humans everywhere.379  
It was precisely because of their progressive character that it seemed natural for trade and private 
property to be recognized as human rights enforceable worldwide. Accordingly, international lawyers 
defended the extension of the rights of private property and trade overseas. It was of outmost importance 
for the promotion of progress and civilization that the sphere of action of the homo economicus stretched 
to the farthest corners of the globe. The Earth ought to be an unrestricted economic space where modern 
individuals could freely operate.  
This belief provided an invaluable twofold source of legitimization for imperial rule. One of the criteria 
whereby the primitive communities of Africa and Asia were distinguished from civilized communities 
was precisely their incapacity to provide an unencumbered sphere of legal protection for the homo 
economicus. Maine’s distinction between primitive and modern nations was important in this regard. The 
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modern conception of territorial sovereignty meant exactly the existence of a government who could 
enact legislations that protected and sponsored a legal sphere where contracts of an economic and 
individualized nature could take place. That was the sphere inhabited by the unencumbered homo 
economicus. By contrast, primitive communities did not have this kind of legislation and lived by the 
customs necessary to regulate a backward material life. Of these two kinds of political communities only 
the first counted as a sovereign state recognized by international law, a state that could promote economic 
growth and prosperity. That is why exporting this kind of political formation to the most backward regions 
of the non-European world through imperial rule was considered indispensable for the spreading of 
civilization.  
In this sense, Westlake linked civilization with the capacity to govern. The decisive test of that capacity 
was precisely the recognition and protection of the rights of individuals who belonged to the society of 
civilized nations. Europeans ought to be able to enjoy the ‘complex life’ to which they were used to in 
their own countries everywhere in the world.380 Demanding such treatment toward foreigners seemed fair 
because that was precisely the kind of protection that other civilized states offered.381 Government was 
also important because of the possibility of signing treaties to regulate modern life. When a modern and 
civilized government was in place, ‘[t]he states which are members of our international society’ 
concluded ‘treaties with it as to the especial position to be allowed to their subjects in its territory’.382 
These treaties dealt mainly with ‘custom duties and the regulation of trade’.383 
The capacity to recognize the rights of trade and private property and sign treaties to promote commerce 
allowed a dividing line to be drawn between semi-civilized nations and uncivilized populations. Some 
‘Asiatic empires’, Westlake recognized, were able to assure the enjoyment of European’s complex life 
abroad. But ‘most of the populations with whom Europeans had come into contact in America and Africa’ 
did not have a government capable of such deeds, a fact that paved the way for imperial rule.384 
Paradoxically, once imperial rule was in place, Westlake failed to apply the high standard of protection 
of rights he had come up with, to the colonial population. Civilized states could colonize certain regions 
of the world for the reason that there was a lack of a political community able to guarantee the rights of 
their subjects. But once they were the rulers, colonial powers could deny rights to their new subjects (the 
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absence of which was the very rationale for their intervention) at their discretion. According to him, 
international law ‘leaves the treatment of the natives to the conscience of the state to which the 
sovereignty is awarded’.385 
A similar line of inquiry was adopted by Edward Hall in the 1895 edition of his treatise on international 
law. For him, the standard of civilization was related to ‘the existence in almost all states of a municipal 
law, consonant with modern European ideas’ which granted foreigners the possibility of obtaining 
‘criminal and civil justice with a tolerable approach to equality as between themselves and the subjects 
of the state’.386 Outside the sphere of European civilization things worked differently. When states could 
not give foreigners these rights because of ‘the imperfection of its civilization’ or because its laws were 
founded on ideas ‘alien to those of the European peoples’, civilized states were free to condition the 
admission of outsiders to the European family of nations ‘on special provisions being made to safeguard 
the person and property of their subjects’.387 
So, the degree of civilization of a particular state was often related to its capacity to guarantee the 
enjoyment of the private rights of Europeans, especially the right to private property and commerce.388 
Lorimer put it bluntly, referring to the conquest of Algeria by France, that he was sure that ‘had Algeria 
come to respect the rights of life and property, its history would have not permanently deprived it of the 
right to recognition’.389 Civilized states were those that were able to protect the sacrosanct legal 
institutions that guaranteed the unrestrained economic activities of European operators. In this sense, the 
Final Act of the Berlin Conference imposed the duty of exercising authority in the lands occupied by 
Western nations. One of the aspects of that authority was the capacity to protect ‘freedom of trade’.390 In 
addition, Article 6 of the Final Act stated that the private property of all those implicated in the 
colonization of Africa such as ‘Christian missionaries, scientists, and explorers’ shall receive ‘especial 
protection’.391 
Building sound political systems with the proper legal institutions that facilitated the life of the homo 
economicus was one of the animating forces of imperial rule in Africa and Asia. Moreover, the creation 
of that sphere entailed the transfer of innumerable natural resources into the hands of the colonists. This 
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was so because the absence of institutional arrangements and legal norms conductive to the exploitation 
of nature in the first place logically indicated that nature had not historically been sufficiently exploited. 
Only the deployment of private legal entitlements assured that natural resources were efficiently utilized. 
Even if Africans or Asians had for millennia worked their territories before European colonialism, the 
degree of exploitation in the tropics did not redound in the benefit of the whole of humanity. This is the 
sense in which Lugard defined the tropics as the heritage of humanity and Westlake declared the 
preeminent access of the white race to natural resources when there were vacant land minerals and 
underdeveloped commerce.392 
Africans could not extract the wealth of their subsoil; neither could they create plantation agriculture 
for export. This lack explained the need for imperial administration. For Lugard, one of the fundamental 
goals of the British mandate in Africa was to foster commerce, improve communications, ‘and to protect 
the interests of merchants and others who are engaged in the development of its commercial and mineral 
resources’.393 In the same line, Lindley observed that mines and minerals belonged to the colonial 
government ‘both in land granted to settlers and others and in lands owned or reserved to the natives’.394 
Lugard concurred. In Africa, dispossession did not ‘involve injustice to the natives who themselves were 
not in a position to exploit the minerals’.395 
If Africa was to progress, so Western policy makers and jurists thought, commerce had to be externally 
introduced in the continent. Trade was officially sanctioned at the Berlin Conference where European 
powers gathered to arrange the partitioning of Africa, with one of the main objectives of the conference 
being the preservation of the freedom to trade in the Congo and the Niger.396 During the conference, trade 
was not presented exclusively as beneficial for Europe, but also as a generous effort on the part of 
European nations to improve the living conditions of Africans. According to Bismarck, ‘all the 
Governments invited share the wish to bring the natives of Africa within the pale of civilization by 
opening up the interior of the continent to commerce’.397 
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Trade was sanctioned in the legal text adopted at the conclusion of the Conference, which established 
in its first article that ‘The trade of all nations shall enjoy complete freedom’.398 But European sovereignty 
and the right to free trade in Africa entailed responsibilities. Concretely, Western nations committed to 
‘the preservation of the native tribes’ and to ‘the improvement of the conditions of their moral and 
material well-being’.399 The duty of civilized states to help the amelioration of African populations was 
related to the mandate of civilization.  
But not all international lawyers uncritically adhered to the allegedly progressive creed of trade in the 
colonies. Some French international lawyers, like Charles Salomon (1862-1936), were critical of imperial 
justifications based on commerce. For them, the supposed European altruism in spreading civilization 
cloaked a clear economic interest. So Salomon, for example, denounced the hypocrisy of the language of 
civilization as a mechanism for the mere advance of European commerce.400 Gaston Jezé (1869-1953) 
also criticized the exploitative practices of private capital. Notwithstanding their criticisms, neither 
Salomon nor Jezé doubted the convenience of European rule over less developed societies. 
The thought that Western imperialism was inspired by selfish economic motives casted a dark shadow 
on the humanitarianism characteristic of late-nineteenth century internationalism. The extension of the 
sphere of the homo economicus could not be justified exclusively based on the economic benefit of 
Western nations. Otherwise imperialism seemed, in principle, extremely one-sided. So, without being 
critical of trade, British international lawyers would have agreed with Jezé and Solomon that civilization 
had to be introduced in primitive societies for the benefit of the latter. 
The legitimation of Western economic and political hegemony in the colonies was predicated on the 
West’s capacity to lift the colonized. In fact, even the Berlin Conference supposedly had a higher 
aspiration than the mere division of African riches between Western colonial states: it also included a 
humane desire to elevate lower races from material backwardness. According to the final text of Berlin, 
‘instructing the natives and bringing home to them the blessings of civilization’ was one of the primary 
objectives of European colonialism.401 The Swiss lawyer Joseph Hornung (1822-1884) clearely 
formulated this aspiration. For him, the ‘hegemony and trusteeship of the strong’ ought to be carried out 
‘in the interest of the weak and in view of their full future emancipation’.402 
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The extension of a modern economic sphere and the transfer of natural resources to the Western homo 
economicus operated in a similar way as the political subjugation of colonial populations. European 
economic preeminence and hegemony in the exploitation of natural resources was only a necessary first 
step due to the incapacity of the locals. But eventually, so international lawyers and colonial 
administrators thought, the colonized were to progress in their political and economic capacity.  
It was also relatively easy to circumvent the criticism that colonial trade served only Western economic 
interests. Because of its cosmopolitan ring, it was almost an axiomatic truth that trade, after all, benefited 
everyone. But that was easier assumed or even stated than demonstrated. International lawyers failed to 
clarify how the delineation of two spheres of economic life—one retrograde, the other progressive—was 
exactly going to help in improving Africans’ standard of living. How was the Western appropriation and 
exploitation of parts of Africa’s natural wealth going to help Africans achieve a better life? 
Lugard was perhaps the one that came most close to providing a practical answer to this question. He 
maintained that the two spheres of material life in the colonies ought to cooperate with one another—
ought to communicate—so the advanced sphere would push the ‘native economic sphere’ forward. He 
was also convinced that the colonial exploitation of the tropics could benefit the locals by effect of 
international trade. Europeans imported natural products from the tropics that could later be exported as 
manufactured ‘articles for the use and comfort’ of tropical populations.403 This affirmation, however, did 
not explain how exactly the bulk of the colonial population, who derived their profit from an economic 
sphere of material production oriented toward subsistence, could have the capital to purchase Western 
industrial products. All but a tiny minority of Africans were cut off from the natural wealth that the 
continent had in abundance. Only African economic elite, closely tied to the interests of imperial powers, 
had a real chance to improve their condition. As Western merchants, businesspersons, and their African 
allies monopolized the main natural resources and commercial channels of the continent, imperial rule 
failed to become an instrument for the general improvement of living conditions in Africa. What is more, 
it actually became the instrument that pushed many Africans to harsh conditions of labor, and still many 
more toward a kind of life whose conditions were far worse than they had ever experienced.  
The contrast between the humanitarian rhetoric that international lawyers exhibited in their treatises on 
international law and that could be found in the Final Act of the Berlin Conference and the cruelty that 
often accompanied European commercial expansion in Africa was evident in the Congo. Contrary to what 
was stated and regulated in Berlin, King Leopold established a commercial monopoly over trade in the 
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Congo and instituted an unparalleled regime of cruelty and terror.404 There were some critical voices that 
stood against Leopold’s practices. However, this criticism did not have to do with the fact that he had 
established a commercial monopoly at the exclusion of the inhabitants of the Congo—after all, the British 
had done pretty much the same in the Niger.405 That monopoly was consonant with the alleged need for 
the intervention of the homo economicus to help alleviate African backwardness. The main problem was 
that Leopold’s exploitative practices had gone too far, dispossessing and terrorizing the Congolese.406 
Decades after Leopold policies in the Congo were introduced, the British Foreign Office and especially 
the Congo Reform Association started to press for change, urging a return to the spirit of Berlin. The 
solution was to hand in the territory to the Belgian state, which soon managed to assure free trade and 
protect the Congolese. Nevertheless, the happy victory of Western humanitarianism had a blind spot. One 
of the objectives of the Congo Reform Association (which was dropped at the end) was left aside from 
the package of reform: Africans were still not permitted to own land in their own territory.407 
 The mission to create a worldwide institutional framework for the unfettered reign of the homo 
economicus and the export of the very economic activities—such as industrial agriculture and industrial 
mining—that those institutions facilitated were an integral part of the civilizing mission in African and 
‘backward’ Asiatic societies. It also served to make a distinction between various non-European societies: 
whereas uncivilized societies were considered to lack the conceptual and institutional infrastructure that 
modern economic life required, it was believed that semi-civilized states were able to provide them, at 
least to a certain extent. International lawyers acknowledged that semi-peripheral states such as the 
Ottoman Empire, Japan, and China were almost fully civilized, or were at least in possession of a 
particular civilization. This more lenient judgment of Asian states was partly based on the fact that those 
societies, not unlike European nations, were commercial societies.408 
In the most advanced non-European states, Western nations did not need to directly undertake the 
exploitation of underutilized natural resources. Those societies used the concept of private property and 
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the economic activity of trade to undertake directly that exploitation. But still, international law demanded 
that the world was an open space for the Western homo economicus. So, semi-peripheral states ought to 
open their markets and allow the participation of the homo economicus in the circulation of wealth that 
took place in their societies. Western merchants and businessmen had to be allowed to conduct their 
economic activities everywhere in the world. 
The standard that allowed a distinction between different kinds of non-European communities was 
based on the capacity of non-Western political communities to reciprocate.409 In Europe, every foreigner 
could (in theory) enjoy the same rights as the Europeans nationals of each state. Accordingly, European 
merchants, missionaries, and explorers ought to be able to have access to an impartial application of 
justice regarding their private economic rights when residing abroad. Several late-nineteenth century 
lawyers actually recognized that this already happened in the most advanced non-European nations. This 
was, for example, the reason why Westlake differentiated Asiatic empires from other non-European 
polities.410 The same distinction was at work in Oppenheim’s placement of Turkey and Japan within the 
sphere of international law.411 Even though both had entered the family of nations, Oppenheim still made 
a distinction between both nations. He explained that in Turkey foreigners were under the sole jurisdiction 
of Turkish consuls.412 This way, the economic interests of the homo economicus could not be properly 
guaranteed. According to Oppenheim, Turkey ought to follow Japan’s modernizing initiatives, which had 
assured the impartiality of its legal system in the treatment of foreigners.413 
Lorimer parted ways with the former jurists in his assessment of non-European societies. For him, 
humanity was divided in three ‘concentric zones’: civilized, barbarous, and savage.414 Only within the 
first group were nations able to reciprocate, a capacity that for Lorimer was the definitive criteria for the 
recognition of membership in the community of civilized nations. For Lorimer, the civilized sphere was 
composed of Western nations, their settler colonies, and American States. These were the only states that 
could reciprocate and, thus, had assured their total recognition. So, outside this exclusive sphere, the legal 
protection required for the ‘progressive’ operations of the homo economicus, Lorimer argued, could only 
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be guaranteed by the establishment of Western courts in foreign countries.415 Therefore, the recognition 
of extra-territoriality and the establishment of consular jurisdiction became a vital question in European-
Asian relations.416 
The judgment of whether a handful of non-European nations—namely Turkey, Japan, China, and 
Siam—were capable of assuring an economic sphere for Western individuals and thus deserving of 
recognition into the community of states under international law varied among international legal 
scholars. But what was common among them was basing the admission into the family of nations on the 
capacity of non-European states to guarantee the freedom of economic action and the private property of 
foreigners.417 The homogenization of legal condition for the economic operation of Western individuals 
was not always in place even in the most advanced non-European states. So, during the nineteenth century 
a regime of capitulations was developed in order to assure the extraterritorial jurisdiction of Western 
powers over its nationals operating abroad. For Fidler, capitulations were ‘a crude form of legal 
harmonization to facilitate the conduct of international trade and transactions in the early era of global 
commerce’.418 They removed the legal uncertainty and risk incurred by Western merchants, investors, 
and entrepreneurs when doing business abroad. 
Not surprisingly, many nations were unwilling to open themselves to the kind of foreign intrusion 
demanded by Western nations.419 However, their resistance was legally overcome by the imposition of 
unequal treaties that favored Western interests.420 For instance, the Treaty of Nanking of 1842 obliged 
China to lower its tariff rates and accept extraterritorial jurisdiction.421 The fact that unequal treaties were 
forcedly concluded with countries such as Japan, Siam, the Ottoman Empire, and China—which were 
regarded as quasi-equals to Western states—evidences the importance for Western powers of assuring 
private rights and favorable commercial terms for their citizens. The protection of Western rights in 
                                                 
415 Lorimer, The Institutes of the Law, 217. 
416 Pitts, ‘Boundaries of Victorian International Law’, 81. 
417 Georg Schwarzenberger, ‘The Rule of Law and the Disintegration of the International Society’ 33 The American Journal 
of International Law (1939) 56-77, 64. 
418 David P. Fidler, ‘A Kinder, Gentler System of Capitulations? International Law, Structural Adjustment Policies, and the 
Standard of Liberal, Globalized Civilization’ 35 Texas International Law Journal (2000) 388-421, 391.  
419 Extraterritorial rights to Europeans had been recognized previously by the Ottoman Empire, Japan, China, and Siam, and 
were generally based on reciprocity. However, the increasing demands of European powers and their superior military 
powered made foreign states reluctant to make new concessions. This is why in those cases Europe resorted to war. Gong, 
The Standard of ‘Civilization’, 67-68. 
420 Ibid., 65. 
421 Ibid., 67. 
477 
 
international law and its articulation as a criterion to measure non-European civilization hid imperial 
commercial ambitions.422 
States that could not protect the rights of foreigners were labeled uncivilized. But even those which 
could guarantee them but did not want to do so were forced—violently, if necessary—to comply. 
Therefore, the ultimate criterion for Western intervention was not the capacity of a state to grant rights to 
foreigners. That was a mere façade. What was decisive was the willingness of a particular nation to let 
foreigners take a piece of the cake of its natural wealth.423 
During the second part of the nineteenth century, the U.S and Great Britain had 28 million square 
kilometers at their disposal. They could directly, or by way of its settler populations, undertake the 
exploitation of the ecosystems in those territories. By the end of the century a selected club of Western 
nations acquired another 30 million square kilometers in Africa. The idea that the ‘Dark Continent’ 
needed to be opened to the light of Western economic initiative animated African colonization. Due to 
its alleged backwardness, the direct administration of Africa was an imperative necessity. Almost half of 
the surface of the Earth had been appropriated by Western powers based on a standard of environmental 
exploitation.  
But at the turn of the century, as Western industrial countries looked at the rest of the world from the 
pinnacle of their power, the standard of environmental exploitation stopped short of being applicable 
outside Africa and the most backward Asian societies. In between civilization and primitiveness were 
those non-European polities which were trying to modernize and had already committed to exploiting 
their own resources. What was necessary, then, was that the individuals of the most powerful Western 
industrial nations could participate in the exploitation of ecosystems everywhere in the world, and that 
their economic activity could proceed in a harmonized legal universe of appropriable natural resources. 
That way global capitalism, impersonated in the progressive activity of the homo economicus, could 
endlessly transform nature into a civilized realm and a modern space of power and plenty.  
 
Concluding remarks 
Since the beginning of the nineteenth century, Western intellectuals had studied with a sense of perplexity 
and admiration the economic and social trajectories of the most advanced Western nations. 
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Industrialization and science had brought about sweeping transformations in all spheres of life. 
Industrialization, not without its negative trends of pollution and suffering for the labor class, had 
nevertheless contributed to the general amelioration of living conditions in the U.S. and a few European 
countries. Moreover, progress seemed to be unlimited and quicker than ever before. Changes that had 
previously taken centuries were now happening in the span of decades. When compared to the rest of the 
world it was not only clear that industrialized Western societies were superior to non-European ones, but 
also that their superiority kept growing as those societies progressed. One of the main elements of their 
superiority consisted of making possible the old religious aspiration that Prince Albert had pertinently 
expressed during the Great Exhibition: that of modeling the Earth in their own image (which, in practice, 
meant according to their own economic interests). 
 The old division between civilized and uncivilized societies based merely on the superiority of 
different elements of Western nations, which conjectural history had aptly captured, had to be rethought 
during the second half of the nineteenth century. World societies could no longer be ordered merely 
according to divergent social trajectories on their path toward progress. There were, of course, differences 
between the degrees of progress of different non-European communities. But the most important social 
division worldwide was now articulated around two clear-cut camps. Already in the beginning of the 
nineteenth century James and John Stuart Mill had noticed that while European societies kept 
progressing, most of the world outside Europe had stagnated. Progressive societies carried within 
themselves the seeds of continuous and unlimited progress. The free movement of capital, 
industrialization, and innovation created a virtuous circle of economic growth and social improvement. 
At the other end of the spectrum were non-progressive societies; static and retrograde political units that 
could not be moved forward from within.  
 Despite these differences, one still had to concede that some non-Europeans were more advanced than 
others. The peoples of Africa, for example, excelled when compared Australian savages. They had a 
notion of private property and practiced agriculture and commerce. But mirrored against the image of 
industrial Europe they were still lagging far behind. Besides, the task of catching up with the West was 
not an easy one. As non-Europeans managed to meet old standards of civilization, new ones constantly 
appeared, and the gap between the backward and the progressive widened again and again. For the 
agriculturalist Africans, statehood became the new horizon of progress and civilization. And once they 
eventually formed independent states the standard evolved again—be it development, respect for human 
rights, or good governance, Non-European polities have historically been found wanting by universal 
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standards of social amelioration. The power to define what progress meant was the power to shape and 
remodel societies according to one’s own ideology, interventionist agenda, and set of priorities. In other 
words, the priorities that counted were those of the ones with the power to define what was universally 
appropriate and desirable. 
 The vernacular of evolution was vital in providing a vocabulary that could aptly capture the new set 
of differences that at the end of the nineteenth century informed the hierarchical division of the world. 
The gap between advanced and backward world societies had grown into a gulf that could be better 
expressed through the distinction between pre-modern/primitive/ancient societies and modern ones. 
Modernity was the reign of progress.  
 Evolution also resolved another of the challenges posed by the growing social gap between modern 
and pre-modern societies. During the seventeenth and eighteenth century, when social differences 
between Europeans and non-Europeans were supposedly related only to their productive and institutional 
systems, it was somehow feasible to bridge the gap and bring civilization to uncivilized non-Europeans 
by changing those systems. At the turn of the twentieth century, civilized modernity was out of reach for 
primitive societies. Forcing pre-modern peoples to accept ideas, practices, and institutions that as Lugar 
recognized were ‘a thousand years in advance’ of their ‘mental and social equipment’ was like forcing a 
person to change her/his very bone structure. For this reason, imposing civilization was meant to create 
pain, turmoil, and resistance. 
 Intellectuals like Maine and colonial figures like Lugard found a way through this challenge. They 
suggested that societies ought to evolve from pre-modern to modern forms at a slow pace. Mere contact 
with superior forms spontaneously disintegrated primitive societies and pushed them onto the path toward 
progress. Indirect rule was the institutional response that the British envisaged in order to carry their 
civilizing mission without dislocating colonial societies. To the extent possible, pre-colonial societies 
ought to be left to themselves. Their governmental structures, customs, and productive systems ought to 
be respected. This seemingly passive attitude was in reality a well-engineered intervention in order to 
hold power tightly while engendering minimal resistance.  
 But respect for the pre-modern economic sphere of the colonized populations clashed with the 
cosmopolitan mandate of exploiting the world’s virgin natural frontiers. A constant flow of raw materials 
from the colonies was indispensable in keeping up the ever-growing expansion of the international 
capitalist economy. In response to this demand, Lugard explained that one of the main functions of 
colonial administration was to promote the economic development of the colonies. In order to reconcile 
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that mission with respect for the backward economy of colonized populations, the British demarcated a 
parallel modern economic space in the colonies, one occupied by the Western homo economicus in which 
the modern rights of a private economic nature could be used in order to exploit vacant natural resources. 
 The imperialist promotion of the homo economicus was facilitated by the scientific language of 
international law. This, of course, was not a new development particular to the nineteenth century. Since 
the first Spanish colonists appropriated Latin American ecosystems and traded the natural resources of 
the continent, Spanish commentators had recognized the international legal validity of private property 
rights, international trade, and a right to occupy unexploited resources. In the following centuries other 
European jurists and intellectuals similarly legitimized the economic activities of the Dutch in the East 
Indies and the British in the West Indies and North America. Since the day European imperialism started 
in Hispaniola, the homo economicus was the private face of state imperialism. At different times that face 
was more visible. All in all, public and private power were two sides of the same coin, two aspects of the 
same phenomenon. And while international law was generally associated with the former, it also provided 
the legal architecture and raison d'être for the private appropriation of the world. 
 But during the second half of the nineteenth century the homo economicus was new in a certain sense, 
at least in contrast to the way colonization had operated during the first half of the century. Settler 
colonialism did not need the construction of a particular space and set of rules that enabled free capitalist 
economic activity, because in settler colonies the boundaries of the free space for the homo economicus 
coincided with the very boundaries of the continents settled. The pre-colonial populations were 
completely cut out of the enjoyment of the natural resources available in those territories. It was only 
when Westerners could not appropriate whole continents that the existence of regimes of private property 
rights and free trade became a standard of governance and civilization, its absence validating imperial 
interventions to guarantee—or rather impose—them. But at the end of the day, even if the way in which 
it was exercised was different, imperialism provided hegemonic power over the natural resources of non-
European territories at the cost of the ecological balance of ecosystems and the well-being of the very 
populations that depended on them. 
 The homo economicus was no abstraction. Individuals like Leopold II and Cecil Rhodes and families 
like the Rothschild, who amassed huge fortunes through the appropriation and commercialization of 
particular non-European natural and mineral resources like rubber, diamonds, and land, or the financing 
of those international economic ventures, incarnated it. However, not all of the economic actors that 
operated in the Empire were greedy investors or ruthless empire-builders. Some were humanitarians that 
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saw no incompatibility in acquiring fortunes from exploiting the resources that backward populations 
could not use and using part of their gains to uplift the very populations whose resources they had taken. 
In addition, Western humanitarianism in Africa found its most altruist impulse in the work of charities 
and missionaries whose mission was, paradoxically, to provide material well-being to those impoverished 
by the very acts of appropriation of profitable natural resources, the benefits of which they could not reap. 
 Evolution had closed the full circle of imperialism by providing a novel legitimating vocabulary. It 
would not be the last. In the mid-twentieth century, after two World Wars ravaged Europe, shattering the 
European sense of moral superiority, the new global hegemon of the U.S. proclaimed the dawn of a new 
era: the era of development. This does not mean that development was a completely new term. In the 
opening pages of The Dual Mandate Lugard had already explained that after the Berlin Conference a 
program of development had been launched in Africa.424 The material development of the tropics was a 
specific goal of imperialism. Development, the novel terminological expression of progress, would 
acquire great importance in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. It became a new vocabulary of 
progress, one that was particularly palatable in a politically post-colonial world. 
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Part VI 
 
10  End of Colonialism, End of Story? 
 
The Thesis in a Nutshell 
 
This work has grown out of a conviction that the way in which the history of international law has been 
generally told is fundamentally incomplete. By and large, nature has been marginal to international legal 
histories. This is not, of course, the result of bad scholarship. Rather, it is the logical corollary of the fact 
that legal scholars have only recently started to devote attention to the past of the discipline. Inspired by 
the need to explore the environmental dimension of international legal historiography, this study has 
attempted to start mapping the historical relationship between international law and nature. This is a huge 
intellectual task, so this study is just a first step in that direction.  
It is the central argument of this study that the appropriation of non-European nature has been a vital 
component of the development of international law and that, conversely, international law has played a 
fundamental role in legitimizing the colonial appropriation of non-European nature. During the colonial 
era, legal arguments fashioned around the use and exploitation of nature validated a number of imperial 
interventions in non-European territories that often resulted in environmental degradation and social 
dislocation.  
 By legitimizing the appropriation and exploitation of non-European ecosystems, international law was 
an instrument of empire. It helped Europe and the U.S. gain environmental hegemony over huge portions 
of the Earth. That hegemony was simultaneously the cornerstone of Western economic prowess and 
political power and the cause of the impoverishment of non-European peoples who were largely deprived 
of the enjoyment of the natural wealth available in their surroundings. 
  The appropriation of non-European nature—land and natural resources—had a twofold dimension. 
Appropriation needed, on the one hand, a justifying rationale (why to appropriate) and, on the other hand, 
a series of institutional mechanisms to materialize it (how to appropriate). This second demand was 
fulfilled by the rights to private property, trade, and occupation. These rights provided the legal vehicle 
whereby nature could be transformed into an economic entity and, once objectified, appropriated. The 
application of these rights converted natural elements that functioned together in complex ecosystems 
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into a series of individualized articles that could be separated from those ecosystems, privately owned, 
marketized, and transformed into objects of elite or mass consumption. So, the history of international 
law is also the history of the universalization of legal processes of privatization and commodification of 
nature in America, Africa, Asia, and Oceania.  
The theory of occupation—the idea that after God’s creation there were still certain vacant goods and 
lands in the world that could be occupied by the first taker—became crucial in elucidating the extent to 
which non-European nature was appropriable. But in Europe, as elsewhere, there was a lot of unexploited 
ecosystems, and no one claimed that they were susceptible of appropriation. On what grounds could non-
European territories be treated differently? Would not the right to occupy necessarily collide with non-
Europeans’ free enjoyment of the natural wealth of their territories? Europeans resolved this paradox by 
linking the right to occupy in the colonies to the question of non-European social progress. And the 
evaluation of whether Europeans were advanced was, among other factors, ultimately based on their 
capacity to exploit nature—that is, to transform supposedly idle natural resources into economic items of 
civilized life. In time, a standard of environmental exploitation developed, which helped in delimiting the 
extent of Europeans’ right to appropriate and exploit non-European vacant land and natural wealth. 
What Antony Anghie has called the ‘dynamic of difference’—the ideological belief of European 
intellectuals in the existence of a gap between their superior social condition and the inferior state of non-
Europeans—was partly based on the belief that non-Europeans existed in a continuum with nature. Even 
if approached from contrary ends of the spectrum the colonial natural-social continuum revealed the same 
gloomy reality. On the one hand, the abject condition of non-Europeans evidenced that they did not have 
the capacity to work and transform their surroundings, which logically were in a wild condition: 
backwardness produced wilderness. On the other hand, the assumed wilderness of non-European 
territories clearly indicated that non-Europeans lacked the capacity to utilize, improve, and make those 
ecosystems productive: wilderness produced backwardness. 
This dynamic of difference created a fertile ground for a redemptive mission. Because, according to 
representations of non-European nature and people, the social and natural spheres of life had not 
completely disentangled in the colonies, it was then the European imperial mission to affect that 
separation—that is, to unravel the social/natural continuum. Therefore, the civilizing mission, which has 
been identified with the attempt to uplift non-European peoples, needs to be redefined. It was larger than 
the mere attempt to redeem non-Europeans and upgrade their condition—it was a more thorough, 
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encompassing, and far reaching project: the project of creating civilization out of wilderness (wild nature 
and wild people).  
Once the civilizing mission was defined in such terms, it was easy to conclude that the most suitable 
instruments to bring it about were European economic rights. Because of the progressive nature of these 
instruments, the privatization and commodification of nature could turn wilderness into economic items 
of progress and transmute half-social/half-natural individuals into civilized economic operators. Nature’s 
exploitation was the cornerstone of human progress. So it was assumed that once that process was 
undertaken in the colonies through European superior economic institutions, the static non-European 
world could finally gain traction, move toward Christianity, civility, civilization, or modernity (the 
different European vernaculars that had historically captured the idea of progress), and thus enter the 
realm of progressive history. Unluckily for non-Europeans, the promise receded as it was supposedly 
approached. This was so because, in practice, imperialism tore down a substantial part of the social texture 
of non-European societies, creating the very states of destitution and deprivation that it then theorized as 
an inherent social condition of the colonies to be corrected. 
The legitimization of the appropriation of non-European nature by international law, which paved the 
way for environmental exploitation and human impoverishment, leaves little to celebrate. But while it is 
tempting to look at the past from a contemporary ecological sensibility and firmly point the finger of 
blame, a point of caution is needed. Phenomena like acid rain, the thinning of the ozone layer, global 
warming, desertification, etc., have contributed to raising awareness about the destruction of our natural 
surroundings. But centuries ago, the world looked rather unexploited, and the conceptual lens with which 
people looked at it were completely different. So, it feels wrong to judge others by standards they would 
not even have comprehended.  
The past and the present seem incommensurable. Still, despite undeniable and huge differences, it is 
difficult not to feel that there is a tragic connection with the past. For this reason, it seems pertinent to 
interrogate into the historical operation of powerful narratives that do not allow humans to wake up from 
the dream of owning the Earth and feeling superior to other living creatures, be they human or non-human. 
The point is not to find fault and lay blame, but rather to raise awareness about the multiple ideological 
layers that have produced and still create a distorted way of perceiving reality and operating in the world. 
The practical imposition of that distortion on the world through expert analyses, policies, and institutional 
apparatuses—all increasingly taking place at the international level—have caused and continue to cause 
enormous suffering. Awareness about the past can illuminate the present and, hopefully, prevent an 
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actualized tragic trap of repetition. We can only transform what is brought to light, no matter how painful 
it is to see what we did not want to see.  
In order to verify whether the past repeats itself in regard to the narrative that informs the present work, 
I would like in the following pages to interrogate whether the Western appropriation of non-European 
nature and its associated environmental hegemony actually ended once Western imperialism was formally 
dismantled. The remainder of this work thus seeks to open a window of possibility into future research 
by outlining certain grand schemes directed at non-European nature in the post-colonial era. Concretely, 
I will focus on and reflect separately upon the discourses of development and conservation in order to 
ascertain whether certain features of the seemingly far colonial past, as outlined in this study, are still part 
of our more recent history. A thorough analysis of these discourses clearly surpasses the scope of this 
work. So, in this final chapter, I will not go farther than the Stockholm Conference (1972), which 
inaugurated the concept of sustainable development, in itself a huge field of research.  
 
Coda: Development 
 
Development and the inauguration of a new era 
On Thursday 20 January 1949, Harry S. Truman gave his inaugural address as newly elected president of 
the U.S.1 Truman began his speech by emphasizing the various challenges that the U.S. and the world at 
large faced at that particular historical juncture. In the aftermath of two world wars that had ravaged the 
Earth and with the start of decolonization looming on the horizon, the world as it was known before the 
mid-twentieth century was passing away. Thus, it had to be reborn again. Truman’s speech sought to 
adumbrate the contours of that new era. In this context, U.S. democratic values and free-market capitalism 
were presented as the right and bright way forward. But, despite the seemingly glaring progressive nature 
of this path, it was not self-evident at a time when many ex-colonies were ‘advancing toward self-
government’2 that the new nations that were to emerge from colonialism were going to choose the option 
that Truman so fervently cherished. What is more, the U.S. had to face a competing and, according to 
Truman, misleading philosophy of life: communism, which threatened to attract nations down a wrong 
and harmful historical path. 
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It was in the context of competing ideologies to reconstruct international life after the Second World 
War that Truman presented a four-point program of action, intended to shape the future in a way that 
would be attractive to all nations. That program included adherence and support to the United Nations, a 
plan for the economic recovery of European nations, and the creation of a collective defense arrangement 
for the security of the North Atlantic Area. The fourth and final point was a general socio-economic 
program intended to the ‘improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas’. In this regard, Truman 
declared that: 
 
We must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress 
available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas. More than half the people of the world are 
living in conditions approaching misery. Their food is inadequate. They are victims of disease. Their economic life 
is primitive and stagnant. Their poverty is a handicap and a threat both to them and to more prosperous areas. For 
the first time in history, humanity possesses the knowledge and the skill to relieve the suffering of these people …  
I believe that we should make available to peace-loving peoples the benefits of our store of technical knowledge 
in order to help them realize their aspirations for a better life. And, in cooperation with other nations, we should 
foster capital investment in areas needing development … The old imperialism—exploitation for foreign profit—
has no place in our plans. What we envisage is a program of development based on the concepts of democratic 
fair-dealing.3  
 
Truman’s fourth point of the address inaugurated the ‘era of development’.4 Even though the threat of 
communism seemed the most urgent, and hence important, of all the concerns that Truman raised in his 
address, it was the new program of development that would prove historically more consequential for the 
vast majority of the world population. Eventually, the West at large embraced development as the right 
prism for understanding and relating to non-Europeans. 
Truman himself believed that, at the time of his renewed presidency, the world was entering into a 
crucial and new historical period.5 In consequence, his address was seemingly no more than a timely 
response to the exigencies of the new times. Paradoxically, Truman’s speech contributed to bringing 
about the very reality to which his speech sought to respond—at least, this was the case with regard to 
non-European peoples. As Gustavo Esteva has famously put it, ‘underdevelopment began … on 20 
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January 1949’.6 According to Esteva, as a result of Truman’s discourse ‘2 billion people became’ 
suddenly ‘underdeveloped’.7 Truman made a diagnosis of the deficiencies that afflicted most non-
European societies and prescribed a precise cure. His words configured the very geographical and 
conceptual deficient entity: the Third World, which his program of action was destined to redeem.  
 Development, of course, was not a total newcomer. Without using the term, the Final Act of the Berlin 
Conference had, nonetheless, committed European countries to the improvement of the material well-
being of Africans.8 Years later, in the Dual Mandate Lugard used the word prolifically.9 He dedicated 
two whole chapters to dealing with the question of the economic development of British colonies. 
Similarly, the League of Nations promoted the economic development of the colonies and the welfare of 
colonized populations.10  
Even though Lugard and the mandate system laid the first bricks of the contemporary edifice of 
development, both came short of using the word with the historical specificity that Truman did. The main 
reason why Truman’s program of development seemed such a novel enterprise was because it consciously 
distanced itself from imperialism. Both the mandate system and Lugard inserted economic development 
as one aspect of a more general program of civilization applied to the colonies. For that reason, the world 
of Lugard and the League did not need underdevelopment. There were other terms available, such as 
primitive or uncivilized, to help capture and express the retrograde moral and economic condition of non-
Europeans before Western imperialism started to correct their historical trajectory. The difference 
between development and underdevelopment became significant to international life only after the 
Second World War, in the context of the new institutional reconstruction of the world under the auspices 
of the United Nations.11 
‘Truman’s development’ was a much more specific and encompassing historical project because it 
came about partly as a result of the intersection of two broad historical processes. One of them was the 
ascension of the U.S. as the new world hegemon in competition with the communist Soviet bloc. The 
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other was the beginning of decolonization. Both were interrelated because communism presented an 
alternative socio-economic creed that independent nations could embrace.12 None other than Lenin had 
claimed that imperialism was the highest stage of capitalist domination.13 So it was vital for the new 
project of development to disassociate itself from the very beginning from former Western imperialist 
projects of progress. It was politically savvy to emphasize that development was ‘clean’ from its inception 
and, although it had nothing to do with the shameful history of European colonialism, it still could deliver 
the same progressive promise of universal social amelioration. 
Despite Truman’s claim that the ‘old imperialism’ had nothing to do with the new project of 
development, the influence of imperialism filtered into Truman’s discourse in various ways. On the one 
hand, the distinction between developed and underdeveloped areas seemed to reproduce old colonial 
hierarchical divisions between Europeans and non-Europeans, such as backward/advanced, 
civilized/uncivilized, retrograde/progressive, primitive/modern, etc. On the other hand, Truman retained 
terms that had a clear colonial ring. For example, he characterized the economic life of those who lived 
in underdeveloped areas as ‘primitive’ and ‘stagnant’. These were terms that authors such as Henry Maine 
and John Stuart Mill had already used in the nineteenth century to capture non-Europeans’ backwardness.  
But still, there were differences between the old and new vocabularies. Truman talked about 
‘underdeveloped areas’ but did not use the expression ‘underdeveloped peoples’. And even when he 
recognized the primitiveness of the peoples that populated those areas, he restricted primitiveness to the 
economic sphere. The Second World War had destroyed the supposed moral/cultural superiority of the 
West that was implicit in the language of civilization.14 The advanced European nations had shown that 
even civilized states were capable of committing unimaginable atrocities. For that reason, the moral 
distance between the savage and the civilized man seemed smaller than ever before. And even if 
Europeans still felt superior to their colonized populations, it was particularly difficult after the War to 
base that superiority on moral or cultural grounds.  
But renouncing moral superiority did not amount to getting rid of hierarchy as such. Truman showed 
that the West could still cling to the superior material conditions of life that their societies had attained 
vis-à-vis non Europeans, which in turn were the result of the application of Western superior scientific 
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knowledge. The Marshall plan allowed a prompt recovery of a devastated Europe that only a few decades 
after the War rejoined the track of economic growth and prosperity. Europe too could enter the 
development wagon, forget its darkest recent times, and join a utopian program for the reconfiguration 
of the non-European world which allowed it to retain its preponderant world status. As the hero of the 
war, the U.S. did not have to face Europe’s moral hesitation. Therefore, it was the perfect candidate to 
outline the developmental path for the future of the world and take the leadership without remorse.  
Development and underdevelopment, as previous imperialist languages, served to identify (or rather 
re-create) a new gap between Western and non-European societies. As the vernacular of civilization 
became morally inappropriate and outdated, inferiority was reduced to a socio-economic plane. Once the 
gap between the superior West and backward non-Europeans was reproduced in socio-economic terms, 
it was easy to offer development, Western knowledge, science, and economic institutions as the best 
instruments to close that gap.  
In 1949, Truman lay the foundations of the development era. Nevertheless, in the 1960s, as tens of 
nations from Asia and Africa achieved independence, there was a compelling need to explain in detail 
how the new independent non-European societies could ascend from underdevelopment to the promised 
land of development. It was at this crucial juncture that modernization theory came to complete the work 
commenced by Truman a decade before. It is not a coincidence, perhaps, that the most significant 
intellectual work of modernization theory, Walt Rostow’s The Stages of Economic Growth,15 was 
published in 1960, the year that 17 sub-Saharan African nations gained independence. 
 
Modernization theory and the re-appropriation of non-European nature 
Rostow’s manifesto and Truman’s address were born out of the same historical influences and, 
particularly, the Communist threat.16 In the aftermath of Truman’s inaugural address, U.S. political elites 
encouraged U.S. social scientists to devise theoretical instruments that would foster U.S. sponsored 
                                                 
15  I have used the third edition of this work. See Walt W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist 
Manifesto (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990). 
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capitalist development.17 A staunch anti-communist and a fervent defender of capitalism, Walt Rostow 
was the perfect candidate for such an enterprise.18  
Modernization theory was the conceptual response to the need to identify and concretely delineate 
how underdeveloped nations could climb the social scale in order to attain economic progress. But in 
order to find the solution to underdevelopment it was vital to identify on what underdevelopment 
concretely consisted. Truman had hinted that underdevelopment was the result of a primitive and stagnant 
economic life; but that was a somewhat circular response, as it left unidentified the sources of economic 
primitiveness.  
Rostow began his book by identifying five universal economic categories in which all world societies 
could be divided. Those five types of societies were (from most backward to most advanced): the 
traditional society, the preconditions for take-off, the take-off, the drive to maturity, and the age of high 
mass-consumption. After presenting a universal social classification, Rostow went on identifying the 
source of backwardness of traditional societies. According to Rostow, the most backward social 
formation was ‘one … based on pre-Newtonian attitudes toward the physical world’, which, in other 
words, meant a society in which ‘men’ had not yet realized ‘that the external world was subject to a few 
knowable laws, and was systematically capable of productive manipulation’.19 Accordingly, those 
societies ‘remained untouched or unmoved by man’s new capability for regularly manipulating his 
environment to his economic advantage’.20 
Rostow related the underdevelopment of non-European nations to their incapacity to master nature. 
Those societies had not yet been able to exploit their ‘unused natural resources and methods of 
production’.21 Economic advantage and economic growth were the result of humanity’s increasing 
capacity to exploit vacant/wild nature.  
Truman had already indicated in his speech that, with the help of modern science and technology, 
development was to maximize the utilization of the world’s untapped natural wealth. According to Beard, 
Truman’s conception of development echoed Bacon’s belief that humanity ought to assert its dominion 
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over nature.22 This conclusion seems correct in hindsight. Today we are conscious of how 
environmentally destructive industrialization and modernization have been. However, while Truman 
presented different elements that could be seen as an invitation to exercise dominion over nature—the 
importance of science and technology for productivity, the need for better use of natural resources, etc.—
he never joined the dots.  
That was not the case with Rostow. The Baconian perspective that informed his conception of 
development was evident in his conviction that development could only take place with the realization 
that: 
 
Man need not regard his physical environment as virtually a factor given by nature and providence, but as an 
ordered world which, if rationally understood, can be manipulated in ways which yield productive change and, in 
one dimension at least, progress.23 
 
Rostow anchored human progress to the capacity to perceive nature as an entity that could be rationally 
understood and manipulated. Nature’s ‘aliveness’ was objectified, turned into an ‘ordered world’, and 
made malleable to human scientific and technical power.24 Bacon’s influence (here understood as the 
belief in the importance of the human domination of nature) is much more visible in Rostow’s ideas than 
in Truman’s declaration.25 In Rostow’s modernization theory there is powerful invitation to dominate 
nature for human profit.  
Rostow’s ideas are not only a thing of the past. When in 1990, thirty years after the first edition of his 
book, Rostow addressed the critique that his model was too general and automatic and in consequence 
trapped societies in a one-dimensional progressive scheme, he defended the automaticity of his model in 
at least one way. At the core of the model, he stated, was the transition from a pre-Newtonian way of 
relating to nature to a post-Newtonian one. This transition occurred, he maintained, when humans 
understood the laws that governed nature and, hence, were able to manipulate nature to their advantage 
in a systematic way.26 For Rostow, the capacity to exploit nature was, in the 1990s as in the 1960s, one 
                                                 
22  Jennifer L. Beard, The Political Economy of Desire: International Law, Development and the Nation State (New York, 
Routledge-Cavendish, 2007) 159. 
23  Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth, 19. 
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of the main drivers of history and, as such, one of the most important interpretative devices for 
understanding humanity. For Rostow, that capacity was the element that could singlehandedly explain 
the difference between the ‘modern world’ and ‘all previous history’.27  
The way in which modernization theory defined social progress and the role given to nature in it 
resembled in important ways the intellectual story that this work has described. As in previous centuries, 
the dynamic of difference between Westerners and non-Europeans was predicated on the capacity to 
master and exploit nature. This, in turn, created a standard of environmental exploitation. One could place 
societies in a hierarchical scale of progress by judging how much they exploited their ecosystems for 
economic gain. The developmental mission was, then, as the civilizing mission had been before, a twofold 
project of bringing humans and nature out of wilderness.28 As underdeveloped peoples and 
underdeveloped nature were again (but using a different vernacular) placed in a continuum, 
modernization entailed bringing non-European peoples ‘out of nature’ so that they could autonomously 
ascend over it and exploit it.  
It is striking the extent to which modernization bore a resemblance to previous progressive philosophies 
of history, particularly conjectural history. Both traditions identified the existence of different stages 
through which all human societies transited in their path toward progress. Both were simultaneously 
descriptive and prescriptive, and interpreted reality as well as created it. Both visions were born in 
powerful locations and were embraced by powerful agents that had the tools to implements their vision 
of the world and superimpose it onto the ‘real’ world. Modernization also rescued from the annals of 
history the identification of a society’s productive capacity as benchmark for its progressiveness.29 It was 
stadial theory that had popularized the ideas that humans progressed as they managed to more thoroughly 
exploit nature—in contemporary vernacular we could say that modernization was merely ‘copy-pasted’. 
The intellectual influence of Henry Maine and nineteenth century social theory is also evident. In fact, 
modernization theory can be seen as the epitome of the old social distinction between traditional and 
modern societies.  
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Modernization theory reconfigured the world in ways that are by now familiar and that have had 
enormous and deleterious effect for non-Europeans. It is clear that modernization contributed to what I 
have called the conceptual appropriation of non-European nature, that is, the definition of nature and 
people in non-European territories in a way that favored European hegemony. The existence of 
underdeveloped areas and peoples outside the West called for a redeployment of the Western superior 
capacity to master and exploit nature. Progress, understood as the domination of nature, was the way to 
overcome what for Truman were the three ‘ancient enemies’ of humanity: ‘hunger, misery and despair’.30 
Once the ‘old’ vision about the most progressive way to relate to non-European nature was inserted at 
the core of the ‘new’ vocabulary of development, it still had to be decided how to carry out that grand 
vision. What were the most suitable institutional mechanisms for arriving at the progressive and 
developed society that Truman and Rostow had envisioned?  
The answer could already be found in Truman’s speech. The developed society he proposed as a model 
for the world was a capitalist society, namely one based on the twin economic institutions of private 
property and enterprise and free trade. As part of his development program, he committed the U.S. to 
‘foster capital investment in areas needing development’.31 This in turn required the participation of the 
U.S. business community, ‘private capital’, industrial agriculture, and intensive labor.32 Finally, 
development was an instrument to favor U.S. free trade with the rest of the world.33  
Rostow shared Truman’s’ conviction that development should be based on private capital and free 
trade. For him, the transit of a self-sufficient community to a modernized society required expanding 
trade from a local setting to a national ambit and even a broader international scale.34 In addition, he 
believed that the expansion of trade had been one of the cornerstones of European progressive 
development. That allowed the glorification of the masculine colonial past, particularly ‘those men 
devoted to commerce: men concerned with fine calculations of profit and loss, men of wide horizons, 
whose attitudes communicated themselves in various ways through their societies’.35  
The rise of a traditional society to modernity demanded the dismantling of the very economic and social 
fabric of that society and its reconstitution in a capitalist model. That implied, first of all, ‘persuading the 
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peasant’ to embrace industrial agriculture and orient his production to ‘wider markets’.36 In addition, 
industrialization required a body of experts, technicians, and an entrepreneurial class oriented toward 
‘expanded output’.37  
Development, as modernization theory conceived it, encouraged both what I have called the conceptual 
and the material appropriation of non-European nature. This means it defined non-European nature and 
people as backward and in need of Western intervention while, at the same time, promoting private 
economic rights as the most efficient and progressive way to undertake that intervention.  
For Rostow, modernization was both the history of the privatization and commodification of nature as 
well as the application of modern science and technology. Both processes went hand in hand and 
reinforced one another. The path for the new independent nations was clear. But what was the role of 
international law in the new ‘era of development’? In what ways did international law help the U.S. and 
other Western nations implement the wide-ranging and thorough agenda of change that Truman had 
generously offered to the world on the 20 January 1949? 
 
Development and international law 
International law relates to the ‘era of development’ in two crucial ways—one is conceptual, the other 
practical. On the one hand, in the post-war period in which development was born (or rather reborn) 
international law helped build an indissoluble and necessary link between decolonization, the nation state, 
and development.38 On the other hand, international law was the instrument that permitted the articulation 
of the institutional apparatus that facilitated the implementation of development in the decolonized world. 
By the mid-twentieth century, international law offered decolonizing nations a language to counter 
imperialism. But, in so doing, it also kept the radicalism of non-European nations within a limited 
conceptual horizon that prevented a real change of the structural power inequality which had 
characterized the relationship between different areas and continents during the colonial era. Two basic 
legal principles of the post-colonial era, namely self-determination and sovereign equality, promised 
newly independent nations an end to the political subjugation experienced under European rule. At the 
same time, the only way in which human communities could gain international recognition, and hence 
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sovereign status, in the post-colonial era was by constituting nation-states. Only nations were recognized 
actors of international law. But statehood and nationhood had a very specific meaning in international 
law, one that had been historically associated with the supposedly universal and progressive trajectory of 
Western nations.39 The state incarnated the modern organizational nature of progressive societies. 
Consequently, the goals and orientation of the international community that non-European nations 
entered after decolonization were already established. The form (nation) that the newly independent non-
European communities historically ‘inherited’ had inscribed within it a particular understanding of human 
life (progress). The nation-state had a purpose, an ultimate raison d’être, that had been historically 
implanted into it. In the post-colonial era, that rationale was termed ‘development’. 
This does not mean that the aspiration of national development was forcedly imposed upon non-
European nations. In fact, that aspiration was also fully embraced by the nationalist leaders. As Chatterjee 
has claimed, independent nations challenged the charge of cultural inferiority associated with colonialism 
precisely by claiming that the new nations were able to modernize themselves.40 Non-European nations 
limited their backwardness to the economic sphere, but by doing so were not able to completely break 
free from the Western conceptual universe.41 Through the developmental state, international law allowed 
non-European nations to gain formal sovereign equality while maintaining old imperialist hierarchies.42  
The end of history that Fukuyama would announce in the 1990s seemed real, at least to a certain extent 
already in the 1960s.43 While there were several ideological alternatives for achieving the advanced vision 
of society that development encapsulated, the horizon of progress was one and the same for all nations. 
Eventually in the 1990s Fukuyama celebrated the consolidation of the single path for reaching that 
horizon: liberal democracy. But in the 1960s the developmental state had already become the accepted 
paradigm, the only international political unit. The difference with colonial times was that whether 
civilization was a requisite for statehood in the nineteenth century, development was no requisite in the 
post-colonial era. Every colony could achieve independence regardless of its developmental condition. 
The new international order was politically even in form. Contrastingly, in substance, there was an 
economic hierarchy between its members. This new gap allowed Western nations to launch a new grand 
program of reform for the underdeveloped world. 
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Perhaps the issue that most clearly evidenced the homogeneity of the developmental state was the 
approach to nature. All states, independent of the socio-economic ideology that they adopted 
(communism, socialism, capitalism), sought to modernize and attain economic growth in one way or 
another through the exploitation of nature. In the Soviet Union, for example, the intensive exploitation of 
the nation’s natural wealth was the corner stone of industrialization. Communist industrialization in the 
Soviet Union produced widespread ecological destruction.44 Chernobyl was the ultimate proof of the huge 
impact the imperative of economic growth through industrialization had on nature in Soviet times.45 In 
Egypt, under the nationalist leader Nasser (one of the promoters of the Non-Aligned Movement), the 
construction of the Aswan High Dam to fuel Egypt’s industrialization caused an environmental disaster.46 
Everywhere around the world, in India, Brazil, Nigeria, the U.S., Germany, and China, development and 
modernization projects took a huge toll on the environment.47  
Even at the theoretical level there was no clear alternative to the assault on nature that post-World War 
II economic growth demanded. Dependency theory, which in opposition to modernization explained 
underdevelopment as a result of the historically uneven economic relationship between Western and non-
European polities, advocated self-sufficient economic growth through import-substitution 
industrialization. So, industrialization was again the basis of the radical goal of correcting international 
social inequality. Similarly, in a famous farewell letter to his children, the Argentinian revolutionary Che 
Guevara (perhaps the figure that most strongly incarnated the struggle against U.S. imperialism in the 
1950s and 1960s) recommended his children to study hard ‘para poder dominar la técnica que permite 
dominar la naturaleza’ (‘in order to master the technique that permits the domination of nature’).48 
The same approach to nature was present in concrete attempts to reform international life. One of the 
key demands of the project of a New International Economic Order (NIEO), for example, was the 
permanent sovereignty over the nation-state’s natural resources. Through the NIEO several Latin 
American, African, and Asian nations attempted to redress the imbalance that characterized international 
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economic relations in the post-colonial era. But in this context, and independently of who exercised it, 
sovereignty over natural resources meant effective control and exploitation of nature.49 The Resolution 
on the Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources indicated very clearly that sovereign control over 
each nation’s environment was subordinated to the goal of national development.50 Regardless of their 
political radicalism and their merit in bringing about a just and socially equal world, all ideological 
avenues for the development of the nation state in the post-war era followed a one-dimensional economic 
path, which had as its cornerstone the exploitation of nature.  
The fact that there was a general agreement on how states worldwide ought to use the part of the Earth 
within their national borders facilitated the second way in which international law related to nature in the 
‘era of development’. International law provided the legally authoritative texts and the institutional 
apparatus to inscribe development deeply into the texture of international life after the Second World 
War. Some of the most important international legal instruments of the post-war era, such as the UN 
Charter and the two International Covenants of Human Rights, embraced development as one of the 
priorities of the new international order, linking it with international cooperation and a concrete set of 
expert international institutions that were to implement it.  
Article 55 of the United Nations Charter, for instance, established as one of the main goals of the 
United Nations in the socio-economic sphere the promotion of ‘social progress and development’.51 In 
particular, the Charter compelled colonial powers to promote development in non-European states under 
their administration.52 It internationalized this mandate, inviting colonial powers to cooperate in the goal 
of development with specialized international bodies.53 Similarly, Article 1 of both the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights linked self-determination, and hence, the right to independence of non-European colonies with the 
pursuit of economic development.54  
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The International Covenant of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights linked the right to work with the 
achievement of social and economic development.55 The ultimate reason for human labor was the 
achievement of economic growth and socio-economic development. The Covenant also presented 
development as a crucial way of fulfilling the right to an adequate standard of living and of combating 
hunger.56 In particular it set the premises for agricultural modernization worldwide. Signatory States 
committed themselves to employ ‘technical and scientific knowledge’ to improve ‘agrarian systems’ in 
order ‘to achieve the most efficient development and utilization of natural resources’.57 Moreover, one of 
the ways in which agricultural modernization was expected to take place was through ‘international co-
operation’.58 Article 11 of the Covenant resembled in important ways the program of modernization 
advocated by Rostow. Agricultural modernization became linked with the human right to a good standard 
of living and the improvement of living conditions. Development through international cooperation was 
elevated to the status of a legal obligation. It was set as a progressive goal to modify non-Europeans’ 
systems of agriculture, and this was to have enormous implications in the years to come. 
Apart from inscribing development and international legal institutions in the international life of the 
post-colonial era, international law was the language that facilitated the creation of the concrete 
international apparatus that were going to implement development in, to use Truman’s expression, 
‘underdeveloped areas’.59 In his inaugural address Truman invited technologically advanced nations to 
cooperate ‘through the United Nations and its specialized agencies’ in order to foster development and 
‘raise substantially’ the ‘standards of living’ of non-European populations.60 In addition to this invitation, 
the Truman Administration provided vital economic and political support to the developmental agendas 
of several international organizations. The most important among them were the World Bank (WB), the 
World Health Organization (WHO), and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).61 The Truman 
Administration poured millions of dollars into these agencies, strengthening the United Nations agencies 
that were going to implement point four of his program.62 Development was part of the theoretical body 
of international law, and international organizations became the tentacles that allowed development to 
spread throughout the world, reshaping non-European nature as a result. 
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The Green Revolution: domination of nature in practice  
It would be logical to think that after decolonization the West would have lost its hegemonic hold over 
non-European nature. As new independent nations gained sovereignty, and hence control over their 
territory, they could use the ecosystems comprehended in that territory at will. But decolonization 
unfolded in parallel to the universalistic era of development. Development, in the modernizing version 
sponsored by the U.S., opened a window of possibility for the West to retain its influence and control 
over non-European natural habitats. International standards and institutions rapidly acquired a defining 
power over non-European nature thanks to a growing influence in deciding the goals to which the vacant 
natural resources of the global South ought to serve. The existence of underdeveloped regions and the 
call for their improvement constituted a new opportunity for the West to retain its conceptual hegemony 
over non-European nature.  
As aforementioned, that hegemony consisted in the historical capacity of the West to depict non-
European nature and, based on that image, to determine how it ought to be employed. In the ‘era of 
development’ that power, in turn, allowed Western nations to deploy their supposedly superior 
technological and scientific knowledge to manipulate the environment. International organization were 
at the forefront of that grand scheme. A detailed study of how concretely international organizations 
helped reinstitute Western dominance over non-European ecosystems is beyond the scope of this study. 
However, before turning the focus of attention to the topic of international conservation, I would like to 
briefly illustrate my point by way of one example. 
 The Green Revolution was one among a series of large interventions by international organizations 
oriented to reshaping non-European nature. In his 1949 speech, Truman clearly linked poverty with food 
shortages. In addition, he identified the latter as one of the main problems of underdeveloped areas.63 
Accordingly, he declared that it was incumbent upon the U.S. and other wealthy Western states to help 
underdeveloped peoples increase food production.64  
Altruism was not the only reason behind the Green Revolution. U.S. policy makers were convinced 
that food availability was vital for national security.65 Hunger could engender revolution and, concretely, 
foster the specter of communism in non-European states—a scenario that had to be avoided at all costs. 
Finally, the Green Revolution was part of the universal program of modernization sponsored by Rostow 
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and modernization theory. Transforming local subsistence agriculture into industrial agriculture oriented 
to international markets was a vital part of the consolidation of capitalism’s economic institutions and 
relations worldwide.66 In turn, that shift profited U.S. agribusiness and transnational corporations, which 
invested in agricultural technology in the global South.67 
Inspired by Truman’s policy recommendations and the dictates of modernization theory, the 
Rockefeller Foundation established an agricultural research center in Mexico in 1943. The main goal of 
the center was to obtain grain varieties (mainly wheat) that produced better yields.68 The center soon grew 
into a large organization of international scope: the International Center for the Improvement of Corn and 
Wheat.69 A decade later the Rockefeller foundation started a similar initiative in the Philippines, which 
was soon joined by the Ford Foundation.70 The Philippine International Rice Research Institute as its 
Mexican counterpart received millions of dollars from both Foundations and the U.S. Agency for 
International Development. 
 U.S. experts believed that the high-yielding seeds that both institutes developed could be used 
worldwide. But the production of high-yielding seeds and their international dissemination was only one 
step of a larger modernization process known as the Green Revolution. New seed varieties needed 
fertilizers, herbicides, pesticides, and hydraulic infrastructure. The Green Revolution also sponsored the 
mechanization and commercialization of agriculture, orienting cultivation toward the production of cash 
crops.71  
The World Bank took a leading role in providing the loans that non-European states needed in order to 
implement the necessary changes in their agricultural sectors and build the infrastructure that was required 
to irrigate huge acres of land.72 In addition, it created an international research network known as the 
Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research, which sponsored a multitude of research 
centers (following the Mexican and Philippine model) around the world.73 In the two and a half decades 
that the Consultative Group functioned, the World Bank provided training for approximately 50,000 
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scientists.74 This was a staggering number of agricultural experts, who eventually had an enormous 
influence on agricultural policies worldwide. As soon after they were trained, many of them joined 
Ministries of Agriculture and Finance in non-European states and occupied managerial position in large 
corporations.75 Therefore, they were able to influence agricultural policies and practices worldwide and 
disseminate the vision of agriculture in which they had been trained. 
The World Bank was also joined by the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) in paving the way 
for the Green Revolution. With a budget that paled in comparison to that of the WB, the FAO had a more 
limited role in the promotion of the Green Revolution. It provided political support for the Green 
Revolution at the international level by presenting it as the best way to achieve modern and efficient 
agriculture in underdeveloped non-European states.76 This institutional support for the new policies from 
the international body in charge of promoting agriculture worldwide was far from inconsequential. 
Through its technical advice and support for underdeveloped areas the FAO contributed to the 
consolidation of just one model of agriculture for the whole world: that promoted by the Green 
Revolution.77 
  The Green Revolution is a good example of how the social, political, and economic complexity of the 
post-war world was turned into a managerial problem. It bypassed crucial questions that had considerable 
political implications such as unequal land distribution, wealth inequality, access to markets, terms of 
trade, and other structural conditions that contributed to the creation of the very conditions of ‘poverty’ 
that the Green Revolution aimed to addressed.78 Instead, it presented poverty and food scarcity as a 
managerial question, one that could be resolved by the application of modern Western science and 
technology.79  
 The Green revolution swept the territories of the new independent nations. While in 1970s the new 
crop varieties produced by the Green Revolution occupied only 15 percent of the land in the decolonized 
world, that amount increased to approximately 75 percent by the 1990s.80 While it is undisputable that 
new seed varieties allowed substantially increased agricultural yields,81 that quantitative success had 
enormous social and environmental costs. 
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 The Green Revolution affected patterns of land distribution worldwide, increasing land concentration 
and producing landlessness at the same time. This was so because agricultural modernization was applied 
in countries with great social disparities without attention to context. Sensibility and attention to social, 
political, economic, and cultural differences is precisely what the single recipe of development neglected 
all along. It failed to recognize that the infinite intricacy of social life thwarts any attempt at social 
engineering.  
In the particular case of the Green Revolution, the need for capital to buy fertilizers, pesticides, 
machines, and fuel, and the need for large tracts of land to implement industrial agriculture strengthened 
the position of landowners while making it more difficult for small cultivators to reap the benefits of 
mechanization and production for exports.82 Some of the documented social consequences of the Green 
Revolution have been the indebtedness of small cultivators, the polarization of rich and poor farmers, the 
marginalization of the latter, and the increasing dependency of peasants vis-à-vis the market.83 Unable to 
compete in the market millions of peasants lost their lands, providing necessary cheap labor for export-
producing industrial agricultural business.84 Paradoxically, the Green Revolution contributed to 
increasing the destitution that it purposely sought to counteract. It also exacerbated global and national 
inequalities.85  
Social inequality was not the only impact of the Green Revolution. The widespread use of seeds that 
demanded fertilizers depleted vast amounts of land, causing the reduction of soil fertility and even soil 
erosion. The extension of monocrops reduced biodiversity. Cultivated in extensive fields, the new seed 
varieties also demanded the intensive use of water resources. Huge dams that had enormous ecological 
impact were created to irrigate fields planted with these new seeds. The use of herbicides and pesticides 
polluted food and aquifers and in many cases also caused health problems for the peasants that 
manipulated them. In addition, the use of fuel-demanding technologies dramatically increased the 
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emission of greenhouse gases in comparison to non-industrial agriculture. Overall, new industrial 
agriculture proved largely unsustainable.86 
The Green Revolution was part of the larger program of development that sought to modernize and 
reform the ‘primitive and stagnant’ (in the words of Truman) life of underdeveloped non-European 
populations.87 This large scheme strengthened Western hegemony over non-European nature in two 
familiar ways that this study has underlined repeatedly. On the one hand, the Green Revolution 
contributed to the conceptual appropriation of nature, defining non-Europeans agriculture and non-
European peasants as backward. Development and progress demanded a rather thorough and intensive 
utilization of non-European land and ecosystems that, in theory, non-European agriculture could not 
achieve by itself. What was needed, then, was the deployment of Western science and technology. On 
the other hand, the intensive model of land exploitation that the Rockefeller Foundation, the Ford 
Foundation, USAID, the FAO, and the World Bank promoted was associated with a specific institutional 
economic mechanism to relate to land and resources. Agricultural modernization as conceived and 
promoted by the U.S. and international organizations worldwide was inextricably linked to private 
property rights, trade, and investment.88  
The Green Revolution not only entailed social, political, and economic changes. It also affected the 
relationship between non-European peasants and nature in a deeper way. In this sense, Latham has argued 
that in the Philippine International Rice Research Institute ‘scientists, promoters and sponsors … expected 
that the new seed would trigger changed in the psychology and worldviews of the farmers that adopted 
it’.89 Peasants who for centuries had obtained from nature the inputs they needed to cultivate had, under 
the imperative of modernization, to be transformed into businessmen, orienting their activity exclusively 
to the maximization of profits.  
International law played a large role in the appropriation of non-European nature by Western and non-
European elites after decolonization. International texts and organization endorsed the developmental 
agenda that Truman presented and the modernization theory that accompanied it. Supported by the new 
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ideology of progress and the huge apparatus that sustained it, international organizations, Western 
nations, and multinational corporations led a series of massive interventions to manage non-European 
nature that greatly affected non-European populations. The World Bank more than any other international 
organization took a prominent role in this process.90 For Bryant and Bailey:  
 
In a manner reminiscent of colonial times … IFI-sponsored ‘progress’ was measured in terms of trees felled, valleys 
flooded, minerals extracted and acreage dedicated to cash crops or cattle ranching. The flip-side of such ‘progress’ 
… was ruined livelihoods and degraded environments as the environmental resources of poor grassroots actors 
were despoiled by loggers, engineers, mining companies, cattle ranchers, agri-business or land-hungry migrants 
encouraged by state and World Bank officials.91 
  
In the new international scenario that appeared after decolonization, the link between development and 
international law reinstated Western domination over non-European nature at a high environmental and 
social cost. Because of the imperative of development, agriculture—a practice through which almost half 
of humanity related to nature—needed to be completely reformulated. Modernization through Western 
science and technology was the way forward, a way that also entailed the development of a business 
mentality. However, at the same time, there was another large international project of intervention over 
non-European nature that seemed to base the human-nature relationship on a non-exploitative basis. 
Conservation encapsulated the promise of protecting nature in the era of economic growth.  
 
Counterpoint: Conservation 
 
The colonial roots of conservation 
So far the present study has revealed the existence of a repetitive pattern in Western intellectual history, 
one that underlines the way in which international law has been implicated in the appropriation and 
exploitation of non-European nature during the colonial era. In so doing, this work has emphasized 
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continuity and has not contemplated the possibility of contrasting tendencies within colonial history and 
international legal historiography. However, it would be possible to construct an alternative history to the 
one this work narrates by paying attention to the way in which European intellectuals and colonial figures 
sought to protect nature. For this reason, in the last pages of this research, I would like to turn the focus 
of analysis to that alternative story in order to determine whether it sits comfortably with or rather 
challenges the main narrative of this work.  
It is fair to say that some of the main protagonists of this study had ambivalent attitudes toward nature. 
In these cases, they fell short of giving humans carte blanche to use nature at will. This, for example, is 
evident in Las Casas’ affirmation that humans could not treat non-human nature as they pleased. Their 
power over nature was constricted by the need to respect God’s plan for the fulfilment of nature’s 
perfection. For Las Casas, human superiority over the environment was limited by God’s program—the 
content of which was, nevertheless, not outlined.92 During the sixteenth and seventeenth century, 
preoccupation about the overall human impact over nature was logically absent, as humanity’s capacity 
to negatively affect the Earth was still somewhat limited.  
Environmental concerns became more prominent during the Industrial Revolution as the human power 
to manipulate and exploit nature significantly increased. As aforementioned, John Stuart Mill was one 
reputed figure who warned his contemporaries about the ecologically destructive processes set by 
industrialization.93 In contrast, he generally perceived non-European ecosystems, particularly in settler 
colonies, as a wilderness to be civilized. Mill’s attitudes toward colonial nature contrast with the attention 
that colonial administrators paid to environmental dynamics in small tropical islands.  
Western imperialism fomented exploitative attitudes toward nature. Paradoxically, one important 
stream of conservation was born out of the growing awareness about the adverse environmental effects 
of the colonial economy. Despite early observations of environmental degradation in the Canary Islands 
and Madeira in the sixteenth century, it was not until the eighteenth century that critiques of 
environmental degradation found space in colonial debates. One of the main reasons for this shift was the 
evidence of rapid environmental deterioration in tropical islands. These types of islands were more than 
mere physical places of provision and plantation agriculture for the metropolis. They acted as well as 
powerful ideal images in the Western intellectual tradition.94 They were the place of location for paradisal 
                                                 
92 See supra Chapter 2, page 105.  
93  See supra discussion at pages 283-284. 
94  Richard H. Grove, Green Imperialism: Colonial Expansion, Tropical Islands Edens and the Origins of Environmentalism 
1600-1860 (Cambridge University Press, 1995) 33. 
506 
 
utopias, Gardens of Eden and Arcadias.95 And while exotic islands in the tropics offered the possibility 
of redemption and relief from European social upheavals, they also posed a threat to physical and mental 
health.96  
Due to the small size of islands, it was relatively easy to observe and measure the swift environmental 
changes that followed their incorporation into transcontinental trading networks dominated by 
Europeans.97 Accordingly, the first local attempts at conservation were made by the East Indian Company 
and the French in the islands of St. Helena and Mauritius.98 The new sensitivity toward the environment 
grew out of a contradiction. The appreciation of tropical islands in Western thought and the value of their 
preservation clashed with the destructive ecological forces unleashed by the expansion of European 
plantation agriculture and overseas trade.99 
Despite early attempts at conservation, it was not until the mid-eighteenth century that climate theories 
and deforestation combined to provide a more convincing justification for conservation. Before that time, 
deforestation was perceived as negative only when it created timber shortages. The first attempt at the 
thorough analysis of conservation practices to control the impact of a ‘capital-intensive, slave-utilizing 
plantation economy’ took place in the French island of Mauritius.100 Conservation policies were also 
partly the result of the efforts of single individuals such as the botanist and naturalist Pierre Poivre who 
linked deforestation with the alteration of rain patterns.101 Theories of climate change and desiccation 
linked to environmental degradation posed a threat to the long-term survival of colonies that could not be 
ignored. 
The program of conservation implemented in Mauritius was soon replicated by the EIC in some British 
islands such as St. Helena.102 But their major continental application during the nineteenth century was 
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in India.103 In fact, it was India’s forest conservation practices that were, in turn, replicated in other 
colonies of South East Asia, Australasia, and Africa.104  
One of the main consequences of the direct involvement of colonial powers in conservation was the 
creation of forestry departments, which seized considerable portion of the territory of the colonies to 
assure their preservation. Environmentalism justified colonial control of vast areas of the globe. In India, 
for instance, more than one-fifth of the total extension of the colony was in the hands of the Forest 
Department by the end of the nineteenth century.105 By the beginning of the next century, the British 
Empire had protected an area ten times the size of Great Britain.106  
Participation of colonial powers in conservation was driven, largely, by their need to assure the 
availability of natural resources for the empire. Nevertheless, protection of resources per se is not enough 
to explain the implementation of conservation policies in the colonies. Theories of climate change posed 
a more serious and long-term challenge to colonial rule. This was so, not only because desiccation 
threatened natural resources, making their exploitation difficult, but also because it could provoke famine 
and, thus, social unrest.  
Efforts of colonial conservation and state intervention helped reduce the excesses of laissez-fair 
policies and the unlimited appetite of private capital for the exploitation of natural resources.107 
Environmental preservation evidenced the divergent approaches to nature held by private capital and the 
imperial state. Short-term private profit often conflicted with the state’s long-term plans.108 However, 
despite the capacity of early colonial conservation to soften the most adverse impact of unrestricted 
Western economic forces on nature, there was also a dark side to its legacy.  
Controlling nature meant also controlling the non-European populations that inhabited those protected 
areas. The social component of environmental protection turned out to be, in the hands of imperial powers, 
a new instrument for governmental authority and domination of non-European populations. Discourses 
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of environmental threats justified the colonial acquisition of large portions of land in Asia and Africa and 
the exercise of increasing control over non-European populations.109 Because of these policies, non-
Europeans’ enjoyment of their surrounding environment was severely curtailed.110 Entire cultures were 
alienated from natural habitats by the colonial administration.111 Referring to India, Williams affirms that: 
 
The foresters and their regulations became the face of alien power, which pervaded Indian rural life just as surely 
as any military, judiciary, or political administration framework. The process of colonization was far more complex 
than political domination alone. Its cultural, economic, and even psychological ramifications cut deeply into the 
fabric of traditional life—in this case the forest—carrying with them rapid and sometimes deleterious change.112 
 
Western environmental science validated colonial authority. In India, surgeons of the colonial 
administration were convinced that the itinerary cultivation practices of the Kumri people threatened 
forests.113 In view of that, dispossession of their land was justified by health concerns related to 
environmental degradation.114 Once controlled and deprived of their means of living, they became a cheap 
source of labor for the colonial economy.115  
In Africa, the consequences of this new kind of domination were also significant. As in the rest of the 
colonial world, African botanists relied on theories and assumptions about natural degradation and 
ecological change that were in vogue and circulated in European and Indian intellectual circles at the 
time.116 This kind of analysis, exported to Africa, became institutionalized in forestry protection policies 
without further research.117 Colonial scientists wrongly assumed that large portions of the African 
landscape, especially savanna ecosystems, had been covered by forest before. They also established a 
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link between deforestation, the extension of drought, and the advance of desserts, an idea that can still be 
found in current analyses.118 
In Africa, the colonial state also assumed the goal of conservation. Lugard explicitly mentioned 
conservation as one of the ultimate tasks of the colonial state. Because of the environmental 
destructiveness of Africans’ agricultural systems, Lugard believed that ‘the forest wealth’ of African 
territories was under threat.119 Consequently, it was the task of the colonial administration ‘as trustee for 
posterity against the reckless destruction of the present generation’ to safeguard what remained of African 
tropical forests.120 In order to carry out this task, Lugard recommended the extension of the power of the 
colonial state over tropical forests and the creation of forest reserves.121  
It is worth noticing that the colonial scientific reading of African landscapes was largely misleading 
and opposed to what local knowledge and recent research suggest.122 Importantly, this sort of distortion 
had a dramatic effect on local populations, as environmental protection justified state intervention, 
removal, and repression.123 African rural inhabitants were identified as the cause of environmental 
degradation.124 Therefore, they had to be either enlightened or disciplined—by force, if necessary.  
The control over natural resources was removed from the hands of local inhabitants who were regarded 
as unreliable custodians of the land.125 These measures dislocated local communities which nevertheless 
actively resisted these forces, contributing to partly shaping the results of this power struggle.126 
Paradoxically, in some cases conservationism accelerated degradation, exacerbating the very problems 
that it was supposed to resolve.127 In his analysis of forestry conservation in Tanzania, Monson suggests 
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that the answer to this paradox lays in the fact that ‘government impositions … were part of an economic 
strategy that did not seek to end the exploitation of the forests but simply to change its form’.128 
Ultimately, the increase of power and resources in favor of the colonial state—either in the form of natural 
resources or natural reservoirs—entailed disempowerment and impoverishment for large sectors of the 
rural African population.129 
Colonial conservation seems to somehow contradict the thesis that Western imperialism contributed to 
the appropriation and exploitation of nature. This is true to a certain extent as conservation in the colonies 
tended to assure the long term availability of natural resources. But it is also important to bear in mind 
that colonial conservation was born out of the preoccupation with the rational exploitation of colonial 
natural resources, rather than with the overall preservation of nature. Moreover, although colonial 
conservation managed to somewhat limit the most adverse effects of the profitable colonial economy, it 
also contributed to the appropriation of nature. While under the rationale of civilizing wild colonial nature 
non-European ecosystems could be appropriated for exploitation, the rationale of conservation allowed 
the seizure of the very same wild non-European ecosystems for the contrary purpose of their preservation.  
Both rationales also provided justification for an increase in control over non-European populations. 
Colonial conservation justified authority over non-European peoples for exactly the contrary reason to 
their assumed lack of mastery over nature, which (this study claims) was one of the bases of the civilizing 
mission. In this light, non-Europeans, who had largely been perceived during colonial times as unable to 
modify nature enough, were also perceived as threats to the conservation of valuable ecosystems. In light 
of the preceding conclusions, an important question to be answered in the remaining pages is whether 
this situation has changed with the end of colonialism. 
 
International law and conservation: toward the post-war era 
The animating rationale of conservation during the eighteenth and nineteenth century was the assurance 
of the long-term availability of natural resources for European empires. However, the genealogy of 
international conservation after the Second World War points toward a different origin. It owes its 
beginnings to the colonial fascination with African wildlife at the turn of the twentieth century and the 
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conviction about the urgency of its preservation. Various factors converged at that historical moment. 
The assurance of game for hunting for the colonial elite spurred the creation of game reserves within the 
British Empire at the end of the nineteenth century.130 But as the century drove to an end, the rapid 
diminution of game in South Africa increased colonial concerns about the impact of excessive European 
hunting on African wildlife.  
There was a widespread belief that, unless measures of conservation were rapidly introduced, African 
fauna was doomed to extinction.131 At the beginning of the twentieth century, letters that travelled back 
and forth between colony and metropolis raised alarm about the possibility of species extinction. German 
ornithologist Oskar Neumann, for example, wrote to the colonial department in Berlin warning that 
without measures of conservation several African animals were soon going to be gone forever.132 The 
same concern prompted British Prime Minister Lord Robert Cecil to alert the colonial administrators of 
Uganda and the East African Protectorate about the destruction of African wild animals.133 
 Another source of preoccupation for colonial authorities in Africa was the ivory trade. Ivory was of 
utmost importance for the colonial economy.134 So, when the indiscriminate killings of elephants 
threatened to halt commerce all together, colonial authorities were compelled to act.135 An African 
explorer and passionate hunter, Herman Von Wissmann was a ‘privileged’ witnesses of the elephants’ 
slaughter. When he was appointed governor of German East Africa, he was convinced of the necessity of 
protecting African wildlife.136 To this end, he passed a series of ordinances to protect game in the German 
territories.137 Similar regulations were introduced in several British African colonies at the end of the 
nineteenth century.138 
But Wissmann and other German colonial officers went one step further. They were convinced that 
without international cooperation, ordinances and game reserves were not going to be able to halt the 
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decimation of African wild fauna.139 Accordingly, the Germans proposed that the British hold an 
international conference on the preservation of wildlife in Africa. The British received the German 
proposal with enthusiasm and the Foreign Office took responsibility for organizing the event. As a result, 
the International Conference for the ‘Preservation of Wild Animals, Birds and Fish in Africa’ convened 
in London in 1900.140 
Representatives of all European colonial powers with interests in Africa—France, Germany, Italy, 
Portugal, Spain, and the Congo Free State—gathered at the Foreign Office in London between April and 
May 1900.141 In May, the colonial powers signed the Convention on the Preservation of Wild Animals, 
Birds and Fish in Africa, known as the London Convention. Among the policy prescriptions of the 
London Convention were hunting and trade restrictions, the creation of protected areas, and lists of 
species according to the necessary degrees of protection.142 Despite its innovative character and its 
undoubtedly historical importance, the Convention had two important shortcomings. First, it did not apply 
to the whole of Africa or even all of Sub-Saharan Africa. This deficiency was already recognized at the 
time of the Conference.143 Second, the Convention never entered into force.144 
The deficiencies of the London Convention and the growing importance of conservation in the British 
Empire had as a result a second international conference and the elaboration of a second international 
treaty on conservation in 1933. The 1933 International Conference for the Protection of the Fauna and 
Flora of Africa resulted in the Convention Relative to the Preservation of Fauna and Flora in the Natural 
State, also known like its predecessor as the London Convention. The British were again the main 
supporters of the conference and the treaty, reflecting the predominance of British conservation in the 
international world of the first half of the nineteenth century. The Convention entered into force in January 
1936. 
An important historical development that helps explain the transition and the link between the first and 
second London conventions was the foundation of the Yellowstone National Park in the U.S. in 1872. 
Yellowstone helped create the U.S. national park model of conservation that was to be replicated all over 
the world. For that reason, Yellowstone was a milestone in the history of international conservation.145 
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British colonial officers gladly and swiftly welcomed the U.S. conservation model and applied it in 
various British territories in North America and Oceania.146 This development ran parallel to and 
influenced a shift in the colonial approach to wildlife conservation. Instead of focusing on the impact of 
elite hunting and the ivory trade, metropolitan and colonial authorities increasingly put the blame on the 
unsuitable hunting practices of Africans as factors leading to the decrease of wildlife.147  
The 1933 London Convention was a watershed in international conservation as it introduced two 
important innovations. One of them was the geographical expansion of the area covered by the treaty to 
the whole of sub-Saharan Africa, thus correcting a deficiency present in the previous London Convention. 
The second, which was to influence conservation during the whole of the century, was the creation of 
protected areas. Importing the concept of national park from the U.S. into the African context meant, as 
well, introducing a stark and, in many cases, total separation between humans and animals in protected 
areas.148 This approach produced what Cioc denominates ‘apartheid parks’.149 These kind of parks 
entailed preserving chunks of ‘wilderness’, which, according to Adams, have made the history of 
conservation ‘one of exclusion and latent or actual conflict’.150  
 International regulations were not the only pillar of international conservation at the beginning of the 
nineteenth century. This period saw as well the emergence of powerful international non-governmental 
organization that strongly lobbied governments and influenced policy initiatives. The most important 
organization in the first decades of the nineteenth century was the London-based Society for the 
Protection of the Wild Fauna of the Empire (SPFE), founded in 1903. Spearheaded by Edward North 
Buxton, the society was integrated by influential aristocratic and political figures, business ‘men’, 
scientists, naturalists, hunters, writers on Africa, and colonial administrators.151 The Society functioned 
like an expert and pressure group with close ties to high-ranking British authorities. Its first task, after its 
creation, was to promote the implementation of the 1900 London Convention. Despite its clear 
conservationist nature, the Society always remained ambivalent about hunting. Many of its members were 
reputed hunters that advocated the compatibility of conservation with hunting for sport.152 Besides, the 
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society saw colonial administration as the most efficient vehicle to protect African nature. For that reason, 
it worked hand in hand with the colonial office.153  
The SPFE influenced British conservation during the first half of the twentieth century. In 1930, for 
example, the SPFE sent naturalist, explorer, and physician Major R. W. G. Hingston on a fact-finding 
mission to Africa.154 In a report on the state of African wildlife, Hingston identified four major threats to 
African wild fauna. According to Hingston the driving factors for the disappearance of African game 
were cultivation, trade, hunting, and the tsetse fly.155 His formula to save African wildlife from these 
destructive forces was the translation of Africa to the American model. That meant the creation of national 
parks with a legal status to protect animals and spare them from human presence.156 Hingston’s 
recommendations were adopted by the SPEF and through the latter’s lobbying efforts found reflection in 
the 1933 London Convention. In fact, according to Rachelle, by moving behind scenes the SPEF was 
actually the ‘mastermind’ of the Convention.157 It thus took upon itself ‘the government’s traditional role 
in international law making’.158 
Around the same period the SPEF came into life, similar initiatives of preservation spread all over 
Europe. They resulted in the creation of a number of national conservationist groups.159 There were also 
attempts at founding an international organization that would serve as umbrella for these more dispersed 
national organizations.160 These efforts, however, would not crystalize until the end of the Second World 
War with the foundation of the International Union for Protection of Nature (IUPN) at Fontainebleau in 
1948.161 The creation of a non-governmental international organization owed much to the support of 
Julian Huxley, a British biologist with influence in British colonial conservation, who had been appointed 
as first Director General of UNESCO.162  
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At the legislative level, the London Conventions were followed by a series of international treaties on 
conservation, the most important of which was the 1940 Convention on Nature Protection and Wild Life 
Preservation in the Western Hemisphere. In the years before the Convention, Harold Jefferson Coolidge, 
an admirer of the British SPFE, had worked hard to create a similar kind of organization in the U.S.163 
His initiative and that of the Boone and Crockett Club, an elite U.S. hunter-conservationist organization 
with members of high stature like President Theodore Roosevelt, resulted in the establishment of the 
American Committee for International Wildlife Protection in 1930.164 The Committee was from the outset 
interested in international conservation and, particularly, in the preservation of African wildlife.165 
The American Committee had strong links with the SPEF, and shared the latter’s belief in the 
importance of international law for the internationalization of British and American visions of wildlife 
conservation. Having close links to high ranking U.S. politicians, it also possessed the SPEF’s strong 
lobbying capacity. Based on these premises and inspired by SPEF’s leadership in the adoption of the 1933 
London Convention, the American Committee, and specially Coolidge, took a prominent role in the work 
leading to the 1940 Western Hemisphere Convention.166 
In Europe at the end of the 1930s, the British government envisioned extending the rationale of the 
London Convention to Asia.167 Similarly, the SPEF hoped to be able to ‘export’ international conservation 
to Australasia.168 These initiatives, however, came to a halt with the onset of World War II. But in the 
aftermath of the war there was a proliferation of international conferences on conservation, which put 
forward the idea of a world convention for the conservation of nature.169 Yet something had changed in 
the field of international conservation. While the influence of the SPEF partly waned as de-colonization 
approached, UN specialized agencies, particularly UNESCO, gained notoriety in conservation.170 A 
world convention for nature was an urgent concern because of the need to preserve Western-style 
conservation in the post-colonial era. Moving international conservation from a colonial to an 
international plane was the best way to assure that after decolonization international conservation would 
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still be informed by the Western approach to non-European nature and its vision of non-European 
people.171 
 
Serengeti and the Massai: international post-colonial conservation 
The institutional architecture of international conservation was well established in the post-war period. 
The IUPN and UNESCO to a lesser extent became leaders of international conservation in the new era. 
International law was the instrument through which colonial governments, transnational non-
governmental organizations, and influential Western individuals had put their everlasting imprint on the 
policies that guided international conservation after the Second World War. From the 1930s, the main 
tenet of conservation had been the delimitation of territories in which nature was absolutely protected 
from human intervention. The translation of this policy to Africa dictated that in this continent non-
European nature ought to be protected from non-Europeans.  
While development sought to eliminate wilderness, conservation paradoxically tried to preserve it. But 
African ‘wilderness’ was in reality a social construct, the result of applying on reality the conceptual 
prism through which colonizers had historically and misleadingly perceived Africa. So, in Africa, 
wilderness was created by acts of conservation imposed on the African landscape and on African peoples, 
refashioning them as a result.172 As aforementioned, the model of national parks without human habitation 
travelled from the U.S.A. to Africa. It was not the only U.S. influence on international conservation. 
During the first decades of the nineteenth century, scientific wildlife management became a new scientific 
discipline in the U.S., leading to the production of experts on conservation.173  
 Trying to foster the authority of conservation policies by underlying their scientific respectability, 
colonial authorities turned to U.S experts for advice.174 With wildlife managers from the U.S. came the 
idea that human presence was incompatible with the preservation of nature in protected areas.175 But this 
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idea took some time to become hegemonic. At first, colonial governments regarded African habitation of 
national parks as an inevitable nuisance, which was acceptable and even recommended in order to 
preserve social stability.176 In time, however, under the new scientific outlook of conservation and 
increasing pressure from international conservation organizations, Africans were considered enemies of 
wildlife. For that reason, their presence in national parks was prohibited. From the mid-1950s, a panoply 
of U.S. organizations such as the National Science Foundation, the American Wildlife Management 
Institute, and the Fulbright Program sponsored U.S. experts on conservation to travel Central and East 
Africa to help colonial governments manage wildlife conservation.177 
Another basic aspect of wildlife conservation that came to Africa with the U.S. model was the 
importance of tourism. In the U.S., the creation of national park was related to the economic interests of 
the Northern Pacific railroad company.178 Recognizing the business opportunity presented by the 
expected affluence of visitors from the east of the U.S. to the western part of the country, the Northern 
Pacific lobbied the U.S. government to help adopt laws to create national parks.179 In time, tourism 
became a source of revenue that made conservation economically profitable.180 But in Africa there were 
no huge metropolitan areas where middle-class individuals chocked by pollution and surrounded by 
jungles of asphalt and concrete dreamt of an escape to the wild.181 For that reason, the construction of 
trains and railways was economically unviable. 
The British Colonial Office found the answer to the challenge of the economic viability of national 
parks in a newcomer to the African context: the airplane. The development of commercial aviation in the 
1950s made African national parks an accessible tourist destination for wealthy Westerners.182 Because 
of tourism, conservation afforded Westerners not only the possibility of imposing their vision of 
wilderness in Africa but also the chance to create a new industry that was to prove enormously 
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profitable.183 From 1948 to 1949, U.S. tourists visiting British East Africa increased by 300 percent and 
generated revenue to the value of $1,200,000.184  
Having a firm institutional apparatus and a solid inner logic, international conservation was like a well-
oiled machine. With deep colonial roots, it was also well ingrained in the apparently neutral international 
architecture of the post-war period. However, the approximation of independence made the watchdogs of 
conservation, and the IUCN especially, feel anxious about the prospect that African nations could impair 
the international work on conservation that had been done so far. More than any other protected area, the 
national park of Serengeti in Tanzania and the fate of the Maasai people within the park illustrates how 
international law and conservation interacted in the post-colonial period and the political dynamics that 
they generated. 
When Major Richard Hingston travelled on his fact-finding mission to Africa he visited Tanganyika, 
the British name for what is today Tanzania. One of the concrete suggestions that he made at the time 
was the creation of the Serengeti national park. As he envisioned it, the park was to occupy a huge area, 
almost the size of Belgium.185 The influence of the SPFE on the British government soon helped transform 
the Serengeti from a game reserve into a national park, albeit one not as ambitious as Hingston had 
originally dreamt of. With the passing of the Game Ordinance in May 1940, Serengeti became the first 
such park in British colonial Africa.186 It soon acquired a symbolic value that superseded its mere 
biological importance, becoming a model for conservation for the whole of Africa and the rest of the 
world.187 Despite its importance, during the first years of existence the park suffered budget, staff, and 
operative capacity limitations. 
In 1948, the British Legislative Committee issued the National Parks Ordinance, which included 
Serengeti as the first of its kind.188 Interestingly, the Ordinance did not prohibit human habitation of the 
park. But, respectful as it was to the entitlements of African societies, the fact that the Ordinance 
unilaterally declared the existence of a protected area without consultation with the African residents of 
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the park was enough reason to ignite conflict.189 Different African communities soon challenged the 
proposed boundaries, with the Maasai particularly resisting British encroachment on their hunting 
grounds. Despite what the Ordinance decreed, in practice, the park’s guards restricted Maasai’s hunting 
territories more and more.  
The tension surrounding the question of human habitation of the Serengeti grew as colonization 
approached. On the one hand, the land question had provoked conflict and even violence in East Africa, 
so the British government wanted to proceed with caution with regard to Maasai’s lands.190 On the other 
hand, due to the symbolic value of Serengeti, U.S. and European international conservation organizations 
(with the SPEF again playing a prominent role) intensively pressured the British government to expel 
African residents from the park.191 The result was the 1958 National Parks Ordinance, which declared 
that human rights were to be excluded from African national parks.192 That meant, in other words, that 
human presence was completely banned in Serengeti and similar parks. In the following decades, the 
Serengeti model became the blueprint for international conservation of non-European nature worldwide. 
The Massai suffered the same fate of the millions of non-Europeans that were removed from their lands 
to make room for conservation. 
The Ordinance that declared Serengeti a park without people was adopted just before Tanganyika 
started moving toward independence. A new era was beginning, and it was yet to be seen if the conceptual 
basis of international conservation, strongly rooted in the colonial era, was to survive once African 
independent nations took charge of the administration of their territories. The general feeling in Western 
international conservation circles was that African independence endangered the preservation of African 
wildlife, potentially spoiling the great work on conservation that had been undertaken in Africa and all 
around the world during the colonial era.193 To address this situation the IUPN, which in 1956 was 
renamed the International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN), focused its 
lobbying capacity on the African continent. One of the initiatives of the IUCN was to launch the African 
Special Project, a plan destined to convince the public and, particularly, the new African political leaders 
about the importance of maintaining international conservation in Africa.194  
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The African Project soon bore fruit. In 1961, the IUCN organized a Symposium on the Conservation 
of Nature and Natural Resources in African States.195 The conference took place in Arusha, the capital of 
Tanganyika, months before the country gained independence from Great Britain. Tanganyika had also 
become the African sanctuary for the international movement of conservation, so the Conference was 
emblematic of IUCN’s attempt to try linking the colonial with post-colonial conservation. 
 During the conference, Tanzania’s first president, Julius Nierere, put forward what has been called the 
Arusha Manifesto, in which he committed his government to do everything that was in its power to 
guarantee the protection of African wildlife. Concretely, he stated that ‘the conservation of wildlife and 
wild places calls for specialist knowledge, trained manpower and money and we look to other nations to 
cooperate in this important task—the success or failure of which not only affects the Continent of Africa 
but the rest of the world as well’.196 Julius Nierere’s call for international assistance and international 
cooperation for conservation was music to the ears of international conservation organizations.  
 The lobbying capacity of the IUCN paid great dividends in Arusha. For instance, Nierere’s speech had 
been written by experts of Western conservation organizations.197 Despite the clear neo-colonial 
connotation of Western pressure on African nations, the agenda of conservation, as that of development, 
cannot only be presented as an external imposition. In most cases African governments gladly accepted 
conservation. There was an economic reason for this. African governments expected to obtain a much-
needed income from tourism coming to enjoy national parks. In Tanzania, for example, developmental 
plans estimated that tourism would be the country’s second source of foreign revenue.198 There was also 
the symbolic value of national parks in Africa. Africa, a continent invariably pictured as a failure, a place 
of rampant poverty and strife, could now offer the world something to be proud of, something of 
enormous value that no other place could offer: areas of unspoiled wilderness where lions, elephants, and 
rhinoceroses roamed in complete freedom. 
Convincing African authorities about the need to protect African nature from Africans was not the only 
way in which the IUCN sought to neutralize the threat that decolonization, and hence Africans’ control 
over their territories, posed to international conservation. A second maneuver was the internationalization 
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of the conservation agenda. 199 This move had two aspects. On the one hand, placing conservation in 
international legal texts entailed transforming conservation into an international obligation, which would 
eventually tie the hands of independent nations. On the other hand, internationalization also implicated 
moving authority over conservation from African governments to international bureaucracies composed 
of Western experts and Western policy makers.  
The first element of the process of internationalization envisaged by the IUCN produced the 1968 
African Convention for the Protection of Nature and Natural Resources.200 In competition with the FAO, 
the IUCN—, which from 1966 was headed by one of the most prestigious U.S. conservation figures, 
Harold Jefferson Coolidge201—played a fundamental role in the creation of the Convention. However, 
the IUCN worked mostly behind scenes, as having a Western organization, and one with colonial ties, 
dictating conservation in Africa was an extremely sensitive political issue at the end of the 1960s.202 The 
scope of the Convention was wider than mere conservation: it also paid attention to the preservation of 
natural resources, such as soil, water, etc. But, as the IUCN had wished the Convention to give 
international legal validation to the conservation model applied in Africa during the first half of the 
twentieth century, it was thus cemented as a blueprint for future initiatives.  
Article X, for example, guaranteed that new countries were not going to modify the protecting areas 
that existed before the entry into force of the Convention within their territorial borders.203 Article VIII 
recognized the need to protect wildlife species and their habitats in the case that those species could 
become extinct.204 Finally, Article III of the Convention defined national parks as places exclusively 
dedicated to the preservation of nature, in which human activities were prohibited and animals could not 
be killed or disturbed.205 That, of course, was incompatible with the presence of Africans whose 
livelihoods depended on hunting and agriculture. 
 As important as the African Convention was, the IUCN still sought to consolidate a second element 
of internationalization: moving the management of biological resources from the national to the 
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international plane. That was the rationale behind the Convention Concerning the Protection for the 
World Cultural and Natural Heritage (World Heritage Convention).206 It is noteworthy that it was the 
threat to the conservation area of Ngorongoro and Serengeti that ultimately triggered the need for the 
Convention. Plans of the Tanzanian government to designate part of the Ngorongoro conservation area 
for agricultural development alarmed the IUCN and pushed it to act swiftly. Coolidge, the IUCN director, 
wrote personally to President Julius Nierere to halt the government’s plan.207 In addition, Coolidge and 
the IUCN started work on a plan to establish an International Heritage Trust to protect world natural 
spaces of incalculable value such as Serengeti. The Trust was to be an international agency that would 
have the last word on deciding about the inviolability of natural sites that were considered part of the 
heritage of humanity.208 
IUCN’s ambitions were unrealistic in the 1970s, a time in which many non-European states pushed for 
a new international economic order and for absolute sovereignty over their natural resources. Moreover, 
UNESCO was finally successful in stealing the initiative from the IUCN and taking the lead toward the 
Convention.  
Even though the Convention recognized that the final word about what sites were to become world 
heritage belonged ultimately to states (Article 3) and that the responsibility of preserving those sites 
belonged also to the state, it also committed states to seeking international assistance (financial, scientific, 
technical) to that end (Article 4).209 Moreover, Article 6 declared that, despite respecting state 
sovereignty, the cultural and natural heritage was also a world heritage ‘whose protection’ was ‘the duty 
of the international community’.210 Articles 4 and 6 constituted a clear ‘invitation’ to non-European states 
to surrender part of their territorial sovereignty to Western superior expertise in conservation. The 
cosmopolitan goal of preserving the world’s natural beauty demanded it.  
The IUCN, an organization that as Rachelle has contended ‘emerged from colonialism’,211 had 
succeeded in internationalizing areas of conservation of outmost importance. Moreover, it managed to do 
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so while hiding the connection between international and colonial conservation. Soon the IUCN was 
assisting non-European states in managing hundreds of national parks around the world. To that end, the 
IUCN also created a World Wildlife Fund (WWF) in 1961, an international NGO that employs tens of 
thousands of peoples and control billions of dollars, giving it a hegemonic position in conservation.212 
Thanks to this privileged position, it can participate in the management of thousands of conservation 
initiatives worldwide, especially in non-European states, most of which face huge budgetary constraints.  
International conventions on conservation and the internationalization of the management of protected 
areas have assured Western hegemonic control over the international agenda of conservation in the post-
colonial era. Through the agenda of conservation, non-European nature was re-appropriated, albeit for a 
contrary goal than development. Both agendas helped Western interests to re-appropriate and retain 
control over non-European nature after the Second World War. Conservation was the ‘little brother’ of 
development. Seemingly, it was the exception to the general plan of development launched by 
international organization in non-European states. But, while less expansive than development, 
conservation was nonetheless huge in territorial scale. In 2005 there were more than 100,000 protected 
areas worldwide, covering an areas bigger than 20 million square kilometers. This space represents 12.2 
percent of the terrestrial area of the Earth, not an inconsequential amount of land and natural resources.213 
Finally, development and conservation also had a similar disciplining effect over non-European 
populations who, in the case of conservation, were regarded as hazardous for the preservation of non-
European wild fauna and flora. This characterization continued and even deepened in the era of 
sustainable development. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
When asked in the abstract about the relationship between international law and nature, international 
lawyers usually point out the existence of a branch of the discipline—international environmental law—
devoted to the protection of nature. Under this light, international law is perceived as a positive 
instrument to counter the most exploitative tendencies and adverse effects of the global economic system 
on the environment. However, as this chapter has pointed out, international law has also supported the 
extension of an exploitative approach to non-European nature in the name of development. Moreover, 
                                                 
212  Dan Brockington, ’Powerful Environmentalisms: Conservation, Celebrity and Capitalism’ 30 Media, Culture & Society 
(2008) 551-568, 555. 
213  S. Chape et al., ‘Measuring the Extent and Effectiveness of Protected Areas as an Indicator for Meeting Global 
Biodiversity Targets’ 360 Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society (2005) 443-455,443 and 447. 
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international law’s managerial power over non-European territories has not been limited to the discourse 
of development. Conservation has also placed in the hands of international expert bodies control over 
immense regions of the world. 
 The hegemonic power that international law has given Western nations and elites over non-European 
nature is not a novel development. During the colonial era international law sponsored the appropriation, 
commodification, and exploitation of the non-European natural resources. Even though colonial rule 
formally ended in the second half of the twentieth century, international law allowed the continuation of 
Western hegemonic interventions on non-European nature through the discourses of development and 
conservation. Both were placed at the top of the international agenda after the Second World War. Their 
presence in some of the most significant international legal texts of the post-war era fostered their appeal 
and cemented their discursive and factual power. 
International development and international conservation represented two contrasting approaches to 
non-European nature. While international development identified the thorough exploitation of non-
European nature as the basis for the achievement of socio-economic progress and, accordingly, promoted 
its thorough transformation, international conservation emphasized the need for preserving non-
European ecosystems. One urged to modify non-European nature thoroughly; the other urged no 
modification at all.   
The international legitimation of development and conservation contributed to what this study has 
termed the conceptual appropriation of nature. This appropriation had historically translated into a power 
to define non-European nature and set the goals to which it ought to be employed. During the colonial 
era, non-European nature was viewed as deficient and thus in need of intervention. This pattern continued 
in the post-colonial era. By presenting non-European nature as an underutilized realm, the transformation 
of which was vital for post-war economic recovery and future world prosperity, development created an 
irresistible appeal for its exploitation. Conservation complicated that narrative. In contrast to 
development and by portraying non-European nature as a wild and endangered natural treasure, 
conservation strongly compelled the international community to preserve it. 
 Apart from their impact upon nature, development and conservation also had an important effect on 
non-European peoples. This was so because defining non-European ecosystems as either in need of 
protection or exploitation implied something about the people that inhabited them. The lack of 
development and, thus, of environmental exploitation of non-European territories indicated non-
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European’s inability to master their ecosystems. Conversely, the need for absolute protection of African 
wildlife meant that Africans were detrimental to its preservation.  
 Development and conservation placed non-European peoples under the schizophrenic logic of two 
discourses that blamed them simultaneously for one and the contrary reason. While the discourse of 
development postulated that non-Europeans transformed or exploited nature too little, under 
conservation’s rationale non-Europeans were accused of transforming and exploiting nature too much. 
Under this double prism, the same non-European population, say the Tanzanian Maasai, could be judged 
simultaneously as underdeveloped and in need of intervention that would help them exploit nature 
efficiently and as impediments to conservation, thus in need of an intervention that would prevent their 
exploitation of nature.  
Even though the discourses of development and conservation seemed to be based on a contrary logic, 
they ultimately produced the same result. They led to the conclusion that non-European nature ought to 
be taken away from the control of non-European populations and, instead, managed by Western actors, 
institutions, and experts who knew better. In so doing, both discourses transformed non-European 
peoples and non-European ecosystems into entities to be managed by powerful international 
bureaucracies that were supposedly in possession of the superior scientific and technological knowledge 
that would allow the bypassing of complex socio-economic and political questions and guide non-
Europeans toward the good life.  
International law was a vital component of this process. As an authoritative global scientific language, 
it allowed the taking of power to define the use of land and natural resources away from non-European 
states and placing it, instead, in the hands of international bureaucracies. Western international 
organizations and governments were in control of the international agenda of development and 
conservation and the international grammar through which it was articulated. This privileged and 
hegemonic position gave them a huge scope of influence over non-Europeans and their surroundings. 
The managerial power of development and cooperation fell upon non-European peoples, creating 
strikingly similar if deleterious results. For instance, millions of peoples in non-European states were 
removed or relocated both for developmental goals like the construction of large dams and conservation 
projects such as the creation of national parks. The lives of non-European peoples could be sacrificed for 
the achievement of higher goals. 
Non-Europeans were managed and so were their surroundings. International expert bodies were also 
invested in efficiently reshaping non-European nature. The ultimate goal was to utilize and transform it 
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into a commodified realm for the maximization of wealth or, alternatively, into a profitable wilderness. 
Interestingly, the conceptual appropriation of nature foreshadowed its material appropriation. At the 
same time that Truman and Rostow linked economic underdevelopment with a lack of exploitation of 
non-European nature, they promoted private property, free trade, entrepreneurialism, and a business 
mentality as the best institutional and psychological mechanisms to reach the goal of development. 
Linked to the work of international organizations and nation states, conservation was also turned into a 
commodity to be enjoyed by tourists. Tourism was mostly managed by elite private operators and, 
consequently, it marginalized the local non-European peoples most negatively affected by conservation 
policies. The former benefited from the business opportunity offered by a growing trillion-dollar 
industry.214  
Apparently basing their foundations on diametrically opposing approaches to non-European people 
and nature, development and conservation logically legitimized different international agendas of action. 
However, as aforementioned, both discourses shared important conceptual premises at a deeper level. 
They both represented non-European nature as a wilderness. Only the aims of this representation and the 
interests behind it were different. Under development, non-European nature was seen as an expansive 
wilderness that ought to be circumscribed, controlled, and transformed into a commodified realm for 
economic exploitation. For conservation, non-European nature was a receding wilderness whose pristine 
majesty ought to be maintained at all costs. Both rationales were able to operate only by imposing 
wilderness on non-European nature, either in order to eliminate it or safeguard it. 
Similarly, the seeming paradox that non-European peoples could be simultaneously unable to master 
nature and capable of destroying it was dissolved by the redefinition of the very condition of 
underdevelopment and poverty. The economic primitive life that, for Truman and modernization theory, 
was the cause of underdevelopment could be redefined as the reason that also pushed non-Europeans to 
destroy nature. That was a great ‘conceptual discovery’, one that took place with the emergence of the 
concept of sustainable development. Point four of the Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment 
declared that ‘in the developing countries most of the environmental problems are caused by 
underdevelopment’.215 In other words, the poor, apart from delaying economic progress, were destroying 
nature due to their underdevelopment. 
                                                 
214 See supra footnote 183. 
215  Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment 1972 in Report of the United Nations 
Conference on the Human Environment—A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1, Ch I point 4, 3 [http://www.un-documents.net/aconf48-
14r1.pdf, accessed 15 April 20016]. For a similar kind of analysis about the link between poverty, underdevelopment, and 
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Once poverty was presented as simultaneously encapsulating the incapacity to make nature productive 
and the inability to preserve it, international law could repackage the—by then strongly criticized—
programs of development and conservation into a single and more palatable program that corrected both 
anomalies at the same time. The vernaculars of development and conservation fused into the novel 
concept of sustainability. Accordingly, point four of the Stockholm Declaration compelled developing 
countries to direct their efforts to both ‘safeguard and improve the environment’.216 The underlying 
implication of this discursive maneuver is the—by now familiar—(re)production of a deficiency to be 
corrected: because of their poverty, non-European peoples did not know how to relate to nature in order 
to create sustainable societies and sustainable livelihoods. This conclusion created a seemingly new and 
compelling appeal to re-educate non-Europeans and take control of their societies for the betterment of 
the Earth and human life on it. So, once again, international law could deploy its authoritative language 
to finally bring about a sustainable and progressive global life. In so doing, it continued a long-standing 
line of historical interventions in non-European territories that have failed to yet deliver the promised 
results. Unluckily, the price of this failure has not been inconsequential. Those interventions have created 
and (as I write these lines) continue to create immense ecological and human suffering. Hopefully, this 
study can bring awareness about this situation and make a contribution toward putting an end to it. 
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